NATO's Northern Research Articles

REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS IN NORTHERN EUROPE (ON THE EXAMPLE OF NORWAY) IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT CHANGES

The paper examines the dynamics of regional security in Norway as a part of Northern Europe. Being a political and geographical part of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Northern Europe, in its turn, is experiencing the impact of the confrontation between Russia and NATO. Norway's security policy analyzed from the perspective of a regional leader, as a NATO member country participating in the operations of the North Atlantic Alliance and as NATO's northern wing.

The “Star Wars” Murders: Revisiting a Cold Case from the Cold War

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsMarian K. LeightonDr. Marian K. Leighton has been working in the United States Intelligence Community since 1980, first as a Soviet analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, and again with the CIA as an independent contractor working first in the Counterterrorism Center and later in the Declassification Center. A graduate of Barnard College, New York City, with a B.A. in Russian Studies, she received her M.A. from the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, New York City, and her Ph.D. in International Relations, also from Columbia. Dr. Leighton is the author of The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1979); The Deceptive Lure of Détente (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989); and Soviet Propaganda as a Foreign Policy Tool (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991).

Strange Bedfellows: The Stasi and the Terrorists

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsMarian K. LeightonDr. Marian K. Leighton has been working in the United States Intelligence Community since 1980, first as a Soviet analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, then as a counterterrorism specialist at the Defense Intelligence Agency, and again with the CIA as an independent contractor working in the Counterterrorism Center and later in the Declassification Center. A graduate of Barnard College, New York City, with a B.A. in Russian Studies, she received her M.A. from the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, New York City, and her Ph.D. in International Relations, also from Columbia. Dr. Leighton is the author of The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1979); The Deceptive Lure of Détente (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989); and Soviet Propaganda as a Foreign Policy Tool (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991).

Sir Ian Gourlay

Sir Ian Gourlay had a distinguished career in the Royal Marines. He was born on 13 November 1920 and died on 17 July 2013, aged 92. During World War II, he took part in the landings in North Africa and fought in the Adriatic, in Italy and in Yugoslavia. He was appointed Commandant-General from 1971 to 1975, during which years he organised the change in training from jungle and desert warfare to the Arctic, in order to defend NATO's northern flank against possible Soviet aggression. He retired in 1975 from the Royal Marines, when he became Director General of the United World Colleges, at the request of Lord Mountbatten. During his fifteen years in office, this educational foundation for the world-wide development of international understanding expanded considerably. On its website on 30 September 2013, UWC's Executive Director recorded that the movement was transformed by Sir Ian, who proved to be an inspiration to very many people.

Amber Nine: NATO's Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the Incorporation of Sweden in NATO's Infrastructure

All through the 1950s and 1960s NATO had secretly utilized a secret flight path, called Amber Nine, over the southwestern part of Sweden. The Swedish government condoned the frequent overflights, despite the fact that Sweden was at the time professing to follow a policy of neutrality in the power struggle between the two superpowers. This article argues that the frequent American use of Amber Nine should be viewed as a materialization of Sweden's consent to US hegemony, and that Amber Nine effectively made Swedish airspace and airports a part of NATO's infrastructure. It also makes the case that the arrangement contributed to the eradication of the credibility of Sweden's policy of neutrality, and that NATO's routine use of a flight path over Sweden, a non-NATO country, warrants a reinterpretation of Sweden's role in the Cold War on NATO's northern flank, as well as challenging the definition of the NATO alliance.

The Threat of Unintended Use of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

The Threat of Unintended Use of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

Fire Brigade or Tocsin? NATO's ACE Mobile Force, Flexible Response and the Cold War

During the Cold War, NATO planners created the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) to implement proto-flexible response strategies. Originally conceived as a means to plug gaps in the NATO Central Region "Shield" forces with portable tactical nuclear weapons, ACE Mobile Force evolved into a signalling device intended to forestall an escalatory situation with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces on NATO's northern and southern flanks. The story of ACE Mobile Force is a lens from which to view the implementation of Flexible Response, particularly in the mature period of the 1970s and 1980s.

NATO's northern allies: Contributions in the post‐Cold War era

The vast majority of scholarly and media attention on NATO focuses almost exclusively on the alliance's major powers: the United States, France and Great Britain. Considerably less attention is given to the Scandinavian member‐states; Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, all of whom have been members since its founding in 1949. Research on these Nordic members reveals much about their new place in the Alliance.

Redeeming Vietnam: Techno-Thriller Novels of the 1980s

In 1978, General Sir John Hackett, former commander in chief of the British Army of the Rhine and NATO's Northern Army Group, joined forces with six other leading British generals and admirals. Together they wrote The Third World War: August 1985, a novel that vividly describes a Soviet air and land attack on Western Europe and naval battles in the North Atlantic.' Both the Soviet attack and NATO's response remain below the threshold, until the Soviets destroy Birmingham, England, killing 300,000 people and wounding an additional 250,000. In retaliation, NATO launches four nuclear missiles at Minsk. Its destruction sparks national liberation movements throughout Eastern Europe and the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union, and leads to a coup in the Kremlin. According to Hackett et al., WW III lasts eighteen days and ends with a complete Western victory. The Third World War received rave reviews in England. In the United States, New York Times military correspondent Drew Middleton described it as a compelling account of the utmost seriousness, fascination, realism, readability, and relevance. By 1979

Concepts and future capabilities in NATO's northern region

Concepts and future capabilities in NATO's northern region

Britain and NATO's northern flank

Britain and NATO's northern flank

NATO's northern allies: the national security policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, & Norway and Defending the West: a history of NATO

NATO's northern allies: the national security policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, & Norway and Defending the West: a history of NATO

Book Reviews : Gregory Flynn (ed.): NATO's Northern Allies. The National Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985, 294 pp. Nils Ørvik (ed.): Semialignment and Western Security. London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986, 286 pp

Book Reviews : Gregory Flynn (ed.): NATO's Northern Allies. The National Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985, 294 pp. Nils Ørvik (ed.): Semialignment and Western Security. London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986, 286 pp

Emerging security considerations for NATO's northern flank

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsPeter deLeonPreviously he was a Senior Staff Member in the Political Science Department at the Rand Corporation.

NATO's Northern Front: Developments and Prospects

Beginning in the mid-1970s, a number of observers of the so-called Nordic balance began to draw attention to the growing imbalance in NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities in the region. The U.S.-Norwegian prestocking arrangement was one NATO response to the limited warning time for a Soviet move to cut off the North Cape area. Whereas Norway, in conjunction with the United States, is currently in the midst of a major effort to restore the credibility of its northernmost defenses, Denmark has been amongst the most reluctant of Alliance members to increase its level of defense spending. Furthermore, Greenland's home rule represents another complication. Given Greenland's clear determination to go its own way in international economic affairs, it is important to assess whether it might do the same on defense matters. Greenland's importance to NATO is often overlooked but cannot be over stated. Finland's neutrality and Sweden's more forceful armed neutrality permit NATO to adopt a posture which does not impose upon Denmark and Norway the burden of hosting foreign troops upon their soil.

NATO's Northern Front: Developments and Prospects

Beginning in the mid-1970s, a number of observers of the so-called Nordic balance began to draw attention to the growing imbalance in NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities in the region. The U.S.-Norwegian prestocking arrangement was one NATO response to the limited warning time for a Soviet move to cut off the North Cape area. Whereas Norway, in conjunction with the United States, is currently in the midst of a major effort to restore the credibility of its northernmost defenses, Denmark has been amongst the most reluctant of Alliance members to increase its level of defense spending. Furthermore, Greenland's home rule represents another complication. Given Greenland's clear determination to go its own way in international economic affairs, it is important to assess whether it might do the same on defense matters. Greenland's importance to NATO is often overlooked but cannot be overstated. Finland's neutrality and Sweden's more forceful armed neutrality permit NATO to adopt a posture which does not impose upon Denmark and Norway the burden of hosting foreign troops upon their soil.

The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank and Soviet Military Strategy in Europe

The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank and Soviet Military Strategy in Europe

SWEDEN AND NORDIC BALANCE

Abstract : Sweden's role as a great world power ended when Karl XII was defeated at the Battle of Poltava in the Ukraine in 1709. The Baltic provinces had to be ceded to Russia, and Peter the Great moved his capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg (now Leningrad). Russia thus arose as a major power on the Baltic, envisioning then as now that the Baltic provided access to Europe and a natural outlet for the Russian Empire to the west. Although relegated to the status of a third rate power, Sweden has continued to a surprising degree, to influence world events in the Twentieth Century. This influence is exerted largely by its national vigor, by its example of social and industrial progress, by its contributions to humanitarian causes, by its activist participation in international organizations, and by its military involvement in the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. Modern Sweden occupies a central position at the head of the Baltic, on NATO's northern flank. Except for the Finnish crisis of 1961, when the Soviet Union threatened to invoke the consultation provisions of the Soviet-Finnish Mutual Assistance Treaty as a counteraction to growing West German strength in the Baltic, relative quiet has generally prevailed. The northern calm and stability stand in sharp contrast with the events of the Mediterranean area, where recent inflammatory events focus the attention of planners, and policy and decision makers on the threats to NATO's southern flank. The buildup of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean, the increasing Soviet influence in the Arab states because of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the problems of base rights in Franco Spain, and grant aid support for the military dictatorship in Greece are but a few examples of major Mediterranean problems. Although less volatile, the Baltic and the Scandinavian peninsula are in many respects significant to western defense.

Problems of the Defence of Nato's Northern Flank

Problems of the Defence of Nato's Northern Flank

Soviet Approaches on Nato's Northern Flank

The analysis presented in this paper is based upon the assumption that neither the relaxed atmosphere which followed the Cuban crisis and the Test Ban Treaty, nor the shift of leaders in the Soviet Union has altered basically Soviet intentions toward the West. Moscow continues to foster hopes for the disintegration of the Western alliance. What remains open is the question of the means which the Soviets could use for the fulfillment of their aims in the changed circumstances. One reason for the reduced cohesion within the Western alliance is claimed to be the relaxation of a Soviet threat. Can the West rest assured that the Soviet leaders, because of their own difficulties at home and within the Soviet bloc, will refrain from making any military or political moves? Or are there, within the limits drawn by the detente and the nuclear stalemate, means and methods for actively extending Soviet influence and control? Are all Soviet approaches barred by unacceptable risks or are some roads still open, free from the restraints of the present international situation? These questions could be raised with respect to any part of the Western defence perimeter. In this case, they will be limited to NATO's northern flank, particularly its Northern Cap. The Cap is the area where Norway borders directly on the Soviet Union.1 Unlike the central and southern parts of nato, the northern flank has not been the scene of a major EastWest crisis. It has therefore tended to recede into the background of the strategic debate. Why worry about a spot where nothing happens? Recent changes in Soviet strategy would make it useful to take a fresh look at possible incentives for the Soviet Union to try to influence the status quo of the area.