Opposite Standpoints Research Articles

Petrarch's Defense of Secular Letters, the Latin Fathers, and Ancient Roman Rhetoric

Abstract: Like the Church Fathers before him, Petrarch was forced to defend secular learning against its detractors, and his defenses draw on many of the same arguments that Augustine and Jerome had used. In these defenses he blends classical rhetoric and Christian values, and his procedures also follow the traditions of classical rhetoric, relying on the epistolary form and utilizing the Ciceronian manner of debating all topics from opposite standpoints. Perhaps, however, because his indecisiveness complemented the classical rhetorical premise that many issues present many possible resolutions, Petrarch also rejects secular learning in some of his writings. His arguments are therefore conclusive only within their unique rhetorical situations.

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite “propositions” are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.

Religion and the Limits of Limited Government

A reflection on the meaning of limited government illuminates both its theoretical limits or boundaries and its practical limitations. The full rationality of the Lockean argument for narrowing the scope of politics to bodily self-interest may be questioned from two apparently opposite standpoints: because of its aggressive materialism or because it seems to rest upon a distinctly Christian dichotomy between spiritual and secular concerns. This paradox is further represented in the religious liberalism of the American Revolution, and a consideration of Calvin's theology suggests that this spiritual secularism is not simply an eighteenth-century confusion, but may derive from a radicalization of the Christian idea of transcendence. Thus both religious and secular sources of the ideal of limited government rest on unlimited claims for the unity of private self-preservation and universal Truth. This faith does not, however, exhaust the meaning of the Founding.

Civilian Defence as a Complement

Bergfeldt, L. Civilian Defence as a Complement, Cooperation and Conflict, XX, 1985, 279-296.In the late 1960s and early 1970s, civilian defence was much discussed as an alternative form of defence. In the last ten years, the idea has gradually lost momentum among peace activists and researchers. However, it has been taken up and partly accepted by authorities in a few European states, at least for further exploration as a possible complementary form of resistance.In this article, which argues that there is an actual need for a practical policy of civilian defence, the concept is briefly reviewed and the relevant literature analysed in a concise manner. After that, the arguments for and against the idea of civilian defence as a complement to the existing, militarily dominated, forms of defence are presented. Two 'actually existing' models of a combination are also briefly discussed on the basis of some theoretically possible combinations.A rapprochement may be on its way between the opposite standpoints 'civilian defence — a full-blown alternative' and 'civilian defence — a perhaps beautiful, but totally useless thought'. The synthesis would, then, be a wider acceptance of the idea of a complement: a future co-existence between military and civilian forms of defence and resistance. Such a development may be the proper way to give new impetus to the idea of civilian defence — e.g. through renewed and intensified research and practical development — and it may even prove to be a step in the direction of improved and more secure policies of defence.

Single cell origin of adventitious buds

Objections are raised against the view of Norris et al. (Science 220, 1983), that adventitious buds from African violet leaf explants are of multicellular origin. The experimental results of these authors can be interpreted differently and may therefore support as well the opposite standpoint that the adventitious buds are (ultimately) of single-cell origin.

The Hegelsche Mitte and Hegel's Monarch

HE GREATEST CHALLENGE FACED by Hegelian scholarship during this century-the skeleton in its closet, according to Topitsch'-has been posed by interpretations accommodating Hegel's political philosophy, as expressed chiefly in his Philosophy of Right (1820), to the totalitarian worldview and policies of fascism. Authors proposing such views have followed the path of those who earlier sought to assimilate Hegel to the authoritarianism of Bismarck and of the Prussian regime generally. The challenge faced by Hegelian scholarship has been posed not only by those who actually acclaimed Hegel for having developed a universalistic political philosophy compatible with totalitarianism and opposed to the individualism of traditional liberal theories,2 but also by those who accepted this interpretation and condemned Hegel for it.3 Nowadays there is consensus in rejecting this interpretation. Nobody wants to deny that Hegel adhered firmly to a liberal Grundkonzeption. The consensus stops, though, when it is further asked whether Hegel continuously and/or consistently maintained that liberal Grundkonzeption throughout his different politicophilosophical expositions, particularly in his Philosophy of Right. Accordingly, two opposite standpoints emerge at the very inception of the polemic against those who assimilate Hegel's views to fascism. The most influential of these standpoints, a standpoint which has been accurately described as the Hegelsche Mitte, seeks generally to integrate Hegel again in line with the fathers of Western democracy.4

Philosophy in Italy

Platonic studies continue to be cultivated, even in Italy, with undiminished fervour. And in Italy, as in England and Germany, interpretation tends to pass from one extreme to the opposite. At one time the chief concern of the exponents of Plato was to reconstruct his ”system“; and since his thought did not easily lend itself to unification, every effort was made to force it within the limits of a preconceived scheme. The present tendency, however, is to start from the opposite standpoint–that there is no philosophy of Plato, only a variable philosophical activity which is, as it were, consumed in each dialogue in turn, to be rekindled inexplicably in the next. Hence the work of interpretation reduces itself to a summary of the contents of various writings, arranged as far as possible in chronological order, and each examined independently as a complete and self-sufficing entity. The systematic interpreters used to make all the dialogues burn with a single flame, for which is now substituted a series ofignes fatuiin which the connection is lost, or only visible at intervals.

Foundations of the new field theory

The relation of matter and the electromagnetic field can be interpreted from two opposite standpoints:— The first which may be called the unitarian standpoint assumes only one physical entity, the electromagnetic field. The particles of matter are considered as singularities of the field and mass is a derived notion to be expressed by field energy (electromagnetic mass).