Noble Lie Research Articles (Page 1)

This article unsettles the traditional views about Sophocles' Philoctetes and Plato's Republic on the issues of noble lying and democratic rhetoric. I do this by delving deeper into 1) the Athenian democratic context in which both works are set or were staged, 2) the intertextualities between the two works, and 3) recent scholarship that reads both Plato and Sophocles against the grain of the traditional scholarship. This new reading allows us to understand Plato's infamous noble lie (gennaion pseudos) as a less anti-democratic teaching about ideal forms of rhetoric than it is normally taken to be.

Full and Open Competition in Public Procurement: A Noble Lie

Multiple concepts are compatible between the Neocons and postmodernists. i.e., The concept presented by Leo Strauss of "Noble Lie," if we further dissect this concept, shows how compatible and similar with the reality-free world of the postmodern philosophers. According to postmodernism, we have no objective reality exists in this world as it is relative, and everyone sees it according to his understanding. This thesis becomes apparent when studying Nietzsche's critique against Juan Stuart Mill. Nietzsche has denounced Mill's concept of a universal and objective Moral system. As Nietzsche says, I abhor this man's vulgarity when he says, "what is right for one man is right for another man." It shows that all postmodern philosophers and Nietzsche were of the same view.

Plato’s programme for establishing his ideal state involved propagating two foundation myths for it, described by Socrates as a “noble lie”, which were designed to persuade its citizens to embrace the classes of society to which they had been assigned, and their roles within them, contentedly and in harmony with their fellow citizens. Because most citizens were judged incapable of understanding the truth about the most important matters, the rulers of the ideal state were authorised to tell them whatever stories, true or false, would induce them to behave well. Advocates of the management of corporate culture similarly emphasise the potency of story-telling and myth-making in inducing employees to adopt the beliefs, values and assumptions that corporate leaders consider desirable for both corporate performance and employee wellbeing. There are similarities between Plato’s programme for his ideal state and the programmes recommended by advocates of the management of corporate culture. There are also similarities between them in the ethical questions that they raise. Do corporate leaders have the moral authority to shape people’s beliefs, values and assumptions in the ways that these programmes entail? Are the outcomes to which those programmes lead really beneficial for all those who are affected by them? Even assuming that those outcomes are beneficial, how likely are the strategies proposed for realising them to be successful? Literature that explores these ethical issues is sparse, and this paper argues that it is doubtful whether any of these questions can be answered decidedly in the affirmative.

If there exist no incentive or selective mechanisms that make cooperation in large groups incentive-compatible under realistic circumstances, functional social institutions will require subjective preferences to diverge from objective payoffs – a “noble lie.” This implies the existence of irreducible and irreconcilable “inside” and “outside” perspectives on social institutions; that is, between foundationalist and functionalist approaches, both of which have a long pedigree in political economy. The conflict between the two, and the inability in practice to dispense with either, has a number of surprising implications for human organizations, including the impossibility of algorithmic governance, the necessity of discretionary rule enforcement in the breach, and the difficulty of an ethical economics of institutions. Leeson and Suarez argue that “some superstitions, and perhaps many, support self-governing arrangements. The relationship between such scientifically false beliefs and private institutions is symbiotic and socially productive” (2015, 48). This paper stakes out a stronger claim: that something like superstition is essential for any governance arrangement, self- or otherwise. Specifically, we argue that human social structure both requires and maintains a systematic divergence between subjective preferences and objective payoffs, in a way that usually (though in principle does not necessarily) entails “scientifically false beliefs” for at least a subset of agents. We will refer to the basis of such preferences from the perspective of those holding them as an “inside perspective,” as opposed to a functionalist-evolutionary explanation of their existence, which we will call an “outside perspective.” Drawing on the theory of cooperation, we then show that the two perspectives are in principle irreconcilable, discussing some implications of that fact for political economy and the prospects of social organization.

For the traditional legalistic discourse on the International Criminal Court (ICC), “politics” is a bête noire that compromises the independence of the Court and thus needs to be avoided and overcome. In response to this legalistic approach, a burgeoning body of literature insists that the Court does not exist and operate “beyond politics”, arguing that the ICC is an institution where law and politics are intimately connected. The present article seeks to contribute to this “non-traditional” literature by addressing two of its fundamental weaknesses: First, writers of the “non-traditional camp” often present a rather limited view of “politics”; in particular, they have shied away from taking the radical step of portraying and analysing the ICC as a “political actor”. This undermines both its critical and constructive potential. Secondly, these commentators offer a simplistic explanation as to why “traditionalists” treat politics as the ICC’s bête noire: Traditionalists, they claim, are “legalists” with scant interest in and understanding of politics. By focusing on the ICC’s nature as a political actor, this article does not only paint a more nuanced picture of the ICC but also demonstrates the constructive potential of this understanding of the ICC to shed light on the so-called “peace versus justice dilemma”. And secondly, it demonstrates that precisely because the ICC is and ought to be a prudent political actor, it must officially disavow politics. The “noble lie” of disavowing politics, therefore, is a prudential strategy to avoid dangerous moral and political consequences and, ultimately, to secure the continued existence of the ICC itself.

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that 1) the ostensible inconsistency between the judgments of value on different kinds of lying, like poetry, fabricated story, myth and noble lies, is not a veritable one, and 2) Plato does not hold a utilitarian position on the question of lying, or making up something false to be more precise, and lies do not turn into noble lies once they are told to be in the service of some superior purpose. Plato does state in Book II of the Republic that the veritable lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) is what all gods and all man hate (382a), and poets must be punished for deceiving people by linking the Supreme Being to its contrary. But Plato also discusses the useful lie, especially the one lie that is necessary for the unity and stability of the polis: the Noble Lie. Neither useful lies nor noble lies can be acceptable just because we can make a use out of it, and it does not hold either that the greater the use we can make out of a lie, the nobler a lie is. A true lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) for Plato is the kind of lie leading people to believe that the hierarchy of the forms can be reordered in any way, and we can make random associations between the forms, like forming the relation between gods and the action of war. On the other hand, useful lies and the noble lies are in fact a duplicate of the order of the forms. This order, which articulates forms, is what makes thinking of truth possible, and we can later find this idea of the order of the forms which allows us to think truth and falsity in both the Theaetetus and the Sophist.Keywords: Lie, imitation, dialectic, falsehood

Моральный абсолютизм и ложь во благо

Reviewed by: Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet’s Legacy by Jonathan A. C. Brown Scott C. Lucas Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet’s Legacy, by Jonathan A. C. Brown, 2014. London: Oneworld, xii + 361 pp., £25.00. isbn: 978-1-78074-420-9 (hbk). One of the most poorly-understood conflicts, at least in the West, is the internal struggle within Sunni Islam between traditional, madhhab-trained scholars, and Salafis, who generally insist upon the unmediated application of scripture. While the Sunni-Shiʿi conflict can be framed as the legacy of an early political succession dispute and continuing disagreement over the scope of religious authority granted to ʿAli and Fatimah’s descendants in articulating Islam, the Sunni traditionalist-Salafi struggle defies simple explanations. First, both parties claim to be following the Qurʾan and Sunnah, as articulated in the canonical Sunni collections, although Salafis generally reject weaker hadiths more readily than do madhhab-affiliated scholars. Second, there are blurry lines between the parties, since some traditionally trained scholars are influenced by Salafi thought, and many Salafis, especially from Saudi Arabia, are really just loyal Hanbalis. And finally, to further complicate matters, no less than the pro-democratic Muslim Brotherhood, which is one of the most senior Salafi organizations in the Arab world, is viciously attacked by Gulf-sponsored Salafi preachers, who consider democracy antithetical to Islam. How did all this come to be? Jonathan Brown’s most recent book, Misquoting Muhammad, is an indispensable guide for anyone perplexed by these transnational Sunni debates. At the outset, Brown justifies his focus on Sunni Islam in order to keep the book to a reasonable length, and suggests that many of the developments discussed in this book are also found in Shiʿi Islam (5). This restriction strikes me as a wise choice because it allows Brown to highlight a core issue Sunni Muslims face, regardless of where they live: how does one interpret and apply the vast ocean of Sunni hadith, [End Page 245] especially those which conflict with ethical values that, in much of the world, have changed over the past century? Before he can address specific case studies, Brown devotes detailed chapters to mapping the Islamic interpretative tradition and discussing the nature of scripture in Islam and other religious traditions. He shows that the tension between traditional Sunnism – characterized by law schools, Ashʿari theology, and Sufi orders – and the ‘austere iconoclasm’ of individual scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), developed over the centuries into revivalist movements, some of which are clear predecessors of Salafi movements today. He also reminds the reader that the pernicious practice of takfir, Muslims declaring other Muslims to be apostates, often to justify waging war against them, expanded during the eighteenth century. The big rupture, though, to the Sunni interpretive community, was European colonialism and imperialism, which displaced the authority of traditional Sunni scholars and triggered a ‘crisis of confidence’ among many Muslims in the Islamic scriptures. Brown’s deployment of the story of Tawfiq Sidqi, a medical student who was troubled by the infamous ‘hadith of the fly’ in Bukhari’s Sahih, is particularly helpful in clarifying the new challenges twentieth century science brought to the traditional scholarly community. Misquoting Muhammad takes the reader through an array of topics in which Sunni hadiths (and occasionally Qurʾanic verses) present many contemporary Muslims with ethical quandaries. These topics include jihad, the right of a woman to serve as head of state or judge, child marriage, ‘honour killing,’ usury, and the seventy-two virgins in heaven allegedly promised to martyrs. While Brown stays true to his promise not to provide solutions to these challenges, he does employ his formidable scholarly abilities to analyse and dispute the authenticity of three of the hadiths in question in the appendices to Misquoting Muhammad. Even more valuable is the chapter, provocatively titled ‘Lying about the Prophet of God,’ about the fuzzy nature of truth and the controversy over Plato’s ‘Noble Lie.’ Brown ties the concept of the Noble Lie to the centuries-old Sunni debate over the use of weak or even spurious hadith...

As is well known, the rule of the philosophers is what ultimately completes the political project in Plato's Republic. Only if the philosophers accept to rule, may the city see the light of day. Yet, as is equally well known, the philosophers are reluctant to rule. But ruling is what they are designed to do. Their entire education was constructed to prepare them for this task. And therefore, as Plato's repeatedly puts it, they will need to be compelled. How? As this paper sets out to argue, it is what Plato calls the noble lie that does the job. Established in the philosophers' souls during their childhood, and tested like gold in the fire, it is only the city-love established by the noble lie that can counteract their otherworldly desire for truth and knowledge. Designed to imbue their souls with a sense of responsibility and care, the noble can outweigh their political reluctance, and turn their eyes back to the city.

How Deactivating an Inhibitor Causes Absence Epilepsy: Validation of a Noble Lie

This viewpoint challenges the explanation that societies increasing confrontation with climate change results from its observable realities, specifically those derived from current understanding of its causes and consequences and ability to reliably forecast future changes. It demonstrates that the reality of climate change is not related to personal experience but rather that society's apprehension stems from media attention which is based on advances in scientific understanding as assessed by the IPCC. However this current consensus view fails to meet the requirements of an exact science and is unable to reliably forecast decadal trends. It is speculated that the motives for the promotion of apprehension follows Plato's strategy of the Noble Lie, serving to promote the adoption of an alternative energy policy. The dangers to science of this approach are outlined and a simple way to restore climate science to a more rational and skeptical basis is suggested.

「気高い嘘」と「有益な偽り」

Acknowledgments1. Viruses, Health, and International Security2. A Noble Lie? Examining the Evidence on AIDS and Security3. Security in the Era of Governmentality: AIDS and the Rise of Health Security4. National Security: Sovereignty, Medicine, and the Securitization of Aids5. Human Security: Discipline, Healthy Bodies, and the Global Curing Machine6. Risk and Security: Government, Military Risk Groups, and Population Triage7. The Power of AIDS: Responding to the Governmentalization of SecurityReferencesIndex

The first section of this article examines Jacques Derrida’s essay ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, specifically his discussion of the ancient Greek word for drug, pharmakon. It is argued that the rhetorical force of Derrida’s essay has led to the mistaken impression that he and more importantly Plato understood pharmakon to have two possible meanings: remedy or poison. In the second section a number of Platonic and other ancient Greek texts are used to demonstrate that pharmakon signified several additional things, such as painters pigment, magical talisman, cosmetic, and mind-altering substance. The final section builds upon Carl Page’s observation that the Noble Lie of the Republic is itself a pharmakon, situating Plato’s Noble Lie in the context of his vision of the philosopher as a moral physician, and Plato’s on-going opposition to psychological conditions characterized by ecstatic displacement.

Precedent and Legal Reasoning in Classical Athenian Courts: A Noble Lie?

The myth of Athens and Atlantis in Plato'sTimaeusandCritiascan be, and has been, interpreted on a number of different levels. On the most fundamental, philosophical level the myth sets into narrative motion the paradigm of the ideal state elaborated in theRepublic.Gill, in a series of publications, has done much to throw light on the nature of this invention: its relationship with modern categories of fiction and with antecedent historiography. Yet the extent to which the myth of Atlantis is embedded in larger fourth-century political and historiographical concerns has been insufficiently appreciated. In what follows, I shall attempt to reconstruct some of these concerns. I shall argue, first, that the narrative set-up of the Atlantis myth corresponds to the conditions specified in theRepublicfor the successful creation of a charter myth (the ‘Noble Lie’) for the ideal city, and that this is a valuable indication of the truth status of the myth and of the function it is expected to perform. This function is not merely a matter of abstract philosophical interest, since there are close parallels between the Atlantis myth and contemporary panegyric versions of Athenian history; in Section III, therefore, I shall explore these parallels through an examination of some Isocratean orations. Sections IV and V will investigate how such panegyric history illuminates areas of ideological concern for Athenians in the first half of the fourth century, most notably worries about legitimating the constitution(politeia)under which they lived, and about the attitude that should be taken towards Athenian maritime interests in the Aegean. The Atlantis myth creates a vision of Athens that is true to Plato's political ideals, but which is animated by contemporary historicaltopoi.The result is a narrative for an audience of philosophicalcognoscentithat both rejects and transforms suchtopoi, and sparks a second-order consideration of the forces at work in the construction of history.

In this ambitious, interdisciplinary work, Loyal D. Rue reassesses the value of deception in nature, and in human society, asserting that myths are essential to the health, and even survival, of a culture as a whole. Advancing his theory of the Noble Lie, he maintains that we urgently require a new myth to replace the religious beliefs rejected by the modern mind. Such a Lie, Rue believes, offers our only salvation from the psychological and social chaos now threatened by the spread of scepticism about the meaning of the universe and life. Rue holds our deeply ingrained western bias against deception up to rigorous examination, comparing it to what he calls the natural bias in favour of deception. Evolution rewards the successful deceiver, he maintains, and cites examples from the natural world and from psychological research indicating that strategies of deception and self-deception are essential to our personal well-being.

Zygon®Volume 29, Issue 3 p. 409-416 DENIAL OF DEATH AND THE NOBLE LIE Neil J. Elgee, Corresponding Author Neil J. Elgee Neil J. Elgee is Emeritus Clinical Professor of Medicine, Department of Medicine, University of Washington and President of the Ernest Becker Foundation.His mailing address is 3621 Seventy-second Avenue S. E., Mercer Island, WA 98040.Search for more papers by this author Neil J. Elgee, Corresponding Author Neil J. Elgee Neil J. Elgee is Emeritus Clinical Professor of Medicine, Department of Medicine, University of Washington and President of the Ernest Becker Foundation.His mailing address is 3621 Seventy-second Avenue S. E., Mercer Island, WA 98040.Search for more papers by this author First published: September 1994 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.1994.tb00679.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume29, Issue3September 1994Pages 409-416 RelatedInformation

Law Justice and Democracy: The Reith Lectures 1986. By Lord McCluskey.Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Survey. By Ferdinand von Prondzynski.English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs. By S. M. Poulter.The Noble Lie: A Rejoinder