Nonreductive Materialism Research Articles

Completing Kornblith’s Project

In his Inductive Inference and Its natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology, Hilary Kornblith presents an argument for the justification of induction that is bold, brilliant, and plausible, but radically incomplete. In the development of this position, Kornblith relies heavily on the philosophical work of Richard Boyd as well as on some empirical psychological studies. As Kornblith sees it, the philosophical position entailed by his proposed solution to the problem is a thoroughgoing realistic, scientific materialism. I will argue that the brand of realism that Kornblith's solution to the problem of induction presupposes is inexplicable within the context of the non-reductive material- ism that he espouses. Although Kornblith provides us with valuable elements for a solution to the problem of induction, it needs to be supplemented with something like a renovated Aristotelian notion of form in order for the solution to be plausible. A LTHOUGH IT WAS originally suggested by Quine, Hilary Kornblith has become the standard-bearer of naturalized epistemology, and in Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology 1 he proposes the outline of a solution to the problem of the justification of induction that is bold, brilliant, and plausible but radically incomplete. In the development of this posi- tion, he relies heavily on the philosophical work of Richard Boyd as well as on some empirical psychological studies. As Kornblith sees it, the philosophical posi- tion entailed by his proposed solution to the problem of induction is a thoroughgoing, realistic, scientific materialism. However, in this paper, I will argue that the brand of realism that Kornblith's solution to the problem of induction presupposes is inexplicable within the context of the non-reductive materialism he espouses. I will argue that although Kornblith provides us with valuable elements for a solu- tion to the problem of induction, it needs to be supplemented with something like a renovated Aristotelian notion of form in order for the solution to be plausible. In order to defend the appeal to the Aristotelian conception of form and formal causality and yet be consistent with the spirit of naturalized epistemology, I will rely upon the ecological theory of perception of James J. Gibson. Gibson's work makes possible—in fact it cries out for—a naturalized epistemological renovation of form. Although I see my project here as being within the general contours of naturalized epistemology, one of the global implications of the position I propose

Thoughts on Nonreductive Materialism

Thoughts on Nonreductive Materialism

More on Global Supervenience

Jaegwon Kim contends that global supervenience is consistent with non-materialistic cases. Paull and Sider, Horgan, as well as Kim, attempt to defend it from these charges. It is shown here that their defense is only partially successful. Their defense meets one challenge to global supervenience-the hydrogen-atom case-but fails to meet other, 'local', cases. It is suggested that the other challenges can be met if global supervenience is combined with weak supervenience. The combination of global and weak supervenience constitutes a viable picture of psychophysical relations, and is especially attractive to nonreductive materialists who are also anti-individualists. Global supervenience is seen as an important version of non-reductive materialism. It is especially attractive to non-reductivists with anti-individualistic inclinations. But there are also worries that global supervenience falls short of establishing important aspects of a materialist picture of the mind. Jaegwon Kim,' for example, argues that there are non-materialist scenarios that are compatible with global supervenience. More recently, Paull and Sider2 and Terence Horgan3 attempt to defend global supervenience from these charges. I argue that their defense is only partially successful. It succeeds in meeting one challenge to global supervenience, but fails to meet others. I then suggest that global supervenience can be salvaged if it is combined with weak supervenience. The combination of global and weak supervenience, I argue, is a serious option for non-reductive materialists who are also antiindividualists.

Closet Dualism and Mental Causation

Serious doubts about nonreductive materialism — the orthodoxy of the past two decades in philosophy of mind — have been long overdue. Jaegwon Kim has done perhaps the most to articulate the metaphysical problems that the new breed of materialists must confront in reconciling their physicalism with their commitment to the autonomy of the mental. Although the difficulties confronting supervenience, multiple-realizability, and mental causation have been recurring themes in his work, only mental causation — in particular, the specter of epiphenomenalism — has really captured the interest of philosophers in general in recent years.This growing attention has spawned a large body of literature, which it is not our aim here to explore or assess. Rather, we want to call attention to what we believe is a new and quite different argumentative strategy against epiphenomenalism voiced in some recent articles by Tyler Burge and Stephen Yablo. Each has challenged two central assumptions of the existing mental causation debate.

Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion

For three decades Jaegwon Kim has articulated and defended the view that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, are supervenient on physical properties, and are causal properties figuring in supervenient causation. But he has increasingly come under the influence of a problem, the causal exclusion problem, which threatens to undermine any kind of psychophysical property dualism, thus leaving type-type identity as the only viable form of realism about the mind. In this paper I will focus on the increasingly central role of the causal exclusion problem in Kim's philosophical work.' I will argue that if we seek to accommodate causal-exclusionary considerations, as he does-rather than firmly repudiating them as mistaken-then we are inevitably driven toward a psychophysical type/type identity theory. This is where Kim's intellectual trajectory is leading him, although he has not yet embraced the view. The appropriate form of the identity theory is one that also accommodates species-relative multiple realization-despite the fact that multiple-realization considerations are commonly thought to undermine type-type psychophysical identities altogether. Ironically, the relevant version of the identity theory is not new at all; in its essentials, it is the position of D.M. Armstrong (1968, 1970, 1977) and David Lewis (1966, 1972), as amended in an important and insufficiently appreciated way in Lewis (1980). Although I will suggest that the Armstrong/Lewis version of the psychophysical identity theory is the position that Kim himself should adopt, given his own philosophical attitude toward the problem of causal exclusion, I do not believe it is the right view. I favor a version of nonreductive materialism that (i) asserts that mental properties can be physically multiply realizable not just across different species but within creatures of the same species, (ii) repudiates psychophysical type-type identities, and (iii) maintains that causal-exclusionary reasoning is mistaken. In the final section I will briefly explain my own position on the matter of causal exclusion.

Two Cheers for Reductionism: Or, the Dim Prospects for Non-Reductive Materialism

I argue that a certain version of physicalism, which is viewed by both its admirers and its detractors as non-reductionist, in fact entails two claims which, though not reductionist in the currently most popular sense of ‘reductionist’, conform to the spirit of reductionism sufficiently closely to compromise its claim to be a comprehensively non-reductionist version of physicalism. Putatively non-reductionist versions of physicalism in general, I suggest, are likely to be non-reductionist only in some senses, but not in others, and hence to disappoint those who wish to be physicalists but still to remain soft and cuddly non-reductionists.

Nonreductive Materialism and Mental Causation

I take nonreductive materialism to be the conjunction of two theses, the first ontological, the second epistemological. The ontological thesis - token physicalism- is that mental events (processes, states, etc.) are tokenidentical to physical events; the epistemological thesis is that psychology is not reducible to physical theory in the classic sense of 'reduction,' according to which we reduce a theory to a another theory by deriving the laws of the former from the laws of the latter via 'bridge principles' linking the predicates of the reducing theory with the predicates of the reduced theory.

Romanticism in science: science in Europe, 1790-1840

Preface. Introduction. Wechselwirkung in the Life and Other Sciences: a Word, New Claims and a Concept around 1800 ... and much Later G. H. Muller. Geometry and 'Metaphysics of Space' in Gauss and Riemann U. Bottazzini. Romanticism versus Enlightenment: Sir Humphrey Davy's Idea of Chemical Philosophy F. Abbri. Lamarck and the Birth of Biology 1740--1810 G. Barsanti. On the Origin of Romantic Biology and its Further Development at the University of Jena between 1790 and 1850 I. Jahn. 'Nature is an Organized Whole': J.F. Fries's Reformulation of Kant's Philosophy of Organism F. Gregory. The Anthropological Theory of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach S. Fabbri Bertoletti. Sommerring, Kant and the Organ of the Soul L. Marino. Neurology and Biology in the Romantic Age in Germany: Carus, Burdach, Gall, von Baer S. Poggi. From Romantic Naturphilosophie to a Theory of Scientific Method for the Medical Disciplines W.R. Woodward, R. Pester. Romanticism and Dutch Scientists H.A.M. Snelders. The Unity of Teaching and Research R. Stichweh. Linguistics and Modern Philology in Germany 1800--1840 as 'Scientific' Subjects and as University Disciplines H.H. Christmann. The Unity of Nature and Mind: Gustav Theodor Fechner's Non-Reductive Materialism M. Heidelberger.

Psychophysical supervenience and nonreductive materialism

Jaegwon Kim and others have claimed that (strong) psychophysical supervenience entails the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties. I argue that this claim is unwarranted with respect to epistemic (explanatory) reducibility (either of a ‘global’ or of a ‘local’ sort), as well as with respect to ontological reducibility. I then attempt to show that a robust version of nonreductive materialism (which I call ‘supervenient token-physicalism’) can be defended against the charge that nonreductive materialism leads to epiphenomenalism in failing to account for the causal or explanatory relevance of mental properties.

In Defense of Global Supervenience

In recent years many philosophers have defended nonreductive materialism. According to this view, the special sciences are irreducible to physics even though all non-physical facts are determined by (and depend upon) physical facts. The notion of supervenience has played a prominent role in the thinking of these philosophers.' To see that this is no accident we need only consider the two main desiderata that supervenience relations are meant to capture: (i) the dependence of the supervening properties on the subvenient, or base, properties and (ii) the irreducibility of the supervening properties (and hence of the sciences that study them). In his recent Presidential Address to the APA, and elsewhere, Jaegwon Kim has argued that none of the standard supervenience relations found in the literature are capable of capturing both of these desiderata.2 A relation strong enough to ensure dependence, says Kim, will be so strong that it will jeopardize irreducibility. A relation weak enough to be compatible with irreducibility will be too weak to yield dependence. Kim's conclusion is that nonreductive materialism is not a viable option for philosophers of mind. Kim pays particular attention to the relation of global supervenience which is thought by many to be the version of supervenience that best satisfies the two desiderata and is therefore available to nonreductive materialists. He claims that, while it is weak enough not to endanger irreducibility, global supervenience is too weak to satisfy the first desideratum of dependency. We deny this claim. We will show that Kim's arguments do not establish that global supervenience is too weak to count as a respectable dependency relation. The problem with the arguments originates in his discussion of the nonequivalence of strong and global supervenience.

The metaphysics of irreducibility

We do not believe that the reasons which have been offered of late for rejecting non-reductive materialism should be accepted. The reasons for which reductive accounts were largely abandoned remain good ones, and non-reductive materialism remains the most satisfying and sensible account of the relationship among the special sciences.

The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism

The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism

Non-Reductive Materialism and the Spectrum of Mind-Body Theories

In what follows I will sketch a very simple possible-world semantics which will allow us to sharpen the notion of a non-reductive, but materialist, mind-body identity theory. This simple semantics will enable us to characterize the various possible positions on mind-body identity and display the range of positions with respect to psycho-physical reduction. Though I am sympathetic to a non-reductive position which I label “autonomous monism”, I will be concerned here less with presenting positive arguments for that position than with describing a framework in which such arguments can be made and pointing out the issues that the position raises. The discussion achieves its abstract viewpoint at the cost of slightly idealizing the process of theory reduction, but the overview attained is worth the price.

Nonreductive materialism and the materialisms of Marx and Heidegger

It is often argued that the marxist and existential-phenomenological orienta? tions in sociology are incommensurable. Insofar as Marx's sociology is founded upon a materialist ontology, it is presumed to entail the thesis of physicalism. Physicalism is the thesis that all human activity can, in principle, be adequately described and explained in the languages of physics, chemistry, and biology. The problem with physicalism is that it constitutes a strong challenge to the notions of human moral responsibility and free will. On the other hand, the existential phenomenological approach to sociology upholds these concepts. It consequently denies the thesis of physicalism. It has therefore been taken to be denying materi? alism as well, in favor of ontic dualism (i.e. an ontology that posits a radical sepa? ration of mind and matter). Thus, although such schools as critical theory and praxis theory have attempted to synthesize marxism and existential phenomenology, the mixture always seems to bear the aura of paradox. The objective of this paper is to reconsider the relationship between marxism and existential-phenomenology in light of Margolis' (1978) recent articulation and systematic defense of what he terms nonreductive materialism. By nonreductive materialism, Margolis means a material monist ontology that never? theless acknowledges an irreducible dualism of attributes. In particular, a number of points will be argued. First, it will be argued that physicalism is an indefensible philosophical position that is better replaced by a nonreductive materialist ontology. Second, it will be shown that the most impor? tant reasons for thinking that marxism entails physicalism are mistaken. Finally, it will be argued that the existential-phenomenological approach does not necessa? rily presuppose an ontic dualism. As evidence of this, Heidegger's Being and Time is examined as an existentialist attempt at a nonreductive materialist ontol? ogy. It is concluded that the issue of materialism ought not to be a stumbling block to the rapprochement between marxism and existential-phenomenological sociology.

REVIEW ARTICLE

MetaphilosophyVolume 12, Issue 2 p. 169-180 REVIEW ARTICLE MARGOLIS ON PERSONS AND NONREDUCTIVE MATERIALISM BarbaraVon Eckardt, BarbaraVon Eckardt YALE UNIVERSITYSearch for more papers by this author BarbaraVon Eckardt, BarbaraVon Eckardt YALE UNIVERSITYSearch for more papers by this author First published: April 1981 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1981.tb00036.x Formerly, Barbara Von Eckardt Klein. AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume12, Issue2April 1981Pages 169-180 RelatedInformation

Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism. By Joseph Margolis

Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism. By Joseph Margolis

Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism.

General Introduction.- 1. The Theory of Persons Sketched.- One. Mind/Body Identity.- 2. The Relation of Mind and Body.- 3. The Identity Theory.- 4. Radical Materialism.- 5. Materialism without Identity.- Two. Toward a Theory of Persons.- 6. Problems Regarding Persons.- 7. Language Acquisition I: Rationalists vs. Empiricists.- 8. Language Acquisition II: First and Second Languages and the Theory of Thought and Perception.- 9. Propositional Content and the Beliefs of Animals.- 10. Mental States and Sentience.- Three. Sentience and Culture Psychophysical Interaction.- 11. Psychophysical Interaction.- 12. The Nature and Identity of Cultural Entities.- 13. Action and Ideology.- References.- General Index.- Index of References.