Open-list Proportional Representation System Research Articles

Race and Competitiveness in Brazilian Elections: Evaluating the Chances of Black and Brown Candidates through Quantile Regression Analysis of Brazil's 2014 Congressional Elections

Although the proportion of black, brown and indigenous electoral candidates in Brazil is close to the proportion of blacks, browns and indigenous in the general population, the proportion elected to the country’s Federal Congress is significantly lower. Statistical techniques such as linear or logistic regression are typically used to estimate the effect of a particular variable such as color/race or gender on a candidate’s electoral performance. However, in Brazilian elections, characterized by substantive, asymmetrical differences such as extreme variations in campaign finance distribution, the efficacy of these types of regression models is limited. Such being the case in Brazil's open list proportional representation system, we propose quantile regression as the most suitable means for estimating the relationship between voting and other variables such as race/color, because it enables us to estimate relationships between the variables of interest across several distribution quantiles. Quantile regression models show that black and brown candidates get as many as 40% fewer votes than white candidates in higher vote distribution quantiles. Furthermore, analysis of access to campaign financing finds that black and brown candidates on average garner only 75% of the funds available to white candidates at quantile 80 of campaign finance distribution. This drops to 65% at quantile 90.

Women who win in Indonesia: The impact of age, experience, and list position

Indonesian women make up more than half of the national population, yet their representation in the national parliament has been unsteady and low. This condition continues despite a series of electoral reforms, including the implementation of gender quotas and open-list proportional representation systems. By observing the demographic characteristics of over 6000 legislative candidates who participated in the 2014 general elections, this paper highlights how three groups, namely women, young people, and the outer-Java population, are heavily under-represented from the nomination stage. Furthermore, the elected female lawmakers still do not represent the vast majority of women in Indonesia, especially the different socioeconomic classes and political kinships. The findings derived from a multi-level approach suggest women's electability continues to be strongly associated with experience in political office, age, and list position on the ballot sheets. The trend shows younger women running as candidate #1 have a stronger viability in getting elected. The chance is also higher for those with existing political careers. The effects of voters' socioeconomic status on women's electability, however, offer no clear connection.

Rank effects in political promotions

This paper studies the effect of candidates’ personal vote ranks on promotions to political power in an open list proportional representation system. Using a regression discontinuity design and data from Finnish local elections, we find that ranking first within a party enhances a politician’s chances of getting promoted to the position of a municipal board chair, the most important task in Finnish local politics. Other ranks matter less. We document that the effect of ranking first is larger when there is less within-party competition, but the role of external competition is ambiguous. Our evidence suggests that the mechanism behind the rank effects is primarily unrelated to electoral incentives but rather to party-specific norms or political culture. Ranks seem to be, however, only a complement to other promotion criteria such as politicians’ previous political experience or how close to the party lines their policy positions stand.

ZWYCIĘSKIE PREFERENCJE. SKUTECZNOŚĆ GŁOSÓW PREFERENCYJNYCH W SYSTEMIE PROPORCJONALNYM Z LISTAMI OTWARTYMI

The article presents the usage of the preference votes in open-list proportional representation system (OLPR). The electoral rules condition the effi ciency of the casted votes, i.e. the extent to which the voters’ preferences affect the distribution of seats. In the OLPR system the “wasted votes” may refer not only to the representation of party preferences, but also personal preferences frequently expressing distinct territorial identities. Using the data from Polish Sejm elections, as well as the subnational elections, the authors analyze the usage and outcomes of the preference votes. During the last two decades in Sejm elections the share of effi cient preference votes (casted for the elected representatives) was only slightly higher than the share of votes casted for the losing candidates; in case of the subnational elections, the latter category of votes visibly prevailed. The authors analyze in detail the differences between the elections, parties and Sejm electoral districts, representing various characteristics. Non-parametrical regression analysis provides the list of factors infl uencing the effi ciency of preferential votes, which is generally in agreement with the theoretical expectations. The largest shares of effi cient preference votes may be observed in the districts of a high magnitude, and a lower level of fragmentation (both party and territorial).

Do Voters Affect Policies? Within-Coalition Competition in the Chilean Electoral System

It has been argued that close elections lead to policy convergence, as legislators elected by a small margin are more likely to adopt moderate policy positions (Downs 1957). However, Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) find that electoral competition does not affect legislators’ policy preferences in the United States, questioning the median voter paradigm. To help to discern this paradox, we estimate the effect of close elections on legislators’ subsequent policy positions under different electoral rules. With Chile's two-seat open-list proportional representation system, we exploit the dynamics of within-coalition competition to test both hypotheses. Using the margin of victory in 383 races in four different parliamentary elections and 3,741 roll-call votes for the 120-seat Chamber of Deputies from 1998 to 2014, we find that electoral competition did not lead to policy convergence under either the center-left Concertación coalition or the rightist Alianza coalition. We contend that policy convergence responds to electoral incentives but is also conditioned by the nature of the political regime (presidential or parliamentary) and government–opposition dynamics.

Ineffective and Counterproductive? The Impact of Gender Quotas in Open-List Proportional Representation Systems

Research on the impact of gender quotas in open-list proportional representation systems has described quotas as ineffective or even paradoxical. While some authors argue that gender quotas without a placement mandate will be essentially ineffective since most women will be nominated to unpromising positions, others suppose that women will be disadvantaged by gender quotas because the increase in the number of female candidates will decrease the average number of preferential votes cast for women. We reexamine the evidence for these claims by analyzing the case of Poland. We demonstrate that the gender quota introduced there in 2011 increased the number of women placed at promising ballot positions and had very little impact on the number of preferential votes cast for women. Additionally, using simulations, we show that the quota had a positive impact on the number of elected women.

Interventionism of voters: district size, level of government, and the use of preference votes

This paper examines the use of preference votes under the open-list proportional representation system in the elections of assemblies at different levels of government. Our empirical analysis focuses on the elections held in Poland, where similar system is applied in elections of councils in three subnational tiers. This setting allows us to test the hypotheses concerning the impact of party magnitude and district size on the usage of preference voting. Earlier research demonstrated that the distribution of preference votes is heavily influenced by candidates’ ballot positions and their personal vote-earning attributes. While the ballot position serves as a cue for less-informed voters in all tiers, we demonstrate that the elections held in smaller constituencies, where voters are more proximate to their representatives, are more personal. This is reflected by the higher chances of changing the candidate order by using preference votes in constituencies characterized by the lower voters per seat ratio. We also find that preference voting matters more when party magnitude is larger. Our theoretical expectations are tested using logistic regression models, accounting for candidate- and list-level effects.

Preferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems

Under open list proportional representation, voters vote both for a party and for some candidates within its list (preferential vote). Seats are assigned to parties in proportion to their votes and, within parties, to the candidates obtaining the largest number of preferential votes. The paper examines how the number of candidates voters can vote for affects the representation of minorities in parliaments. I highlight a clear negative relationship between the two. Minorities are proportionally represented in parliament only if voters can cast a limited number of preferential votes. When the number of preferential votes increases, a multiplier effect arises, which disproportionately increases the power of the majority in determining the elected candidates.

Climbing the ranks: incumbency effects in party-list systems

Incumbents tend to have a solid electoral advantage in candidate-centered electoral settings. Do similar incumbency effects exist in more party-centered environments? We estimate incumbency effects in an open-list proportional representation system, exploiting that seats are first allocated across parties, and then to candidates within party lists. Using data from Norwegian local elections 2003–2015, we document that a candidate that barely wins a seat in the local council has about a 9 percentage points (43%) higher probability of being elected in the next election compared to a candidate that just misses out on a seat on the same party list. We find no evidence that voters contribute to this personal incumbency advantage. Rather, it seems as if party elites are instrumental in securing the electoral success of their party affiliates. We show that incumbents and non-incumbents run again in the subsequent election at about equal rates, but that incumbents tend to advance in the party hierarchy and obtain safer ballot positions in future elections, which is what ultimately leads to electoral success.

Making gender quota mechanics work: a paired comparison of Brazil and Peru

ABSTRACTWhy do similar quotas affect descriptive representation differently and different quotas produce similar results across states? Extant research posits that quota mechanics, which include quota design features and enforcement mechanisms, shape election outcomes. Quota mechanics uses electoral cycles as a common framework with critical junctures for cross-national comparison. A paired comparison of quota mechanics in Brazil and Peru juxtaposes an analysis of their similar 30 percent legislated quotas in sequential election cycles to identify differences that shape their divergent levels of descriptive representation. The findings suggest that quotas can foster critical mass representation in open-list proportional representation systems with the knowledge of quota mechanics. In other words, an understanding of how thresholds, placement mandates and voting procedures shape different stages of the electoral process and of how enforcement is a crucial component for an effective quota. The conclusion summarizes the benefits of the paired-comparison model, in particular for the large number of open-list proportional representation systems worldwide, and future research should further explore the quota mechanics across the world to better understand the process of political representation.

Incumbency advantage and candidate characteristics in open-list proportional representation systems: Evidence from Indonesia

We use evidence from Indonesia's April 2014 legislative elections to study the relationship between incumbency, list position, candidate characteristics, and electoral success in open-list PR systems. Contrary to a recent literature identifying an incumbency disadvantage in other large developing democracies, we identify a consistent personal incumbency advantage in Indonesia. However, we argue that this advantage is mediated by party choices over how incumbents and newcomers are ranked on party lists, a key heuristic for voters in low-information electoral environments such as Indonesia.

Legislative Equilibria and Economic Policy under Alternative Electoral Rules

This paper develops a game theoretic model in which S incumbent legislators simultaneously allocate effort between producing non-excludable public goods, targeting local goods to particular geographic constituencies, and engaging in rent-seeking. The game’s equilibria are determined by both the profile of the electorate and the electoral institution in place. Closed-List Proportional Representation (CLPR) is characterized by a fundamental collective action problem which leads to high levels of shirking among incumbent legislators. Single-Member District (SMD) systems are effective at resolving this collective action problem when voters are highly responsive to public good provision. Open-List Proportional Representation (OLPR) systems are effective at resolving this collective action problem when voters exhibit low responsiveness to public policy. Indeed, OLPR generates high levels of policy effort in electoral contexts where both CLPR and SMD systems are characterized by high rent-seeking. The model provides a wide range of implications for future empirical studies of the relationship between electoral institutions and economic policy.

How single-member districts are reinforcing local independents and strengthening mayors: on the electoral reform in Polish local government

ABSTRACTIn this article, we investigate whether the design of the electoral system used in the elections of local councils affects the position of national parties and their main competitors, local independent lists. We study the case of the electoral reform enacted recently in Poland which modified the rules of council elections by introducing the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, quite rarely used in local elections. Using empirical evidence from the municipalities where FPTP replaced the open-list proportional representation (OLPR) system, we demonstrate that the introduction of single-member districts, and majoritarian rule in council elections, increased the number of single independents, unaffiliated to any party or committee, and limited the (already poor) presence of party candidates and councillors. The reform also strengthened the position of directly elected mayors, in Poland – usually independent, by assuring many of them safe majorities in councils. We found that the share of seats for the winning mayor’s list increased by 10 pp on average after the reform.

Local representation and strategic voting: Evidence from electoral boundary reforms

We analyze whether voters value local political representation by exploiting municipal mergers, which increase the number of candidates available to voters and intensify political competition. In the Finnish open-list proportional representation system, voters rank the candidates within parties, and thus, concentrating votes to local candidates increases the extent of local representation. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that the vote distributions become more concentrated in municipalities less likely to gain local representation after the mergers. Moreover, the effect is much larger in municipalities where the benefits of local representation to voters are large. The latter result disentangles voters' responses from the responses of other political actors. The results are important also for designing local government mergers, which are an important policy tool in many countries. They highlight that concerns over deteriorating local democracy due to mergers have merit, because voters have preferences for local representation. At the same time, the vote concentration patterns we find alleviate these concerns.

The Remorseless Power of Incumbency in Fiji’s September 2014 Election

Fiji’s September 2014 election was the first since the military takeover of December 2006 and the first under a new open list proportional representation system. It proved a landslide victory for coup leader turned Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama’s FijiFirst Party. This was a ‘competitive authoritarian’ election, characterised by careful controls over media outlets, manipulation of rules regarding political parties and candidate nominations, and selective use of state finances to harass opponents. It was a genuine contest only in so far as the government could control the process. The outcome demonstrates the potency of incumbency in Fiji, which was also an important factor in the country’s previous post-coup elections in 1992 and 2001.

Gender quotas, candidate background and the election of women: A paradox of gender quotas in open-list proportional representation systems

We study the effects of mandatory (legislated) gender quotas in Poland, a country utilising an open-list proportional representation electoral system. We use a unique data set comprising multiple characteristics of all candidates running in two consecutive elections to the lower chamber of the Polish parliament (the Sejm). The first of them (held in 2007) was the last pre-quota election and the second (held in 2011) the first post-quota one. We show that quotas have an inherently paradoxical nature: they cause a substantial increase in the number of female candidates but the increase is accompanied by a sharp decline in women's electoral performance. This regularity holds even if we account for multiple indicators of candidate background, including previous political experience.

Explaining the number of preferential votes for women in an open-list PR system: An investigation of the 2003 federal elections in Flanders (Belgium)

The electoral system is an important factor influencing female representation in Parliament. There is a consensus that a proportional representation (PR) system is more beneficial for women than a majoritarian system. Since there is a lot of variety in PR systems and since recent literature suggests that how actors cope with institutional provisions should be looked at more closely, we have investigated why women receive fewer votes in an open-list PR system. More in particular, it was our aim to find out whether women receive fewer votes because of voter bias or systemic bias. We have analyzed three variables influenced by systemic actors (parties, society and media) that have a substantial effect on the number of votes: media attention, campaign expenditures and list position. Our analysis of the 2003 federal Belgian elections shows that women are disadvantaged on these three variables and that as a consequence they obtain fewer votes. There is no voter bias, but a systemic bias. These disadvantages can be due either to individual characteristics influenced by education and society (less ambition, less convinced of capabilities, and so on) or, more importantly, to party- or media-related factors (a.o. list composition, designation of campaign budgets and spokespersons).