Nuclear Phase-out Research Articles

White Knights: will wind and solar come to the rescue of a looming capacity gap from nuclear phase-out or slow CCS start-up?

In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident, countries like Germany and Japan have planned a phase-out of nuclear generation. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology has yet to become a commercially viable technology with little prospect of doing so without strong climate policy to spur development. The possibility of using renewable power generation from wind and solar as a non-emitting alternative to replace a nuclear phase-out or failure to deploy CCS technology is investigated using scenarios from EMF27 and the POLES model. A strong carbon price appears necessary to have significant penetration of renewables regardless of alternative generation technologies available, but especially if nuclear or CCS are absent from the energy supply system. The feasibility of replacing nuclear generation appears possible at realistic costs (evaluated as total abatement costs and final user prices to households); however for ambitious climate policies, such as a 450 ppm target, CCS could represent a critical technology that renewables will not be able to fully replace without unbearable economic costs.

Decarbonizing Europe's power sector by 2050 — Analyzing the economic implications of alternative decarbonization pathways

The European Union aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80–95% in 2050 compared to 1990 levels. The transition towards a low-carbon economy implies the almost complete decarbonization of Europe's power sector, which could be achieved along various pathways. In this paper, we evaluate the economic implications of alternative energy policies for Europe's power sector by applying a linear dynamic electricity system optimization model in over 36 scenarios. We find that the costs of decarbonizing Europe's power sector by 2050 vary between 139 and 633bn €2010, which corresponds to an increase of between 11% and 44% compared to the total system costs when no CO2 reduction targets are implemented. In line with economic theory, the decarbonization of Europe's power sector is achieved at minimal costs under a stand-alone CO2 reduction target, which ensures competition between all low-carbon technologies. If, however, renewable energies are exempted from competition via supplementary renewable energy (RES-E) targets or if investments in new nuclear and CCS power plants are politically restricted, the costs of decarbonization significantly rise. Moreover, we find that the excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets depend on the acceptance of alternative low carbon technologies. For example, given a complete nuclear phase-out in Europe by 2050 and politically implemented restrictions on the application of CCS to conventional power plants, supplementary RES-E targets are redundant. While in such a scenario the overall costs of decarbonization are comparatively high, the excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets are close to zero.

Impact of the German nuclear phase-out on Europe's electricity generation—A comprehensive study

The combination of the ambitious German greenhouse gas reduction goals in the power sector and the nuclear phase-out raises many questions concerning the operational security of the German electricity generation system. This paper focusses on the technical feasibility (electricity generation and transmission) and CO2-impact of the German nuclear phase-out on the short term (2012–2022). A detailed electricity generation simulation model is employed, including the German transmission grid and its international connections. A range of different conventional and renewable energy sources (RES) scenarios is considered. Results are presented for the change in generation mix, on the flows on the transmission network and on operational reliability issues. The scenario analysis shows that nuclear generation will be replaced mainly by coal- and lignite-based generation. This increases the CO2-intensity of the German electricity sector. Furthermore, the results indicate that the German electricity export will decrease and under certain circumstances, the system becomes infeasible. Keeping some nuclear power plants online, would mitigate these effects. The amount of electricity generated from RES is shown to be the main driver for grid congestion.

Future nuclear perspectives based on MESSAGE integrated assessment modeling

Nuclear energy has the potential to be a vital component toward a clean energy strategy – but future energy systems may or may not include nuclear power. This study explores a range of future nuclear pathways consistent with different levels of energy demand, and explicitly assesses the implications of a potential global nuclear energy phase-out. In our scenarios the mitigation of climate change is one of the main factors driving a much needed transformation of the global energy system. A range of climate change mitigation scenarios is outlined and compared to a business-as-usual case. The scenarios are characteristic of different approaches to climate mitigation, including alternative combinations of supply and demand-side changes. Our analysis indicates that under a comprehensive and global mitigation effort, the stabilization of GHG concentrations at low levels (450 ppm CO2) would be technically achievable even at high energy demand and with a nuclear phase-out. We identify that significant investments in energy efficiency improvements and demand reduction offer the most flexibility in energy supply options and may or may not include nuclear power.

The economics of a US civilian nuclear phase-out

In the United States, which trades three-fifths of its electricity in competitive markets, the prohibitive capital cost of new nuclear power plants ensures that only a handful will be built. Nonetheless, with 40-year licenses being extended to 60 years, the 104 existing reactors’ relatively low generating costs are widely expected to justify decades of continued operation. But the generating costs of aging reactors have been rising, while competitors, including modern renewables, show rapidly falling total costs—and those opposed cost curves have begun to intersect. An expanding fraction of well-running nuclear plants is now challenged to compete with moderating wholesale power prices, while plants needing major repairs or located in regions rich in wind power increasingly face difficult choices of whether to run or close. Thus, even without events that might accelerate nuclear phase-out, as the Fukushima disaster did in Germany, shifting competitive conditions have begun to drive a gradual US nuclear phase-out. Its economics are illuminated by a detailed energy scenario that needs no nuclear energy, coal, or oil and one-third less natural gas to run a 158 percent bigger US economy in 2050—but cuts carbon emissions by 82 to 86 percent and costs $5 trillion less. That scenario’s 80-percent-renewable, 50-percent-distributed, equally reliable, and more resilient electricity system would cost essentially the same as a business-as-usual version that sustains nuclear and coal power, but it would better manage all the system’s risks. Similarly comprehensive modeling could also analyze faster nuclear phase-out if desired.

The limited national security implications of civilian nuclear decline

A declared exit from commercial nuclear power in the United States is highly improbable. But a stealthy, gradual nuclear decline motivated by economics seems reasonably likely, as US utilities decide to close some plants early, rather than implement costly post-Fukushima safety regulations, and the number of new nuclear power plants fails to offset retirements. If nuclear power does make a slow exit, the national security implications are smaller than sometimes suggested. Nuclear energy is far down the list of options for enhancing the US military’s energy security. Weapons programs aren’t dependent on the civilian nuclear industry, and the nuclear Navy has a reliable supply chain. The United States has not needed to produce fissile material for weapons in decades, and although tritium for defense purposes is now produced in civilian reactors, there are other options for obtaining it. A nuclear phase-out could affect US nuclear export control and nonproliferation efforts, but export controls are only one tool among many that can be used to curb the desire for nuclear weapons. Even in a slow slide toward phase-out, the United States would remain at the global nuclear bargaining table for decades because of its status as a military nuclear superpower.

Orchestrating a Low-Carbon Energy Revolution Without Nuclear: Germany’s Response to the Fukushima Nuclear Crisis

In October 2010, the German conservative ruling coalition (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP)) passed a law permitting the extension of contracts for Germany’s seventeen nuclear power plants. This policy amended a law passed in 2001 by a Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Green Party majority to phase out nuclear energy by the early 2020s. The explosions in the nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power facility, however, resulted in a decision to speed up the phaseout of nuclear energy. The nuclear meltdowns in Japan sent hundreds of thousands of protesters onto the streets. Angry voters made their disillusionment with the nuclear politics of the conservative government coalition clear in local elections. The federal government responded by setting up an Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Supply, which recommended an end to nuclear energy and a shift to a renewable energy-based economy. Within months of the Fukushima disaster, the government had permanently shut down eight of the country’s oldest nuclear power plants and issued a schedule for the phased shutdown of the remaining nine plants by 2022. In addition, the government reaffirmed its climate change plans, which call for a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by around forty percent of 1990 levels by 2020 and eighty percent by 2050. Thus, out of a crisis, the German government is forging an opportunity to become a global leader in the promotion of new renewable energies, energy efficiency, and greenhouse gas emission reductions. In Japan, the nuclear crisis has also weakened support for nuclear energy, but with a strong industrial coalition calling for its continued use, both for energy stability and in response to climate change, a complete nuclear phaseout is less certain, at least in the short term.

The legalities of leaving nuclear

The current political consensus favors continued reliance on civilian nuclear power in France, but a reduction in that reliance was discussed during the 2012 presidential election, and debate on that score continues. If the political consensus ever shifts toward a nuclear phase-out, the French government has several options through which it can reduce or abandon civilian nuclear power generation. The parliament can pass a law to discontinue nuclear power. The people can do the same, through referendum. Or the executive branch of government can simply not authorize the construction of new nuclear plants. If the parliament, the executive branch, or citizens acted to eliminate nuclear power, EDF, the operator of France’s 58 nuclear power plants, could seek compensation for lost revenue. The legal considerations involved in such an effort vary, depending on whether the nuclear shutdown were enacted into law or instituted through executive-branch regulation. Currently, it is unclear what chances of success a compensation claim might have. Over time, though, France will retire at least part of its aging fleet of nuclear reactors. The executive branch and parliament should pay careful attention to the structure of laws and regulations related to nuclear shutdowns, to reduce the likelihood that successful legal action will ensue.

Hopes and Traps on the Path to a Nuclear-Free Japan: The Fukushima Disaster and Civil Society

The Fukushima nuclear disaster, which caused complex societal damage, also led to a shift in Japanese public opinion supporting the move away from nuclear power. The nuclear phaseout movement has transcended the traditional framework of Japanese social movements and has the potential to become a new force for reform. However, the Japanese nuclear phaseout is also complicated by the Liberal Democratic Party’s style of rule, the link with nuclear weapons, and the relationship between Tokyo and the areas hosting the nuclear power plants. This article considers the future outlook for an energy shift and political reform in Japan with a focus on the roles of civil society and local leadership.

Innovation Benefits from Nuclear Phase-Out: Can They Compensate the Costs?

This paper investigates whether an inefficient allocation of abatement, due to constraints on the use of currently available low carbon mitigation options, can promote innovation in new technologies and eventually generate welfare gains. We focus on the case of nuclear power phase out, when accounting for endogenous technical change in energy efficiency and in low carbon technologies. The analysis uses the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH, which features multiple externalities due to both climate and innovation market failures. Our results show that phasing out nuclear power stimulates additional R&D investments and deployment of infant technologies with large learning potential. The innovation benefits which this would generate and that would not otherwise be captured due to intertemporal and international externalities almost completely offset the economic costs of phasing out nuclear power. The technological change benefit depends on the stringency of the climate policy and is distributed unevenly across countries.

Blown by the wind. Replacing nuclear power in German electricity generation

Abstract Only three days after the beginning of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, Japan, on 11 March 2011, the German government ordered 8 of the country's 17 existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) to stop operating within a few days. In summer 2011 the government put forward a law – passed in parliament by a large majority – that calls for a complete nuclear phase-out by the end of 2022. These government actions were in contrast to its initial plans, laid out in fall 2010, to expand the lifetimes of the country's NPPs. The immediate closure of 8 NPPs and the plans for a complete nuclear phase-out within little more than a decade, raised concerns about Germany's ability to secure a stable supply of electricity. Some observers feared power supply shortages, increasing CO2-emissions and a need for Germany to become a net importer of electricity. Now – a little more than a year after the phase-out law entered into force – this paper examines these concerns using (a) recent statistical data on electricity production and demand in the first 15 months after the German government's immediate reaction to the Fukushima accident and (b) reviews the most recent projections and scenarios by different stakeholders on how the German electricity system may develop until 2025, when NPPs will no longer be in operation. The paper finds that Germany has a realistic chance of fully replacing nuclear power with additional renewable electricity generation on an annual basis by 2025 or earlier, provided that several related challenges, e.g. expansion of the grids and provision of balancing power, can be solved successfully. Already in 2012 additional electricity generation from renewable energy sources in combination with a reduced domestic demand for electricity will likely fully compensate for the reduced power generation from the NPPs shut down in March 2011. If current political targets will be realised, Germany neither has to become a net electricity importer, nor will be unable to gradually reduce fossil fuel generated electricity. Whether the reduction in fossil fuel use will be sufficient to adequately contribute to national greenhouse gas mitigation targets significantly depends on an active policy to promote electricity savings, continuous efforts to increase the use of renewables and a higher share of natural gas (preferably used in combined heat and power plants) in fossil fuel power generation.

From Brokdorf to Fukushima: The long journey to nuclear phase-out

Shortly after the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Germany’s government started preparing legislation that would close the country’s last nuclear power plant by 2022. But this wasn’t an entirely new development: Germany had been planning to leave nuclear energy behind for decades, and to understand its nuclear phase-out requires a close look at the past. Several projects and events mark the beginnings of the German anti-nuclear power movement: Among them are the huge protests over the Brokdorf reactor, which began in 1976 and led to civil war-like confrontations with police, and the controversy over the Kalkar fast-neutron reactor in the mid-1970s. Because of these and subsequent developments—including the 1986 Chernobyl accident—by the 1990s, no one in German political life seriously entertained the idea of new reactor construction. This tacit policy consensus led to energy forecasts and scenarios that focused on energy efficiency, demand reduction, and renewable energy sources. By the time of the Fukushima accidents, many of these new energy priorities had already begun to be implemented and to show effect. Replacing nuclear power in Germany with other energy sources on an accelerated schedule is likely to come with a price tag, but, at the same time, Germany’s nuclear phase-out could provide a proof-of-concept, demonstrating the political and technical feasibility of abandoning a controversial high-risk technology. Germany’s nuclear phase-out, successful or not, may well become a game changer for nuclear energy worldwide.

Exit economics: The relatively low cost of Germany’s nuclear phase-out

The decision of the German government, post-Fukushima, to phase out the country’s nuclear power sector by 2022 builds on legislation in place since 2002. This earlier legislation was amended in 2010 to extend the lifetime of the nuclear plants, but the German parliament reversed this extension in the summer of 2011, slightly accelerating the original phase-out schedule; therefore, the market and the nuclear operators were prepared for the shutdown schedule. In this context, it is not surprising that the observed price impacts from the shutdown of 40 percent of the German nuclear power capacity in 2011 are smaller than some modeling exercises had projected. When empirical observation is analyzed in light of a range of economic models, the price effect of the nuclear phase-out can be expected to peak at 5 euros per megawatt-hour or less for a few years around 2020, a reasonably small increase compared with the uncertainties created by other fundamental determinants of Europe’s electricity prices. The macroeconomic effects attributable to the complete shutdown of nuclear power also appear likely to be relatively small, peaking at perhaps 0.3 percent of gross domestic product or less a few years before 2030. In the end, the management of the German transition to an energy mix dominated by renewable energies—and not the use of the existing nuclear reactor fleet for a decade more or less—will be the key determinant of whether that shift has larger or smaller effects on electricity prices or on the German economy overall.

Germany’s merger of energy and climate change policy

Nuclear exit has been on the German policy agenda for more than three decades. After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, a majority of the public and relevant stakeholders opposed nuclear power and strove for renewable energy alternatives. At the same time, climate change policy gained the attention of German policy makers, and they approved ambitious targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In 2000, the federal government and the operators of nuclear power plants reached a phase-out agreement, and since 2002, the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act has been not the promotion but the phasing-out of commercial nuclear electricity generation. After the federal elections in 2009, the conservative–liberal coalition government implemented a slow-down of the phase-out. But that reversal provoked strong negative public reaction, and in response to the nuclear disaster in Japan, the German cabinet and the Bundestag agreed in the summer of 2011 to a gradual phase-out of nuclear power that will shut down the industry by 2022. They also agreed to accelerate the transformation of Germany’s energy portfolio. This transformation, or Energiewende, will include three key methods of replacing the electricity once produced by nuclear reactors: It will expand renewable energy production and provide the infrastructure needed for that expansion; it will significantly improve the country’s energy-efficiency efforts; and for a transition period, it will also encourage the construction of new and more efficient coal- and gas-fired power plants. Already, the Energiewende has observably decoupled energy supply from economic growth, with Germany’s energy supply and carbon-dioxide emissions dropping from 1990 to 2011 as its gross domestic product rose significantly. It is this evolving Energiewende, rather than the nuclear phase-out, that will require and, perhaps, inspire continuing reforms of social, economic, technological, and cultural policy in Germany.

Japan backs down from nuclear phase-out goal of 2040

Japan backs down from nuclear phase-out goal of 2040

German Nuclear Phase-Out Policy: Effects on European Electricity Wholesale Prices, Emission Prices, Conventional Power Plant Investments and Eletricity Trade

The German decision to finally phase-out nuclear electricity has led to a debate on its effects on electricity prices, emission prices in the European emission trading system, as well as on international electricity trade. We investigate these effects with a Electricity market model for Europe with investments in power plants under oligopolistic conditions in Germany. We find modest price increases on the German wholesale market by the mid-term 2020 and an effect of the accelerated nuclear phase- out of between four and twelve percent. Moreover, the increase in the emission allowance prices due to the change in nuclear policy is between 1:8 and 3 Euro per ton of CO2 by the same period. The large variations in our results are induced by four combinations of the European emission trading policy and the success of the German energy efficiency policy. Most pronounced price effects are found in scenarios with a successful energy savings policy, which acts as a substitute for new power plants. Moreover, the tighter the emission trading system is, the larger are the effects of the accelerated phase-out on electricity and emission prices. Under a tight system, however, investments in conventional generation are likely to be dominated by natural gas fired plants since the decrease of utilization rates induced by renewable energies are more important for coal fired power plants with their relative high investment costs.

German Nuclear Policy Reconsidered: Implications for the Electricity Market

In the aftermath of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima-Daiichi, German nuclear policy has been reconsidered. This paper demonstrates the economic effects of an accelerated nuclear phase-out in Germany on the European electricity market. An optimization model is used to analyze two scenarios with different lifetimes for nuclear plants in Germany (phase-out vs. prolongation). Based on political targets, both scenarios assume significant electricity demand reductions and a high share of renewable energy sources in Germany. We find that electricity costs and prices in the European system are higher in the phase-out scenario, especially in Germany, associated with welfare losses. Due to lifetime extensions of existing fossil-fired plants as well as moderate capacity additions, we conclude that the generation sector can generally cope with the phase-out under the given assumptions. Yet, we emphasize that this requires a substantial and costly transformation of the supply and the demand side.

The Energy Turnaround

When the tsunami hit the Fukushima atomic plant in Japan in March 2011, causing the reactor disaster, it was impossible to predict the consequences for the future of energy supply. Many countries have considerably strengthened their activities since then to realize an energy turnaround, i.e., a switch from nuclear power and fossil fuels to a more sustainable energy supply with increased use of regenerative energy resources such as wind or sun. Whereas only 55 states had political ambitions to expand the use of renewable energies in 2005, this number has increased to about 190 states in 2012. Also a change in attitudes can be observed. Early in 2012, more than 70 % of the French supported a phase-out of nuclear power – even though France was worldwide frontrunner in this area with a 75 % nuclear powered energy supply in the end of 2010. Germany takes an uncompromising approach in that it has officially decided to phase out nuclear power completely by 2022, although the economically strong parts in the country’s south receive more than 50 % of their electricity from nuclear power plants. This development towards a nuclear phase-out, which can be observed in other countries to a lesser extent, can be considered – in the jargon of BISE – as a ‘revolution’ more than an ‘evolution’. A revolution always comes with risks, but also offers opportunities. In the following we will show that the energy turnaround opens up a wide range of opportunities – if it is addressed responsibly and with a well-conceived plan. First of all it should be mentioned that this ‘revolution’ may be a current topic, but in principle is not a new one. Business & Information Systems Engineering (BISE) addressed this issue in a very early stage. For example, in issue 4/2008, the high potential of IS beyond Green IT regarding an energy turnaround was pointed out. Exactly one year later, in BISE 4/2009, the responsibility of our discipline for our planet and the threat of a worldwide resource crisis were discussed. The editorial 1/2012 and the corresponding special focus issue focused on “Smart Grids” and their relevance for the energy turnaround. All in all, we can see that the international community was aware of the energy turnaround’s relevance even before the Fukushima reactor disaster. But this is not sufficient. Rather, to ensure the success of the energy turnaround it is essential that single countries do not indulge in blind activism. This is especially important because the aims associated with the energy turnaround, such as an increased use of regenerative energies, will lead to major challenges (e.g., it is Germany’s goal to increase the use of regenerative energies from 20 % in 2011 to at least 35 % in 2020). Some of these challenges are briefly mentioned in the following: • The yield of renewable energies is often difficult to plan and control – e.g., wind and solar energy can only be extracted during suitable weather conditions. This frequently leads to a mismatch between the times of supply and demand. • These supply risks require energy storage and conventional power plants. Construction projects for energy storage are often in conflict with current regulations concerning environmental protection or are unpopular with the public. Moreover, many concepts regarding the storage of energy are still in research and development phases and thus cannot yet be used commercially. Also, construction projects for conventional power plants are often highly unpopular within the local population. • Onshore wind parks also have a negative impact on nature and hence are more and more subject to critical valuation by the public. • The transport of renewable energy requires a massive expansion of the super grid at national as well as international levels. In Germany alone, about 400 kilometers of the current distribution system would have to be enhanced and further 850 kilometers would have to be newly built until 2015. This seems challenging considering that Germany constructed only 90 kilometers from 2006 until 2011. According to the “dena-Netzstudie II”, a further 3600 kilometers are supposedly needed by 2020. Also,

A method for estimating security of electricity supply from intermittent sources: Scenarios for Germany until 2030

In this paper, we develop a methodology for deriving a consistent measure for supply adequacy in the power generation sector. We especially consider the secured generation capacity of intermittent renewable energy sources such as wind. Availability of conventional power plants is estimated through stochastic convolution of unscheduled non-usabilities. We employ our methodology to measure supply security in Germany until 2030. A detailed market analysis of power plants that are currently being built or planned provides support to our analysis for the short term. For the long term, we rely on a large-scale dispatch and investment model of the European power sector to account for the embedding of the German electricity sector in the European market. We analyze two scenarios: one with prolongation of nuclear power plants and one with a nuclear phase-out. Our results show that, even though intermittent renewables only provide very limited secured generation capacity, security of electricity supply in Germany can be assured until 2015. In the long term, the need for backup capacity for renewable energy sources increases as well as the need for electricity imports.

Economic Effects of a Nuclear-Phase Out Policy: A CGE Analysis

The paper investigates the long-run consequences of a phase-out of nuclear energy for the Swiss economy. We apply the CITE model, a CGE model with fully endogenous growth, and complement it with a bottom-up model. We find that the nuclear phase-out can be achieved at relatively low costs, even when the expansion capacities of other technologies are limited. Consumer welfare decreases by 0.4% at the maximum compared to business as usual. Our results show that an economy can cope well with ambitious energy policies through sufficient innovation. Economic growth is not slowed down significantly. The phase-out policy contributes to a structural shift in favor of innovative, energy extensive sectors. It does not work against the climate policy goals but rather accelerates the transition to a less energy-dependent economy.