Naval Establishment Research Articles

India’s Maritime Geopolitics: Philosophy and Practice

Within the contemporary global maritime realm, India’s core area of interest is the ‘Indo-Pacific’. India’s maritme forays depend upon a geopolitical philosophy that buttresses strategic practices. To underscore this link, the article seeks to ascertain Alfred T. Mahan and K. M. Panikkar’s thoughts in Indian maritime perceptions, assessing the application thereof on protean power structures. Finally, it delves into Indian maritime doctrines and strategies to explore core focus and geopolitical/geostrategic formations resorted to by the naval establishment vis-à-vis its plans for achieving sea power either derived from, or aspired to align with the Mahan-Panikkar thought-composite.

Chaplains in the Imperial Russian Navy, 1890–1914

Naval chaplains in the Imperial Russian Navy faced particular difficulties at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They initially had little training and were not paid as part of the naval establishment. They were therefore treated with condescension or contempt and it proved difficult to recruit chaplains to the naval service. Despite their low status within the navy, many served with distinction in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. New regulations came into force in 1908 that required chaplains to monitor the political as well as religious well-being of the crew following the revolutionary events of 1905–7. Reforms to the naval chaplaincy in 1911–12 saw a professionalization of the service and an influx of clergy who were educated. Despite this their status and influence remained limited, and they were unable to combat anti-government sentiment resulting in the sailors becoming the ‘vanguard of the revolution’ in 1917. This article provides an insight into the chaplaincy service of the Imperial Russian Navy at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Enrolment at the French Navy’s School of Advanced Studies in Paris from 1896 to 1899

ABSTRACT The navy in France, like several other leading countries in the late nineteenth century, opened a school of higher learning for education of naval officers aspiring to command and staff positions. The School of Advanced Studies came out of a struggle between the ministers and officers supporting the Jeune École and those of a more conventional frame of mind within the naval establishment. The school’s background and rationale, as well as a list of naval officers who attended as students in those early years provide a foundation for further comparative research.

The Penetanguishene Decision

His Majesty’s Naval Establishment for Lake Huron has been portrayed as deriving from a decisive decision, in the wake of the War of 1812, that resulted in a significant, active naval yard being developed on the shores of Penetanguishene Bay. This picture ignores the earlier plans for its development, and the protracted period of indecision that marked its beginning. Once built, the potentially significant establishment was rendered impotent through a continuous series of reductions that left a handful of men in charge of five decaying vessels in ordinary.

Commodore Sir Edward W. C. R. Owen: Shaping the British Naval Establishment on the Great Lakes in the Wake of the War of 1812

Commodore Sir Edward W. C. R. Owen: Shaping the British Naval Establishment on the Great Lakes in the Wake of the War of 1812

“The most humane attention”: patient care and treatment at Haslar, 1753-1855

When Haslar Hospital admitted its first patients in 1753 ([Figure 1][1]), there was no book of instructions for the Naval Hospitals. There was, however, a collection of forms for use in any naval medical establishment: By the Commissioners for taking care of sick and wounded seamen, and for

Para la propagación de la Fe, para el servicio del rey, y utilidad de sus estados y vasallos. Proyecto anónimo para la instalación de una misión en las Islas Malvinas alrededor de 1766.

En este artículo se analiza brevemente un documento anónimo en el cual se exponen los beneficios que conllevaría la instalación de una misión y un establecimien-to naval en las Islas Malvinas. Dos son los ejes sobre los que se centró el análisis de dicho proyecto. El primero aborda el fuerte contenido geopolítico del mismo, coherente con las reformas promovidas por la Corona. Mientras que el segundo indaga sobre el complejo aparato crítico que le sirve de apoyatura, el cual da cuenta la vasta red infor-mativa a la que tenía acceso el autor como miembro de la Compañía de Jesús.

Anglicizing America: Empire, Revolution, Republic

Anglicizing America: Empire, Revolution, Republic

From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (review)

Reviewed by: From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Euan Graham (bio) From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States. By Sadao Asada. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md., 2006. xii, 385 pages. $32.95. Sadao Asada’s underlying contention is that a failure of leadership within Japan’s naval establishment was ultimately responsible for the slide from the naval arms limitations regime of the 1920s and 1930s to the desperate gamble of attacking Pearl Harbor and invading Southeast Asia, in spite of clear indicators that Japan had little prospect of prevailing against the United States in a prolonged conflict. Asada debunks two assumptions in the process. The first is that war was the inevitable outcome of irresistible historical forces. The second, a revisionist view that has gained some currency in Japan, is that the Imperial Navy was dragged reluctantly into war with the United States by the army. Asada documents how a few within the naval establishment fought a rear-guard action to avert war but puts it beyond doubt that Japan’s own “navalists” were just as belligerent and reckless as their army counterparts. When Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History was published in 1890, it established his reputation as the leading exponent and “propagandist” of the navalist era. Asada argues convincingly that Mahan’s association of powerful navies with national greatness and belief in the decisive fleet encounter sowed the seeds of a deterministic logic on both sides of the Pacific that commercial and naval rivalry between Japan and the United States would eventually force a showdown for maritime supremacy. The Imperial Navy’s “mirror-imaging” of the U.S. Navy did not properly materialize until the annihilation of the Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905 shifted its strategic horizons to the Pacific under the influence of Mahan’s contemporary and nearest Japanese equivalent, Satō Tetsutarō. Mahan’s advocacy of naval expansion quickly wrought the desired effect. In 1901, the United States possessed a mere seven battleships to Japan’s twelve. By 1907 the balance was reversed to 35:25 in American favor. Mahanian “mirror-imaging” took on increasingly dogmatic appeal in Japan, where an unsuccessful bid was even made to lure Mahan to teach at the Naval Staff College. Japan’s navalists, protective of the navy’s special position within the Meiji constitution, feared eclipse and extinction with the U.S. Navy’s reach expanding westward. In their search for a budgetary enemy, [End Page 517] partly to compete for resources with the army, they forgot “Mahan’s real teaching . . . that the decisive battle was a means to securing command of the sea” (p. 182). Although Japan and the United States were briefly both British allies in World War I, the naval arms race continued, absorbing an extraordinary one-third of Japan’s national budget in 1921. Asada reconstructs in impressive detail, from personal and official archival material, how Japan’s chief negotiator to the Washington Conference in 1922, Admiral (later Prime Minister) Katō Tomosaburō, on his own initiative and in the teeth of opposition from the Navy General Staff, accepted a capital ship ratio of 10:6 vis-à-vis the United States. Firebrands, led by Chief of the Naval Staff Katō Kanji, developed a “ratio neurosis” wedded to the idea that maintaining 70 per cent of U.S. frontline strength was the Imperial Navy’s nonnegotiable margin for survival. Although the naval limitations treaties were maintained and extended to auxiliaries in 1930, the navalists worked throughout to undermine an arms control regime that had done much to enhance Japan’s security and spare it financial pain. Asada notes that relations with the U.S. Navy improved thereafter, until Katō Tomosaburō’s death removed the main obstacle to hard-line opponents of arms limitation. The death knell of civilian government in 1936 cleared the path for all-out rearmament and full-scale war in China. In this destabilized environment, deteriorating relations with Washington and resulting pressure on Japan’s oil supplies led the navy to advocate an “advance to the South Seas,” equal to the army’s expansionism in China, risking...

The genesis of the naval profession

Norbert Elias, 1897-1990 Norbert Elias (1897-1990) Editors' Preface Introduction: Elias's Studies of the Naval Profession by Rene Moelker and Stephen Mennell Gentlemen and Tarpaulins Tensions and Conflicts The Development of the Midshipman Achieving Maritime Supremacy FRAGMENTS: The Growing Costs of the Naval Establishment: Elizabeth and Cromwell Compared On Institutions The Last Act: Elias's Scenario For a Play about Drake and Doughty Textual variants Bibliography Index.

Management development: developing ethical corporate culture in three organisations

PurposeThe purpose of this investigation was to look at three organisations (a naval shore establishment, a police academy, and a small, family‐owned engineering firm) and see to what extent they had developed a culture that was both ethically and socially responsive.Design/methodology/approachThe investigation was carried out by speaking to key players, observing their organisations and by detailed analysis of the documents which related to this study.FindingsThe findings revealed that the Navy has a set of values (HHCIL) which overlap with the more general values of the Department of Defence (imPLICIT). The Western Australian Police Service has an approach to developing an ethical corporate culture which includes the establishment of a dedicated unit, and running discussion groups and seminars. The family‐owned and operated engineering business relies more heavily on an indirect approach based on following traditional family values.Research limitations/implicationsPursuing the topic of what makes a just war, particularly in today's political climate, was one possibility for further research. There were limitations to the study; these were mainly due to issues of confidentiality and in broaching sensitive topics to both Navy and Police senior officers.Originality/valueThree conditions were essential for developing an ethical corporate culture: CEOs were ultimately responsible for the ethicality of their organisations; formal training programs were necessary to impart the required knowledge; and formal mechanisms were essential to facilitate the reporting of any behaviour of organisational members that was deemed to be wrong, unethical or illegal.

A Call to the Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution (review)

Reviewed by: A Call to the Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution Spencer C. Tucker A Call to the Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution. By Claude Berube and John A. Rodgaard. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2005. ISBN 1-57488-518-9. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 299. $35.00. An icon of the early U.S. sailing navy, Charles Stewart is best known as the captain of the frigate Constitution, although his naval career spanned more than sixty years. It is thus quite surprising that this is the first published biography of Stewart. Fortunately for those interested in the period, it is a splendid book. Stewart was born in Philadelphia on 28 July 1778. His father and stepfather both made their living from the sea and his close boyhood friends were future naval luminaries Stephen Decatur, Jr., and Richard Somers. Stewart joined the merchant marine as a cabin boy at age twelve, but in March 1798 at nineteen he secured a commission as a lieutenant in the new U.S. Navy. After a stint on the frigate United States, in 1800 during the Quasi War (1798–1800), while commanding the sloop Experiment, he took two French privateers and also recovered a number of U.S. merchant ships. [End Page 510] Stewart's fine record led to his retention in the downsized peacetime naval establishment. He participated in the war with Tripoli (1801–5) and took part in Lieutenant Stephen Decatur's expedition to destroy the captured frigate Philadelphia in Tripoli harbor in February 1804. Advanced to captain in 1806, Stewart spent several years overseeing gunboat construction. Following several furloughs with the merchant marine, Stewart returned to the navy just before the War of 1812 and took a number of prizes in the brig Argus. He then assumed command of the frigate Constellation at Norfolk. Unable to escape the British blockade, he was transferred to the Constitution at Boston and in December 1813 got to sea and captured several prizes. In December 1814 he again ran the blockade. Off Madeira on 20 February 1815, the Constitution encountered the British 32-gun frigate Cyane and the 20-gun sloop Levant. Skillfully maneuvering his own heavier vessel, Stewart was able to rake both British ships without ever exposing the Constitution's bow or stern. Within an hour both his opponents had struck, although a pursuing British squadron subsequently retook the Levant. Returning to New York in May, Stewart was hailed as a national hero and voted a gold medal by Congress. After the war, Stewart held various commands ashore and afloat. In 1830 he served on the Board of Naval Commissioners and also commanded the Philadelphia Navy Yard between 1838 and 1841 and again between 1854 and 1860, then advised President Abraham Lincoln at the beginning of the Civil War. Stewart died at Bordentown, New Jersey, on 6 November 1869. Fittingly, his headstone reads simply, "Charles Stewart, U.S.N." Authors Claude Berube and John A. Rodgaard are to be highly commended for this splendid book tracing Stewart's life and accomplishments. It is both thoroughly researched and engagingly presented. Both men have contributed articles to Naval History but this is their first book, and it is a major accomplishment. Its great strength lies in the authors' ability to present a clear picture of Stewart's public and private lives within a grander setting. Alas, the foresight that served Stewart so well professionally did not carry over to his personal life. Desperate for marriage, he chose badly and it ended in divorce. He was, however, devoted to his five children, three of whom were by his mistress. The authors do a fine job of setting the surroundings. Thus there are descriptions of the Philadelphia of Stewart's youth and discussions of the formation of the U.S. Navy and the background of the wars of the period, as well as of the sea fights, which the authors handle deftly. Stewart also made major contributions in other areas, which the authors detail. An important addition to the literature of the U.S. age of sail, A Call to the Sea will appeal to all those with an...

Social Flux at the Naval Establishment at Penetanguishene, Lake Huron, 1817–1834

Factors influencing the spatial arrangement of buildings at the Royal Navy establishment at Penetanguishene on Lake Huron are discussed. Excavation at the naval hospital at this site provides new insight into the residential movements of the various social groups at the base. Analysis of stratigraphy and artifacts recovered from the hospital suggests that the assistant naval surgeon and his wife, military officers, and aboriginal people resided in the structure at various times over a 17-year period. Contemporary attitudes toward social and economic status, service rank/rating, and aboriginal people are explored within the context of the archaeological and documentary evidence to explain changes in residential patterning through time.

Naval policy and national strategy in France, 1933–1937

This article argues that French naval policy‐makers were slow to adjust to the changed strategic landscape of the 1930s. During the 1920s France did not face a serious land or air threat. Defence policy‐makers were therefore able to devote a large portion of the defence budget to rebuilding French maritime power. But when the Depression and the rise of Nazi Germany overturned the strategic situation in Europe, policy‐makers adjusted by giving priority to land and air rearmament and by placing ever greater emphasis on securing an alliance with Great Britain. The French naval establishment resisted this trend unsuccessfully. The frustration of naval planning increased the resentment and mistrust of both the Third Republic and Great Britain that characterised naval attitudes before and particularly during the Second World War.

Naval Surgeon: Life and Death at Sea in the Age of Sail (review)

Reviewed by: Naval Surgeon: Life and Death at Sea in the Age of Sail Eric Howard Christianson J. Worth Estes. Naval Surgeon: Life and Death at Sea in the Age of Sail. Canton, Mass.: Science History Publications/USA, 1998. xii + 266 pp. Ill. $39.95. What can we learn about health, disease, death, and medical practice at sea by focusing on the fragments and records prepared by one individual who spent most of 1778–1822 on dry land? According to Worth Estes, we can learn much about late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century medical practice in general. The exemplar for practice during the period is Peter St. Medard (1755–1822). Born in France, he served a medical apprenticeship and by the mid-1700s found appointment aboard vessels in the Caribbean, some of which were involved in the lucrative slave trade. Captured by the British in 1778, he soon found himself in revolutionary Boston where he offered his services to the Continental Navy. Later, during the Quasi-War with France, he served on the first tour of the newly commissioned USS Constitution, 1798–1802. During 1802–3, St. Medard served as surgeon in the US Frigate New York, sailing to the Mediterranean and into the theater of the Barbary Wars. As the author points out, one of the ironies here is that casualties of battles occupied very little of his professional time at sea, although while posted to marine and naval facilities on land he did treat wounded and indigent sailors. This is not traditional biography. Rather, Estes uses what little is known about St. Medard to assemble around him secondary materials and chapters that contextually explore medical practice on land and at sea during that time, with special reference to the evolving nation’s naval establishment. With virtually nothing known for sure about St. Medard’s practice in Boston while not in service, the author relies upon the manuscript journal in which St. Medard details his experiences while aboard the New York. Much of this volume derives from Estes’s earlier published work on St. Medard’s experiences, but here he can offer even greater detail and analysis of the day-to-day medical encounters. We learn that of 370 crew and passengers on the New York in 1802–3, 64 percent (239) were recorded on the sick list by Dr. St. Medard and his colleague Dr. Nathaniel T. Weems, which means that 36 percent required little or no medical attention. The author uses many graphs and charts to document that officers fared better than others, that few cases required surgical intervention, and that few died of any injury or disease. One appendix lists the surgical equipment and drugs taken on the New York, and Estes points out that there are no surprises here: civilian practitioners and army surgeons generally utilized similar instruments and drugs. The health records of the crew constitute another appendix, with yet another chart that details how long people were on the sick list, with what affliction, and how and what medication or treatment was administered. As the author observes, with some obvious exceptions sailors on the New York present health profiles quite similar to those of their land-locked counterparts, and they underwent similar therapeutic procedures. He helps us understand how healers and others believed in the efficacy of drugs that today we know do not work as their advocates claimed. In most respects the contents of this volume are true to its title. There is the [End Page 508] romance of a time under sail aboard some of the great vessels that we associate with independence and the emergence of the early republic. The author’s skill at analyzing data such as St. Medard’s contributes to our knowledge of how healers understood illness and injury, and how they responded therapeutically. Eric Howard Christianson University of Kentucky Copyright © 1999 The Johns Hopkins University Press

Sickness absence in male Royal Naval medical and dental branch ratings: 1981-1989.

Sickness episodes for the male members of the medical and dental branch of the Royal Navy were compared with those for a control group consisting of other male naval ratings over the period 1981-1989. Age-corrected statistical analysis showed the study group to have had a significantly higher (P < 0.001) number of sickness episodes. An estimate of under-reporting was carried out by taking a sample of weekly sick lists and establishing which cases should have been reported and which actually had been reported. In the sample from a naval hospital, 67.8% (120/177) of cases that should have been reported were actually reported. This figure dropped to 46.8% (171/365) for a naval shore establishment. From this information, correction factors were derived and applied to the sickness episode data. The resulting difference in episodes was not statistically significant between groups. When the study group was compared with male NHS workers, both the observed rates and the estimated rates for the study group were much lower than those for the NHS groups. Bias due to under-reporting was probably a major factor in the overall difference originally observed.

The Secret of the Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence: September 1939 — May 1940

After more than three decades it is now possible to examine and analyze the early Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence. It has long been known that there was an exchange of telegrams and letters between the President and the First Lord of the Admiralty in the months between September 1939 and May 1940. To many, this exchange between the President of a neutral country and the head of a warring nation's naval establishment seemed unneutral, imprudent and possibly indicative of a deeper relationship. The reluctance of the American Government to open the full Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence file, even after the usual classification period of twenty years had passed, added to the suspicion of conspiracy. Now, however, the files in London and in Washington are open and it is possible to reveal the facts of the case. A careful examination reveals that there was no plot to get the United States involved in the war at least not at the American end. There is

Navigational Planning and the Use of Special Techniques

This paper stresses the need for realistic planning prior to a transit of hazardous waters as opposed to the mere study or review of navigational data, no matter how exhaustive. If the planning is realistic, it should be directed toward the most effective use of nagivational data, methods, and navigational aids. Therefore, during the planning stage the navigator should determine how he can make most effective use of the information and means available. A study of the navigational situation may reveal the applicability or feasibility of employing certain special techniques as supporting methods, or emergency methods in the event of failure of certain primary navigation sensors. The paper indicates that the planning should include drill in those special techniques infrequently used which may be extremely valuable in an emergency during the transit. Drill, or mental preparation at the very least, should be conducted because the procedures are infrequently used. Some special techniques, which could be extremely valuable during an emergency, may require only a few minutes preparation of commonly available materials. During an emergency, there may not be time, even a few minutes, to prepare the materials,—thus, the need for identifying during the planning those techniques and associated special preparations which can be of considerable help during the transit. In relationship to navigational planning, the paper treats of a variety of special visual and radar techniques. It treats of interim procedures which can be employed during an emergency until more accurate and reliable procedures can be employed. The opinions and assertions contained in this article are not to be construed as being officially endorsed by the Naval Oceanographic Office or the Naval Establishment.

Simplified Radar Plotting

THIS PAPER TREATS briefly of the current dissatisfaction in the maritime industry with respect to the efficacy of the conventional means of radar plotting for collision avoidance and suggests possible feasible approaches which may be employed to alleviate the problem, particularly among users without resources for expensive and complex plotting equipments. The suggested means have the objective of working towards reducing the blunders frequently made even by experienced radar observers in the solution of the vector diagram through variations in technique as opposed to the introduction of new principles. A parallel objective is the presentation of the solution in a form which will tend to reduce the confusion frequently associated with relative motion. A desired byproduct is increased solution speed with reduction in the need for continuous attention to the radar plot, particularly for deck watch officers who have multiple duties and responsibilities, with little or no assistance from other qualified personnel. While the paper is directed primarily towards the problems of the merchant marine deck officer, the suggested techniques and their variations applied to radar plotting could prove of benefit to the naval officer. Expanded treatment is given of the alternative solutions presented in the 1968 Corrected Print of H. 0. Pub. No. 257, Radar Plotting Manual. The paper includes a discussion of the relative merits of geographical (navigational) and relative plots used in interpreting the data of relative motion radars. Simple means of rapidly converting a geographical plot to a relative motion plot are investigated. The opinions and assertions contained in this article are not to be construed as being officially endorsed by the Naval Oceanographic Office or the Naval Establishment.

The Lure of Empire: Why Frenchmen Entered the Colonial Service

A revolutionary figure in Flaubert's Education sentimentale, frustrated by restrictions on liberty at home, exclaims, 'I feel like going off to live among the cannibals'. In the end he remains in France, but the readiness with which this remark was made is revealing. Throughout western thought the attraction of life among non-Europeans, among peoples thought to be primitive, has exercised a strange fascination. While the overseas areas had their own charm, the interest in exoticism was to a significant degree an outcome of the dissatisfaction which many Europeans felt with their own culture and society. Imperialism gave an official outlet to this urge to 'escape' from Europe. No single cause can be found for the attraction which the colonial empires exercised, once they had been established; but seen in their entirety the various motives reveal either an inability or a reluctance to cope with European society. This essay, limited to French imperialism, attempts to show why Frenchmen entered the colonial service, in particular the Corps of Colonial Administrators, the service charged with the administration of the French possessions in sub-Saharan Africa and Madagascar.1 The Corps provided the men who were in charge of regional administration; they were the equivalent of the British district officers. In the middle of the nineteenth century the French empire was still so small that it was hardly profitable to establish elaborate methods of recruitment. The colonies, considered as part of the French naval establishment, were administered by marine officers.