Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Research Articles

Latin American commitment in support of the IAEA role on non-proliferation control

The Latin American and Caribbean countries' contribution to the implementation of worldwide nuclear non-proliferation is well demonstrated by the establishment of a nuclear weapons free-zone and by their permanent support of IAEA safeguards. The 'Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean', encompassing all region territories from Mexico to Argentina and adjacent maritime space, entered into force in April 1969. Latin American support to the IAEA non-proliferation role was already given in the early stages of setting up the IAEA Safeguards procedures. An example for building up trust among nuclear states of the region was the 1981 Agreement between Argentina and Brazil, creating ABACC for jointly accounting and controlling their nuclear materials. Nowadays, all Latin American and Caribbean countries are parties to the NPT, having established safeguard agreements with the IAEA. Additional 'Protocols to IAEA Safeguards Agreements' have been signed or ratified by almost all Latin American and Caribbean countries.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone developments in Asia: Problems and prospects1

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) are binding agreements to prevent the acquisition and stationing of nuclear weapons within a particular region, and to secure guarantees from nuclear states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the zone. In the context of developing dialogues on nuclear proliferation and security issues in the Asian region, the existing Southeast Asian NWFZ (Bangkok Treaty), the current negotiations towards a Central Asian NWFZ, and proposals for NWFZs in South Asia and Northeast Asia, are examined and assessed from the viewpoint of their contributions to regional arms control and security, scope, and prospects for implementation. It is concluded that such zones provide an important avenue, in conjunction with the Nonproliferation Treaty, for regional groups of states in Asia to reduce nuclear proliferation threats within their own regions, to gain security assurances from the nuclear powers, and to facilitate wider confidence-building and cooperative security approaches to nuclear and weapons-of-mass destruction threats across the Asian region. Proposed ways forward include enhanced cooperation between existing NWFZ states, further international conferences in UN studies on NWFZ initiatives, and civil society pressures to establish NWFZs. 1This is a refereed version of an address delivered to the Symposium ‘Security and Co-operation in Asia Pacific: Chinese and Australian Perspectives’, held at La Trobe University, Melbourne and jointly sponsored by East China Normal University, Shanghai, 5–6 July 2004.

A Nuclear Weapon‑ Free Southeast Asia and its Continuing Strategic Significance

2005 marks the tenth year since the ten countries of Southeast Asia declared the region a nuclear weapon-free zone. Under the new and fast evolving strategic environment, is the original purpose of establishing the zone still valid? This article will suggest that SEANWFZ remains strategically relevant because it conveys a message of peace, contributes to the global campaign against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, adds pressure to the Nuclear Weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament, and contributes to building the confidence of Southeast Asian countries in managing their common security and exercising a good measure of control over their destiny. SEANWFZ is also relevant to counter-terrorism efforts by ensuring that WMD material, and technology from which nuclear weapons could be developed, do not fall into the hands of terrorists or be transmitted through the Zone.

L’initiative de Gorbatchev à Mourmansk et les mesures de restauration de la confiance dans l’Arctique

In his speech at Murmansk on October 1, 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev presented a programme to radically lower the level of military confrontation in the Arctic and proposed a number of confidence-building measures. The Murmansk initiative followed numerous previous proposals along the same line, going back to the nineteen fifties. The political and military aspects of the initiative are linked to the Soviet concept of international security. There are three main elements to this concept: first, the impossibility, to-day, of insuring a country's security by military means alone; second, security must be mutual between the Soviet Union and the United States and it must be universal in the rest of the world; third, security must be comprehensive and must include the military, political, economic and humanitarian dimensions. Specifically on northern security, it must be noted that the Soviet Union is quite vulnerable in the Arctic, with about half of its total land mass north of the 60th parallel. Also, the Arctic offers the shortest route for ICBMS, SLBMs and strategic bombers. Consequently, international security in the Arctic dictates confidence-building measures. The Murmansk initiative represents a significant contribution to the whole process of confidence-building by proposing, in particular: to limit the number of large exercises by naval and air forces in the Northern seas; to invite observers to such exercises; to include Barents Sea, along with other Northern seas, in a zone of peace; to ban anti-submarine activities in agreed areas of the Northern and Western Atlantic; to include the reduction of military activities in the Arctic on the agenda of the second stage of the Conference on CBM and Disarmement in Europe; to reduce naval activities in international straits; and to pursue the establishment of a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone for which the Soviet Union would act as guarantor.

MONGOLIA

Formed according to broad principles laid out by the United Nations, nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) play an important role in promoting nuclear nonproliferation, paralleling and complementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. But the traditional regional treaty-based path to establishing NWFZs is not open to all states. Owing to various factors, some countries cannot realistically follow the path of states that have established traditional NWFZs. Mongolia, having declared itself a single-state NWFZ in 1992 and gained UN General Assembly recognition of this status in 1998, may provide an example for other countries to follow. This viewpoint presents Mongolia's case as a state seeking to acquire a nontraditional nuclear-weapon-free status despite unfavorable geopolitical circumstances. The case of Mongolia clearly demonstrates that the creation of a credible, single-state NWFZ status is possible, but demands the support and flexibility of both neighboring states and the nuclear weapon states.

Mongolia's National Security and Nuclear-Free Policy

Abstract For Mongolia, the 1990s have been years of search for identity, development of different perspectives, formulation of policy and preparation for the next century. The starting point of its journey, at the beginning of the 1990s, involved ideological collapse and economic turmoil. After decades of unilateral policy, Mongolia rushed to formulate its national security, foreign policy and military doctrine, taking account of international developments, based on principles of international affairs. In 1992, in order to contribute to disarmament and trust in the region and globally, Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear weapon-free zone. Since then various measures and activities have been launched to achieve institutionalization of this status in its concept of foreign affairs. This article starts with the setting: facts-factors that affect and shape the state policy of Mongolia. Under the influence of these factors, from the beginning of the 1990s, Mongolia started to formulate its policies. And ...

China and the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Regime

This article surveys China's policy towards nuclear non-proliferation regime and contests view that China has now completed transition from a challenger to an upholder of global non-proliferation regime. It argues that the learning curve hypothesis and bureaucratic politics and profit motives arguments provide only a partial explanation of China's shifting but ambiguous and contradictory policy towards non-proliferation. China has cleverly played the proliferation card by exploiting loopholes in nonproliferation regime and contradictions in major power relationships so as to serve its national security interests. The article examines factors that have led Beijing to disregard non-proliferation regime in past and might make it continue to do so in future. It also analyses changing Asian security environment and its impact on China's nonproliferation commitments in future. Introduction The global nuclear non-proliferation (NNP) regime is an outgrowth of steps taken during second half of twentieth century to halt horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The NNP regime consists of several components. These are Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957; 1953 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) banning testing of nuclear weapons in atmosphere, outer space, or under water; 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was extended indefinitely in 1995; London-based Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), formed in 1974, which requires IAEA safeguards on all of its participants' nuclear exports; 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aimed at halting proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems; 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement (a successor to Cold War era's COCOM) covering conventional weapons and dual-use exports; and Zangger Committee which covers nuclear-related exports. T he 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet to come into force, further constrains all states from conducting nuclear tests. In addition, nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) in Latin America, South Pacific, and Africa have further strengthened regime. In 1995, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) proposed establishment of a NWFZ in Southeast Asia, and in 1997 five Central Asian states issued Tashkent statement proposing a NWFZ for Central Asia. The overall record of NNP regime has been a mixture of success and failure. On positive side, five decades of international efforts at curbing spread of nuclear weapons have created a political and normative climate in which no state can easily declare its nuclear intentions. The unsuitability of nuclear weapons to most military situations also renders them useless. Moreover, a number of nuclearcapable states -- notably Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan -- have in recent years agreed to abandon strive for, or dismantle their nuclear weapons capabilities. In this sense, regime has been fairly successful. On negative side, campaign for nuclear disarmament appears to be failing just when success seemed at hand. Since mid1980s, regime has been undermined by emergence of new suppliers of nuclear technology and delivery systems, as well as by an increase in number of threshold or new nuclear weapons states (NWSs).. Apart from five declared NWSs (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China), and two new self-declared NWSs (India and Pakistan), several other nations (Israel, Japan, North Korea, and Iran) are widely believed to have made significant progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. The changes in international system and global nuclear balance of power since end of Cold War have thrown up new challenges and opportunities for NNP regime. …

An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold War

The United States continues to maintain a large nuclear arsenal guided by a deterrence strategy little changed since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Notwithstanding changes in the size and composition of nuclear forces since 1991, the fundamental rationales and planning principles which informed US nuclear policy for decades remain in place - despite the disappearance of a superpower nuclear enemy. In this work, Janne E. Nolan traces the effort to articulate a post-Cold War nuclear doctrine through decisions taken in the Bush and Clinton administrations, focusing on the leadership styles of presidents, bureaucratic politics, and broader foreign policy objectives. Based on in-depth interviews with policy participants, this study seeks to illuminate the dynamics by which the US government has tried to reflect the dramatically altered international arena in its nuclear policies. In two major policy developments - the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review and the decision to sign the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty - US policy makers sought to define the utility of nuclear weapons after the Cold War and to gain broad-based consensus. For many reasons, these efforts were largely unsuccessful in developing coherent policies, with the absence of sustained presidential leadership proving most decisive.

Denuclearizing central Asia

This study deals with two interrelated issues: the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear weapons from Central Asia; and the regional nuclear‐weapon‐free zone (NWFZ) initiative. Central Asian countries succeeded in denuclearizing the region. The ex‐Soviet nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Central Asia, and fissile material production for military purposes was stopped. The Central Asian states acceded to the Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty regimes, and established elements of a nuclear export control system. By removing the threat of nuclear confrontation and strengthening the nonproliferation regime these countries promoted security in the area. By establishing a Central Asia NWFZ the regional and global NPT regimes could be further strengthened and a new type of regional international relations system could emerge. There are both incentives for and obstacles to the NWFZ idea. On the one hand, all major regional players and nuclear powers favour, with some minor exception, establishing such a zone. On the other hand, a number of factors, such as problems in cooperation between Central Asian countries, negative implications of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programmes, security interests of some nuclear powers, and numerous technical problems, create obstacles to establishment of the zone.

Track‐II cooperative regional security efforts: Lessons from the limited nuclear‐weapons‐free zone for Northeast Asia*

The post‐Cold‐War era has seen a proliferation of Track‐II, or unofficial, efforts to enhance cooperative regional security in many regions of the world. These efforts have had mixed results, but the lessons learned from their experiences may be useful to analysts and practitioners alike. The Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology initiated a Track‐II effort in 1991 aimed at enhancing cooperative regional security in Northeast Asia through the establishment of a Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Northeast Asia (LNWFZ‐NEA). Under the direction of one author of this article (J.E.E.), this initiative has evolved through several phases. Beginning with the reasoning behind the birth of this initiative, the authors trace the evolution of this Track‐II process through the opening presentations of the concept to international experts, to the current status of the process. Assessments of the changing phases of the process are highlighted with lessons learned from the formation of a Senior Panel, and later Expanded Senior Panel, to meetings held in Atlanta, Buenos Aires, Bordeaux, Moscow, and Helsinki. The authors include insights into the negotiating process and the security environment in Northeast Asia.

South Asia after the nuclear tests: Prospects for arms control?*

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 have threatened the norms of nonproliferation while at the same time raising the possibility of an accidental nuclear war in South Asia. Ideally, this situation could be improved by India and Pakistan renouncing their nuclear option and opting for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia. The existing realities in the region, however, militate against these ideals. Both the Indian and Pakistani governments have declared their intentions of developing and maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent capability. Public opinion in these two states supports such a stand. Therefore, a need exists for adopting a flexible approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Instead of insisting on Indian and Pakistani membership of the Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT), attention should be focused on securing their agreement to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut‐Off Treaty (FMCT). These international attempts need to be supplemented by regional arms control moves aimed at taking into account both Indian and Pakistani threat perceptions. By implication this means going beyond the South Asian scene and including the Sino‐Indian equation as part of the discussion. Sino‐Indian and Indian—Pakistani nuclear relations, however, could best be managed and arms control regimes developed if, in each bilateral relationship, the stronger power acknowledges the fears and concerns of the weaker partner. At the same time, such ‘major power benevolence’ would need to be reciprocated by realism on the part of the smaller state in the relevant bilateral equation. To assist this process, the international community, and especially the United States, needs to develop a more realistic understanding of the psychological and emotional context in which nuclear weapons have entered the South Asian region. Effectively it means avoiding the temptation of linking sanctions to a change in the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan.

A zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East: A political project

The history of the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone proposal, originally advanced by Iran and Egypt in 1974, is described, as well as the extension of the concept in 1990 to include all weapons of mass destruction, and the UN Secretary General's 1990 expert report on the subject. The possible geographic scope of the Middle East for a zone purpose is discussed, concluding that such a zone should include all League of Arab States members and Israel and Iran. The elements and design of a potential treaty for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMDFZ) are then considered, including a proposed definition of the concept of weapons of mass destruction, standard features and aspects of such zones, and the issue of sea areas adjacent to the zone. Finally, recent developments are analyzed, particularly the possible effects of the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear test explosions on the Middle East peace process. It is concluded that Israel, the third nuclear threshold state, will most probably not follow the South Asian example; and that the principal obstacle to progress on the WMDFZ proposal is the delay in implementing the peace process.

A Northeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone

A subtle balance in public sentiment emerged in Japan about Northeast Asian regional security after a series of recent incidents related to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). These incidents included the alleged construction of underground nuclear facilities, a surprise launch of a three‐staged Taepodong missile or satellite over Japanese territory in August 1998, and the intrusion of two allegedly North Korean spy boats into Japanese territorial waters in March 1999. On the one hand, more Japanese citizens are uncomfortable with the DPRK's unpredictable behavior and thus are increasingly susceptible to hardliner arguments in favor of strengthening Japan's military capabilities. On the other hand, many citizens have realized anew that Japan has virtually no diplomatic channels with the DPRK, one of its closest neighbors. That fact clearly indicates the diplomatic failure of successive Japanese administrations, a failure that must be redressed before all else.

Nuclear weapons‐free zones

In April 1996, the latest agreement on establishing weapons‐free zones, the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (or the Treaty of Pelindaba), was signed in Cairo by more than 40 African nations. By this treaty, African nations pledge not to build, test, bury, or stockpile nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons material. A Washington Post article claimed the treaty was “... a culmination of work which began as a response to French nuclear tests in the Sahara desert in the 1960s ...,” thus typifying how long these weapons‐free zones take to evolve.

The nuclear equation in a new middle east

regime? What about the Iran-Iraq nuclear entanglement? Can both issues be dealt with under a regional arrangement? Can new global approaches be reconciled with a regional approach in the Middle East? This article attempts to identify and explore some of these issues, examining the Middle Eastern nuclear situation in light of the experience of Iraq, North Korea, South Africa, and Latin America. It begins with a tour de horizon of both the positive and negative nonproliferation trends in the region, then considers the deadlock on the nuclear issue as manifested in recent regional discussions. Since both Arabs and Israelis now agree that the long-term objective of those talks should be the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons (WMDFZ), the article examines the feasibility of such a zone in the Middle East by comparing the situation in this region with both the establishment of a nuclear-weaponsfree zone (NWFZ) in South America under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and South Africa’s unilateral decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and join the NPT. Although my findings present a rather pessimistic assessment of the near-term likelihood of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East, they also point to other possible confidence-building measures that could eventually lead to the establishment of such a zone. Finally, the article comments more optimistically on the applicability to the Middle East of the recent proposal for a global ban on the production of fissile material.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

The pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation has been a major international concern of our times. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is of great historical significance for having created the world's first nuclear-free zone (NFZ). Article 5 of the Treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in the Antarctica. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 established the first internationally recognised Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in a populated region of the world, namely Latin America. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was an attempt to bring in a global regime to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). States in the latter category can adhere to the NPT while accepting a stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, as long as they do not exercise jurisdiction and control over the weapons. West Germany is an obvious example of such a country. A NWFZ, however, prohibits such stationing of nuclear weapons. The three essential characteristics of a NWFZ are non-possession, non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons. NWFZs can help to strengthen and promote non-proliferation by providing a means of extending and reinforcing the NPT. In fact Article 7 of the latter accepts that, “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” The article merely acknowledged that one such treaty had been negotiated more or less simultaneously with the NPT. The second NFWZ in an inhabited region was not to be established for another eighteen years. At the Sixteenth South Pacific Forum meeting held in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, Forum countries adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty on 6 August 1985 (Hiroshima Day). The Preamble to the treaty expresses the commitment to world peace, a grave concern at the continuing nuclear arms race, the conviction that every country bears an obligation to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons, a belief in the efficacy of regional arms control measures, and a reaffirmation of the NPT for halting nucleor proliferation. The core NFZ obligations are contained in Articles 3–7. Each party agrees not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control—or seek to do so—over any nuclear device; not to assist or encourage others to make or acquire nuclear weapons; to prevent the stationing or testing of nuclear weapons on its territory; not to dump radioactive wastes at sea anywhere in the zone, and to prevent such dumping by others in its territorial sea. Discussions at the United Nations had, by the mid-1970s, identified nine major principles as the guiding elements of a NWFZ: (1) the initiative should come from the countries of the region; (2) the specific provisions of the NWFZ treaty should be negotiated between the regional member states in the form of a multilateral treaty establishing the zone in perpetuity; (5) while adherence to the treaty should be voluntary, the NWFZ must nevertheless embrace all militarily significant states in the region: (4) existing treaty relationships within the zone should not be disturbed; (5) there should be an effective verification system: (6) peaceful nuclear development should be allowed; (7) the zone should hare clearly defined and recognised boundaries; (8) in defining the territory of the zone, members must respect international law, including freedom of the seas and straits used for international navigation and of international airspace; and (9) the NWFZ should have the support of the nuclear-weapon states. Thus the NWFZ concept in established United Nations vocabulary does not prohibit the temporary presence of nuclear vessels during transit or on port calls, and it does not necessarily preclude the acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities and materials tantamount to having a nuclear-weapon capability or producing untested nuclear bomb components. Nevertheless, it will be useful to follow the UN criteria in order to examine the nature and implications of the South Pacific zone.

The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone proposal

The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone proposal The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone proposal. By Ingemar Lindahl. London: Macmillan. 1988. 226pp. Index. £33.00. ISBN 0 333 43638 5. Thomas Pedersen Thomas Pedersen 1University of Copenhagen Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 64, Issue 4, autumn 1988, Pages 668–669, https://doi.org/10.2307/2626074 Published: 01 October 1988

A Balkan Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: Viability of the Regime and Implications for Crisis Management

terms of its utility as a bargaining chip or as a by-product of build-down formulae. When used as a bargaining chip, non-deployment is rarely the intended outcome; in a builddown context, any advantage resulting from even the dismantling of weapons is often outweighed by the disadvantage of technical upgrading, or by the deployment of other categories of weapons. There is, however, another approach to non-deployment which receives little attention in the United States; namely, the nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). Nuclear weapon-free zones serve several purposes of arms control which are often overlooked: in addition to reducing the actual numbers of weapons deployed, nuclear weapon-free zones can contribute to effective crisis prevention and crisis management, and they can make it possible to limit destruction in the event of actual hostilities. If a conflict which threatened to draw in both the United States and the Soviet Union

SPD‐SED initiatives for chemical and Nuclear Weapon free zones in Central Europe

SPD‐SED initiatives for chemical and Nuclear Weapon free zones in Central Europe

Security Co‑operation in ASEAN

Ever since Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967, questions of security have become an ever increasing issue, despite rhetoric to contrary. ASEAN was set up primarily to promote co-operation among members in socio-economic field. However, ASEAN leaders, then and now, have been tacitly preoccupied with security issues. One can argue that security co-operation has been far more successful than in economic matters. The fact that ASEAN could galvanize support of majority at United Nations over Kampuchean issue is indicative of importance of role of secu rity in ASEAN. The concept of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), although Utopian in nature, is yet another example where notions of security have proved to be significant. At present, proposal for setting up of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Southeast Asia sits high on ASEAN agenda. As we approach end of this decade, there is every indication that security issues will continue to play very significant role in ASEAN. It has been said that security is one element that could either unite ASEAN or lead to breaking up of this regional organization. There are many challenges to ASEAN security co operation and it is these elements that this paper will primarily focus upon. Let us first define some key concepts. The word * 'security'' has wide range of meanings and connotations, far more encompassing than term defence. It is defined by one scholar as, the protection and preservation of minimum core values of any nation: political independence and territorial integrity.1 There are various levels of security, ranging from individual and national security to international and regional security. In context of ASEAN, both national and regional security are of paramount importance. However, there is no doubt that national security is far more important than regional, although latter could well contribute to preservation of former and vice versa. Co-operation can generally be defined as, a joint or collaborative behaviour that is directed toward some goal in which there is common interest or hope of reward.2 The goal here is, in present context, attainment of security of states concerned. The other key factors are, firstly, common interest and, secondly, hope of reward. As we will later discover, there is no real consensus among ASEAN states on these two pertinent elements of co-operation. What then do we really mean when we talk of ASEAN security co-operation? It is important to remember at outset that ASEAN was and still is socio