The interpretation and application the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status Refugees demands an approach which is consistent with general international law, whether it involves implementation through domestic legislation or in the judgments courts and tribunals. Since 1951--and since the mid-1970s especially--there has been a phenomenal growth in jurisprudence. UNHCR's Refworld database now holds over 10,000 decisions, which makes a lot noise, out which it can be hard to extract consistent and coherent lines reasoning. Nevertheless, the primary focus remains the refugee definition, because satisfying its terms leads, in principle, to an international status and to protection. Moreover, although the 1951 Convention rarely mentions or speaks rights, today we understandably do speak refugee rights, such as the right not to be sent back to risk persecution or other relevant harm, which is the reverse side the state's duty non-refoulement. And because rights are involved, correct interpretation becomes critical, requiring not just a measure responsibility, but also an awareness and heightened sense consequences. It is concern, therefore, when perhaps well-intentioned rephrasing treaty terms distorts or focus, or when governments advance legally unsound interpretations with a view to limiting or avoiding their responsibilities. Although some 148 states are now party to the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol, there is no single body with the competence to pronounce with authority the words, let alone their application in widely and wildly differentiated and evolving fact situations. In the first instance, it is therefore each state party to implement its international obligations in good faith and, in its practice and through its courts and tribunals, to determine the and scope those obligations. We begin with the words. As international lawyers, we take guidance from the general rule treaty interpretation usefully codified in Article 31 the 1969 Vienna Convention the Law Treaties, and from the supplementary means identified in Article 32. In particular, we come to the words the refugee definition and interpret them in accordance with their ordinary in context and in light the object and purpose the treaty in question. Ordinary meaning is important, because these are the words which states have agreed, and which encapsulate international obligation. Many states have incorporated their refugee obligations in municipal law, or use the refugee definition, in one way or another as the basis or criterion asylum and non-removal policies. In the process incorporation, some use the words the Convention verbatim, while others may try to improve the original, or variations may creep in through the accidents the legislative process. Do any these differences matter? They can do, practice shows that even apparently innocuous differences in wording can lead to deviations from the international standard. The test compliance, however, remains the text the treaty and its international meaning, so that domestic incorporation and application are to be judged in that light. For example, the 1980 Refugee Act talks being persecuted on account not for reasons race, religion, and so forth, and membership in, not of, a particular social group. The differences may seem harmless, though the words on account of have in fact generated considerable forensic debate the necessity evidence persecutory intent in the United States, which has not been replicated to the same extent in other jurisdictions using the language reasons. Why is not exactly clear. However, it is not the varieties the legislative language chosen to implement international legal standards which is the subject these comments, interesting as they are. …