Net Stable Funding Ratio Research Articles

Basel III's ability to mitigate systemic risk

PurposeThe financial crisis 2007‐2009 calls for a regulatory response. A crucial element of this task is the treatment of systemic risk. Basel III gains centre stage in this process. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate Basel III, examining its ability to reduce systemic risk.Design/methodology/approachThe paper highlights the importance of reducing systemic risk to achieve the goal of overall financial stability. By first focusing on the theoretical foundations of systemic risk, this paper explores and analyzes the crucial aspects of this almost impalpable risk type. It further investigates the current regulation of systemic risk, clearly showing Basel II's inability to reduce it. Then, it evaluates the Basel Committee's efforts to address these weaknesses through Basel III by investigating its incentives and its ability to reduce obvious drawbacks of Basel II as well as systemic risk factors.FindingsThe findings show that there are still adjustments necessary. Although the development of Basel III is well advanced, providing some stabilizing incentives, there are still issues calling for closer consideration to counter all Basel II drawbacks and systemic risk factors adequately. These include: a risk‐weighted leverage ratio; a more thorough treatment of procyclicality; adjustments for the NSFR (Net Stable Funding ratio); and most importantly, the mandatory issue to internalize negative externalities from financial institutions, that is, the call for pricing systemic risk.Originality/valueThe paper not only examines the new Basel III framework, as a response to the Financial Crisis 2007‐2009, but also draws attention to specific areas which the Basel Committee and regulators need to focus on more thoroughly.

Capital, Liquidity Standards and Macro Prudential Policy Tools in Financial Supervision: Addressing Sovereign Debt Problems

During the recent Financial Crisis, as well as the 2010 and ongoing European Sovereign Debt Crisis, several governments had/have had to raise their debt levels in order to stabilize their economies. The principal problem attributed to sovereign debts, which is linked to their characteristics, is the possibility of defaults occurring in relation to these – since they are usually accompanied without collaterals. The possibilities of such defaults occurring are further increased where bailouts are granted in relation to these debts. Increased doubts in relation to the likelihood of larger sovereigns “rolling over maturing debt on their own”, as well as the consequential occurrence of “very high, economically penalizing, interest rates”, is considered to be the present reality. As well as a consideration of improvements which have been introduced through Basel III in respect of prudential supervisory tools (supervisory tools such as capital, liquidity requirements, and macro prudential policy tools), and an analysis of recent efforts which have been undertaken by the Basel Committee to address information gaps in derivative markets (a source of huge losses to many major banks), the paper also explores how the new Basel liquidity standards (that is, the Liquid Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), could be effectively implemented in mitigating sovereign debt crises. Ultimately, the paper will seek to demonstrate that additional leverage ratios which are to be introduced by the Basel Committee, will play a very crucial role if the new liquidity standards are to achieve their desired effects and stated objectives.

Preparing for Basel IV (Whilst Commending Basel III): Why Liquidity Risks Still Present a Challenge to Regulators in Prudential Supervision ( Part II)*

Whilst the predecessor (Part I) to this paper addresses criticisms and challenges which have arisen in response to recent Basel Committee's initiatives aimed at addressing capital and liquidity standards, the present paper highlights further measures which are being introduced by the Basel Committee to address such criticisms and challenges. As well as presenting and drawing attention to proposals which could serve as means of addressing challenges presented by liquidity risks, Part I of the paper concludes with the result that market based regulation is an essential and vital tool in the Basel Committee's efforts to address some of the challenges presented by liquidity risks. The present paper highlights the Basel Committee's acknowledgement of this conclusion. Furthermore, it draws attention to other areas which are considered to constitute fertile substrates for purposes of future research. This paper will also illustrate why the potential of banking regulations and disclosure requirements to impact risk taking levels is not only dependent on certain factors such as the dissemination of information to appropriate recipients, appropriate volume of disseminated information, when to disseminate such information, but also on other factors such as ownership structures and effective corporate governance measures aimed fostering monitoring, supervision and accountability. In arguing that additional leverage ratios which have recently been proposed by the Basel Committee will play a key role in facilitating the diversification of banks‘ liquid assets – via the new liquidity standards (Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio), contribution is also made to the current discussion on the resilience of the banking sector – albeit from the perspective of the stabilisation of the entire system.

III (An Evaluation on the Basel III Liquidity Regulation)

Korean Abstract: 2007년의 글로벌 금융위기 이후 금융규제 개혁의 일환으로 유동성규제가 새롭게 도입되게 되었다. 새로운 유동성 규제기준인 유동성커버리지비율은 2015년부터, 순안정조달비율은 2018년부터 활용될 예정이다. 유동성 규제가 도입된 것은 그 동안 금융환경 및 은행의 영업행태가 크게 변화하여 유동성 위험이 증가하였지만 기존의 금융규제는 이에 적절하게 대응하지 못하였기 때문이다. 새롭게 도입되는 유동성규제기준의 정의와 그 논의과정에서의 주 요 쟁점들을 자세히 살펴보고 유동성 규제기준의 의의와 한계에 대해서 알아 본다. English Abstract: As a response to the financial crisis of 2007, the Basel Committee has introduced a new set of regulatory tools to limit the liquidity risk of global banks: liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR). The objective of this paper is to discuss the background, impact, and limitations of these new regulatory standards. To help better understanding of the new regulation, it also provides a description on the major issues raised from member countries and banking industries. The Basel Committee has made a remarkable success in reaching agreement despite of the widely different views on the new standards. But the successful implementation of the new regulation is yet to be seen considering that the liquidity regulation is new to global bankers and regulators alike, and that the impact on the behaviour of global banks and financial system is mostly left to be discovered in coming years.

Mapping Capital and Liquidity Requirements to Bank Lending Spreads

This study outlines a methodology for mapping the increases in capital and liquidity requirements proposed under Basel III to bank lending spreads. The higher cost associated with a one percentage point increase in the capital ratio can be recovered by increasing lending spreads by 15 basis points for a representative bank. This calculation assumes the return on equity (ROE) and the cost of debt are unchanged, with no change in other sources of income and no reduction in operating expenses. If ROE and the cost of debt are assumed to decline, the impact on lending spreads is reduced. To recover the additional cost of meeting the December 2009 proposal for the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), a representative bank would need to increase lending spreads by 24 basis points. Taking into account the fall in risk-weighted assets from holding more government bonds reduces this cost to 12 basis points or less.

Analysis And Comments On The Consultative Document: International Framework For Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards And Monitoring

The market turmoil that began in mid-2007 re-emphasized the importance of liquidity to the functioning of financial markets and the banking sector. In December 2009, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) released a consultative document entitled: “International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring”. Interested parties were invited to provide written comments by April 16th 2010. Given our interest in promoting sound liquidity risk management and supervision, three members of the Chair responded to the BIS request. Today, we share with you a summary of our analysis and comments. Our work first supports the adoption of the BCBS proposals on two new liquidity risk management standards which take the form of a 30-day minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) combined with a one-year minimum net stable funding ratio (NSFR), both to be accompanied by a mandatory set of market-related monitoring tools. Second, we share with you several general comments and suggestions we formulated on the following topics: the need for better coordination, both domestically and internationally between macro and micro-prudential supervision, the need to formulate more precise liquidity risk requirements on foreign currency funding, the importance and usefulness of public financial disclosure, suggestions on extending the use of market-related monitoring rules and metrics. Third, we also share with you more specific comments and suggestions formulated on the following topics : areas of further work like intra-group and cross border liquidity risk management, selling to gauge market liquidity, clarifying LCR and NSFR definitions, credit rating downgrades, and defining required stable funding categories. Fourth, the results of the analysis support the need to promote a more level business and supervisory playing field for all internationally active banks. Last but not least, we draw the risk-return and financial implications for Canadian banks of the adoption of the BCBS proposals for liquidity risk management and supervision.