Non-Proliferation Treaty Research Articles

A subtle call to greatness: Unipolarity, US foreign policy, and the indefinite extension of the NPT

Abstract In this article, we analyse the implications of the end of the Cold War for US non-proliferation policy and the non-proliferation regime. Contrary to widely held expectations, we show that the end of bipolarity did not undercut the pursuit of non-proliferation but supercharge it. While bipolarity had afforded non-proliferation hold-outs opportunities to evade superpower pressure, the structural condition of unipolarity both incentivised and enabled the United States to pursue a more robust non-proliferation policy than before. Against the view that contemporary unipolar power is severely circumscribed by the need to make compromises and adhere to social norms, unipolarity allowed the United States to entrench a regime that was widely considered unjust. We support this argument with an analysis of non-proliferation dynamics in the early 1990s, focusing in particular on the process that culminated with the indefinite extension of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995.

Reframing climate security: The “planetary” as policy context

Much of the discussion under the label of “climate security” focuses on potential conflicts and disruptions in peripheral locations in the global south putatively triggered by climate change. If, however the analysis starts with climate, and the earth system as the point of departure for analysis, then things look very different. The speed and scale of climate disruptions is accelerating. Earth system science suggests that urgent action is needed to deal with climate change; waiting too long may make the issue impossible to address. Framing matters in terms of a planetary condition and focusing on climate rather than national security as the starting point for analysis suggests very different policy priorities. Reframing climate security to grapple with the planetary condition requires policies that first, facilitate adaptation, second work to make sustainable habitats for humanity and third, work to drastically constrain the use of fossil fuels urgently. Here, proposals for fossil fuel non-proliferation treaties and similar measures analogous with earlier arms control agreements. This provides the security sector with a much-needed direct engagement with the causes of climate change and its resultant disruptions while simultaneously reframing climate as a matter of planetary rather than national security. Tackling climate change is a matter of urgency, and failure to so effectively in the short run my derail needed efforts later, simply because the resources to do so are no longer available.

Methodology for Multiparameter Evaluation of Barriers Against Proliferation of Minor Actinides

There exist elements apart from uranium and plutonium that could potentially be used to construct the core of a nuclear explosive device. These belong to the so-called minor actinides (MAs), which exist in nonnegligible amounts in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and are in nearly all cases not covered by international safeguards. Future reprocessing of SNF could result in significant separation of these elements, potentially leading to new proliferation concerns. In this work, a methodology for a transparent assessment of the barriers against proliferation of MAs has been developed and applied to the case of neptunium, americium, and curium separated from spent fuel from pressurized water reactors. In this methodology, openly available data and Monte Carlo simulations have been used to assess the barriers posed by a number of parameters relevant to the production of a nuclear explosive device from SNF. The evaluation shows that the properties of neptunium present low barriers to proliferation and that it should be discussed within the context of future nonproliferation treaties and possibly be placed under international safeguards. The properties of americium and curium present higher barriers to proliferation, meaning that these elements require less focus in the nonproliferation context.

Cyber Shadows over Nuclear Peace: Understanding and Mitigating Digital Threats to Global Security

This article examines the intersection of cyber warfare and nuclear security, emphasising the significance of addressing the emerging threats to nuclear facilities from cyberattacks. The article highlights a gap in the international security architecture: the absence of an international regime for nuclear cybersecurity. This deficiency challenges the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, threatening global peace and stability by undermining the treaty’s objectives and increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation and misuse. The research underscores the need for an international regime that integrates cybersecurity with nuclear security. It calls for the involvement of middle powers in international negotiations and consensus-building, alongside exploring innovative diplomatic strategies and robust legal frameworks. The article seeks to contribute to the discourse on international security, advocating for a coordinated global response to safeguard against the catastrophic consequences of digital threats in the nuclear domain.

Russia, the Global South and the Mechanics of the Nuclear Order

Russia’s war against Ukraine has reverberated across the global nuclear order. The heightened tensions between Russia and Western states have paralysed and politicised processes in various multilateral nuclear forums and governance bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the United Nations First Committee. The earthquake in procedure has further exacerbated frustrations with the state of the nuclear order, particularly among the non-nuclear-weapons states of the Global South. These states have long lamented insufficient progress towards nuclear disarmament, the prospects for which were rendered even more remote by the war. Russia, for its part, has pursued a dual strategy in multilateral nuclear diplomacy: it has undermined non-proliferation efforts and chipped away at trust in the legacy forums on the one hand, while leveraging them in pursuit of greater alignment with the Global South on the other. These dynamics have combined to drive the further fragmentation of the nuclear order in ways that, while taking time to fully play out, promise to be profound.

Gamma noise to non-invasively monitor nuclear research reactors

Autonomous nuclear reactor monitoring is a key aspect of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s strategy to ensure nonproliferation treaty compliance. From the rise of small modular reactor technology, decentralized nuclear reactor fleets may strain the capacities of such monitoring and requires new approaches. We demonstrate the superior capabilities of a gamma detection system to monitor the criticality of a zero power nuclear reactor from beyond typical vessel boundaries, offering a powerful alternative to neutron-based systems by providing direct information on fission chain propagation. Using the case example of the research reactor CROCUS, we demonstrate how two bismuth germanate scintillators placed outside the reactor vessel can precisely observe reactor criticality using so called noise methods and provide core status information in seconds. Our results indicate a wide range of applications due to the newly gained geometric flexibility that could find use in fields beyond nuclear safety.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime as a “Failed Promise”: Contestation and Self-Undermining Dynamics in a Liberal Order

Abstract The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) forms the core of the most prominent multilateral security governance regime of the liberal international order (LIO). Despite being a widely supported and remarkably successful security regime to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons, NPT politics have become increasingly polarized. In this article, I analyze contestation and self-undermining dynamics in the nuclear regime. The NPT is a strongly institutionalized but weakly liberal regime. However, it is unevenly institutionalized. Patterns of contestation in the regime derive from these characteristics. The basic source of contestation is the fundamental inequality between the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” Specifically, dissatisfied states seek to strengthen the rules and obligations in the less institutionalized domain. I argue that when efforts at order-consistent reform fail, states shift to a more radical strategy of liberal counter-institutionalization to pursue their goal of equality. Nonnuclear states have long been dissatisfied with the uneven distribution of the burdens and benefits of the regime, and especially the nuclear-armed states’ failure to pursue their obligation of disarmament. Most of the contestation in the NPT over the decades has been order-consistent and pursued “liberal reform.” However, when proponents of nuclear disarmament failed to achieve meaningful progress through the NPT, they shifted to a liberal counter-institutionalization strategy and adopted an entirely new legal instrument, the 2017 Nuclear Prohibition Treaty, to pursue disarmament. This was a direct—but liberal—challenge to the existing suborder. This treaty, which prohibits nuclear weapons for all, legalizes the NPT obligation to pursue disarmament.

The Impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: The Crucial Role of the European NATO Allies

This article makes the argument that the role of the European NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies, and especially the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), may and should play a key role in the future of nuclear disarmament. Once the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is signed and ratified by more or less 100 NNWS, mostly from the Global South, it will be up to the allied NNWS to make up their mind about their role vis-à-vis nuclear disarmament. Will they continue to behave as protégés by (and in some way also protectors of) the nuclear-armed states and break the disarmament process further, or will they shake off the nuclear “protection” in the interest of making progress toward a world without nuclear weapons? This article zooms in on the European NATO allies in particular. The TPNW can and will be used to put pressure on the European NATO allies to switch sides, and it can, on its turn, be used by the European NATO allies to stigmatize the nuclear-armed states in order to make progress in the direction of nuclear elimination. The article starts by reviewing the origins and objectives of the TPNW. In the next section, its impact will be scrutinized. We then turn to the current and possible future role of the European NATO allies.

The role of the UN in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

According to the UN Charter (Article 26), the UN Security Council is the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Nuclear states agreed to the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution that provided positive security assurances. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution №255 on June 19, 1968, was of particular significance. This resolution stipulated that instances of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would require immediate action by the UN Security Council and its permanent members, who are nuclear-armed states.
 The aim of the work is to determine the role of the UN Security Council in the system of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The methodological basis of the study will focus on the analysis and understanding of the impact of the UN Security Council on strategies and measures aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the international context.
 The results of our research have shown that the role of the UN Security Council in the disarmament of Iraq’s nuclear program, which could have led to the development of nuclear weapons, proved to be significant. To achieve this, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution №687 adopted on April 3, 1991, the Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established.
 During an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council at the highest level on September 24, 2009, Resolution UN Security Council Resolution № 1887 was adopted, aimed at supporting nuclear non-proliferation, criticizing Iran and North Korea. Resolution №1887 outlines measures to strengthen control and the rights of nuclear-weapon states to demand the return of nuclear materials and equipment in case of violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or withdrawal from it. It also involves enhancing security measures for the storage of nuclear materials and strict export controls.
 Conclusions. In our opinion, the powers of the UN Security Council in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be utilized more promptly and effectively. The insufficient effectiveness of this international mechanism in preventing proliferation remains a cause for serious concern among UN members worldwide. To enhance the effectiveness of the UN Security Council, we propose the adoption of a comprehensive resolution that includes provisions on the procedure for a state’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its violation of commitments to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. This resolution should stipulate the imposition of sanctions against such a state based on a special report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such a mechanism can ensure an effective impact of the international community on states that withdraw from the NPT.

An In-depth Study on Nuclear Weapons and Their Role in Global Politics

Nuclear weapons’ continued existence has led to rising concerns across the world. They have gained importance in global politics across time and space. The Cuban Missile Crisis, Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, and Nuclear Deterrence have indicated that nuclear weaponry will stay relevant with their continued existence and that G-7 countries must restrict their use to ensure a peaceful future. Recent events in the world have increased the danger of nuclear weapons; Concerted efforts have to be made by all countries to reach a peaceful solution. Nuclear weaponry should be buried forever if humanity is to progress and prosper.

Влияние Индии на формирование многополярного ядерного порядка

India’s decision not to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has led to its labelling as a state that is not fully aligned with the global nuclear order. This places it in the same category as other nuclear-armed countries outside these agreements, such as Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. India’s nuclear weapons testing in 1998, followed by a similar move by Pakistan, has been viewed as a challenge to international security and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This article aims to examine India’s stance on these treaties and its choice to become a nuclear-armed state in 1998 within the context of its efforts to influence the establishment of a fair global order that serves the interests of not only the major nuclear powers (USSR/Russia, Great Britain, China, the United States, and France) and their allies, but also the rest of the world. Delhi’s actions in the realm of nuclear arms control highlights the emerging multipolar world. Although India has refrained from actively participating in disarmament negotiations after the end of Cold War, its previous experiences remain relevant today. The breakdown of the U.S. – Russia nuclear arms control as well as crises over the nuclear non-proliferation and testing banning regimes have given weight to the arguments put forth by Indian leaders and diplomats. These arguments emphasize the urgency of reducing nuclear risks and exercising strategic restraint, including maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing. Since 1998, India has adopted an approach different from its previous policy on various nuclear disarmament issues. This shift is evident in the country’s solidarity with other nuclear powers in opposing the 2021 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. However, India’s longstanding support for multipolarity in international security policy, particularly regarding nuclear weapons, remains unchanged.

Navigating the Nuclear Horizon: Japan’s Yin-Yang Duality in Threshold Statesmanship

The discourse concerning global nuclear issues amidst the escalation of geopolitical crises, particularly the Russia-Ukraine conflict, underscores the complex and multifaceted nature of nuclear dilemmas. The perception that nuclear weapons are indispensable for assuring survival in an unstable international environment generates increased concern. Aggression or the threat to the existence of a nation may motivate nations to construct nuclear arsenals. As a result of discontent with existing non-proliferation mechanisms and the conviction that proliferation is inevitable, discussions concerning nuclear alternatives are propelled. Diverse considerations, including security, prestige, and politics, motivate nuclear pursuits. Probing the nuclear intentions of states is a challenging endeavour due to the capricious nature of nuclear latency, which can vary from latent capability to circumspect acquisition. International regulations, financial investment, and technical intricacy are barriers that function as discouragements against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, the nuclear status quo is facing opposition from evolving motivations and dwindling deterrents. The article conducts a comprehensive examination of the Japan case, delving into the ways in which historical traumas, security imperatives, and global responsibilities shaped its non-nuclear stance. Despite its latent capabilities, Japan maintains its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its security alliance with the United States. Discussions regarding the reassessment of nuclear determinations are influenced by geopolitical shifts and the continuous emergence of global uncertainties. Japan's societal sentiments, which have been significantly influenced by its historical context, remain adamantly opposed to nuclear weapons, despite the continuous discussions sparked by external threats. The case study provides a comprehensive analysis of the intricate interplay between geopolitical, security, and domestic factors that impact the development of nuclear policy within a constantly changing global context.

Slouching Towards a Nuclear Gomorrah

The global nuclear order – encompassing measures to prevent nuclear war, slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons and manage peaceful nuclear technology – today faces pressures that threaten its very viability. Global cooperation to limit arms racing has all but ceased. Frustration with the failure of the nuclear powers to make progress towards disarmament has called into question the durability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The mixture of incentives and penalties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is losing its potency. A new grand bargain, equal in creativity and ambition to the one that birthed the NPT, is needed. The United States must signal willingness to make significant concessions to achieve a fresh consensus on global nuclear policy with two objectives. The first one is the prevention of a new arms race among the nuclear powers and the cessation of further proliferation. The second is a recommitment to sharing peaceful nuclear technology as part of a worldwide campaign to combat the climate crisis.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Global South: Understanding Divergences and Commonalities

ABSTRACT For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the heightened risks of a nuclear catastrophe are being seriously felt around the world. Over the past decade, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – the central instrument of the global non-proliferation regime – has been rife with divisions among its members and has been undermined by the failure of two consecutive Review Conferences (RevCons) to adopt a consensus outcome document. The basic assertion underlying this Special Issue is that there is growing criticism or contestation from countries in the Global South about the role and future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in particular with regard to the obligations imposed by the NPT and the lack of a reciprocal benefit for these countries. This contestation could hinder the optimal functioning of the NPT, for instance through reduced cooperation in the implementation of its provisions. As such, a serious examination of the Global South’s criticism of the NPT and what this means for the future of the non-proliferation regime is both timely and necessary.

Exploring ‘Accommodation’ to Understand the Behaviour of Rising Powers in the Global Nuclear Order: The Cases of India and Brazil

ABSTRACT First put forth by Hedley Bull in the 1970s, the notion of ‘accommodation’ is an often-neglected approach to understanding the role, rights and responsibilities of emerging nuclear powers from the Global South in the nuclear order. The existing literature looks at the avenues and conditions through which the institutions of the nuclear order grant accommodation. However, analysis of the demands raised by rising powers at various stages of the nuclear order's development is severely lacking. The cases of India and Brazil, two rising powers with advanced nuclear capabilities, highlight some of the demands of accommodation raised by these states during the early development of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – a cornerstone agreement in the global nuclear architecture. Two important demands – namely, regional security considerations in the global system and the adoption of the principle of mutual obligations and responsibilities – have shaped these states’ behaviour vis-à-vis the NPT.

Pakistan: A Responsible Nuclear State

This paper delves into the multifaceted factors contributing to the concerns expressed by various global stakeholders concerning the security of nuclear materials, facilities, and installations within Pakistan. The study comprehensively explores the tangible, perceived, and propagandistic elements that have collectively contributed to the prevailing global skepticism surrounding Pakistan's nuclear program. Furthermore, this research elucidates the domestic and international measures that Pakistan has undertaken to ensure the secure development, testing, deployment, utilization, and presence of nuclear weapons, employing both human expertise and technological resources. Additionally, the paper briefly highlights Pakistan's contributions to global peace, exemplified by its integral role in the global campaign against terrorism and active participation in United Nations Peacekeeping missions. Moreover, the paper provides insight into Pakistan’s adherence to international guidelines, notably those set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and overarching international protocols concerning arms control and disarmament. By examining these facets, this study provides a comprehensive understanding of Pakistan’s nuclear program and its efforts to align with international norms, thereby fostering a more nuanced comprehension of the nation's stance within the global nuclear landscape.

Roadblocks to Disarmament in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty System

Abstract For the last five decades, the states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have come together every 5 years at Review Conferences to explore how they can advance the Treaty’s goals, including the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Despite lengthy negotiations, the Review Conferences have failed to reach a consensus final document as many times as they have succeeded and even when a final document has been agreed it has contained few tangible gains for those working towards a nuclear weapon free world. This state of affairs played out again in 2022 when the NPT’s 10th Review Conference ended without agreement and with many states decrying the weakness of the disarmament provisions that had been under discussion. It has been common in the aftermath of Review Conferences for academics to consider the contemporary political issues that stymied progress. While such studies are important, it is also necessary to consider what deeper structural issues may be at play in preventing the goal of nuclear disarmament from being advanced in the NPT context. To this end, this article identifies and analyses three key structural issues with the NPT and NPT Review Conferences that create difficulties for those pursuing a nuclear disarmament agenda. First, it explores issues with the scope and content of Article VI and how it has been interpreted by the nuclear weapon states. Secondly, it looks at the difficulties that arise from the commitment to achieving consensus outcomes at the Review Conferences and, thirdly, it considers the limitations of who actually attends and contributes to Review Conferences.

Five Decades of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Time to Pass the Baton to the UN Security Council?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force in 1970. After renouncing its nuclear weapons programme, South Africa became a party to the NPT in 1991. The NPT is the principal international instrument aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT has generated various other treaties with similar aims, which, together with the NPT, constitute the ‘nuclear non-proliferation regime’. The NPT has, for various reasons, not been a success. Whether the NPT has achieved nuclear non-proliferation is a moot point–a concept which implies nuclear disarmament. For example, there is evidence of a network of covert operations marketing nuclear technology; some non-NPT states have clandestinely embarked on nuclear weapons programmes, and some NPT states have threatened to adopt a policy of actual or pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapons states for its deterrent value. Alarm bells are ringing regarding the interpretation of ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-peaceful’ uses of nuclear energy. Despite the NPT, nothing prohibits the testing and refinement of existing nuclear weapons technology. Certain questions need to be answered. Has the NPT not become an instrument of rhetorical posturing by the five major nuclear weapon states–the ‘Club of Five’? Why has none of the Club of Five given their nuclear weapons up? Where do the Club of Five get the moral authority to declare that introducing new members on the Club is unacceptable? Instead of concentrating on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as the NPT does, should there not rather be an emphasis on the total prohibition of all nuclear weapons? It is submitted that a more active role for the UN in nuclear non-proliferation issues be considered. All UN Secretaries-General have made nuclear non-proliferation one of their top priorities. Kofi Annan concluded that the NPT was the victim of insufficient progress in not only nuclear non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament and that the world was sleepwalking towards a nuclear disaster. The basis for greater involvement of the UN Security Council in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is to be found in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Statute of the NPT, the UN Charter and in Security Council Relations 1540 of 2004 and 1929 of 2010. The argument is put forward that as the Security Council has the legal authority to determine threats to the peace or acts of aggression and make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken regarding it, utilising that body may be a more meaningful route to follow than the NPT which appears to have reached its sell-by date.

State-level Concept Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Article II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*

The NPT placed two non-proliferation requirements on the NNWS. Article II expects the NNWS not to indulge in any activity related to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III(1) requires the NNWS to accept nuclear safeguards to be implemented by IAEA. Recently, the IAEA has proposed State-Level Concept (SLC) for verifying the presence or absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the state within the provisions of the CSA. It is argued in the article how this concept will enable the IAEA to take apposite decisions to judge the State’s credentials towards nuclear non-proliferation under Article II.

Explaining state participation in ten universal WMD treaties: A survival analysis of ratification decisions

ABSTRACT Much of what we know about state participation in universal weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties is based on research about the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This article instead analyzes the ratification of all ten current WMD treaties. Using a survival analysis of ratification events (1960–2022), it challenges conventional wisdom. It shows that security threats—a factor stressed by neorealists and research on the NPT—provide only a weak and incomplete explanation. Instead, three types of costs and benefits influence ratification decisions: policy change costs, benefits from the secondary functions of treaties, and benefits from the conformity with the ratification behavior of regional peers. More specifically, the article finds that the possession and pursuit of WMD delays ratification. The country’s support for the liberal hegemonic order, the level of its economic development, and a high regional ratification rate of the respective treaty increase the probability of ratification.