Metaphysics Of Objects Research Articles

Empowering Self-Care: Caring Things in Alice Dunbar-Nelson's 1890s "New Woman" Short Fiction.

Alice Dunbar-Nelson is mostly remembered as a poet, activist, and ex-wife of Paul Laurence Dunbar. Her volume The Goodness of St. Rocque and Other Stories (1899) has been largely overshadowed as a result. Yet, the collection contains a portfolio of heroines analogous and contemporaneous to the famed New Woman figure of the fin de siècle. In this article, I consider Dunbar-Nelson's heroines in light of their New Woman-esque agency and autonomy as they find remedies and power in objects and materials steeped in New Orleans's cultural heritage. Ceded neither social nor political self-governance nor domestic comfort, this article reads these transcendental, metaphysical objects as sources of self-care. With close analysis of "The Goodness of St. Rocque," "Tony's Wife," and "Little Miss Sophie," I argue that Dunbar-Nelson's protagonists exert influence over their lives, specifically in the negotiation of romantic relationships, through voodoo charms, Catholic candles, tarot cards, sewing machines, and knitting needles. Covering courtship, break-ups, and unhappy marriages, I demonstrate the ways in which these empowering spiritual objects respond to health concerns, including malnutrition and domestic violence, in turn, situating them as alternatives to patriarchal and historically racist medical institutions. Valorizing the cultural milieu of New Orleans and the customs of the Caribbean and European heritage, and thereby conveying Dunbar-Nelson's resistance to white and male supremacist ideologies in late-nineteenth-century Southern America, the article ultimately assesses the parallels with (predominantly white) New Woman fiction, through shared themes of fraught heterosexual dynamics and women's declining health.

Kant’s analysis of the soul: correlation with the body, and the problem of existence

The article highlights the conceptual issues related to Kant’s analysis of the soul, a concept of utmost importance for the metaphysics and psychology of German academic philosophy (Schulphilosophie) of the Enlightenment was significantly dependent on the developed and systematically presented philosophical and scientific ideas and concepts of Christian Wolff. Kantian philosophy, its themes, and conceptual language were formed in the crucible of Wolfean discourse, and from the early 1770s in the struggle against it, which led to the emergence of a new, critical philosophy – transcendental idealism, in which the problem of the soul, consciousness, and self-awareness became fundamental. It is this issue that was thoroughly covered in the «Critique of Pure Reason» and other works that were published later, after the first Critique. The article draws attention to Kant’s Lectures, which, on the one hand, demonstrate his critical attitude towards the so-called Wolfians, their metaphysics, and psychology, and, on the other hand, the lecture materials illustrate Kant's new conceptual position, and, what is important, develop, supplement and clarify it. The sources of Kant’s lectures are highlighted, taking into account the fact that we have at our disposal lecture notes, the authors of which are either unknown or, if known, their authorship is still somewhat doubtful, since they are notes that different people have rewritten. The article analyses lecture notes on psychology, the authors of which are more or less well-known, and experts recognize these notes as quite valid. The conceptual content of these lectures allows us to look at Kant’s understanding of the problem of the soul in a somewhat broader context compared to the «Critique of Pure Reason», where this problem is analyzed in connection with the paralogisms of reason and the transcendental deduction of categories. In his lectures on psychology, Kant draws attention to the problem of the interaction of the soul with the human body, the «location of the soul», linking it not so much to the organs of the human body (for example, the head) as to the location of a person as a bodily being in the world makes all acts of consciousness, self-awareness, and sense perception possible. Kant emphasizes the basic importance of such a spatial location of a person for the soul, as something that belongs to a person with a certain integrity, and not a separate organ, to act properly, to perform its cognitive functions. The article analyses the problem of existence, which is important for critical philosophy, its various modalities, and predication, with a special emphasis on the problem of the existence of metaphysical objects - the soul, God, and the world as a whole.

Czy lingwistyka potrzebuje metafizyki?

A deep reflection on contemporary linguistics, both in terms of its subject matter and methods, as well as in terms of its aims, leads to the observation that naturalism constitutes the basis of the cognitive work of linguists in the mainstream of contemporary research. The essence of philosophical, and hence also linguistic, naturalism lies in materialism, the philosophical legacy of Marx and Engels and their political heirs: Lenin and Stalin. In this light, the title question regarding the possible need for implementing the object, methods and aims of classical metaphysics into linguistics, seems highly legitimate. The problem with linguistic naturalism is, among other factors, its failure to address the real basis of communication, and its nihilism, expressed in the absence of the key questions of linguistics: why (is) language? and for what purposeful (intentional) cause (is) language? In this paper, I will discuss the problems of linguistic naturalism along with the corresponding questions using the dialectical method of St Thomas Aquinas.

Life after life: Mullā Ṣadrā on death and immortality

AbstractThe purpose of this article is twofold: first, I will reconstruct Mullā Ṣadrā's complex arguments for the soul's immortality based on its immaterial nature. Second and finally, I will briefly probe and assess various epistemological and metaphysical objections against Ṣadrā's immaterialist conception of the soul. Ṣadrā contends that our bodily death marks an awakening to the reality of our consciousness on the plane of the imaginal realm (the imaginal world is an isthmus between the sensible world and the world of intelligible forms). For Ṣadrā, ‘death’ does not mark an end or discontinuity in human consciousness, rather it signifies an awakening to a new mode of existence in which the soul, having once been the active principle controlling the actions of the physical body, now manifests itself as the passive recipient of the form given to it by its imaginal reality – a reality shaped by the actions it had performed in its earthly, embodied state. Thus, death is seen as the passage of the soul from the sensible to the imaginal world, until the soul unites with the intelligible world (ʿālam al-ʿaql).

A Spinozist defense of trope theory

AbstractTrope theory and Spinoza's metaphysics apparently present two incompatible ontological landscapes. Spinoza assigns a strong metaphysical priority to a grounding substance and describes common objects as adjectival upon such substance. By contrast, several contemporary trope theories attempt to reduce all substances (both universal and particular) to bundles of individual properties. In this article, I motivate, defend, and develop a compatible reading of Spinozism and trope theories. This interpretation provides new reasons to take seriously some of the most controversial of Spinoza's claims, such as its monism and its commitment to universal necessity. Moreover, my interpretation undermines some classical objections against trope theories, such as their unwarranted multiplication of metaphysical objects, and their commitment to a description of objects based on necessary sets of their properties.

Meta-Epistemological Nature of Mathematics and Its Implication to the Empirical Learning Process in Mathematics: An Extension of Plato’s Thoughts

Mathematics philosophers do not have a common agreed understanding about the nature of Mathematics. An attempt to describe the nature of Mathematics begun in the 4 th C, BC, when Plato conceived that, Mathematics is constituted by abstract objects existing beyond the mind; and its mathematical knowledge is acquired empirically. Aristotle (Plato’s student) extended the ideas of Plato by conceiving that mathematical knowledge can be acquired with or without senses.Since then up to 17 th C, AD, debates continued, experimentalists standing on one side and rationalist on the other side, instead of focusing on the fundamental nature of Mathematics, they focused on whether mathematical knowledge is a an empirical knowledge or rational knowledge. However, from 17 th C, AD, debates moved from experimentalist versus rationalist to an attempt in resolving paradoxes in real number and set theories. The focus in describing precisely nature of Mathematics was completely lost.In respect to the reviews of Plato’s thoughts and related literature, it is concluded that, thoughts of Plato’s thoughts are correct and consistent. Metaphysically, Mathematics is built upon a set of mathematical objects that exist beyond the mind. The mathematical objects possess six attributes: shape, qualities, form, structure, properties and applicability. Also, epistemologically, the attributes of mathematical objects build the body of mathematical empirical knowledge. The empirical mathematical knowledge is acquired in a cycle of five stages: perception, exposition, execution, assimilation and rationalization stages. Keywords: Nature of Mathematics, Metaphysical objects, Mathematical space, Mathematical objects, Meta-Epistemological attributes. DOI: 10.7176/JPCR/56-02 Publication date: March 31 st 2023

Наказание (не)виновных?

This article provides a critical analysis of Mark Walker’s type-token theory. This theory purports to describe, explain, and justify the mechanism by which moral and legal responsibility can be attributed to exact and complete duplicates of persons. However, Walker’s defence of the view of persons as abstract entities is met with several metaphysical objections. Alternatively, a new approach to moral and legal responsibility is developed based on principles of agency law, in which the conception of a guilty person does not require identity with the person who committed the culpable act.

The Fabrian Vision of the Comparison of Being and Nothingness in Aquinas and Heidegger

In this paper I follow Fabro’s analysis of “Dell’ente, dell’essere e del nulla” from the eighth chapter of his book Tomismo e Pensiero Moderno, and his explanation of essere and nulla in Heidegger and Aquinas. Remaining faithful to the author’s outline in said chapter, firstly, I highlight the essential topic of being and the openness to the Absolute in both, the Heideggerian and Thomistic metaphysical thought. Secondly, I consider the reduction of the object of metaphysics to the essence and the problem of being in Christian philosophy. Finally, I address Heidegger’s charge directed to Thomistic philosophy as interpreter of the faith. In the conclusion, by following some of the remarks of Fides et Ratio, I restate the importance of returning to Aquinas’ innovative notion of being, equally to do philosophy and theology in total openness to the Absolute, and I do so in the steps of Fabro, that is, recognizing the contributions of modern philosophy such as Heidegger’s.

Philosophies universelles et philosophies premières selon Alexandre d’Aphrodise

This article is devoted to the interpretation of the object of metaphysics and theoretical sciences proposed by Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 AD). I shall propose two conjectures on crucial passages from his commentary on the Metaphysics (In Metaph. 245.37-246.6 et 246.6-13) and, on this new textual basis, defend the thesis according to which Alexander articulated a primary fundamental philosophy, devoted to immobile substances and treated by Aristotle in Metaphysics Λ, and a philosophy, if one can say so, more primary but less ontological, hence less fundamental, devoted to the general structure of being and treated by Aristotle in Metaphysics Γ. The latter seems to differ from the Categories, according to Alexander, in that in the Categories, Aristotle studies the general classes of beings as general, while in Metaphysics Γ, he studies them as beings.

L’ovvietà del mondo e la trascendenza. Sul concetto di metafisica in Zubiri

Zubiri’s thought can be qualified as an attempt to reconsider the assumptions and contents of the history of metaphysics from a new perspective. In almost all his writings, Zubiri targets the tradition of Western metaphysics and its fundamental concepts from heterogeneous perspectives and with different methods. Among his mature writings there is one that is exemplary in this regard: Los problemas fundamentales de la metafisíca occidental (1969-1970). This paper examines the peculiar definition of metaphysics that Zubiri formulates in this work, paying particular attention to the transcensus of the first science, to the notion of the transcendental and, finally, to the distinction, elaborated by Zubiri, between the object of metaphysics and the things that constitute the object of ordinary knowledge.

THE ISSUE OF INTELLECTUAL INTUITION IN METAPHYSICS

The article presents problems of intellectual intuition in metaphysics from a semiotic point of view. There are various types of intuition in philosophy: rational intuition, irrational intuition, and sensual intuition. All of them are immediate ways of cognition. Classical metaphysics uses intellectual intuition as its main method to find out and justify its statements. The main problem of intellectual intuition is an intersubjective approach to the object of metaphysics. The main aim of this paper is the objectivization and rationalization of intellectual intuition in language. The semantic notion of meaning and the pragmatic notion of understanding are the fundamental tools which are used to translate the issue of intuition from the subject-ma$er level into the language level. This operation allows to look at intuition in a non-psychological manner. It enables the objectivization of the method of intellectual intuition in the light of the understanding of meanings.

REALITAS JIWA SEBAGAI BASIS ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGI PENGALAMAN RELIGIUS

A religious experience in the neuroscience view is interpreted as a symptom of neurological disorders of the brain. The neuroscience view is one of the various views that deny the reality of religious experience. Through empirical research instruments, neuroscientists have found that the soul is identical to the brain, which means that every activity can be measured through the brain. This has implications for the experiences of the Prophets in receiving revelations as the result of brain disorders. This paper seeks to explain religious experience through its ontological basis, namely the existence of immaterial existence and the existence of the soul, as well as its epistemological basis, namely the performance of the faculty of knowledge, both of which cannot be separated. The research method used is descriptive-analytic with the philosophical approach of the soul of Al-Ḥikmah Muta’āliyah. The results of this study indicate that the Al-Ḥikmah Muta’āliyah which was founded by Mulla Ṣadrā proves the existence of the wujūd levels, including the soul, explaining the various levels of perception carried out by the soul corresponding to the various levels of existence. Ṣadrā thought can explain the concept of the soul as an immaterial substance that can perceive metaphysical objects as the emanation of God

¿BEL o Bypass? Dos teorías de la transparencia del autoconocimiento

Alex Byrne y Jordi Fernández proponen dos diferentes versiones de la teoría de la transparencia del autoconocimiento. Según Byrne, para autoatribuir creencias inferimos qué es lo que creemos a partir lo que tomamos como hechos sobre el mundo (siguiendo una regla que Byrne llama Bel). Según Fernández, autoatribuimos la creencia de que p con base en un estado anterior a esta creencia, un estado que fundamenta la creencia de que p (realizando un procedimiento que él llama Bypass). En este artículo expongo las dos teorías y discuto objeciones que conciernen su aspecto normativo (¿puede el procedimiento darnos conocimiento?) y metafísico (¿es funcional el procedimiento?). Concluyo que en especial las objeciones metafísicas son más graves en el caso de Bypass que en el de Bel y que las modificaciones requeridas de la teoría de Fernández la asemejan mucho a la de Byrne.

중세 ‘형이상학’의 여정 -아리스토텔레스, 아비첸나, 아베로에스 그리고 알베르투스를 중심으로 근대를 향한 중세 형이상학-

The name ‘ontology’ is a word coined by modern philosophers. For many years, philosophers used the name ‘metaphysics’ instead of ‘ontology.’ But the name ‘metaphysics’ did not have a clear definition, and the metaphysical discussion in Aristotle’s book ‘metaphysics’ was not clear. The philosophers of medieval Islam attempted to solve this problem. Avicenna, a medieval Muslim philosopher, argued that ‘being qua being’ or ‘being in general (ens commune)’ is a proper object of metaphysics. For him, ‘metaphysics’ is ‘ontology.’ Medieval Muslim philosophers such as Averroes rejected this view of Avicenna. Averroes saw ‘metaphysics’ as ‘natural theology.’ Is the object of metaphysics ‘being in common’ or ‘God’? Is ‘metaphysics’ ‘ontology’ or ‘natural theology’? The medieval European philosopher Albertus Magnus tried to solve this problem on the side of Avicenna. He thought God cannot be a proper object of metaphysics made of human reason, because God is only the object of faith and can not be the object of rational thought. After the long hardships of medieval philosophers, modern philosophers no longer wondered whether metaphysics was an ontology or a natural theology. Modern philosophers did not think metaphysics was one of these two branches; they thought it was a study that included both. To this end, they began to call metaphysics, which studies ‘being qua being’ or ‘being in general’, ‘Generalis Metaphysica’, and created a new name for metaphysics, ‘ontology’. And metaphysics, which studies existences such as ‘God’, began to be called ‘Specialis Metaphysica’. The result of this modern philosophy is the result of the difficult journey of medieval metaphysics. This paper does not simply see medieval metaphysics history as a conflict between ‘ontology’ and ‘natural theology’, but rather it tries to show that the conflict is a journey toward modern metaphysics. Medieval philosophers had already done academic acts on ‘being in general’; there was simply no proper name for them. But modern philosophers have made that proper name, and the name metaphysics has become more clear. And this paper also shows that medieval Muslim philosophers play a major role in all these journeys.

Metaphysics in the Epistemology : A Critical Analysis of Islamic and Western Philosophical tradition

Western epistemology was greatly influenced by Greek philosophical ideas. In the course of history, Epistemology has been dominated by patterns of thought that are rational, secular and free from religious values and beliefs. History shows that the Western Epistemology turned into a large school that became dominant: in the form of rationalism, empiricism, criticism, and intuition. Although it has various methods and approaches to acquire knowledge, in principle the building and its foundation have the same way of thinking that comes from a philosophy that upholds the mind and also relies on human sensory abilities. The West denies revelation as a source of knowledge and for Islam, revelation is the highest source of knowledge. Authentic revelation is the Qur'an and Hadith. The result of this paper shows Western epistemology has a foundation and roots that are based on philosophical thinking that is far from the touch of religious values. Western epistemology in its manifestations is then limited to the acquisition of knowledge about the visible world such as sensory nature and not touching on other realms. Western epistemology focuses more on reason and senses as the main source of science, dichotomization, anthropocentrism, opposition to the spiritual dimension, relentless uncertainty, secularization, desacralization, and empiricism. While tthe Islamic epistemology views both sensory and metaphysical objects and recognizes the three sources of knowledge at once namely senses, reason, intuition. Each of these sources has different levels of ability so they cannot be separated and must be used proportionally. The object of knowledge in Islam is not only empirical, but also metaphysical. The source of knowledge in Islam is also different from Western epistemology. If the West only recognizes the senses and ratios, then in the Muslim view, knowledge comes from God obtained through: the senses are healthy, khabar sadiq , and intuition.

A Question on the Subject of Metaphysics in Which Is Included the Question Whether Metaphysics Is a Science

Giacomino Malafossa’s A Question on the Subject of Metaphysics, in Which Is Included the Question Whether Metaphysics Is a Science, from 1551 (first printed 1553) consists of two parts. In the first part, the author discusses various positions regarding the subject matter of metaphysics. In particular, he debates which conditions any scientific object must fulfill, the most important one being that an object of a science virtually contains all of its truths. Since being as being virtually contains whatever is considered in metaphysics, this is the adequate object of metaphysics. In the second part, the author addresses the problem that the transcendental properties of being are not truly demonstrable. This endangers the status of metaphysics as a science in the strict Aristotelian sense. The author discusses various Scotist solutions to this problem. His own solution is that metaphysics indeed is a science in the strict sense, but only when it considers God, not when it considers being as being, thus unwittingly challenging Duns Scotus’s own idea that metaphysics is a “transcending science” because of its consideration of being and its transcendental properties. Malafossa’s Quaestio is an important example of the metaphysical discourse at the University of Padua in the sixteenth century.

In Defense of Conciliar Christology by Timothy Pawl

Reviewed by: In Defense of Conciliar Christology by Timothy Pawl Christopher Tomaszewski In Defense of Conciliar Christology by Timothy Pawl ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), xiv + 251 pp. In this delightfully well-researched book, Timothy Pawl aims to defend the logical consistency of "Conciliar Christology" from the allegations of inconsistency which have been made against it, mostly in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. By "Conciliar Christology," Pawl means the conjunction of all Christological propositions solemnly taught by the first seven Ecumenical Councils of the Christian Church, which Catholics, the Orthodox, and many Protestants accept as authoritative Tradition. Pawl aims not to show that this conciliar Christology is true, or even possibly true (2), but only to defeat arguments which attempt to show some contradiction in conciliar Christology. The organization of the book is straightforward: after examining the content of conciliar Christology (ch. 1), the definitions of key terms used therein (ch. 2), and fleshing out the integrated Christological theory in a broadly hylemorphic fashion (ch. 3), Pawl examines "The Fundamental Problem" for conciliar Christology (ch. 4), and examines three ways of avoiding this allegation of fundamental contradiction (chs. 5–7), before concluding with an examination of additional metaphysical objections which aim to show that conciliar Christology is inconsistent with divine immutability, impassibility, or atemporality (ch. 8), or that conciliar Christology is committed to just one nature, intellect, or will in Christ (ch. 9). Pawl's book has many merits to recommend it, perhaps the most important and praiseworthy of which is his slavish commitment to the conciliar texts which constitute conciliar Christology. As Pawl himself notes, it is an unfortunate and far too common occurrence in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion to "discover articles wherein a view condemned as outside the fold in days of yore is propounded as a novel answer to a theological problem, with apparent ignorance on the author's part that the view has such an ignoble history, or any history at all" (3). This phenomenon has the unhappy consequence that a significant fraction of the work being produced in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is dead on arrival amongst Christians who are well acquainted with the history of the Church and take seriously the Tradition contained therein. Pawl's book is a refreshing and outstanding exception to this lack of engagement with the doctrinal history of the Church: he has appeals to the conciliar texts and careful interpretation of them sprinkled generously throughout the entire book, and certainly seems to take them to constitute the Christology that must survive scrutiny, thereby setting himself a significantly harder task than those less devoted to these doctrinal authorities, while also positioning [End Page 727] his book to be more useful to Christian philosophers who take these Councils as a definitively authoritative rule of faith. On the other hand, Pawl also demonstrates an excellent facility with the logical analysis which is the hallmark of contemporary analytic philosophy. At places, his book is full of page after page of careful deduction and explanation of the arguments against conciliar Christology which he is attempting to refute. One never wonders exactly which premise Pawl is denying or which inference he thinks is fallacious. For philosophers familiar with the most common forms of argument, this will likely border on the tedious. But it will be very advantageous to the lay reader or the theologian without a background in logic. I am a believer in conciliar Christology, and therefore in its consistency, but I do have some worries about Pawl's solution to "The Fundamental Problem." It would take too long to set up this problem here in the same way or with the same precision as Pawl does in the book, but basically, the claim is that that the predicates which are true of Christ in virtue of his divine nature are inconsistent with the predicates which are true of Christ in virtue of his human nature. But conciliar Christology asserts that many pairs of such predicates (e.g., "passible" and "impassible" or "mutable" and "immutable") are indeed all true of one and the same supposit, the eternal Word. Therefore, conciliar Christology posits contradictions, and is false. This is...

Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism

ABSTRACT Another view has entered the metaethical debate—relaxed realism [Dworkin 1996; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014]. Relaxed realists claim that there are irreducible moral properties, but seek to avoid the metaphysical objections traditionally levelled against this claim: the aim is a ‘metaphysically light’ non-naturalism. This paper asks about what, if anything, distinguishes relaxed realism from sophisticated expressivism. While the relaxed realist response is clear—unlike expressivism, relaxed realism is a cognitivist view—I argue that this response is vulnerable to a dilemma. If relaxed realists understand their cognitivism in minimalist terms, it fails to set relaxed realism apart from expressivism. If, instead, they offer a robust account of truth and belief, relaxed realists incur the metaphysical weight that they aim to avoid. On either horn, relaxed realism fails to be both metaphysically light and genuinely distinct from sophisticated expressivism.

Suling Dewa dalam upacara Ngaponin Suku Sasak

Suling Dewa is a very distinctive art and became the identity of Sasak Lombok Ethnic. This art stores a variety of uniqueness and that is you can’t found in other areas, one of which is the interval of the tone and the lyrics are so contrasting. This art consists only of two players a vocalist and one flute players. In each of the elements in theSuling Dewa Sasak have the meaning of soul from the mirroring of Sasaknese ethnic identity. This distinctive art in its existence in society is widely used in various sacred rituals and ceremonies. One of Suling Dewa functions is used in Ngaponin ceremony or clean up the old metal ceremony every four years. In Ngaponin ceremony series there is one mandatory procession called as Mendewa. The fungtions of Mendewa procession is called the metaphysical object for making the energy wall of guard. Islam Metu Telu is a belief system in Lombok society. This belief system the majority people life in north of Lombok island and the minority you can find that in all areas of Lombok Island. A beautiful combination pattern is contained in the teachings of Islam Metu Telu or also known as Wetu Telu and WaktuTelu. The combination in question is a pattern of syncretism between religions and cultures that are so harmony that so maintained by society. The presentation of Suling Dewa in Ngaponin ceremony consists of two aspects, the textual and contextual. The textual aspect consists of musical events such as gending, music instrument, lyrics of vocal mantra, instrumental organology and contextual aspects including non-musical events consisting of time, place and other ceremonial processions. Suling Dewa to this day is a primary item in a ceremony or a specific ritual that uses Suling Dewa. Any ceremonies and rituals that use Suling Dewa can’t be done without the presence of the Suling Dewa artist. This proves give the concluses the Suling Dewa have a important position in the life of Sasak Kuto - kute community. Keywords: Suling Dewa, Ngaponin, Islam Metu Telu

Natural Selection and Contrastive Explanation

This article defends the Negative View of natural selection explanation, according to which natural selection cannot explain of any given individual why it has the traits it does. Over the years, this view has been criticized on empirical, metaphysical, and explanatory grounds. I review the debate and offer additional reasons for rejecting the empirical and metaphysical objections. The explanatory objection, which holds that the Negative View is rooted in a flawed account of contrastive explanation, initially seems plausible. However, I argue that a closer consideration of the desiderata of contrastive explanation shows that this objection fails as well.