Intuitive Object Research Articles

Is Iteration an Object of Intuition?

Is Iteration an Object of Intuition?

Point'n Move: Interactive scene object manipulation on Gaussian splatting radiance fields

AbstractThe authors propose Point'n Move, a method that achieves interactive scene object manipulation with exposed region inpainting. Interactivity here further comes from intuitive object selection and real‐time editing. To achieve this, Gaussian Splatting Radiance Field is adopted as the scene representation and its explicit nature and speed advantage are fully leveraged. Its explicit representation formulation allows to devise a 2D prompt points to 3D masks dual‐stage self‐prompting segmentation algorithm, perform mask refinement and merging, minimize changes, and provide good initialization for scene inpainting and perform editing in real‐time without per‐editing training; all lead to superior quality and performance. The method was tested by editing both forward‐facing and 360 scenes. The method is also compared against existing methods, showing superior quality despite being more capable and having a speed advantage.

Beating a Benchmark: Dynamic Programming May Not Be the Right Numerical Approach

We analyze dynamic investment strategies for benchmark outperformance using two widely used objectives of practical interest to investors: (i) maximizing the information ratio (IR), and (ii) obtaining a favorable tracking difference (cumulative outperformance) relative to the benchmark. In the case of the tracking difference, we propose a simple and intuitive objective function based on the quadratic deviation (QD) from an elevated benchmark. In order to gain some intuition about these strategies, we provide closed-form solutions for the controls under idealized assumptions. For more realistic cases, we represent the control using a neural network (NN) and directly solve a sampled optimization problem, which approximates the original optimal stochastic control formulation. Unlike the typical approach based on dynamic programming (DP), e.g., reinforcement learning, solving the sampled optimization with an NN as a control avoids computing conditional expectations and leads to an optimization problem with a small number of variables. In addition, our NN parameter size is independent of the number of portfolio rebalancing times. Under some assumptions, we prove that a traditional DP approach results in a high-dimensional problem, whereas directly solving for the control without using DP yields a low-dimensional problem. Our analytical and numerical results illustrate that, compared with IR-optimal strategies with the same expected value of terminal wealth, the QD-optimal investment strategies result in comparatively more diversified asset allocations during certain periods of the investment time horizon.

Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being)

Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions identifying all instances of cognition. They claim that the mark of the cognitive is needed to steer the development of cognitive science on the right path. Here, I argue that, at least at present, it cannot be provided. First (§2), I identify some of the factors motivating the search for a mark of the cognitive, each yielding a desideratum the mark is supposed to satisfy (§2.1). I then (§2.2) highlight a number of tensions in the literature on the mark of the cognitive, suggesting they’re best resolved by distinguishing two distinct programs. The first program (§3) is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive capturing our everyday notion of cognition. I argue that such a program is bound to fail for a number of reasons: it is not clear whether such an everyday notion exists; and even if it existed, it would not be able to spell out individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for cognition; and even if it were able to spell them out, these conditions won’t satisfy the desiderata a mark of the cognitive should satisfy. The second program is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive spelling out a genuine scientific kind. But the current state of fragmentation of cognitive science, and the fact that it is splintered in a myriad of different research traditions, prevent us from identifying such a kind. And we have no reason to think that these various research traditions will converge, allowing us to identify a single mark. Or so, at least, I will argue in (§4). I then conclude the paper (§5) deflecting an intuitive objection, and exploring some of the consequences of the thesis I have defended.

Sequential locality of graphs and its hypothesis testing

The adjacency matrix is the most fundamental and intuitive object in graph analysis that is useful not only mathematically but also for visualizing the structures of graphs. Because the appearance of an adjacency matrix is critically affected by the ordering of rows and columns, or vertex ordering, statistical assessment of graphs together with their vertex sequences is important in identifying the characteristic structures of graphs. In this paper, we propose a hypothesis testing framework that assesses how locally vertices are connected to each other along a specified vertex sequence, which provides a statistical foundation for an optimization problem called envelope reduction or minimum linear arrangement. The proposed tests are particularly suitable for moderately small data and formulated based on a combinatorial approach and a block model with intrinsic vertex ordering.

Bayesian Distance Weighted Discrimination

Distance weighted discrimination (DWD) is a linear discrimination method that is particularly well-suited for classification tasks with high-dimensional data. The DWD coefficients minimize an intuitive objective function, which can solved efficiently using state-of-the-art optimization techniques. However, DWD has not yet been cast into a model-based framework for statistical inference. In this article we show that DWD identifies the mode of a proper Bayesian posterior distribution, that results from a particular link function for the class probabilities and a shrinkage-inducing proper prior distribution on the coefficients. We describe a relatively efficient Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to simulate from the true posterior under this Bayesian framework. We show that the posterior is asymptotically normal and derive the mean and covariance matrix of its limiting distribution. Through several simulation studies and an application to breast cancer genomics we demonstrate how the Bayesian approach to DWD can be used to (a) compute well-calibrated posterior class probabilities, (b) assess uncertainty in the DWD coefficients and resulting sample scores, (c) improve power via semisupervised analysis when not all class labels are available, and (d) automatically determine a penalty tuning parameter within the model-based framework. R code to perform Bayesian DWD is available at https://github.com/lockEF/BayesianDWD. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.

Kant and the Pre-Conceptual Use of the Understanding

AbstractDoes Kant hold that we can have intuitions independently of concepts? A striking passage from § 13 of theCritique of Pure Reasonappears to say so explicitly. However, it also conjures up a scenario where the categories are inapplicable to objects of intuition, a scenario presumably shown impossible by the following Transcendental Deduction. The seemingly non-conceptualist claim concerning intuition have therefore been read, by conceptualist interpreters of Kant, as similarly counterpossible. I argue that the passage in question best supports an underappreciated middle position where intuition requires a pre-conceptual use of the understanding. Such pre-conceptual use of the understanding faces both textual and systematic objections. I show that these objections can be rebutted.

Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content

Mental content normativists hold that the mind’s conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think that facts of the form “subject S possesses concept c” imply that S is enjoined (i.e., bound or genuinely obligated) by rules concerning the application of c in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S’s possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence, these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the “Source Objection.” This paper refutes the Source Objection, outlining a key strand of the relationship between judgments and their contents in the process. Theoretical judgment and mental conceptual content are equally the source of enjoinment; norms for judging with contents do not derive from one at the expense of the other.

Intuitionism in Contemporary Polish Ethics. Part I. From Modernism to the Lviv-Warsaw School

The article summarises the achievements of Polish intuitionist ethics in the period from modernism to the Lviv-Warsaw School and compares the views by the most eminent philosophers of the time such as Edward Abramowski (1868–1918), Julian Ochorowicz (1850–1917), Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911), Florian Znaniecki (1882–1958), Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), Władysław Tatarkiewicz (1886–1980), Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886–1981), and Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981). Finally the author offers a systematics of their ethical standpoints as regards a) the manner of understanding of the act of moral intuition, b) the original nature of the intuitive cognitive act, and c) the formal object of intuition. The standpoints of other supporters of intuitionism in Polish ethics (Henryk Elzenberg, Roman Ingarden, Karol Wojtyła, Tadeusz Styczeń, and Marian Przełęcki) will be summarised in the second part of the article which will be published in one of the forthcoming issues of the quarterly.

Libertarian Volition and the Problem of Luck

The most important difference between contemporary compatibilist and libertarian theories is not the difference in their positions regarding the truth of the thesis of physical determinism, but their different approaches to the causal role of agents. According to libertarians, volitional acts performed by agents constitute a specific type of causes, which are not themselves caused by other causes. In this respect, event-causal libertarianism is similar to the agent-causal libertarianism, because it insists that in performing a volitional act an agent can choose one of the alternative outcomes without being caused to do so by anything else, where ‘anything else’ includes all the facts about the past and the present. Since event-causal libertarians maintain that volitional acts and the causal role of agents can be explained naturalistically, they must solve the problem of luck, i.e., they must explain how an agent is able to control her choices, given that she can choose one way or another without there being any difference in her state immediately preceding the moment of choice. This problem arises not from the indeterminism per se, but from the way it is coupled with the causal role of agents.In section one, I consider the historical development of compatibilist views on physical determinism and indeterminism. In section two, I present an overview of conditional analyses of alternative possibilities. In section three, I analyze the reasons why libertarians reject any type of conditional analysis, and show that intuitive objections against physical determinism, which portrait it as an obstacle to freedom, are untenable. In section four, I consider the consequence argument and show how it is related to the libertarian condition of sourcehood. In the final section, I analyze the problem of luck and show that it inevitably arises for any version of libertarianism. I demonstrate that indeterminism is a problem for libertarians, although they need it. And it is not a problem for compatibilists, who, while they do not need it, can incorporate it in their theories without facing the problem of luck.

Niels Bohr, objectivity, and the irreversibility of measurements

The only acceptable reason why measurements are irreversible and outcomes definite is the intrinsic definiteness and irreversibility of human sensory experience. While QBists deserve credit for their spirited defense of this position, Niels Bohr urged it nearly a century ago, albeit in such elliptic ways that the core of his message has been lost or distorted beyond recognition. Then as now, the objectivity of empirical science was called into question. It was defended by Bohr along the lines of Kant’s (then) revolutionary theory of science, according to which the possibility of empirical science hinges on the possibility of thinking of experiences as experiences of a system of interacting, re-identifiable objects. What Bohr added to Kant’s theory was his insight that empirical knowledge was not necessarily limited to what is directly accessible to the senses, and that, therefore, it does not have to be solely a knowledge of objects of sensible intuition. It can also be a knowledge of phenomena that are not objects of sensible intuition but instead are constituted by experimental contexts, which are objects of sensible intuition. Bohr’s grounding of objectivity (or the objectivity consistent with quantum mechanics), however, is weaker than Kant’s (or the objectivity consistent with Newtonian physics). This conclusion is based on an examination of Bohr’s intentions in appealing to irreversible amplification effects or the sufficient size and weight of the measurement apparatus.

A smart component methodology for reliability analysis of dynamic systems

The new generation of nuclear power plants are being designed with passive safety systems and advanced digital Instrumentation & Control (I&C) systems for achieving required operational performance and improved reliability. Digital I&C systems often perform complex tasks while interacting with time dependent process dynamics. Similarly, in passive decay heat removal systems, the time dependence arising from the variation of heat load and interaction between redundant loops are important. Since static reliability methods cannot model these systems without significant approximations, dynamic reliability methods are preferred. Dynamic methods improve the correctness of modeling and shift the burden of proof for correctness from the modeling expert to the methodology. Though a number of dynamic reliability methods have been developed, they have not been adopted widely, like that of the traditional event tree/fault tree methods. A significant reason is due to the lack of an intuitive simulation framework to translate and represent the system structure and functional aspects by a faithful system reliability model. Therefore, we propose in this paper a methodology known as Smart Component Methodology (SCM) for reliability modeling of dynamic safety systems. The methodology is based on an intuitive object oriented framework for the representation of the components, system structure, behavior and reliability data of a safety system. A suitable Monte Carlo simulation algorithm is embedded into this framework to quantify the system reliability. The SCM architecture for dynamic system representation and the general Monte Carlo simulation algorithm used for driving the object oriented framework are presented. The method is applied to example I&C systems, passive heat removal systems involving human actions. The results are compared with traditional methods to validate the results and to demonstrate the improved accuracy and ease and generality of modeling.

Introduction: The Religious Structure of Phenomena—A Phenomenological Investigation

Introduction: The Religious Structure of Phenomena—A Phenomenological Investigation

О проекте феноменологической психологии Г.Г. Шпета и Н.И. Жинкина

This paper is aimed to reconstruct the project of phenomenological psychology of Russian phenomenologist G.G. Shpet and a psychologist and his disciple N.I. Zhinkin. The research shows the continuity of their investigations in the aspect of inner voice’s mechanisms and points out the possibility of integration of both phenomenological and psychological discourses from their works as the methodological project that is called “phenomenological psychology” by this paper’s authors. The research uncovers the reasons of phenomenological psychology’s origin as Shpet’s creative project. These reasons are rooted in Shpet’s will to investigate phenomena of religious consciousness using inside the phenomenological discourse, that is stated in his correspondence with E. Husserl. The main papers that are used for the synthesis are the mentioned Shpet’s correspondence and Zhinkin’s “On Transition Coded in Inner Voice”. The second one explains the tenets of inner voice’s functionality as the language of thinking, personal consciousness. The general workability of Shet’s and Zhinkin’s method for analysis of religious consciousness is demonstrated on the example Ignatius’ of Loyala “Spiritual Diary” that isn’t only the example of religious consciousness, but also is the specific method of religious comprehension. The general possibility of complex conclusions’ statements about “Spiritual Diary” problem is linked to the understanding of someone else’s consciousness as a possible object of phenomenological intuition and analysis inside Shpet’s concept of phenomenology. The inner consistency of Shpet’s and Zhinkin’s synthetic method gives us a chance to state it as the possible ideological framework for future interdisciplinary investigations of religious consciousness.

Non-Exhaustive, Overlapping Clustering.

Traditional clustering algorithms, such as K-Means, output a clustering that is disjoint and exhaustive, i.e., every single data point is assigned to exactly one cluster. However, in many real-world datasets, clusters can overlap and there are often outliers that do not belong to any cluster. While this is a well-recognized problem, most existing algorithms address either overlap or outlier detection and do not tackle the problem in a unified way. In this paper, we propose an intuitive objective function, which we call the NEO-K-Means (Non-Exhaustive, Overlapping K-Means) objective, that captures the issues of overlap and non-exhaustiveness in a unified manner. Our objective function can be viewed as a reformulation of the traditional K-Means objective, with easy-to-understand parameters that capture the degrees of overlap and non-exhaustiveness. By considering an extension to weighted kernel K-Means, we show that we can also apply our NEO-K-Means idea to overlapping community detection, which is an important task in network analysis. To optimize the NEO-K-Means objective, we develop not only fast iterative algorithms but also more sophisticated algorithms using low-rank semidefinite programming techniques. Our experimental results show that the new objective and algorithms are effective in finding ground-truth clusterings that have varied overlap and non-exhaustiveness; for the case of graphs, we show that our method outperforms state-of-the-art overlapping community detection algorithms.

On the Humphrey Objection to Modal Realism

An intuitive objection to modal realism is that merely possible worlds and their inhabitants seem to be irrelevant to an analysis of modality. Kripke originally phrased the objection in terms of being concerned about one’s modal properties without being concerned about the properties one’s other-worldly counterparts have. The author assesses this objection in a variety of forms, and then provides his own formulation that does not beg the question against the modal realist. Finally, the author considers two potential answers to the objection so understood and concludes that only one of them has a chance of succeeding.

Spectral Word Embedding with Negative Sampling

In this work, we investigate word embedding algorithms in the context of natural language processing. In particular, we examine the notion of ``negative examples'', the unobserved or insignificant word-context co-occurrences, in spectral methods. we provide a new formulation for the word embedding problem by proposing a new intuitive objective function that perfectly justifies the use of negative examples. In fact, our algorithm not only learns from the important word-context co-occurrences, but also it learns from the abundance of unobserved or insignificant co-occurrences to improve the distribution of words in the latent embedded space. We analyze the algorithm theoretically and provide an optimal solution for the problem using spectral analysis. We have trained various word embedding algorithms on articles of Wikipedia with 2.1 billion tokens and show that negative sampling can boost the quality of spectral methods. Our algorithm provides results as good as the state-of-the-art but in a much faster and efficient way.

Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Non-Conceptualism, and the Fitness-for-Purpose Objection

AbstractThe subject of this article is a powerful objection to the non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories. Part of the purpose of the deduction is to refute the sort of scepticism according to which there are no objects of empirical intuition that instantiate the categories. But if the non-conceptualist interpretation is correct, it does not follow from what Kant is arguing in the transcendental deduction that this sort of scepticism is false. This article explains and assesses a number of possible responses to this objection.

A republic of rules: procedural arbitrariness and total institutions

The modern Republican canon provides a number of rival accounts of domination, mostly sharing a conception of domination as arbitrary power. A key disagreement focuses on the nature of arbitrariness. So – what does it mean for power to be arbitrary? One influential answer is what Frank Lovett calls a ‘procedural’ account: roughly, power is arbitrary when it is unconstrained by effective, common-knowledge rules. Despite their simplicity and initial appeal, in this paper I argue that we should reject such procedural accounts. After giving the best case for procedural arbitrariness and defending it against an intuitive objection, I proceed by examining a set of problem cases, examples of what Erving Goffman called ‘total institutions’ – highly rule-bound, tightly controlled environments. Although it is possible for these institutions to be non-arbitrary in the procedural sense, I argue that we should nevertheless see them as prime examples of domination. Such environments produce a relevantly similar bundle of psychological effects – anxiety, adaptation, and so on – to other paradigm cases of domination. I conclude by stressing the relevance of an analysis of totalising tendencies to a variety of contemporary political problems, and the inadequacy of any conception of domination that cannot accommodate them.

ENSAIO SOBRE A UNIDADE SINTÉTICA MERAMENTE SENSÍVEL

I present the essay of my critique to the interpretation that the synthetic unity of intuition in Kant can only result from the effective participation of intellectual faculties. For this, I maintain that the objects of intuition are constructed not only by means of the understanding (lato sensu), but also by the simple imagination, by means of a synthetic unit of the multiple of the intuition given to the sense, without it being necessary the direction or conduction of discursive units, but respecting only autochthonous rules. Thus these objects of intuition contain a unity originated only from the sensibility (merely sensible synthetic unit), for they are produced only by the imagination, under the only condition of obtaining the disconnected manifold of sensible representations from the collaboration of the senses. The faculty of imagination is apt to produce these conceptually indeterminate objects of the empirical intuition called “appearances” [Erscheinungen], because it is a spontaneous sensible capacity with duplicity of character, impulses and aptitudes (Calabria: 2012, 115-167, 2015 and 2016). In addition to showing that appearances, while blind intuitions containing a subjective unity, nevertheless provide an objective reference to empirical intuitions (as mind modifications), I explain in what sense Kant considers appearances to be transformed into objects of experience called «phenomena» [Phaenomena], when they receive the intellectual unit from the application of conceptual representations.