Non-cognitive Processes Research Articles

A property cluster theory of cognition

Our prominent definitions of cognition are too vague and lack empirical grounding. They have not kept up with recent developments, and cannot bear the weight placed on them across many different debates. I here articulate and defend a more adequate theory. On this theory, behaviors under the control of cognition tend to display a cluster of characteristic properties, a cluster which tends to be absent from behaviors produced by non-cognitive processes. This cluster is reverse-engineered from the empirical tests that comparative psychologists use to determine whether a behavior was generated by a cognitive or a non-cognitive process. Cognition should be understood as the natural kind of psychological process that non-accidentally exhibits the properties assessed by these tests (as well as others we have not yet discovered). Finally, I review two plausible neural accounts of cognition's underlying mechanisms—one based in localization of function to particular brain regions and another based in the more recent distributed networks approach to neuroscience—which would explain why these properties non-accidentally cluster. While this notion of cognition may be useful for a number of debates, I here focus on its application to a recent crisis over the distinction between cognition and association in comparative psychology.

Recognizing transcendence when you see it: Dynamical systems theory as an action-based approach: Commentary on “Stepping off the pendulum: Why only an action-based approach can transcend the nativist–empiricist debate” by J. Allen and M. Bickhard

ions. This is the critical juncture, where DST remains non-representational and the Interactivist Approach does not. Those higher order abstractions may, so to speak, represent the concept of representation that has been so troubling. Higher order abstractions transcend a particular system, modality and task (e.g., Barsalou, 2003; Barsalou et al., 2007; Smith & Sheya, 2010). The abstractions contribute stability, so that one can make appropriate behavioral decisions in the face of changing task dynamics. But those abstractions, what we might call knowledge, are still embedded in those complex interactive processes. There is no point at which the abstraction is divorced from the non-cognitive processes that created it, like perception, action, goal management, reward, affect, social interaction and development (Barsalou et al., 2007). Allen and Bickhard (2013) posit that this kind of representation is in the eye of the beholder, that the neural or system-wide stabilities that lead to higher order abstractions only do so to the extent that researchers define them as such. They argue that if researchers do conceive of these stabilities as “representing” the world, then new representations are possible; if they do not, then there is no way to ever become representational. However, I respectfully disagree with Allen and Bickhard on this Author's personal copy M.W. Clearfield / Cognitive Development 28 (2013) 134– 137 137 point for two reasons. First, I’m not convinced that classic representations are any less in the eye of the beholder than higher order abstractions or neural stabilities. Since representations are not a physical body, they must be a theoretical construct. Therefore, they exist only when and where theorists posit that they do. More importantly, I think that the strength of DST is precisely that it is not classically representational, that it never becomes so. Making knowledge representational, even if it begins from non-cognitive processes, eventually divorces it from the non-cognitive processes that created it. This is what the Interactivist Approach proposes, that knowledge is built through action but somehow becomes abstract, and separate from the perception–action loops that made it. Knowledge, according to DST, is never disembodied and it is never static. It is never divorced from the myriad of interacting processes that created it. Indeed, it is truly an Action-Based approach. Overall, I agree with much of Allen and Bickhard’s assessment. I agree that nativism is conceptually flawed. I agree that diagnosing the nature–nurture debate is important in allowing the field to transcend it. And I agree that an Action-based approach is the best approach to understanding the process by which infants both achieve stability in interacting with the world while remaining flexibly adaptive. However, I believe that Dynamical Systems Theory may be the best Action-based approach to date. The sticking point between DST and the Interactivist Approach is the notion of representation. Just as the authors call for transcending the nature–nurture debate, perhaps it is time to transcend antiquated notions of static representations. Only when we embrace a new conception of knowledge, one that is always inextricably linked to the non-cognitive processes that create it, will we truly move developmental science forward.

Individual Differences in Decision‐making Competence

Throughout their lives, people make decisions about their health, finances, and environmental impacts. Research on decision-making competence examines the decision-making skills people need to improve their real-world decisions and to obtain better life decision outcomes (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). If critical decision-making skills can be improved through teaching and decision support, this research ultimately brings the promise of designing interventions that improve the outcomes of people's decisions and, hence, their overall quality of life. In addition to having practical implications, research on decision-making competence contributes important theoretical and methodological insights to the field of judgment and decision-making. Theoretically, research on decision-making competence improves our understanding of the cognitive and non-cognitive processes that shape people's ability to make decisions, as well as their development throughout the lifespan (for reviews, see Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2011; Finucane & Lees, 2005; Peters & Bruine de Bruin, in press; Peters, Hess, Auman, & Vastfjall, 2007). Methodologically, research on decision-making competence aims to improve the reliability of commonly studied judgment and decisionmaking tasks, seen in consistent performance across decision problems, as well as their validity, seen in relationships to obtaining better life decision outcomes. Moreover, it stimulates the use of more sophisticated data analysis methods, in particular, model comparison techniques (e.g., Tomlinson, Marewski, & Dougherty, 2011). Despite its potential promise, the topic of individual differences in decision-making competence has received relatively little attention in the field of judgment and decision-making. Possibly, this scarcity is due to researchers having traditionally focused on identifying decision-making biases, and on the situational conditions rather than the individual differences that contribute to these biases. Furthermore, studying individual differences often requires access to diverse populations that vary in their decision-making competence and life experiences, and the means to recruit samples that are large enough to provide statistical power. Moreover, validating individual-differences measures poses the challenge of identifying objective criterion variables that provide unambiguous evidence of good decision-making (Finucane & Lees, 2005; see also Stanovich & West, 2000). Possibly, researchers have also been discouraged by studies on individual differences in decision-making styles, which have identified few stable personal characteristics that consistently affect decision-making across tasks and contexts (Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf & Weber, 2011). Yet, the few studies that have examined individual differences in decision-making competence have shown the feasibility of overcoming these challenges (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988; Del Missier, Mantyla & Bruine de Bruin, 2011; Finucane et al., 2002; Finucane & Guillon, 2010; Finucane & Lees, 2005; Finucane, Mertz, Slovic, & Schmidt, 2005; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Smith, Shanteau, & Johnson, 2004), with recent work introducing valid and reliable instruments targeting various age groups (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Finucane & Guillon, 2010; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). This special issue of the Journal of Behavioral Decision-Making aims to swell interest in decision-making competence through the presentation of novel research efforts.

Special Issue on Noncognitive Psychological Processes And Academic Achievement

Special Issue on Noncognitive Psychological Processes And Academic Achievement

Information and Atmospheres: Exploring the Relationship between the Natural Environment and Information Aesthetics

Information and Atmospheres: Exploring the Relationship between the Natural Environment and Information Aesthetics

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) use conspecifics’ emotional expressions to evaluate emotional valence of objects

Emotional expressions provide important clues to other individuals' emotional states, as well as the environmental situations leading to such states. Although monkeys often modify their behavior in response to others' expressions, it is unclear whether this reflects understanding of emotional meanings of expressions, or simpler, non-cognitive processes. The present study investigated whether a New World monkey species, tufted capuchin monkeys, recognize objects as elicitors of others' expressions. Observer monkeys witnessed another individual (demonstrator) reacting either positively or negatively to the contents of one of two containers and were then allowed to choose one of the containers. The observer preferred the container that evoked positive expressions in the demonstrator and avoided the container that evoked negative expressions. Thus, the monkeys appropriately associated the emotional valence of others' expressions with the container. This finding supports the view that the ability to represent others' emotions is not limited to humans and apes.

Modeling the effects of hypoglycemia on a two-choice task in adult humans.

Previous research has demonstrated that hypoglycemia causes reaction times to be slower and more variable. Reaction time tests, however, use multiple cognitive and noncognitive processes. This study is the first to use a validated sequential sampling model (diffusion model) applied to results obtained from a simple 2-choice task in adult humans to assess the effects of hypoglycemia on the basic parameters of decision making. Fourteen adult volunteers were tested on a numerosity discrimination task with and without reduced blood glucose concentrations. The results were analyzed with a model that dissects the components of processing that underlie decisions: the quality of the information on which a decision is based (drift rate), the critical amount of evidence that must be accumulated before a decision is made (boundary separation), and the time taken by nondecision processes. Hypoglycemia resulted in a reduction of mean drift rate from 0.290 to 0.211, t(13) = 4.10, p < .05. No effect of experimental state was observed on the amount of evidence required to make a decision or peripheral and motor processes. This study locates the precise processing deficit associated with hypoglycemia and provides further understanding of the precise cognitive effect of hypoglycemia. Further research into the amelioration of these effects is required.

The coupling-constitution fallacy revisited

The hypothesis of extended cognition maintains that cognitive processes sometimes span the brain, body, and world. One of the most prominent types of arguments for this hypothesis begins with observations of the role of certain sorts of bodily and environmental influences on cognitive processes, then concludes that these bodily and environmental influences are themselves cognitive processes. This paper will argue that, while it is widely appreciated that the simplest versions of these “coupling arguments” are fallacious, the advocates of extended cognition still seem to underestimate how prevalent even the simplest forms are in the literature, why they are so pervasive, and how these fallacious arguments might be avoided by greater attention to a plausible theory of what distinguishes cognitive processes from non-cognitive processes.

Letting structure emerge: connectionist and dynamical systems approaches to cognition

Connectionist and dynamical systems approaches explain human thought, language and behavior in terms of the emergent consequences of a large number of simple noncognitive processes. We view the entities that serve as the basis for structured probabilistic approaches as abstractions that are occasionally useful but often misleading: they have no real basis in the actual processes that give rise to linguistic and cognitive abilities or to the development of these abilities. Although structured probabilistic approaches can be useful in determining what would be optimal under certain assumptions, we propose that connectionist, dynamical systems, and related approaches, which focus on explaining the mechanisms that give rise to cognition, will be essential in achieving a full understanding of cognition and development.

The involvement of emotion recognition in affective theory of mind

This study was conducted to explore the relationship between emotion recognition and affective Theory of Mind (ToM). Forty subjects performed a facial emotion recognition and an emotional intention recognition task (affective ToM) in an event-related fMRI study. Conjunction analysis revealed overlapping activation during both tasks. Activation in some of these conjunctly activated regions was even stronger during affective ToM than during emotion recognition, namely in the inferior frontal gyrus, the superior temporal sulcus, the temporal pole, and the amygdala. In contrast to previous studies investigating ToM, we found no activation in the anterior cingulate, commonly assumed as the key region for ToM. The results point to a close relationship of emotion recognition and affective ToM and can be interpreted as evidence for the assumption that at least basal forms of ToM occur by an embodied, non-cognitive process.

Disruption of hippocampus‐regulated behavioural and cognitive processes by heterozygous constitutive deletion of SynGAP

The brain-specific Ras/Rap-GTPase activating protein (SynGAP) is a prime candidate linking N-methyl-d-aspartate receptors to the regulation of the ERK/MAP kinase signalling cascade, suggested to be essential for experience-dependent synaptic plasticity. Here, we evaluated the behavioural phenotype of SynGAP heterozygous knockout mice (SG(+/-)), expressing roughly half the normal levels of SynGAP. In the cognitive domain, SG(+/-) mice demonstrated severe working and reference memory deficits in the radial arm maze task, a mild impairment early in the transfer test of the water maze task, and a deficiency in spontaneous alternation in an elevated T-maze. In the non-cognitive domain, SG(+/-) mice were hyperactive in the open field and appeared less anxious in the elevated plus maze test. In contrast, object recognition memory performance was not impaired in SG(+/-) mice. The reduction in SynGAP thus resulted in multiple behavioural traits suggestive of aberrant cognitive and non-cognitive processes normally mediated by the hippocampus. Immunohistochemical evaluation further revealed a significant reduction in calbindin-positive interneurons in the hippocampus and doublecortin-positive neurons in the dentate gyrus of adult SG(+/-) mice. Heterozygous constitutive deletion of SynGAP is therefore associated with notable behavioural as well as morphological phenotypes indicative of hippocampal dysfunction. Any suggestion of a possible causal link between them however remains a matter for further investigation.

Prescribing love for the heart? Stress reduction and medical effects of altruism, compassion and love

Objective Talking points on the therapeutic significance of love offered by neurobiology and positive psychology. Discussion Love is difficult to define. Looked at neurobiologically, it is closely associated with the concept of pleasure, reward and ‘positive psychology’, i.e., joyful mental states, and therefore has become a feature not only of psychological but also of basic science research and clinical medicine. Though not identical, altruism and compassion show physiological commonalities with the neurobiology of love. This understanding utilizes limbic ‘neural emotionality’, using as substrates, among others, endogenous morphine, dopamine and nitric oxide signaling. Particularly in love responses, oxytocin and vasoppressin additionally fit in. Love in the beginning can be stressful. This is also true of other stress-reducing practices that incorporate a stress component initially, i.e., relaxation and placebo responses. This initial uprise is termed anticipatory stress response (ASR). The initial activation of this stress component of the total response – i.e., relaxation and/or love response – is significant and represents a protective mechanism. Activation is started, then followed by relaxation, i.e., stress release, only if the situation allows for it, guaranteeing an appropriate environment. Stress and love therefore act as biological counterplayers. This function of love is of particular importance for the cardiovascular system and is expressed via stress response pathways and their subsequent down-regulation. Thus, emotional (i.e., non-cognitive) processes became adducts to stress activation, terminating it quickly. Altruistic and compassionate behaviors exactly fulfil this need and thus show stress-reducing capacities. Physiological alterations following such behaviors can be profound and lasting, as demonstrated for the autonomous and the central nervous or the cardiovascular systems. This potential has led to a broad array of studies demonstrating positive medical effects of love, social bonding, volunteering and compassion, especially of benefit for the heart and the brain, implying that this self-healing potential could be used in various therapeutic situations, including integrative medicine. Conclusions Love facilitates health and stress reduction. This effect can be observed clinically and biologically. Thus, love and companionship not only ensure the survival of individuals and their species, but also support beneficial motivation and health behaviors.

LeDoux's Fear Circuit and the Status of Emotion as a Non-cognitive Process

LeDoux (1996) has identified a sub-cortical neural circuit that mediates fear responses in rats. The existence of this neural circuit has been used to support the claim that emotion is a non-cognitive process. In this paper I argue that this sub-cortical circuit cannot have a role in the explanation of emotions in humans. This worry is raised by looking at the properties of this neural pathway, which does not have the capacity to respond to the types of stimuli that are generally taken to trigger emotion responses. In particular, the neurons in this pathway cannot represent the stimulus as a complete object or event, rather they represent the simple information that is encoded at the periphery. If it is assumed that an object or event in the world is what, even in simple cases, causes an emotion, then this sub-cortical pathway has limited use in a theory of emotion.

Wittgenstein and the memory debate

In this paper, I survey the impact on neuropsychology of Wittgenstein's elucidations of memory. Wittgenstein discredited the storage and imprint models of memory, dissolved the conceptual link between memory and mental images or representations and, upholding the context-sensitivity of memory, made room for a family resemblance concept of memory, where remembering can also amount to doing or saying something. While neuropsychology is still generally under the spell of archival and physiological notions of memory, Wittgenstein's reconceptions can be seen at work in its leading-edge practitioners. However, neuroscientists, generally, are finding memory difficult to demarcate from other cognitive and noncognitive processes, and I suggest this is largely due to their considering automatic responses as part of memory, termed nondeclarative or implicit memory. Taking my lead from Wittgenstein's On Certainty, I argue that there is only remembering where there is also some kind of mnemonic effort or attention, and, therefore, that so-called implicit memory is not memory at all, but a basic, noncognitive certainty.

Entrepreneurial human capital accumulation and the growth of rural businesses: a four-country survey in mountainous and lagging areas of the European union

The paper presents the processes of entrepreneurial human capital accumulation and its impact on rural business growth. Data are derived from four surveys on rural businesses in mountainous and less favoured areas in Southern Europe. Formal pathways of entrepreneurial human capital accumulation refer to education and training, while informal pathways include the cognitive processes of work and managerial experience acquisition and the non-cognitive processes of being raised within an entrepreneurial family environment and/or being raised in the area within which the business is later set-up. The studies reveal that there is a variety of processes of entrepreneurial human capital and knowledge accumulation that are case study specific. Human capital accumulation processes related to education and training or to work and managerial experience still plays the prime role in predicting successful businesses. Results indicate the need for decentralised, flexible and selective entrepreneurial human capital accumulation support programmes that take into account local idiosyncrasies and needs.

The Canberra Longitudinal Study: Design, Aims, Methodology, Outcomes and Recent Empirical Investigations

The first section of this paper describes methodology and major cognitive outcomes of the Canberra Longitudinal Study (CLS). This community study of 1045 Australians aged 70 years or over commenced in 1990. Participants were reassessed on three subsequent occasions. Its major themes were investigations of prevalence of dementia and depression, risk factors, inter-individual variability and instrument development. Over 60 papers arising from the study have been published. The second section of this paper describes the use of a Factor of Curves (FOC) latent growth model to examine the existence of a common factor responsible for age-related deterioration in cognitive and non-cognitive processes. This analysis is a logical progression in a series of investigations using the Canberra Longitudinal Study into risk factors and correlates of cognitive change using structural equation modeling techniques. The FOC model is described and is used to explore the nature of an hypothesized common factor and to determine its relationship with age, gender, education, pre-morbid intelligence and to the ApoE genotype. Latent growth models were developed for each of reaction time, Symbol Letter Modalities Test (SLMT), Grip strength, self-reported Sensory disability and memory from three waves of data. Second-order latent level slope factors were established based on the individual factor growth curve models. Although a common factor model could be fitted to the data, there is little support that it represents a single common cause.

Self-directedness: A Process Approach to Cognition

Standard approaches to cognition emphasise structures (representations and rules) much more than processes, in part because this appears to be necessary to capture the normative features of cognition. However the resultant models are inflexible and face the problem of computational intractability. I argue that the ability of real world cognition to cope with complexity results from deep and subtle coupling between cognitive and non-cognitive processes. In order to capture this, theories of cognition must shift from a structural rule-defined conception of cognition to a thoroughgoing embedded process approach.

The "common cause hypothesis" of cognitive aging: evidence for not only a common factor but also specific associations of age with vision and grip strength in a cross-sectional analysis.

A prominent hypothesis in cognitive aging is the existence of a common factor that is responsible for age-related deterioration in cognitive and noncognitive processes. A multiple indicators, multiple causes model was used to examine the nature of this common factor and its relationship to age, gender, and the apolipoprotein E (APOE) genotype. The common factor was modeled by using 10 indicator variables with 374 participants aged between 77.4 and 98.7 years. A latent factor was identified, with all indicators except blood pressure loading significantly. This factor could be established in 2 age strata within the sample. After controlling for the effects of gender, APOE, and level of education, direct effects of age were seen on visual functioning and grip strength. APOE was significantly associated with memory but not with the common factor. The findings suggest that a number of specific processes may operate concurrently with any common cause factor.

Prefrontal, Parietal, and Temporal Cortex Networks Underlie Decision-Making in the Presence of Uncertainty

Decision-making in the presence of uncertainty, i.e., selecting a sequence of responses in an uncertain environment according to a self-generated plan of action, is a complex activity that involves both cognitive and noncognitive processes. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, the neural substrates of decision-making in the presence of uncertainty are examined. Normal control subjects show a significant activation of a frontoparietal and limbic neural system during a two-choice prediction task relative to a two-choice response task. The most prevalent response strategy during the two-choice prediction task was “win–stay/lose–shift,” where subjects will repeat the previous response if it successfully predicted the stimulus and switch to the alternative response otherwise. Increased frequency of responses that are consistent with this strategy is associated with activation in the superior temporal gyrus. In comparison, increased frequency of response inconsistent with win–stay/lose–shift is associated with parietal cortex activation. These results support the hypothesis that subjects use a frontoparietal neural system to establish a contingency based decision-making strategy even in the presence of random reinforcement.

Serotonin and acetylcholine release response in the rat hippocampus during a spatial memory task

By using in vivo microdialysis we monitored the extracellular levels of acetylcholine and serotonin in the hippocampus of rats performing a spatial memory task. After rats were trained for 10 consecutive days to master a food-reinforced radial-arm maze task, they were implanted with a microdialysis probe in the dorsal hippocampus. On day 12, rats were tested in the maze and acetylcholine and serotonin outputs were monitored before the test, during the waiting phase and while performing the trials. In trained, food-rewarded rats, hippocampal acetylcholine levels increased during the waiting period (181±9% of baseline) and further increased during the radial-maze performance to 236±13% of baseline values, while serotonin levels did not change during the waiting period but increased to 142±3% during the maze performance. To discriminate whether the increase of acetylcholine and serotonin levels during the testing was associated with memory performance or with food consumption, we monitored hippocampal acetylcholine and serotonin release in rats that were trained, but not food rewarded, or in rats that were not trained, but rewarded only on the test day. In the trained, non-rewarded group, acetylcholine release increased during the waiting phase to 168±6%, but did not increase further during the task performance. In contrast, no change in serotonin release was observed in this group in any phase of the test. In rats which were not trained, but food rewarded, acetylcholine increased only during the maze period (150±5%). Serotonin increased gradually and become significant at the end of the trials. (130±3%). While both neurotransmitters could be implicated in feeding behaviour, only activation of cholinergic neurotransmission appears to be associated with memory function. Our results support the following hypotheses: (i) hippocampal acetylcholine could be involved in attentional and cognitive functions underlying motivational processes; (ii) serotonin could be implicated in non-cognitive processes (i.e. in the control of motor and feeding behaviour). Since serotonin and acetylcholine neurotransmission is simultaneously activated during the spatial memory task, this suggests that these neurotransmitter systems regulate behavioural and cognitive functions.