Normative Terms Research Articles

Power: ambiguous not vague

ABSTRACT The major problems for complex multi-dimensional social science concepts is incoherence, often hidden by the fact that they are also vague. Analytically, precisifying can demonstrate we have incompatible intuitions about the meaning of complex normative terms. Simple vague terms can be precisified with ‘coding decisions’. Vagueness differs from ambiguity. Ambiguity occurs when a term is used to mean two quite different things and can be handled by the subscript gambit. Power is neither vague nor incoherent. We can identify a simple sense underlying all accounts of ‘power’. Ambiguous usage concerns the extension to which the simple term is applied.

Desuetudo: A Game-Theoretic Approach

I suggest an account of desuetudo in game-theoretic terms. I argue that there is an asymmetry with consuetudo, because consuetudo cannot be fully captured by a game-theoretic analysis, while desuetudo, properly understood as a dynamic, diachronic process, can. A norm (not necessarily a consuetudo) ceases to exist because there’s no need anymore, in an interactive situation, to foster certain equilibria, even though the same norm which is going in desuetudo might not have emerged as a consuetudo. While this kind of norm dynamics cannot explain all kinds of consuetudines, it can explain desuetudo, understood as a dynamic process ending with normative indifference, from a state which was normatively relevant. In this game-theoretic account the dynamicity is captured by the repeated occurence of the game, while desuetudo is the opposite process, in terms of normativity, with which a norm emerges (regardless of the fact whether the initial norm was a consuetudo or posited).

Written and Unwritten Constitutions: The Modality of Change

Written constitutions are the norm, unwritten constitutions the rare exception. There is much that can be said as to the commonalities and differences between them. There are, nonetheless, two principal variables that underscore the respective forms of constitution, which in turn impact on the modality of change: the extent to which the constitution is committed to writing, and the extent which the constitution is perceived to be separate from, and superior to, ordinary law. These twin variables are commonly perceived to be linked. There is empirical warrant for this assumption. The paradigmatic written constitution, which contains the principal constitutional norms in a single document, will commonly also enshrine, expressly or impliedly, constitutional review through which courts subject ordinary statute to review for constitutional compliance; the constitutional norms of the paradigmatic unwritten constitution will normally be found in a plethora of sources, and ordinary statute will customarily have pride of place in the constitutional schema. There is, however, no a priori normative reason why these twin variables should be linked in this manner. The embodiment of constitutional norms in a canonical document does not predetermine the content of the constitution, nor does it impel the conclusion that constitutional review exercised by a court must be part of the resulting schema. This is exemplified, as will be seen below, by the UK, where some suggestions for the shift to a written constitution are premised on the assumption that parliamentary sovereignty remains a cornerstone of the constitutional ordering. It is, by parity of reason, equally possible in principle to think of an unwritten constitution, the central features of which are markedly similar to those of the paradigmatic written constitution, such that it is accepted by all relevant players that ordinary legislative power is bounded by certain structural and rights-based precepts that are enforced, inter alia, by the courts. The manner through which this might occur will be considered more fully below. It follows from the foregoing that while the extent to which constitutional norms are committed to writing is of significance in distinguishing the two forms of constitution, the second variable is more important in normative terms, and shapes the way in which change is effectuated. The contrast in this respect is sharp. The foundational starting point of the standard written constitution is the distinction between law-making through ordinary politics and the constitution; the latter circumscribes the former, such that the terrain of ordinary politics is bounded by the constitution. The foundational starting point of the UK unwritten constitution is that parliamentary sovereignty is the principal constitutional principle; the terrain of ordinary politics is boundless and parliamentary sovereignty instantiates and elevates ordinary statute as the vehicle for its delivery. This chapter in honour of Bruce Harris explores the foregoing ideas and their implication for the modality of constitutional change. Issues of constitutional change within the unwritten constitution have been one of the main themes in Harris’ scholarship. The discussion of written constitutions begins with certain preliminaries as to the origins of the modern constitutional form. It is followed by consideration of constitutional content, distinguishing between the horizontal, vertical and structural features generally found in written constitutions, and includes discussion of over- and under-constitutionalization. The analysis concludes with brief reflection on the manner of constitutional change. The focus then turns to the UK unwritten constitution. It begins with certain preliminaries as to historical origins. The ensuing discussion considers the horizontal, vertical and structural provisions of the UK unwritten constitution and the way in which they are shaped by parliamentary sovereignty. The analysis includes the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK constitutional order, the parallel historical discourse concerning fundamental law, the resultant centrality of parliamentary sovereignty and the ways in which this was justified over time. The inquiry concludes with the modality and frame for constitutional change in the UK.

ON THE (IN)JUSTICE OF GLOBAL SOCIOECONOMIC INEQUALITIES

Global socioeconomic inequalities are one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary era since they represent a gruesome fact for the whole of humanity. This article seeks to provide a picture of the current socioeconomic inequalities at the global level and analyze the extent to which they ought to be assessed as unjust. To pursue this aim, the article examines the empirical evidence related to the growth in global socioeconomic inequalities and critically assesses them in light of the principle of redress of morally arbitrary inequalities. The article claims that global socioeconomic inequalities are affected by two relevant problematics in both methodological and normative terms. The empirical analysis demonstrates that there is a widespread methodological nationalism that jeopardizes the discussion on socioeconomic inequalities at the global level while the critical assessment of the socioeconomic inequalities shows that their strong injustice can be defended even against the Rawlsian objections to the principle of redress of morally arbitrary inequalities.

Hume’s and Kant’s understanding of epistemic normativity

Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d) questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider a priori conditions of our reasoning. Through general rules and epistemic maxims, Hume and Kant provide normative guidelines in accordance which we should form beliefs. However, in order to be able to talk about normativity, at all, we need to answer questions related to doxastic voluntarism. For Kant, the question of freedom is, to some extent, an obvious precondition for his critiques (especially of the practical mind). While with Hume, precisely because of his empirical approach to beliefs and desires, the matter is more obscure, and it seems as if Hume advocates doxastic involuntarism. In this paper, I will try to present the similarities between Hume and Kant in terms of epistemic normativity. Where it seems as if their views are incompatible, I will try to examine why this is the case. I will focus on Hume?s Treatise of Human Nature and Kant?s Second Analogy. In the end, I will present a couple of thought experiments and try to ?test? Hume and Kant. If I manage to confirm the initial hypotheses, then this paper will be a successful epistemic endeavor. However, if I fail to find the expected similarities between Hume?s and Kant?s understanding of epistemic normativity, then this work can be characterized as a historical approach to the normative framework of ?dogmatic slumber?.

Religion as one of the Leading Actors of Medieval Europe (A Critique of Rodney Stark)

The Middle Age is described as the Golden Age of Faith in both intellectual discussions and casual conversations. In addition, normative terms due to people’s ideologies or political convictions are also used to define Europe in the Middle Ages. Renaissance scholars in particular used the term "Dark Ages" to describe the period before them. However, this notion began to be questioned towards the end of the 20th century. Some researchers, especially Rodney Stark, argued that in the Middle Ages, religion was not as dominant as suggested. However, this article claims that their Medieval narrative is a caricatured historical narrative and that their claims regarding the Middle Ages are far away from reflecting that period. For the study, a qualitative research approach was adopted and the data obtained through literature review with primary and secondary sources were subjected to a descriptive analysis. The article argues that, contrary to the claims of Stark and other scholars, The Church and religion shaped the daily life of the lay people, influenced important political decisions made by empires, and dominated the thoughts of medieval intelligentsia. For this reason, the article presents the effects of the church and religion on daily life, politics and intellectual culture in this order and emphasizes that Stark's claims do not reflect the Middle Ages.

HOW DOES THE LAW PUT A HISTORICAL ANALOGY TO WORK?: DEFINING THE IMPOSITION OF “A CONDITION ANALOGOUS TO THAT OF A SLAVE” IN MODERN BRAZIL - DOI: 10.12818/P.0304-2340.2020v77p43

Over two decades, the Brazilian state has engaged in concerted legal efforts to identify and prosecute cases of what officials refer to as the imposition of “slave labor” (trabalho escravo). At a conceptual level, the campaign has paired the constitutional protection of human dignity with an interpretation of the offense described in Article 149 of the Criminal Code as “the reduction of a person to a condition analogous to that of a slave.” At the operational level, mobile teams of inspectors and prosecutors have intervened in thousands of work sites, and labor prosecutors have obtained hundreds of consent agreements and convictions in the labor courts. This article – co-authored by a legal historian, a staff attorney at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, and a federal judge – draws on a massive archive of work site inspection reports to explore the ways in which inspectors and prosecutors give specific meaning to the analogy with chattel slavery. The authors find that the term “slave labor,” in this context, does not depend upon the international law definition of slavery as the exercise over a person of “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership.” Instead, it identifies specific behaviors that are no longer permissible as between employer and worker, and which reproduce elements of what was once imposed by masters upon slaves. Intermediate normative terms introduced in the 2003 revision of the penal code – which prohibits the subjection of workers to “degrading conditions” and “debilitating work days” – have through the inspection processes taken on specific meaning. Rather than representing subjective notions in potential conflict with the principal of legality, as critics argue, their interpretation has unfolded through careful processes of documentation, negotiation, and prosecution. In Brazil’s current situation of political polarization and institutional fracture, this remarkable campaign against slave labor is coming under fierce attack from large-scale landholders and from elements within the executive, a development which adds urgency to the task of explicating the campaign’s legal bases and operational practices.

Governing complex linguistic diversity in Barcelona, Luxembourg and Riga

AbstractContemporary migration has entailed the emergence of new forms of multilingualism in many European cities. The article uses the concept of complex diversity to analyse this dynamic. The concept points at settings where historical forms of multilingualism and more recent patterns of linguistic heterogeneity interact in ways that lead to particularly rich cultural configurations. The authors assess how local authorities deal with multilingualism in three cities that represent ‘most complex’ cases of diversity politics: Barcelona, Luxembourg and Riga. The focus is on policies related to public communication and on the approaches adopted to promote social and political inclusion in ever more multilingual urban environments. In normative terms, the article concludes that political responses to complex diversity should aim both at overcoming linguistic status inequalities based on historical structures of domination and at creating common spaces of communication for diverse citizens.

Reshaping the Patient-Physician Relationship through Artificial Intelligence in Medicine? -Promises, Opportunities, and Ethical Challenges

With the rapid development of AI in medicine, it is to be expected that new asymmetries will arise in the doctor-patient relationship and normative terms such as patient autonomy, paternalism, trust, and confidentiality will acquire new meanings and functions. All of these developments will create new and complex ethical questions. Some of these questions will be analyzed and reflected in this article. It is argued that if AI improves healthcare and promotes the well-being of the patient - without violating the fundamental rights of others - it must be viewed as morally right and should not be fundamentally rejected. On the other hand, it should also be reflected what will be changed by the application of AI in healthcare and whether these changes are desirable, legally appropriate, and ethically justifiable. Therefore, we need investigations from the perspective of ethics and other humanities to go along with the establishment of AI applications in medicine simultaneously and not after the event.

La praxeología en los estudios del desarrollo (humano): lineamientos para una visión hegeliana

Aceptar la praxeología en Mises como método para predecirel desenvolvimiento del desarrollo humano es profundamentecontrovertido y no está exento de problemas analíticos ynormativos. La incapacidad para sustraerse de los llamados juicios autoevidentes se une al rechazo de aquellos elementos que condicionan como un todo su operatividad. Sometido a un concepto estrecho de bienestar (desautorizado para distinguir entre acción y actuación), queda invalidado para realizar comparaciones interpersonales, por lo que es desacreditado para asumir una teoría de justicia social que sea tanto imparcial como plural. El sistema hegeliano penetra, en cambio, con fuerza, pone orden y perfecciona la interpretación praxeológica de lo económico desde sus dimensiones operativa y normativa.

The Appellate Standard of Review in Public Law Cases

The goal of this paper is to conduct a comparative discussion of the issue of the appellate standard of review in public law cases. On this issue, two common law apex courts have recently divided: the United Kingdom Supreme Court taking one view, the High Court of Australia a very different view. In England and Wales, the Supreme Court has limited the role appellate courts can play in assessing the proportionality of administrative decisions, thereby placing a significant degree of authority in the hands of first-instance courts. By contrast, the High Court of Australia has insisted that the question of whether an administrative decision-maker acted lawfully is one of law, even where the answer to legal question at issue depends (as is often the case in contemporary public law matters) on an appreciation of contextual factors; accordingly, an appellate court can substitute its judgment for that of a first-instance court if it disagrees with the first-instance court’s conclusion. In this paper, I will begin by laying out the competing approaches taken by the UK Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia. I will then discuss the divergence between these two common law apex courts. Three issues are relevant in explaining the divergence between these two apex courts: whether clear lines of demarcation can be maintained between questions of “law” on the one hand and questions of “discretion” on the other; whether the goal of proportionate dispute resolution should influence the rules relating to appellate standard of review; and, finally whether a legal system’s culture is relatively legalistic or relatively contextual. In summary, in England and Wales, judicial and academic scepticism of the distinction between “law” and “discretion” (consistent with a general preference for contextual rather than legalistic approaches to legal issues) has allowed proportionate dispute resolution to exercise significant influence over the appellate standard of review. This was previously the case in private law and has now come to be the case in public law too. In Australia, however, judicial adherence to the “law”/“discretion” distinction (consistent with the legalistic approach celebrated by many Australian jurists) means that proportionate dispute resolution is less prominent in determining the appellate standard of review. After my analysis of the reasons for the divergence between the UK Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia, I will also discuss the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada. Although the Canadian approach to the appellate standard of review is the same as the Australian, the current approach has been criticised. Moreover, the orientation of the Canadian legal system on the three issues which explain differing approaches to the appellate standard of review more resembles the English than the Australian. Accordingly, this is an area of Canadian law which seems ripe for judicial reform. Having discussed the divergent approaches in Australia and in England and Wales, analysed the reasons for the divergence and noted the Canadian position, I conclude with a critical assessment of the English position. While the new approach of the UK Supreme Court is unsurprising, as a descriptive matter, it remains to consider whether it is defensible in normative terms. On this, I am sceptical. There are, I suggest, good arguments for the Australian position in public law cases.

Rules as Resources: An Ecological-Enactive Perspective on Linguistic Normativity

In this paper, I develop an ecological-enactive perspective on the role rules play in linguistic behaviour. I formulate and motivate the hypothesis that metalinguistic reflexivity – our ability to talk about talking – is constitutive of linguistic normativity. On first sight, this hypothesis might seem to fall prey to a regress objection. By discussing the work of Searle, I show that this regress objection originates in the idea that learning language involves learning to follow rules from the very start. I propose an ecological-enactive response to the regress objection. The key move is to deny that language learning consists initially in learning rules. A child first engages in regular communicative behaviour, by learning first-order linguistic skills, and then retroactively interprets her own behaviour in normative metalinguistic terms, i.e., as being guided by rules by relying on reflexive or second-order linguistic skills. On this view, metalinguistic reflexivity enables regulation of already regular communicative behaviour, and thereby constitutes linguistic normativity. Finally, I argue that linguistic rules are resources: they are available to participants in order to (re)negotiate properties of situated language behaviour and thereby reorganize linguistic practices. The account developed in this paper thus allows us to understand the constitutive role of metalinguistic reflexivity for linguistic normativity without falling prey to the regress objection.

Un-Masking the Mask: Developing the Sociology of Facial Politics in Pandemic Times and After

The story goes that, when he was asked what he thought were the consequences of the French Revolution, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai replied that it was still too early to tell. The same can be said of the Covid-19 pandemic. No-one knows yet how the pandemic and its multiple and complicated effects will alter the textures of all aspects of life, human and non-human, across the planet in the coming years and decades. But it is clear that, sociologically speaking, some of the consequences are already obvious in general terms. Existing social inequalities and power imbalances have been variously reinforced, extended, and worsened. This is so in terms of all the major sociological axes: class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age, location, legal status, and suchlike. Meanwhile, new inequities are being forged. Conversely, potential novel forms of solidarity and positive social transformation may be in the making, including in terms of modes and forms of citizenship. This is the terrain that a new sociology of masks, masking and facial politics will now have to grapple with. In the normative terms of critical sociology, both negative and positive processes are currently at play, even if the former seem likely to outweigh the latter. This is certainly the case in one of the most striking phenomena of what could be called Covid-19 times, namely the sudden appearance across most parts of the globe of facemasks, worn as protection against infection. Although such masks have been common in many parts of East Asia for a considerable period of time, especially in the wake of the SARS crisis of 2003 (Syed et al 2003), mass masking has not been a central feature of social life in most other world regions until Covid-19 struck. And just as the disease most likely came from East Asia and spread across the planet, so too has mass masking seemed to spread from there too, following in the wake of the virus. Covid-19 and its attendant masking practices are twin and inseparable elements of a certain kind of Asianification of the world (Park, 2019). Of course, the sociologist must be vigilant in making such claims: that apparently neutral statement is itself a kind of observation which right-wing political actors may choose to reframe and promote for their own purposes.

Contesting for Legitimacy: Worker Representation in Collective Bargaining in Guangdong

ABSTRACT ‘Worker Representation’ (WR) originated as a spontaneous practice backed by workers’ collective actions in response to the failed role of trade unions. It allows workers to bargain with employers in a somewhat organized manner, thus facilitating the possibility of voluntary negotiations for dispute settlement. WR activists have sought to regularize the practice and establish its legitimacy in pragmatic, normative and cognitive terms. Yet WR poses a dilemma to the government, as it brings two divergent outcomes: it provides solutions to labor disputes and it inspires labor activism. As a result of its dual institutional logic of dispute resolution and stability maintenance, the government’s response to WR has oscillated between accommodation and suppression.

Globalizacja obojętności czy globalizacja solidarności?

CEL NAUKOWY: Papież Franciszek jako jeden z liderów społeczności światowej często podejmuje temat globalizacji. Artykuł przedstawia poglądy papieża o negatywnie rozumianej „globalizacji obojętności” i pozytywnie rozumianej „globalizacji solidarności” w kontekście wyzwań stojących przed naukami o polityce i administracji.
 PROBLEM I METODY BADAWCZE: Analizie poddano orędzia papieża Franciszka z okazji Światowego Dnia Pokoju z lat 2014-2019 pod kątem najważniejszych wyzwań stojących aktualnie przed społecznością światową oraz kierunków jej dalszego rozwoju. Analiza ma charakter jakościowy i koncentruje się na rekonstrukcji i syntezie merytorycznych treści badanych komunikatów zarówno w warstwie deskryptywnej, jak i normatywnej.
 PROCES WYWODU: Jednym z głównych zagrożeń jest współcześnie „globalizacja obojętności” rozumiana jako pogoń za zyskiem i zamknięcie się na potrzeby najsłabszych. Chrześcijańską odpowiedzią na nią powinna być „globalizacja solidarności”, czyli odnowa ładu społecznego opartego na wartości ogólnoludzkiego braterstwa.
 WYNIKI ANALIZY NAUKOWEJ: Papież zwraca uwagę na wiele negatywnych zjawisk powiązanych z globalizacją, jednocześnie traktując ten proces jako szansę na rozwiązanie wielu problemów społecznych. Papież daje konkretne wskazówki co do koniecznych działań. Generalny konsens społeczności międzynarodowej jednak nie wystarczy, konieczne są wielopoziomowe reformy w celu przełożenia uniwersalnych wartości ludzkich na konkretne działania w różnych częściach świata.
 WNIOSKI, INNOWACJE, REKOMENDACJE: W realizacji koncepcji globalizacji solidarności dużą rolę mogą odegrać nauki społeczne, których zadaniem jest m.in. opracowanie nowego modelu przywództwa politycznego, budowanego na ogólnoludzkich wartościach braterstwa i solidarności, odrzucającego metody walki i dominacji, a opartego na wzajemnym szacunku, zaufaniu i dialogu społecznym.

Varieties of epistemic instrumentalism

There exists a family of views concerning the foundations of epistemic normativity that all travel under the heading “epistemic instrumentalism”. These views are unified by their attempt to explain epistemic normativity in terms of instrumental normativity. Very roughly, they all say that we have reason to respond to truth-related considerations when forming and maintaining doxastic attitudes since regulating our doxastic attitudes in this way helps us satisfy our aims, interests, or goals. Thus, according to epistemic instrumentalists, truth-related considerations constitute reasons for belief, but they only do so because regulating our beliefs on their basis is an effective way to satisfy our ends. I will first try to clarify the question that epistemic instrumentalism is supposed to answer. I will then identify a plausible normative commitment and show that the main varieties of epistemic instrumentalism fail to vindicate it. I will conclude by arguing that this provides us with prima facie grounds for rejecting epistemic instrumentalism.

Frege on the generality of logical laws

AbstractFrege claims that the laws of logic are characterized by their “generality,” but it is hard to see how this could identify a special feature of those laws. I argue that we must understand this talk of generality in normative terms, but that what Frege says provides a normative demarcation of the logical laws only once we connect it with his thinking about truth and science. He means to be identifying the laws of logic as those that appear in every one of the scientific systems whose construction is the ultimate aim of science, and in which all truths have a place. Though an account of logic in terms of scientific systems might seem hopelessly antiquated, I argue that it is not: A basically Fregean account of the nature of logic still looks quite promising.

The anachronistic category of non-government organisations: Moving from normative to empirical-based definitions for identifying organized interest groups in forest policymaking

NGOs take many shapes and forms, operating at various governing scales and levels. As a categorical form, NGOs often emerged as benevolent philanthropists or as antagonistic actors. Relative to governments, NGOs are envisioned to fill a void of unmet public services, exposing shortcomings, or in extreme cases, gain notoriety by applying aggressive campaigns in confrontational ways. However, more recent manifestations of NGOs are maneuvering political strategies in more elegant and reflexive ways that do not always match their more classical categorizations. Notwithstanding the proliferation of literature indicating the evolving role of NGOs, the theorizing of existing definitions and the usage of NGO as a category in the scientific literature remain anachronistic, recalling a particular imaginary of a rather simplistic idea. Indeed, as a category of analysis, the academic literature and associated political commentary refer to NGOs in normative terms that invoke benevolent, independent, and non-profit agents striving for common goals to foster societal betterment. We argue that such normative definitions of NGOs no longer reflect the empirics, and indeed obscure the overall role that such actors perform. By more closely examining NGO activities and the strategies they employ to achieve political goals, we argue that NGOs, like other interest groups, are highly political actors that pursue self-interests in ways that we might not otherwise recognize.

Enabling Translanguaging in the French Language Classroom

Recent studies in multilingual and translanguaging pedagogies have shifted the focus from investigating how students engage their multilingual repertoires to exploring how teachers understand and implement these pedagogical directions in their practice. In this article, the authors report on a national online survey on the multilingual perspectives and practices of teachers of French in Australia. The overall goal of the survey discussed here was to comprehensively capture how teachers of French understand the teaching and learning of languages in general, and of French in particular. The study revealed several tensions between the language teachers’ beliefs and practice. While most of the survey participants expressed strong support for innovative pedagogies such as translanguaging (García & Wei, 2014), and keen motivation to engage the full multilingual repertoire of their learners, a closer reading of the data indicated that most of them felt restricted in their practice by “the normative terms and conditions of an understanding of languages education that remains rooted in parochial, monolingual and pecuniary perspectives” (Weinmann & Arber, 2017, p. 173). In particular, the findings indicate that (self-)perceptions of “non-native” language teachers as “culturally deficient” continue to frame the notion of what constitutes a “good” language teacher (Holliday, 2015). For teachers to feel more confident and better equipped to effectively implement translanguaging pedagogies in their practice, teachers’ perceptions of their own multilingual identities and how these are shaped within the systems they work in (Young, 2017) need to be better understood.
 Keywords: Languages teaching, languages education, translanguaging, native language teacher, non-native language teacher, linguistic repertoire, multilingualism, Australia

Talking about ‘Fairness’ in Football and Politics: The Case of Navad

ABSTRACT We argue that sport in general, and association football in particular, are activities that invite spectators and players alike to talk about them. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, we argued more precisely that football, like any sport, may be understood as a form of life, and as such that it enables speakers to talk about it in quite specific ways, not least in the manner in which normative terms, such as fairness and bias, are used. Football thereby creates a metaphorical space, we suggest, in which there is a freedom to explore and play with language, and in particular normative language, even if that language-use is repressed in the wider political society. Using the example of the Iranian television programme Navad as a case study, we explore the ways in which talk about fairness in the context of football can develop and sustain a competence in the use of political and moral language-use even when that competence is under-threat elsewhere.