Reviewed by: Lengzhan yu "minzu guojia jian'gou:" Han'guo zhengzhi jingji fazhan zhongde Meiguo yinsu (1945-1987) (The Cold War and nation-building: America's role in South Korean political and economic development, 1945-1987) by Liang Zhi Wang Guangyi Lengzhan yu "minzu guojia jian'gou:" Han'guo zhengzhi jingji fazhan zhongde Meiguo yinsu (1945-1987) (The Cold War and nation-building: America's role in South Korean political and economic development, 1945-1987) by Liang Zhi. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2011. 579pp. In The Cold War and nation-building: America's role in South Korean political and economic development, 1945-1987, Liang uses the perspective of the "Cold War and development," taking the 1945-1987 period of South Korea's economic "take-off" and its process of political democratization as his focus. Liang puts this into context against the grand backdrop of U.S. Cold War strategy towards the Third World, and over the course of six chapters, comprehensively examines the role the U.S. played in South Korea's nation-building process. The first chapter, "America's Cold War strategy in the Third World: politics and economics," discusses American economic and political strategies during the Cold War. Politically, combating communism was the core of America's policy in the Third World within which the U.S. therefore attached great importance to preserving political stability and promoting democracy. Economically, from the Truman to Johnson administrations, America's economic Cold War strategy changed from the indiscriminate promotion of Western-style capitalist economic growth to the pragmatic but all-out support of economic development in the Third World. In this process, the goal of containing communist "economic expansion" did not change. The method with which to contain it, however, did. Chapter two, "Anti-communism and financial aid: America and the division of the Korean peninsula (1945-1948)," discusses American policy towards the southern half of the Korean peninsula from 1945 to 1948. In doing so, one aspect the author discusses is the U.S. repression of the revolutionary passion of ordinary South Koreans, and United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) efforts to support the right-wing, attack the left, and how this— objectively speaking—created the polarization of the South Korean political structure, strengthened the nation, weakened society, and both propagated and implemented American-style democratic thinking. Another aspect was that, in order to combat the spread of disease and famine, the USAMGIK supplied locals with "Government and Relief in Occupied Areas" and, furthermore, implemented land and educational reforms. Further, American and Soviet superpowers did not just use ideological warfare as a way of dividing the Korean peninsula. Instead, in the international context of a Cold War spanning both East and West, the Korean peninsula became a petri dish of sorts for experimentation on capitalist and communist systems. [End Page 226] Chapter three, "From limited containment to absolute containment: America's strategic choices on the Korean peninsula (1948-1953)," discusses American policy towards South Korea from 1948 to 1953. Following the establishment of the Republic of Korea, the U.S. continued to provide it with political, economic, technological and military assistance yet, during the same period, in a move that would prove disastrous, withdrew its troops from the Korean peninsula. In June 1950, war broke out, and America immediately intervened militarily. Throughout the war, the Truman administration's priority was to develop South Korean military strength and win the conflict. As a result, Syngman Rhee took the opportunity to strengthen his dictatorial regime, and American economic support reverted back to the level of emergency relief and aid. Chapter four, "Prioritizing military strength: The extension of U.S. policy after the Korean War (1953-1957)," discusses American policy in South Korea from 1953 to 1957. Following the official launch of U.S. containment policy towards China and the plan to slowly [re]arm Japan, in 1954 the U.S. formulated its National Security Council report no. 5514, formally establishing the fundamental doctrine in its policy towards South Korea of "prioritizing military strength and development." Hereafter, economic development and maintaining a strong South Korean military was, for a time, America's chief objective— followed closely by the promotion of...
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Oct 2, 2014
Madeleine Murphy 
Open Access