Purpose Currently, the theoretical and empirical understanding of how founder chief executive officers (CEOs) influence foreign subsidiary ownership decisions is underdeveloped. This study aims to address this gap in research by examining the combined impact of founder CEOs and non-CEO executives on ownership decisions regarding foreign subsidiaries. Design/methodology/approach This study draws on upper echelons theory and relevant psychological literature to develop a conceptual framework to assess the joint influence of founder CEOs and non-CEO executives on firms' foreign subsidiary ownership. Accordingly, this study takes Chinese listed companies as samples and uses a Tobit model to empirically test the relevant theoretical hypotheses. Findings First, this study finds that founder status leads to a higher level of risk-taking and overconfidence among CEOs, which in turn leads to a preference for higher levels of foreign subsidiary ownership. Second, the results reveal that demographic similarity, tenure overlap and power disparity between founder CEOs and non-CEO executives enhance the positive influence of founder CEOs on firms' foreign subsidiary ownership. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature on foreign subsidiary ownership by exploring the micro-foundations of ownership decisions and focusing on the role of founder CEOs, an area underexplored in prior research. Furthermore, by analysing the combined effect of CEOs and non-CEO executives on firms' foreign subsidiary ownership, this study advances upper echelons theory and contributes to the growing body of literature on the dynamics between CEOs and top management teams in strategic decision-making.

This study investigates the impact of tournament incentives on corporate credit repair and re-repair. Drawing on tournament and agency theory, respectively, we argue that tournament incentives improve corporate credit repair and re-repair by motivating non-CEO executives' effort and risk-taking, and by inducing incumbent CEOs to supervise subordinates to restrain opportunistic behavior. Using data from Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2023 and employing SHAP values and benchmark traditional econometric methods, our results show that tournament incentives have a positive impact on corporate credit repair and re-repair. Furthermore, CEO shareholding strengthens the positive impact of tournament incentives on corporate credit repair, whereas firm age weakens the positive impact of tournament incentives on corporate credit repair. Additionally, firm size and leverage weaken the positive impact of tournament incentives on corporate credit re-repair. This paper sheds light on the role of tournament incentives on corporate executives for policymakers to enhance corporate credit repair.

ABSTRACT We examine how non‐CEO executives (NCEs) serving on outside boards affect their focal firm performance. Firms with such NCEs exhibit lower return on asset (ROA) and profit margins than those without. These effects begin after board service starts, are not explained by busy boards or CEOs, and persist at least a year. The negative impact is monotonically increasing with the number of NCEs on external boards and the number of boards they join. Finally, we show that there may be some benefits to NCE board activity as the negative effects are mitigated somewhat when the NCEs sit on their own firm's board.

Against the backdrop of the increasingly salient constraints of resource scarcity and environmental pressures on global economic development, sustainable innovation emerges as an imperative strategic pathway for corporations to secure a competitive edge in the international marketplace. Corporate innovation capability serves as the critical factor for both the advancement of sustainable innovation and the maintenance of the corporate competitive edge. While the extant literature has extensively explored how internal and external governance mechanism forces shape corporate investment decision-making, the critical role of non-CEO executives in the process of corporate innovation investment decision-making remains conspicuously underexplored. This study examines the effect of bottom–up governance mechanisms within executive teams on corporate innovation investment from the perspective of non-CEO executive independence. We used a sample of A-listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2021 for empirical tests. We found a U-shaped relation between non-CEO executive independence and corporate innovation investment, and this finding still held after addressing endogeneity issues and conducting a series of robustness tests. Mechanism analysis revealed that both non-CEO executives’ decision horizon and firm agency costs positively moderate this U-shaped relationship. This U-shaped effect is pronounced in firms with lower CEO power, lower levels of corporate governance, and non-state-owned firms. Our findings provide an important basis for clarifying the internal governance mechanism of the executive teams while offering new insights for optimizing the allocation of corporate resources and promoting corporate innovation from the perspective of improving corporate governance.

[Purpose] This study examines whether there are differences in the extent of the use of material nonpublic information based on the position of insiders transaction types, and different performance information. [Methodology] A regression analysis was conducted using collected share change data from DART. This study analyses companies listed on and delisted from the KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets from 2011 to 2018. To enhance the reliability of the empirical results, multiple methods for measuring insider trading variables and criteria for sample selection were utilized. [Findings] First, unlike external parties, insiders systematically utilize nonpublic both revenue and profit information in trading, especially, in selling compared to buying. Second, non－CEOs utilize nonpublic performance information more extensively than CEOs. Third, insiders have timely access to internal performance information and primarily use changes in revenue information for their insider trading activities. [Implications] To enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of these regulations, the study highlights the need to place greater focus on restricting and monitoring insider trading, particularly in sell transactions and among non－CEO executives.

Does size matter Pay gaps, non-CEO executives, and bank stability

Does size matter Pay gaps, non-CEO executives, and bank stability

Internal governance and investment efficiency: The role of non-CEO executives

Women in C-suite: Does Top Management Team gender diversity matter? Evidence from firm investment efficiency

Competence enhancement from interactive learning: Does attending conferences affect CEO turnover?

Female CHRO appointments: A crack in the glass ceiling?

This article investigates the relationship between the decision-making bias known as escalation of commitment and the turnover of non-CEO executives in top management teams. The phenomenon of escalation of commitment is observed when decision makers persist with business investments that have a low likelihood of success. Theoretical explanations for the association between executive turnover and escalation include self-justification and reputation protection. Top managers may conceal prior errors, escalate commitment to earlier decisions, and exit the organization before the outcome of decisions is observed. Successor managers do not have a commitment to earlier decisions and have the capability to stop investments that are discovered to be failing. Empirical analysis utilizing a sample of over 1600 U.S. firms confirms that departures by non-CEO executives from top management teams are associated with an increased likelihood of new reporting of discontinued operations and extraordinary items by firms and a reduction in the firms’ performances relative to their industry. These effects reflect de-escalation activities and are amplified in the years concurrent with and following a joint departure of multiple management team members. Prior empirical studies on escalation and de-escalation behavior focused on CEO turnover. The contribution of this article is its documenting of the key role of non-CEO managers and team turnover in the context of escalation.

Extant strategic leadership literature has established the substantial and nuanced implications of narcissism in chief executive officers (CEOs) for firm outcomes, and psychological research on narcissism in groups highlights the importance of narcissism for interpersonal dynamics. However, there is little research on strategic leaders’ narcissism and the CEO–top management team (TMT) interface, especially related to its configuration by way of TMT composition. In this article, we therefore study two issues. First, we examine how CEO narcissism directly affects two aspects of TMT composition—the narcissism of newly appointed TMT members and TMT turnover. Second, we consider the moderating effect of TMT narcissism on the relationship between CEO narcissism and TMT turnover. To be able to test our theory, we develop and extensively validate a novel measure based on LinkedIn profiles that allows us to capture the narcissism of non-CEO executives. We find substantial support for our predictions in a large sample of executives of S&P 1500 corporations across a 5-year time frame. We discuss the contributions and implications of our findings for the literatures on executive narcissism, TMT composition, and the CEO–TMT interface.

ABSTRACT Cybersecurity risk has become a more severe issue among firms, especially after the outbreak of COVID-19. Executive compensation has been documented in the literature as a channel to adjust executive risk-taking behaviours. In this paper, we examine whether or not, and if so, how firms change executive compensation after experiencing repeated data breaches. We find that firms decrease the total compensation of CEOs after suffering from repeated data breaches. The non-cash incentive compensation of CEOs decreased at the same time. On the other hand, our results show that firms increase the total compensation of non-CEO executives after experiencing repeated data breaches, and the increase is concentrated on the non-cash incentive component. Our empirical findings indicate that firms tend to penalize CEOs and mitigate their risk-taking activities after repeated data breaches while incentivizing non-CEO executives to take effective measures to improve cybersecurity and recover from data breach-caused damages.

Non-CEO Executives and the Effects of Serving on Outside Boards

Researchers in the field of corporate governance has been committed to exploring the causes and effects of internal compensation dispersion. From the perspective of psychology, this paper discusses the effect of the executive internal compensation gap on risk-taking within the enterprise, from the perspective of CEO overconfidence. According to figures from non-financial corporations listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2010 to 2021, the results of the research are as follows: (1) The internal executive pay gap has a positive impact on the company's level of risk-taking; (2) The large pay gap between CEO and non-CEO executives will cause CEO overconfidence; (3) CEO overconfidence is a path of action that the internal pay gap of senior executives affects enterprise risk-taking; (4) The internal pay gap of senior executives has a positive impact on the level of enterprise risk-taking both in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. The conclusion of this study has certain theoretical and practical significance. From the theoretical level, the introduction of CEO's psychological factors into the mechanism of the effect of the internal executive pay gap on enterprise risk-taking will help to understand the impact of compensation dispersion and enrich the research in this field. From the practical level, the results of this study have bright implications for policymakers and business practitioners.

Internal alliance and firm risk

Do tournament incentives affect corporate dividend policy?

Prior studies have suggested that a large pay gap within the top management team (TMT) can motivate executives to outperform each other and that such competition consequently enhances productivity. We argue that a high pay disparity elicits managerial negative efforts and promotes bribery activities, but this effect can be mitigated by demographic diversity in the TMT and also can be affected by the characteristics of the CEO–TMT demographic interface. Using a sample of listed Chinese firms, our empirical results show that pay disparity is positively associated with bribery expenditure and this association derives mainly from the vertical component when pay disparity is examined via its vertical and horizontal components. In addition, we found that the positive relationship between pay disparity and bribery is weakened when the non-CEO executives have diverse demographic characteristics, and it is strengthened if the CEO is demographically similar to the other executives. This study contributes to the literature on corruption and TMTs by revealing the implications of managerial incentives for firm bribery and by elucidating the role of TMT composition.

I investigate the factors that contribute to financial reporting fraud in firms that are, ex ante, at a high risk of committing fraud. Using propensity score matching, I select a sample of firms with similar ex ante risk for committing fraud. I find that within this sample, interconnectedness among members of the top management team (TMT), specifically connections developed outside the firm, is significantly and positively associated with financial reporting fraud. The effect of TMT interconnectedness on fraud is more pronounced in firms with more powerful Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and in firms in which non-CEO executives’ wealth is more sensitive to firm risk, as measured by their portfolio vega. In addition, I find that the fraud committed by more interconnected TMTs persists for longer periods of time and is more difficult to detect. Further investigations suggest that the intensity of the connections between team members influences the risk of financial reporting fraud. My findings suggest that TMT interconnectedness promotes ‘groupthink’, which is associated with dysfunctional decision-making processes.