Role Of Navy Research Articles

"Intercourse … of the Most Friendly Nature": The U.S. Navy, State Power, and William Walker's Invasion of Mexico, 1853–1854

Abstract: This article examines federal officials' attitudes towards illegal filibustering expeditions, using as a case study the U.S. Navy's role in defeating William Walker's 1853–1854 expedition to Baja California and Sonora, Mexico. The officers of the U.S.S. Portsmouth (especially former Democratic newspaper editor Levi Slamm), fraternized with filibusters, evacuated their wounded, and published expansionist sentiments. Yet even expansionist officers generally disapproved of filibustering's lawlessness and tendency to damage America's reputation and diplomatic attempts to buy territory legally. This article uncovers how many apparently sympathetic actions by officers and other frontier officials were actually covert and indirect anti-filibustering tactics that they adopted to compensate for local sympathy for the invaders, lack of support from Washington, and poorly defined (or nonexistent) authority to act more decisively. Although these tactics could subvert individual filibustering expeditions like Walker's, by not openly and directly opposing filibustering, they undermined U.S. diplomatic and political aims in the long term.

Obstacles to an Effective Low-Titer O Walking Blood Bank: A Deployed Unit's Experience.

We present the experience of our U.S. Navy Role 2's deployment to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility in support of Operation Inherent Resolve and serving a multinational, joint-service military base. We detail our efforts to establish a low-titer O (LTO) walking blood bank (WBB) in an effort to prepare for potential combat casualties. We decided on an LTO WBB based on our available resources and a review of the literature. We collected blood samples from volunteer O-type donors throughout deployment. We conducted some titers locally and sent all samples to the ASBP in San Antonio for confirmatory testing. We conducted internal training on the WBB to improve our efficiency. We conducted monthly base-wide drills and blood drives to increase our donor pool and improve coordination between the multiple units on base. We were able to collect samples from 108 military members during our deployment. Because of cold chain and shipping issues, by the time we departed theater, we had confirmation of 31 LTO donors from the Armed Services Blood Program. Thanks to local titers and units arriving to theater with titers complete; we were able to maintain an LTO donor pool close to our intended target of 50 available donors through most of our deployment. A WBB based on LTO blood is possible in theater. In order to maximize donor pools, it is imperative that units deploying to forward areas complete titer and transfusion transmissible disease testing before arrival in theater.

Optimization Role of the Indonesian Navy in Economic Development Community of Coastal Areas in the West Lombok Through Islamic Perspective

The Indonesian Navy maintains national defence and security, yet supports the coastal communities' economic development. The West Lombok Regency has potential resources to support national development in better management. The Navy economic empowerment role in the West Lombok Regency is urgently needed. This study analyzes the effect of an economic empowerment program of the Navy on the welfare of coastal communities and the impact on national defence and security in sharia perspectives. It also analyzes constraint and strategic issues related the Navy's role in developing the West Lombok Regency coastal communities welfare and composes institutional models and cooperation in supporting the government to promote the coastal communities economy, producing the Navy role optimization strategies in economic empowerment of the West Lombok Regency. Quantitative and qualitative methods are used in this study, with analytical tools include the Result Impact Management System (RIMS), Descriptive Analysis, Tahwidi String Relationship, Strategic Assumption Surfacing and Testing (SAST), Interpretive Structural Modeling (ISM), and Analytic Hierarchy Process Approach (AHP). Research respondents were 150 families who were beneficiaries of CCDP-IFAD in five villages in West Lombok. The results indicate that the Navy's role in economic empowerment in the West Lombok Regency is not optimal yet. In sharia perspective, welfare affects national defence and security. To overcome this problem needs to be prepared the structured and applicable programs with field assistance. Based on the institutional model, the most desirable change issue is the establishment of real policies and legal frameworks to boost cooperation between institutions/stakeholders in empowering the coastal community and clearly institutional sharing of authority Keywords: Economic Empowerment, Development, Coastal Community, Sharia, National Security and Resilience. DOI: 10.7176/EJBM/12-26-05 Publication date: September 30 th 2020

Explaining Japan’s post-Cold War security policy trajectory: maritime realism

ABSTRACT Why has Japan shifted towards a more active security posture since the end of the Cold War? Japan’s security policy under Prime Minister Abe has triggered numerous discussions on the changing nature of Japan as a security actor. This article identifies two independent variables—the balance of power calculations and secure access to the maritime commons—that informs Japan’s security policy trajectory. It argues that Japanese strategy is best described as ‘maritime realism’, a posture in which liberal internationalist and realist elements draw upon principles of maritime strategy to fuse together. Japan has not only actively facilitated US commitment to maritime Asia but also focused on expanding its role in maritime security as the maritime space in the Indo-Pacific has increasingly become a contested space. While Tokyo’s security policy corresponds with structural realist predictions, they have also been frequently expressed in liberal internationalist language given the peculiar nature of the role of navies. This article’s findings advance theoretical debates on alliance politics and great power competition by integrating international relations and concepts in strategic studies. It also contains significant explanatory power in assessing the trajectory of Japan’s defence policy since the end of the Cold War.

The Transformation of Leadership Style in Shaping the Character of World Class Navy Officer

Institutions of education (lemdik) the naval education and training command (kodiklatal) has the duty to organize doctrine and organization guidance in the ranks of the Indonesian National Army Navy (TNI AL) as well as the training and training of the navy in support of the Navy's role in forming officers navy. For that reason, the leadership style transformation commander navy training education can be used as a reference in motivating and encouraging his subordinates to work professionally in accordance with the duties and responsibilities. In the context of the process of education and training of navy officers, it has been from the basic stage of military to the formation of officers that have been instilled in the attitude of loyalty, dedication and respect to senior officers or officers. Transformation of the leadership style of the commander the naval training commander should always be guided by the new spirit by the chief of staff of the navy to develop and develop new aspirations and passion for creative, innovative thinking and character as a naval officer the world class.

GEOPOLITICS OF THE 2015 BRITISH DEFENSE WHITE PAPER AND ITS HISTORICAL PREDECESSORS

IntroductionDefense white papers, sometimes called national security strategy documents, are important expressions of countries national security policy goals. They describe the international security environment facing individual countries at given moments in time and how they expect to counter and defeat national enemies if r esort t o military force is requir ed. The U.S. Gover nment and military r egularly issue national security policy documents such as the National Security Strategy of the United States issued by presidential admin- istrations every four to five years, the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) issued by t he Department of Defense, and the National Military Strategy of the United States. Such documents are important assessments by governments of the day on their national and international security priorities and the financial measures they are willing to take to meet their national interests. These documents also cover economic, diplomatic, environmental, financial, and geopolitical factors influencing their ability or inability to achieve these objectives.1This work examines recent the defense white paper released by the United Kingdom in November 2015. It will analyze the contents of historic defense white papers produced by the UK, the geopolitical factors influencing historical and contemporary British defense white papers, and the UK's willingness and ability to carry out objectives described in these white papers given historical and current economic and security environments facing London. Such documents receive both praise and criticism from interested observers depending on their political perspectives. Research on these documents can revea l significa nt ins ights on how their gover nments addr essed nat iona l secur ity a nd economic priorities they confr onted. These documents a nd research also demonstrate the degree of security coordination Britain has or does not have with its superpower ally the U.S.2The UK has issued a number of defense white papers since World War II. Annual government parliamentary commissions called Statement on Defence and Statement on the Defense Estimates were issued from 1946-1996.3 The 1957 Sandys Review issued by Minister of Defense Duncan Sandys (1908- 1987) during the Macmillan Government (1957-1963) was the first major post-war British defense white paper. Issued in the aftermath of the Suez debacle, this document stressed nuclear deterrence as the keystone of British defense policy recommending the abolition of compulsory military service, greater allied burden sharing with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conventional forces, reducing overseas military forces and the number of Royal Air Force (RAF) fighters, and changing the Navy's role to emphasize relying on aircraft carriers to project power in peacetime emergencies and limited hostilities.4The next British defense white papers were issued between 1965-1968 by Harold Wilson's Labour Government (1964-1970) under Minister of Defence Denis Healy (1917-2015). These documents and subsequently implemented policies involved withdrawing British military forces from east of the Suez, reducing the size of the territorial army, cancelling further construction of aircraft carriers and domestic aircraft construction, and r educing military forces deployed in C yprus, Germany, and Malta due to fina ncia l cris es forcing the pound's devaluation.5 A decade later, another Wils on Labour Government under Minister of Defence Roy Mason (1924-2015) issued a defense review (1974-1975) stating that defense spending would be reduced from 5% to 4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over ten years, that British defense spending should be harmonized with the NATO avera ge which included 3.8% of GDP for France and 4.1% for Germany, and that London's defense spending should be focused on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries.6T he next ma jor Br it is h defense review was initiated during Margar et Thatcher's Conservative government (1979-1990) under the stewardship of Defence Minister John Nott. …

A two-edged sword: The navy as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy, by Nicholas Tracy

Nicholas Tracy A two-edged sword: navy as an instrument of Canadian foreign Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012. 496pp., $49.95 (hardcover) ISBN 978-0-7735-4051-4Nicholas Tracy's comprehensive and thoroughly researched book, A Two-edged Sword: Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy, appeals two audiences: readers of naval history, because of its focus on the actions of the Royal Canadian Navy from its autonomy in 1910 until the present day, and readers concerned with the navy's role in Canadian international relations. Of particular interest the international relations community are Tracy's closing chapters that discuss post-Cold themes involving navy constabulary and humanitarian actions, Arctic concerns, and future strategic directions. Certainly, for those interested in Canadian defence policy, Tracy's detailed study would be a great supplement David McDonough's National Security in the Post-9j 11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats {2012).The genesis of the title, A Two-edged Sword, becomes clear in the concluding chapters, which outline the paradox that navy must navigate between independence and integration with Canadian naval allies. Although the navy remains a critical component of national autonomy, the degree of operational freedom from historic allies is questionable. Integration and interoperability with British and American naval counterparts in terms of command and control, communication, and equipment continues be essential, since foreign encourages its forces to remain in a position play a meaningful role in global security affairs (257). Coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Somalia are examples of how such integration comes at the price of saliency and operational influence. This proviso presents (299), Tracy argues, as Canada's partnership with the United States has come replicate the degree of integration that existed within the British Empire (299). Indeed, as Tracy continues, The management of relationship with the United States has been at the heart of naval strategy and this objective has been largely... successful but it is one that constantly challenges the independence of Canadian policy (300). Tracy's argument certainly rings true when one considers that the procurement policies of the Royal Canadian Navy are this day governed in large part by their need for C4ISTAR interoperability and are therefore heavily influenced by British and American suppliers (submarines and helicopters, respectively).1 Indeed, with a small defence budget, for Canada remain internationally relevant, compromises between command and control and practical sovereignty concerns are inevitable (13).2Although Tracy queries the costs of integration with its southern neighbour, he underlines the leveraging effect soft-power relations between the Canadian navy and her allied counterparts play in mitigating gun-boat intervention. 1995 Turbot War between Spain and Canada off the coast of Newfoundland, for example, was settled peacefully by international leverage brought bear by inter-service camaraderie. In this case, These unquantifiable relationships with the US Navy and the historic relationship with the Royal Navy, Tracy explains, were far more important than the easily assessed power of [naval] units (250). …

America's Black Sea fleet: the U.S. Navy amidst war and revolution, 1919-1923

ROBERT SHENK, America's Black Sea Fleet: The US Navy Amidst War and Revolution, 1919-1923 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012). Pp. 366. $24.94 cloth.This is a very difficult book to review fairly, since it is such a striking mixture of the good and the frankly bad. So what's good about it? First, like most publications of the Naval Institute Press, it is very well produced; it feels and looks good. Second, a review of local American naval reports on the tumultuous events that transformed Turkey between 1915 and 1923 can hardly fail to command interest, especially now perhaps with Turkey playing such a pivotal role in the events of the Near East. This was the age of the Armenian massacres, the burning of Smyrna and the expulsion of the Hellenic community from Turkey and the emergence of the modern secular state that we know today. The book is also a portrayal of naval engagement in action, a case study of what navies are used for when there's no war to fight.Observing these upheavals, and to some extent participating in the management of the tragedies they led to, the U.S. Navy maintained in Constantinople a small naval mission commanded by Admiral Mark Bristol. Making major use of the admiral's papers held in the special collections section of the library of the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, the author assembled a praiseworthy mass of material relating to his subject that intrinsically will be of great interest, both to people wanting to understand the events of the time and to those interested in the role of navies in times of difficult and contested peace. Nor is there any doubt that the author knows what he is talking about. He has clearly researched the background and the context in which this largely neglected naval mission operated. There is, in sum, ample material here for an in-depth analysis of the issue of these events and of the U.S. Naval role in them.Sadly, though, this book is no such thing. For a start, there is no real investigation of what the U.S. Navy was supposed to be doing in Constantinople in the first place. Indeed, the book's title is profoundly mis-leading in that there is very little in it of real substance about the Black Sea Fleet per se. Instead, the bulk of it is about the events ashore and what Admiral Bristol thought about them. One of the reasons for this was that the U.S. Naval contingent here was a very small force compared to the British, French, Greek and other fleets that also operated there and had much more substantial roles to play. The author rather elliptically makes the point that another reason for the helplessness of the U. …

Perilous Fight: America’s Intrepid War with Britain on the High Seas, 1812–1815 (review)

Perilous Fight: America's Intrepid War with Britain on the High Seas, 1812-1815. By Stephen Budiansky. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 201 1. Pp. 448. Cloth, $35.00.)Reviewed by Joshua WolfStephen Budiansky's aim in Perilous Fight is to tell the story of United States Navy's role in the War of 1812. Although Great Britain's Royal Navy was the largest and strongest in the world, the infant U.S. Navy won the majority of ship-to-ship engagements during the conflict. Additionally, the U.S. Navy and American privateers inflicted heavy losses on the British merchant fleet throughout the war. The effectiveness of the American maritime forces in the fight with Great Britain helped secure the U.S. Navy's future and established the United States as a growing naval power.Budiansky narrates the story of American naval success well. He begins with the brief experience of the U.S. Navy in the Quasi- War and the First Barbary War before moving on to the naval causes of the War of 1812. Budiansky spends most of the book reviewing the key singleship battles, including the victories of the USS Constitution and the USS United States. At the same time, he positions the sea war in the larger context of the War of 1812, in which the land war and the perpetual struggle for America to fund the conflict figure prominently. Perilous Fight is narrative history - Budiansky does not offer any strong theses to the reader, and the historiography that he seems most concerned with is the outdated writings of Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan. The one argument that Budiansky does forward is that the U.S. Navy owed its record of success to William Jones, the Secretary of the Navy for most of the war. American leadership during the War of 1812 was fraught with indecision and incompetence, but in Jones, Budiansky sees a man of strength, intelligence, and vision. He credits Jones with the decisions to sail U.S. Navy frigates and sloops individually, instead of in squadrons, and to focus solely on the harassment and destruction of Britain's merchant fleet. Budiansky does an commendable job of demonstrating the difficulties Jones faced; a British blockade, overly sensitive officers, a shortage of money and material, taking on the task as Acting Secretary of the Treasury, personal financial ruin, and a burnt Washington, DC all combined to make William Jones's job a daily struggle. The author clearly establishes Jones a man driven by patriotism and a sense of duty, as well as one of the more admirable, if forgotten, figures of the War of 1812.The strength of Budiansky's work is his narrative of the individual ship engagements and the struggles and triumphs of William Jones. One of his greatest weaknesses is his lack of focus. Budiansky gets sidetrack too often, most notably by the goings-on in Federalist stronghold New England and the breakdown of the prisoner exchange system. Reading Perilous Fight one might think that New England was the only region of the nation concerned with the war - the Federalists' antiwar sentiments pervade the entire book. …

The Influence of Sea Power on China, or the Influence of Mahan on Yoshihara and Holmes?

Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy is part of the growing body of literature that examines China’s expanding naval capabilities. Based on an extensive survey of Chinese language sources regarding the role of navies and maritime power, Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes conclude that China will pursue a maritime future and posit that Chinese decisionmakers will follow the logic of Alfred Thayer Mahan, even if they do not necessarily hew to his specifics (or “grammar”) (p. 18). Thus, the authors laud the Chinese for “an impressive synthesis of strategic theories from foreign and indigenous sources,” with Mahan providing the “geopolitical logic” and Mao providing the specific “strategies and tactics” (p. 30). But while an intriguing hypothesis, the authors’ approach neglects to address the possibility that China may be pursuing policies that are at times consistent with Mahan but not motivated by his writings at all. The authors note in the foreword that by 2004 they had begun to notice that Chinese strategists were regularly citing Mahan, which suggests that these strategists were “studying and internalizing his writings in anticipation of China’s entry into the nautical domain” (p. ix). If so, to the authors, better understanding what kinds of military and non-military strategies, operations, and tactics China might develop was imperative, given that they might well be applied against the United States. In short, the volume is dedicated to trying to understand “how an aspiring or established sea power thinks about strategy [as] indispensable to forecasting how it will fare on the high seas” (p. 3). To this end, Yoshihara and Holmes discuss the growth of Chinese maritime thinking, examine potential approaches by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to fleet tactics, discuss the possible role of antiship ballistic missiles, survey U.S. maritime strategy in Asia, and analyze the growth of imperial German naval power as a possible parallel to China’s experience (and argue that China will not follow the same path). The book astutely notes that Chinese thinking on sea power is likely to differ, often fundamentally, from that of Western counterparts, given that the intellectual struggle over ideas often extends into realms such as geography

The Maritime Security in East Asia and the Role of Navy - Applied to Bifurcationism and Pendulum model-

The Maritime Security in East Asia and the Role of Navy - Applied to Bifurcationism and Pendulum model-

‘Unkle Sommerset's’ freedom: liberty in England for black sailors

With his 1772 decree in Somerset v. Steuart that slavery was ‘so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it [in England] but positive law’, Lord Mansfield altered the legal landscape regarding black rights in England. While earlier judicial decisions had implied that slaves who came to England were free, prior to the Somerset decision there was no judicial consensus on the issue. The Somerset decision did not decree that slavery was illegal in England. Yet many blacks believed it ‘emancipated’ any slave who reached the shores of England. This understanding, combined with the British military welcoming runaways into its ranks during the American Revolution, led to several thousand former slaves reaching England, a considerable number of whom were mariners. Although the Royal Navy was not isolated from the racism or harsh legal treatment of blacks, naval personnel often assisted ex-slaves to obtain freedom in England. The freedom black mariners found in England was fairly limited; they remained subject to re-enslavement, had limited legal protections over employment conditions and were often homeless and poor. Despite such conditions, life in England was a considerable improvement over enslavement in the Americas for many former slave mariners. Slave mariners on the sloop Lawrence illustrate the means black mariners took to obtain freedom, the Royal Navy's role in ex-slave mariners becoming free and the limits of freedom in England.

The Long Road to Annapolis: The Founding of the Naval Academy and the Emerging American Republic (review)

Reviewed by: The Long Road to Annapolis: The Founding of the Naval Academy and the Emerging American Republic Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh (bio) The Long Road to Annapolis: The Founding of the Naval Academy and the Emerging American Republic. By William P. Leeman. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010. Pp. xiii, 292. $39.95 cloth) In the Long Road to Annapolis, William P. Leeman, a professor of history at the Naval Academy's archrival on the Hudson, analyzes the historical context surrounding the founding of the U.S. Naval Academy in 1845. His monograph examines the U.S. Navy methods for training officers before the founding of the Naval Academy through a system of apprenticeship at sea inherited from Royal Navy practice, [End Page 217] calls from naval reformers in the early republic to professionalize the education of naval officers, the influence of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point as a model and example for those reformers, and the Jacksonian opposition to professional military education that helped delay the founding of the Naval Academy for so long. While Leeman makes no dramatic contributions to our scholarly understanding of the founding of the Naval Academy, he deftly draws together all the historical strands that make up the historical context surrounding it. Leeman's study serves not so much as a history of the early years of the Naval Academy, which already exists in the form of Charles Todorich's The Spirited Years: A History of the Antebellum Naval Academy (1984), but as an analysis of the debates and historical setting surrounding the contentious founding of the academy. For that reason, Todorich begins his study with a quick survey of the early history of the American Navy, including its reliance on an apprenticeship model for officer preparation with adolescent boys serving as midshipmen aboard ships. During their time at sea, these midshipmen learned naval officership through practical experience. This system produced naval officers with successful combat records during the War of 1812, but from the earliest days of the republic, some Americans called for a more academic system of education and training for future naval officers. Leeman chronicles an increasing consensus within the navy's officer corps after the War of 1812 in favor of reforming the midshipman system with a more professional system of officer education that would include academic instruction and moral development in schools onshore. The academy was founded, in short, "to provide the academic background, especially in scientific and technical subjects, needed to operate a navy that was gradually becoming more modern and, second, to develop distinguished gentlemen who possessed strong moral character" (p. 234). Leeman thus integrates the story of the founding of the academy with larger currents in middle-class American culture, which hoped to not only allow young people to acquire necessary scientific knowledge, but to cultivate important moral virtues and refined gentility among future professionals. Because [End Page 218] of the navy's role as de facto diplomats in the antebellum period, this was seen as an especially important function. Problems with the old apprenticeship model of midshipman training, highlighted most spectacularly by the controversial execution for mutiny of a midshipman, who happened to be the son of the secretary of war, and two sailors on board the Somers in 1842 also strengthened calls for reform. Leeman also does an able job of analyzing opposition to the creation of the Naval Academy on Jacksonian grounds. He thus integrates the founding of the academy with the story of both the rise to prominence of West Point during the Jacksonian period as a model of professional education and its opponents in Congress who saw the institution as dangerously aristocratic and militarily unnecessary. Secretary of Navy George Bancroft in 1845 eventually overcame such opposition through savvy bureaucratic maneuvering. In short, Leeman has made an able contribution to scholarship on the United States Navy in the context of the history of the early republic. Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh teaches history at the U.S. Naval Academy. He is the author of West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in War and Peace (2009) and is a Henry Chauncey...

Quebec: The Story of Three Sieges; A Military History (review)

Reviewed by: Quebec: The Story of Three Sieges; A Military History John R. Grodzinski Quebec: The Story of Three Sieges; A Military History. Stephen Manning. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009. Pp. 194, $34.95 The many battles fought at Quebec have been a source of endless fascination to historians and the subject of many books and articles. This entry is one of several titles that appeared during the 250th anniversary of the Battle of the Heights of Abraham and was prepared [End Page 765] by British author Stephen Manning, an honorary visiting professor at the University of Exeter, who specializes in Victorian military history. His fascination with military events at Quebec comes from the fact that on three occasions in the eighteenth century, Quebec was at the heart of two different colonial conflicts that had significant continental and transatlantic implications and now form a shared history with Canada, America, Britain, and France. Manning's aim was to examine two battles from the Seven Years' War between Wolfe and Montcalm in 1759 and Lévis and Murray in 1760, along with the siege of 1775 and 1776 during the American War of Independence. Manning also chose to make this a populist history and so avoided the use of endnotes, which he feared would limit the book's appeal to a broader readership. This decision is unfortunate, as it would be interesting to learn how the author used several stimulating primary source materials from the National Army Museum dealing with the 1759 battle and the American siege. The narrative decidedly takes the Anglo, or rather, English-speaking perspective, as the text and bibliography reveal. There is cursory discussion of French commanders, strategy, and plans, just enough to set the stage or provide some colour from the opponent's side without really providing a solid contextual understanding of the challenges France faced. Nevertheless, the author has produced an engaging overview of the three sieges that serves as a useful introduction to the wars he examines. The author offers the usual praise of Wolfe, who 'verged on the brilliant' (49), but also gives some credit to the efforts of the Royal Navy during the campaign. Indeed, the Royal Navy's role in what was essentially an amphibious operation with elements of an assault rivercrossing has not been well explored by historians. Thus, it is probable that it was officers of the navy and not Wolfe who had 'awareness of the tide and moon' (49) in order to set the assault date. Manning makes particular mention of Rear Admiral Charles Holmes and Captain James Shads who commanded the landing force and it would have been useful to learn more about them. However, it is the land battles, not joint operations that are central to this account of the Battle of Quebec. The author also tackles several myths, including Wolfe's courting death the day of the battle or the delivery of the first British volleys, which the author explains was not a volley by the entire British line in unison; rather the fire commenced on the British right and then progressed leftwards, unit by unit. Unfortunately, without notes it is [End Page 766] difficult to determine how the author balanced the various accounts to reach his conclusions. Sainte Foy is very much a dénouement to this story. Despite the loss of Quebec, the French under Lévis could upset British plans, revealing that while the fall of Quebec was important to British war aims, Montreal would have to be taken and the remaining French field army defeated. Unfortunately for Lévis, he could not resist the reinforced and resupplied forces at Quebec and two other armies that all soon converged on Montreal. Fifteen years after Sainte Foy, Quebec was again under siege, with the British now cast in the role of the besieged when rebelling American colonists sought to eliminate Quebec as a base from which the British could crush the rebellion. Manning states that had Washington ordered General Benedict Arnold and his army to march with General Richard Montgomery, Saint Jean would have fallen earlier than it did and the rebels would have reached Quebec before the onset of...

Gustavus Vasa Fox of the Union Navy: A Biography. By Ari Hoogenboom. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008. xvi, 387 pp. $40.00, ISBN 978-0-8081-8986-8.)

In Gustavus Vasa Fox of the Union Navy, Ari Hoogenboom attempts to confirm what many historians have accepted as truth for years: that Fox was the intelligence behind Union naval success during the Civil War. Fox did contribute to the navy's good showing in many ways. He modernized it by championing steamdriven ironclads. He implemented a blockade of the Confederate coast and established a navy on the Mississippi River. Most importantly, Fox convinced politicians and officers that they were dependent upon each other. Officers could not win victories without ships and guns, and politicians could not meet officers' needs without victories. Nowhere is Fox's pragmatic approach more evident than when he told David Dixon Porter that if he wanted a promotion, he should “take a fort” (p. 92). As assistant secretary of the navy, Fox was responsible for commanders, ships, guns, and strategy. Hoogenboom provides an excellent discussion of naval operations, one of the clearest explanations of the Union navy's acquisition and launching of ships in print. His work also reveals the introduction of the ironclads and how Fox and others were seduced by their potential. Hoogenboom weaves the navy's role into the war so well that he pushes the armies to the periphery. This approach breaks new ground; indeed, chapters 7 through 14 should be required reading for all graduate students and upper-level undergraduates in Civil War courses.

A Crisis is Looming: China's energy challenge in the eyes of university students

This paper uses a survey at six universities in China to analyze university students' views on China's energy problems. It finds that gender, the nature and location of a student's original community, and their level of education affects students' views about China's energy problems, as well as the types of solutions that are deemed to be most appropriate to manage this looming crisis. University students are quite concerned about China's energy situation. For them, it is already a crisis. They fear China will be controlled due to resource dependency, see the US as China's primary energy competitor, all the while advocating a more hawkish attitude towards Japan in the East China Sea. But, they look foremost to domestic solutions to this crisis, such as enhanced conservation, more efficient use of energy, new technologies, enhancing China's strategic reserve, and increased government taxation, particularly of large enterprises. When they look abroad, they support diversifying energy sources, increasing energy cooperation, particularly with Russia and Central Asia (but not with Japan), and some increase of the navy's role in enhancing sea lane and energy security.

The French Navy and the Seven Years' War

Seven Years' was the world's first global conflict, spanning five continents and the critical sea lanes that connected them. This book is the fullest account ever written of the French navy's role in the hostilities. It is also the most complete survey of both phases of the war: the French and Indian in North America (1754-60) and the Seven Years' in Europe (1756-63), which are almost always treated independently. By considering both phases of the war from every angle, award-winning historian Jonathan R. Dull shows not only that the two conflicts are so interconnected that neither can be fully understood in isolation but also that traditional interpretations of the war are largely inaccurate. His work also reveals how the French navy, supposedly utterly crushed, could have figured so prominently in the of American Independence only fifteen years later. A comprehensive work integrating diplomatic, naval, military, and political history, The French Navy and the Seven Years' War thoroughly explores the French perspective on the Seven Years' War. It also studies British diplomacy and war strategy, as well as the roles played by the American colonies, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Portugal. As this history unfolds, it becomes clear that French policy was more consistent, logical, and successful than has previously been acknowledged, and that King Louis XV's conduct of the war profoundly affected the outcome of America's subsequent Revolutionary War. Jonathan R. Dull is a senior associate editor of The Papers of Benjamin Franklin series and author of the award-winning history The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787.

The French Navy and the Seven Years' War (review)

Reviewed by: The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War James Pritchard The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War. By Jonathan R. Dull. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005. ISBN 0-8032-1731-5. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiii, 445. $35.00. This excellent book deserves a wide audience. It far surpasses most histories of the Seven Years' War, especially those recent myopic works published on this continent which cover only the Franco-British War in North America. This new book treats the world-wide, especially the European, dimensions of the war from a unique point of view. The war in Europe had consequences that stretched well beyond the continent. Indeed, the author's main contention is that the Seven Years' War cannot be understood unless both European and American wars are studied as a single conflict, and that the French navy's role in this war is a useful way to do this. After 1760, the dominant issue between Britain and France was whether the latter would continue to be a major naval power or leave uncontested command of the seas to her rival. Jonathan Dull, who is a senior associate editor of The Papers of Benjamin Franklin and author of The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787, has written a magnificent book. One must go back more than eighty years to Sir Julian S. Corbett's England in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Combined Strategy, 2 vols. (London, 1918) to find a comparable work. Owing largely to the work of a host of historians who have written during the interval, Dull has successfully integrated diplomatic, political, military, and naval history, even comparative financial history, into a well-written narrative that presents a full treatment of the war and the most complete account of the French navy's important role in it. The book is organized chronologically which allows the author to develop his complex tale without losing the many threads of his story. Dull, who displays a rare mastery of diplomatic archives, argues compellingly that Russia rather than Great Britain was the chief threat to French interests in Europe though previous French conduct during the years 1740 to 1754 led the British to believe otherwise. The book's early chapters well illustrate what someone once called "diplomatic misunderstanding efficiently [End Page 1204] achieved" as each side escalated its response to its rival's actions as failures in leadership allowed war hawks to lead each country into war. Throughout, Dull shows a comfortable familiarity with even the most recent, as well as the standard, secondary works on aspects of the war. The war in Europe from which France had hoped for a quick victory had become by 1758 a seemingly endless war of attrition financed by doubtful loans and dubious expedients. French policy that sought to attack Hanover to check English ambitions elsewhere was flawed from the beginning because the British failed to put enough troops into Europe to enable a defeat there to bring them to the peace table. It also led the French to put insufficient resources into their navy before the war. By 1759, France was caught in a cleft stick. The duc de Choiseul correctly abandoned the flawed policy of defeating Britain by capturing Hanover. Yet, following British victories in Canada, the Caribbean, and the Carnatic in India, Britain's only vulnerability to French arms lay in Germany. No wonder that France was unwilling to abandon its harebrained scheme of invading Great Britain. This book belongs on the shelf of anyone seriously interested in early American and Atlantic history, French maritime and naval history, and in the history of international relations in the eighteenth century. James Pritchard Emeritus, Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada Copyright © 2005 Society for Military History

The German Fleet at War, 1939-1945 (review)

Reviewed by: The German Fleet at War, 1939–1945 Keith W. Bird The German Fleet at War, 1939–1945. By Vincent P. O’Hara. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004. ISBN 1-59114-651-8. Maps. Photographs. Tables. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 308. $32.95. The German Kriegsmarine in World War II remains a highly popular subject, as the numerous recent studies of the U-boat war and the major engagements of surface raiders, the Bismarck and the Graf Spee, demonstrate. [End Page 1242] In this work, the author attempts to show how the surface navy's role was more complex and critical than has generally been appreciated. He summarizes "sixty-nine" surface actions of the "large" warships (which he defines as "purpose-built surface warships" of 500 tons or more) supplemented by a statistical analysis (engagement by type, opponents, location, results, etc.) that provide a useful perspective on the scale of the war at sea and a reminder of the gritty day to day efforts of those in the naval "trenches." Relying on the standard secondary English sources (with some notable omissions) and works translated from German, along with some primary sources from the American and British navies, he has produced a highly readable book which will satisfy the general reader with its focus on the stories of the crews and commanders who carried out their duties with the weapons and conditions (and orders) at hand. However, the absence from its bibliography of most of the standard German secondary sources, such as Michael Salewski's indispensable three-volume history of the Seekriegsleitung or the German Military History Research Office's comprehensive ten-volume history of the Second World War (also published in English by Oxford University Press), raises a question as to whether the book should more properly be titled "Actions against the German Fleet, 1939–1945." His descriptions of the sinking of the Glorious on 8 June 1940 and the Battle of the Barents Sea, 31 December 1942, for example, are told more from the perspective of the British than the Germans and do not reflect current research from the German sources. A more complete analysis of the motivation behind the decisions of the naval command, 1939–1945, and its two commanders, Admirals Erich Raeder and Karl Dönitz, particularly Raeder's struggle to justify his capital ships, while, at the same time, preserving the "core of the fleet" for a future "rebirth," would have provided a richer context for the individual engagements described in this work. Utilizing the published War Diary of the Naval Command (Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, Part A) would also have greatly added to the author's attempt to blend the micro and macro character of the naval war. The exclusion of the auxiliary cruisers (Hilfskreuzer) from this work is also surprising considering their contribution for most of 1939 and 1940 in prosecuting Raeder's sea commerce strategy. More importantly, their role presaged what increasingly became a war of "improvisation" for the navy and after 1943, a necessary "miniaturization" of the navy following Dönitz's appointment as commander and the strains of total war. For the specialist, this book points out the need for a broader new general history of the German navy in World War II that covers all the operations of the naval war, especially the "forgotten navy"—the 3,000 ships of the security forces that protected the coasts from Norway to the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea. Keith W. Bird Lexington, Kentucky Copyright © 2005 Society for Military History

The Tirpitz Legacy: The Political Ideology of German Sea Power

Maritimer Imperialismus: Seemachtideologie, seestrategisches Denken und der Tirpitzplan 1875 bis 1914. By Rolf Hobson. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004. ISBN 3-486-56671-7. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 388. Euro 34.80. Albert Hopman: Das ereignisreiche Leben eines "Wilhelminers." Tagebücher, Briefe, Aufzeichnungen 1901 bis 1920. Edited by Michael Epkenhans. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004. ISBN 3-486-56840-X. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 1231. Euro 49.80. On 7 June 2004, the German Military History Research Office (MGFA) hosted its first program on naval history since it relocated from Freiburg to Potsdam in 1994. This occasion was prompted by the publication of two new and significant works: the German translation of Rolf Hobson's 2002 ground-breaking Imperialism at Sea (Boston and Leiden: Brill) in collaboration with the Norwegian Institute of Defense Studies, and Michael Epkenhans's edition of Vice Admiral Albert Hopman's diaries, letters, and writings, 1901–20. The program began with a panel of "naval history experts" chaired by Jost Dülffer. The panel focused on an examination of the Weltmachthorizonte (perspectives on world power) of four Imperial naval officers: Alfred von Tirpitz (Hobson), Albert Hopman [End Page 821] (Epkenhans), Paul Hintze (Johannes Hürter) and Erich Raeder (Jörg Hillman). The discussion among the panelists and the audience was lively and underscored the significance of Hobson's groundbreaking insights regarding the origins and goals of Tirpitz's strategy. Moreover, Hobson's interpretations present new implications for the "continuity" thesis of German naval history in the period 1890–1945. Although the panel participants had not yet assimilated the impact of Hobson's prescient (and long-overdue) revisionist reassessment of Wilhelmian naval policy and politics and redefinition of the historiographical landscape of the scholarly debate over the aims of German navalism, the overarching discussion reflected the issues brought to the surface by Volker Berghahn's seminal 1971 study of the Tirpitz Plan. Bergahn had emphasized the political and social implications of Tirpitz's naval race with the British (a fleet built against the Reichstag and England). Germany's fleet-building was an attempt to preserve the politico-social status quo of the Kaiserreich's ruling elite through a radical reordering of the international balance of power. Berghahn's interpretation subsequently provided the framework for a rich debate in the 1970s and 1980s over the causes of German navalism and its influence across two world wars. Jost Dülffer's 1973 detailed analysis of fleet-building in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich further illuminated the postwar navy's role in domestic and foreign policy and documented how its leaders continued to keep alive its global ambitions to become a "world sea power." In the late 1970s and 1980s, Gerhard Schreiber demonstrated how the continuity of the navy's concept of Seemacht, blended with the officer corps' Weltmachthorizonte to create Tirpitz's unique concept of Seemachtideologie (ideology of sea power). This navalist ideology underpinned the Germany's navy's goal of "revising" the Versailles Treaty restrictions and resuming the quest for naval world power status. Critics of these scholars rejected what they saw as the "preconceived theoretical frameworks" and the role of social-political motives behind German fleet-building, both before and after Tirpitz, and the "psychological analysis" of the navy's Seemacht ideology. They argued that the documentary records of ambitious fleet plans and aggressive expressions of pursuing world power did not represent military reality and failed to see the catalyst role that the "English problem" played in Tirpitz's formulation (and the perpetuation of his legacy). In spite of Schreiber's additional documentary evidence supporting the linkage between the Tirpitz-Raeder political ideology of sea power and the actual decisions and policies made during the period 1888–1945 (which cannot be simply dismissed as "fantasies" or "utopian"), the controversy over the interpretations of Berghahn, Dülffer, and Schreiber resurfaced in Jörg Hillmann's remarks on Raeder. Challenging...