Notion Of Selection Research Articles

A Pricean Formalization of Gaia

AbstractThe compatibility of the Gaia hypothesis with Darwinism is often challenged on the grounds that (1) to be potent, natural selection requires the existence of a population (whereas Gaia is a single entity), and (2) natural selection requires the entities forming a population to reproduce (whereas Gaia merely persists). However, using the Price equation, I argue, following others, that the Gaia hypothesis can fit squarely within a Darwinian framework because Gaia can exhibit adaptations if a process at a lower level (e.g., an ecosystem) can occur, and the notion of natural selection can be extended to accommodate evolution without reproduction.

Introduction. The Evolutionary Approach to Ethics: From Animal Prosociality to Human Morality.

Evolutionary research on the biological fitness of groups has recently given a prominent value to the role that prosocial behaviors play in favoring a successful adaptation to ecological niches. Such a focus marks a paradigm shift. Early views of evolution relied on the notion of natural selection as a largely competitive mechanism for the achievement of the highest amount of resources. Today, evolutionists from different schools think that collaborative attitudes are an irremovable ingredient of biological change over time. As a consequence, a number of researchers have been attracted by evolutionary studies of human behaviors. Some think that a continuity among prosocial attitudes of human beings and other social mammals (particularly primates) can be detected, and that this fact has relevance for accounting for human morality. Others deny one or the other of these claims, or both. The papers in the present special issue address how these topics impact ethics and religion.

\u201cIf they\u2019ve had a middle class upbringing that\u2019s not their fault\u201d: the professional practices and personal identities of admissions staff at selective universities in England

The role of staff involved with undergraduate admissions and recruitment has changed since the turn towards marketisation in higher education. This article focuses on the system in England following both a sharp rise in student fees and an associated tendency for the public university agenda and related social priorities, such as widening participation, to come up against more private and commercial priorities, such as business engagement, league table performance and internationalisation. Drawing on evidence from detailed interviews with admissions personnel, both academic and non-academic, across three disciplines within one higher prestige university, we revisit the notion of selectivity and the practice of selection. Tensions are revealed between two opposing approaches: a more traditional model of university admissions, as based on local knowledge and sensitivity towards underrepresented groups, and a purportedly merit-driven model, as driven by perceived market position. We explore the intricate and often unexpected ways in which staff reconcile their professed beliefs with their professional practices, and the complex identity work needed to renegotiate personal values in light of shifting institutional needs. Findings are offered as a microcosm for broader trends in the higher education sector.

Evolution of Darwinism. The classical stage: 1859 — 1926 years

The development of the theory of Darwin from 1859 to 1926 is considered. The «cohesive ephemeral» theory of heredity, dominant at this stage, was destroying the nucleus of the Darwinian concept — the notion of natural selection as the leading factor in evolution. The results of studies of geneticists of the first decades of the 20th century also pointed to the futility of the theory of natural selection as a factor directing the process of biological evolution. Keywords: «Origin of Species»; «indefinite» hereditary variability; «certain» hereditary variability; natural selection; «conjointly ephemeral» theory of heredity; «constant-corpuscular» theory of heredity.

MAKING A CONTRIBUTION AND MAKING A DIFFERENCE

Abstract There are at least two different concepts that philosophers might target when analyzing causation: a pre-selective notion and a selective notion. This paper argues that these two distinct conceptions have been conflated to date, citing the puzzles of overdetermination, extensionality, and transitivity as evidence. The primary aim of the paper is to help reset the methodological scene concerning analyses of causation.

Selectivity in Fiscal Aids: Recent Developments

The notion of fiscal aid is becoming crucial in determining the relationship between supra-national integration and national tax sovereignty; the selectivity criterion is often key in the assessment of compatibility of fiscal measures with Article 107(1) TFEU. Therefore, the notion of selectivity as defined by the recent case-law of the CJEU and decision-making practice of the Commission is fundamental in order to understand the actual allocation of powers in direct taxation matters. Against this backdrop, the aim of the present article is to establish what the current notion of selectivity is in fiscal aids, assessing whether the approach used by the CJEU and the Commission share common patterns, and evaluating the impact of such interpretation on the division of competences within the EU. In particular, this article offers a critical reading of the recent European Commission v. World Duty Free case and of the so-called Tax Rulings Decisions.

Persistent directional selection on body size and a resolution to the paradox of stasis.

Directional selection on size is common but often fails to result in microevolution in the wild. Similarly, macroevolutionary rates in size are low relative to the observed strength of selection in nature. We show that many estimates of selection on size have been measured on juveniles, not adults. Further, parents influence juvenile size by adjusting investment per offspring. In light of these observations, we help resolve this paradox by suggesting that the observed upward selection on size is balanced by selection against investment per offspring, resulting in little or no net selection gradient on size. We find that trade-offs between fecundity and juvenile size are common, consistent with the notion of selection against investment per offspring. We also find that median directional selection on size is positive for juveniles but no net directional selection exists for adult size. This is expected because parent-offspring conflict exists over size, and juvenile size is more strongly affected by investment per offspring than adult size. These findings provide qualitative support for the hypothesis that upward selection on size is balanced by selection against investment per offspring, where parent-offspring conflict over size is embodied in the opposing signs of the two selection gradients.

Self-Organization and Natural Selection: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum

This paper is aimed at clarifying one particular aspect of Derek Bickerton’s recent contribution to Biolinguistics (Bickerton 2014a), where he contends that biolinguists tend to emphasize the specifics of certain non-standard evolutionary models in order to prejudicially avoid the theory of natural selection. According to Bickerton (2014a: 78), “they [biolinguists] have problems with the notion of natural selection, up to and including a total failure to comprehend what is and how it works”. This is the most understandable, also according to Bickerton, because even evolutionary psychologists and philosophers like Pinker and Dennett, who have devoted well-known papers and books to explaining and applying natural selection to the case of cognition and language, have failed to understand the real import of Darwin’s idea: “Natural selection could not ‘explain’ complex design”, claims Bickerton (2014a: 79), “even if Pinker & Bloom (1990), Dennett (1995), and others who are not biologists think it does. In fact, natural selection does not provide a single one of the factors that go into creating design”. Bickerton’s comments in the Biolinguistics piece are specifically targeted at the model of ‘self-organization’ associated to complexity sciences, which is introduced in Longa (2001) as potentially capable of dealing with some recalcitrant problems of the evolution of language. Bickerton (2014a: 79) writes that Longa’s attacks point to “a straw man”, and that his claim that self-organization is an alternative to natural selection is “a category mistake”, for selforganization is simply one of the factors that generates the variation that natural selection selects from. So, according to Bickerton, natural selection and self-organization must be conceptualized as two complementary mechanisms that operate in a coordinated manner to bring about complex biological designs. In this response we want to explain that this is a wrong conclusion supported on wrong premises. For that purpose, we first document that biologists generally agree on the idea that natural selection creates design; second,

The function debate: between “cheap tricks” and evolutionary neutrality

We examine the use of the notion of natural selection in the philosophical debate on functions in biology. This debate has been largely shaped by the way in which different accounts assess various selective pressures in justifying claims about biological functions. Cummins (Functions: new essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 157–172, 2002), one of the main proponents of the causal role account of biological functions, argues that a correctly understood neo-Darwinian notion of natural selection has nothing to do with functional talk in biology. In this paper, we counter Cummins’ account by showing that progress in the molecular approaches to evolutionary biology—specifically scientific data available in neo-functionalization research—offers valuable support to the etiological selectionist approach to functions in biological and biologically-related sciences. Finally, we use the presented data to build our own account of biological functions, which tries to avoid the wrong turns taken by both major strands in the biological function debate, namely causal role and etiological accounts. According to our account, the function of a certain gene or a protein in the biological system that contains it is a particular causal activity, or a group of causal activities whose manifestation is in a specific way determined by corresponding mechanisms of genetic expression. Also, we argue that in many important cases this particular expression of genetic activity was positively selected at a certain point in evolutionary history. Since we take selection as an important but not the only factor that grounds biological functions, we are committed to a weak etiological account.

Direct Taxation and State Aid: Recent Developments Concerning the Notion of Selectivity

The interaction of state aid and taxation continues to give rise to conceptual difficulties, despite or, perhaps in some cases, because of the developing jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the General Court. Three recent cases attempt to bring a greater degree of coherence to the subject: Cases 78/08 to C-80/08, Paint Graphos, judgment of 8 September 2011; Case C-279/08 P, Commission v. Netherlands, judgment of 8 September 2011; and Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, Commission v. Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 2011.

Prohibited selectivity of business tax measures and tax policy

The scope of this article is to describe how state aid control is applied with respect to preferential tax regimes inspired by general tax policy considerations such as the promotion of business activities. One has to necessarily place this exercise in the framework of the perpetual debate about the notion of selectivity in reviewing measures relating to business taxation. The examination of how tax systems are used to artificially support the competitiveness of certain undertakings in a sense prohibited by Article 107(1) TFUE, generally results into the tax measure being declared incompatible with the internal market. Indeed according to the settled case law of the Court, any aid granted by a Member State, in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or productions, in so far as it affects trade between Member States is in principle incompatible with the internal market, subject to certain limited exceptions. Under which conditions certain discretional tax policy practices are selective, rather than general measures, is the fundamental question of fiscal aid control.

The Gibraltar Judgment and the Point on Selectivity in Fiscal Aids

A recent judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) provides the latest interpretation of the controversial notion of selectivity with respect to state–aid review of business tax measures pursuant to Article 87(1) of the European Community Treaty. Taxation was not the initial focus of the state–aid restrictions, but the European judicature has made it clear in some early judgments that the restriction applies to all forms of public aid including all kinds of relief from taxation normally imposed and that the restriction does not distinguish between measures of state intervention in respect to their causes or their aims but solely to their effects. However, all tax systems provide exceptions and derogations, and the distinction between legitimate or normal tax differentiations and state aids depends on the interpretation of the national framework concerned with the tax rules under examination, which effectively leaves a broad margin of technical appreciation to the Commission and creates greater practical uncertainties for national authorities and taxpayers alike. The most important statements or findings of the Court with reference to the two issues relating respectively to the notions of geographic and material selectivity are illustrated, followed by a comprehensive review of the controversial notions of selectivity general measure and justification by the nature and scheme of the tax system, under the case law of the Court and the Commission practice.

Tony Blair and the politics of race in education: whiteness, doublethink and New Labour

It is tempting to view the Blairite legacy as a simple story of political hypocrisy: a government, swept to power after almost two decades of Conservative rule, promising much but reneging on those commitments and falling back on Thatcherite authoritarian popularism when the going got tough. But that would be too simple a story. The Blairite policy trajectory in relation to race and education reveals problems that are much more deep‐rooted, and more significant, than mere political opportunism. The failure to address racism as a structural factor that shapes the assumptions of the education system (embodied in notions of selection, ability and discipline) made possible, maybe even inevitable, a situation where race equality would be sacrificed to the perceived interests and sensitivities of White people.

Developments in the Notion of Selectivity

Developments in the Notion of Selectivity

Knowledge, narrations and connoisseurship: revisiting the foundations of knowledge management

This paper attempts to revise the bases of the knowledge discussion in the field of knowledge management. The point of departure is the striking discrepancy between the great importance attributed to knowledge (knowledge economy, knowledge resources, knowledge-intensive firms, etc.) on the one hand and the largely vague and all-embracing conceptualisations of knowledge on the other hand. It is suggested that the concept of knowledge be reformulated in a much more selective and reflective way to provide an adequate template for the academic field of knowledge management. Concepts from the communicative theory of action, discourse analysis and constructivism are integrated to provide a model of the antecedents, processes and implications of a selective notion of knowledge.

Questões Sociais na Análise do Comportamento Artigos do Behavior and Social Issues (1991 - 2000)

Este trabalho teve como objetivo o estudo das publicações a respeito de questões sociais abordadas
 pelos analistas do comportamento. Uma breve revisão da literatura buscou esclarecer as relações
 entreumaciência do comportamento e as questões envolvidas na determinação de práticas sociais.
 A noção de seleção por conseqüências em três níveis proposta por Skinner é entendida como um
 aspecto fundamental para a compreensão da sociedade por parte dos analistas do comportamento.
 Foram lidos resumos e/ou títulos de 122 artigos publicados no periódico americano “Behavior and
 Social Issues” entre os anos de 1991 e 2000.Aanálise dos resultados indica direções em relação aos
 temas, problemas, objetos, natureza e resultados publicados pelos analistas do comportamento
 neste período. O estudo sugere o aprofundamento da investigação do tema em pesquisas futuras
 dada sua relevância paraumaciência do comportamento humano.

A more pluralist typology of selection processes

Instead of using only one notion of selection I argue for a broader typology of different types of selection. Three such types are differentiated, namely simple one-step selection, iterated one-step selection, and multi-step selection. It is argued that this more general and more inclusive typology might face more effectively the possible challenges of a general account of selection.

At last: Serious consideration

For a long time, several natural phenomena have been considered unproblematically selection processes in the same sense of “selection.” In our target article we dealt with three of these phenomena: gene-based selection in biological evolution, the reaction of the immune system to antigens, and operant learning. We characterize selection in terms of three processes (variation, replication, and environmental interaction) resulting in the evolution of lineages via differential replication. Our commentators were largely supportive with respect to variation and environmental interaction but critical with respect to replication, in particular its appeal to information. With some reservations, our commentators think that our general analysis of selection may fit gene-based selection in biological evolution and the reaction of the immune system but not operant learning. If nothing else, this article shows that the notion of selection is not as straightforward as it may seem.

Social assistance in Southern Europe: the case of Greece revisited

Social assistance is a largely neglected part of the welfare state in Greece. Recent surveys of social assistance arrangements in developed countries from a comparative perspective tend to portray Greece as the most 'rudimentary' member of the 'rudimentary' group of countries or social assistance regimes, i.e. Southern Europe. While not entirely unfounded, this view rests on a less than complete account of social assistance in Greece, and also ignores the latest developments that further challenge this position. This article aims to 'map' social assistance benefits in Greece, describe recent developments and discuss current debates on future directions of welfare reform in the country. This review suggests that although social assistance remains a 'poor relation' within Greece's social protection system as a whole, its relative weight is much greater than previously thought. Moreover, the profile of social assistance is set to rise due to a renewed emphasis on notions of selectivity and targeting, but also in connection with the revival of the debate on the merits and practicalities of introducing a minimum guaranteed income scheme in the country. The article concludes that the search for the proper place of social assistance within a reconstructed welfare state in Greece has only just begun.

Biological thinking in evolutionary psychology: Rockbottom or quicksand?

Evolutionary psychology is put forward by its defenders as an extension of evolutionary biology, bringing psychology within the integrated causal chain of the hard sciences. It is extolled as a new paradigm for integrating psychology with the rest of science. We argue that such claims misrepresent the methods and explanations of evolutionary biology, and present a distorted view of the consequences that might be drawn from evolutionary biology for views of human nature. General theses about adaptation in biology are empty schemata, not laws of nature allowing the subsumption of mind under biology. Functional thinking is an indispensable tool for psychology, mostly of value in abstractive unification and as a heuristic, but it gains little from association with evolutionary notions of selection. Thus, we argue, the cherished integrative causal model evaporates, and evolutionary phraseology serves no more than rhetorical purposes. Moreover, the universality of human nature and the evolutionary irrelevance of individual variation are presented as biological truths that psychologists should respect in their approach to mind. On closer inspection, this turns out to be rather dubious biology. Psychology might conceivably be better off as a continuation of biology by different means, but evolutionary psychology does not provide the conceptual integration leading to such a happy union.