Upsurge Of Nationalism Research Articles

民族主义与当代中国的自由主义者 (Liberalism and Nationalism in Contemporary China)

The upsurge of nationalism in China since the 1990s has attracted considerable interest in academic circles. It has come about against the background of the frustration of political modernization (democratization) in China as a result of the June Fourth incident. These historical circumstances have prompted further debate over the relationship between democratization and nationalism. An interesting question for Chinese liberals committed to constitutional democracy is how to respond to nationalism. Generally speaking, contemporary Chinese liberals believe that nationalism is detrimental to democratization, jeopardizes national interest, and allows national sovereignty to override human rights.

The New Nationalism and the Strategic Architecture of Northeast Asia

[ 38 ] asia policy The New Nationalism and the Strategic Architecture of Northeast Asia Francis Fukuyama While Northeast Asia has been a relatively peaceful and prosperous part of the world for the last two generations, there are developments unfolding in the region that can have destabilizing consequences. This should forceU.S.policymakerstothinkaboutwhetherthelegacysecurityarchitecture for the region, inherited from the Cold War, is adequate to meet new needs arising from these developments. The most troubling development is not North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons—a serious problem about which much has been written— but the upsurge of nationalism in the three main countries of the region: China, South Korea, and Japan. This new nationalism is likely to exacerbate in a very concrete way tensions now simmering beneath the surface, making an issue like North Korean nuclear weapons much more dangerous and difficult to handle. This author is not offering any particular insights about the nature of the newnationalisminChinaandSouthKoreaexcepttonotethatinbothcountries the upsurge in nationalism appears to be associated with generational change. That is, those who have been the most assertive in pushing a nationalist agenda (e.g., the campaign that collected some 22 million signatures in China to keep Japan out of the UN Security Council, or those opposing U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula and promoting an accommodation with North Korea) tend to be younger people who did not directly experience either the Pacific War or the Korean War. Both better educated and more prosperous, this generation can take the peace and prosperity they have enjoyed more for granted than can their parents. The passage of time thus has not softened nationalist attitudes but hardened them. This author has much greater direct knowledge of the nature of new nationalism in Japan. Perhaps the most important point to note is that nationalism is not new: the problem in Japan is not that there has never been a full and open debate in that country that appropriately assigned blame for the debacle of the Pacific War. The real significance of former prime minister Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University, and Director of SAIS’ International Development program. He is also Chairman of the editorial board of a new magazine, The American Interest. His latest book is America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (2006). He is available at . [ 39 ] roundtable • pursuing security in a dynamic northeast asia Koizumi’s visits to the shrine lies not in the symbolism of the twelve class-A war criminals buried there but rather in the Yushukan military museum next to the shrine. Yushukan presents the standard nationalist narrative about the war, which maintains that Japan not only was more a victim than a victimizer but also was liberating Asia from European domination and that Japan’s behavior was not different from that of any other colonial great power. If the one point of view on the war presented by Yushukan museum were just one among many, it might be defensible as an unfortunate but aberrant point of view in an otherwise pluralistic society. The problem is that the Yushukan is the only museum in contemporary Japan dealing with Japan’s twentieth century history and that successive governments have hidden behind the fact that it is run by a religious foundation to protect the museum’s status. Unlike the Germans, the Japanese were never able to break decisively with the prewar narrative, and until the Japanese do so their neighbors will continue to have suspicions of Japanese intentions. Why is this longstanding nationalist narrative making a comeback now? There are two structural reasons for the timing. The first has to do with the collapse of the left in Japanese politics. The Japan Socialist Party was always an obstacle to constitutional revision of Article 9—or a shift to more nationalistic policies—but its collapse in the 1990s has encouraged a broad shift to the right. Second, the long-term trend line of Chinese power is clear to Japan: while the Japanese economy is still several times the size of China’s, relative power positions will change in...

Parallel Cultures: Majority/Minority Relations in the Countries of the Former Eastern Bloc by Christopher s> Lord Olga Strietska-Ilina (review)

i6o SEER, 83, I, 2005 Another important theme of this volume is historical memory, which is addressed in four contributions, including Dan Diner's analysis of the Holocaust in historical memory, Elisabeth Domansky's examination of the POW memorial church in Bochum, Germany, and Avner Ben-Amos's dissectionof Leon Gambetta'sfuneralin I833 (and subsequenttransferof his heart to the Pantheon in I920). Boaz Neumann also considers memory, among othertopics, in his thought-provokingarticleon death in Auschwitz. Many of the articlesin this volume build on work that has been published, either previously or subsequently. Though not presenting on the whole fundamentallynew conclusions -especially to readersalreadywell versed in recent scholarship -they all offeroriginalresearchand maintaina uniformly high standard. Furthermore, the comparative framework represents a first attempt to articulatethe pan-Europeanimplicationsof the modernistcurrent in contemporaryhistoriography.In sum, thisusefuland stimulatingvolume is recommended to a wide readership. School ofSlavonic andEastEuropean Studies SUSAN MORRISSEY University College London Lord, Christopher and Strietska-Ilina,Olga (eds). ParallelCultures. Majority! MinorityRelationsin the Countries of the FormerEasternBloc. Ashgate, Aldershotand Burlington,VT, 2001. Xi + 295 pp. Tables. Notes. Bibliographicalreferences .Index. ?45?00. MINORITY issues have not gone away since the collapse of Communism allowed the carving up of the former Eastern Bloc into a large number of ethnically-basedstates.This book aims to addressthem by means of five case studies preceded by an introduction by Christopher Lord which takes up almost half the book. We need broad, over-arching studies that place the recent world upsurge of nationalism in context. We need to examine the culturaland religiousroots of national differences.We need to take a critical look at the legends that so often underpin inter-ethnic strife. The author is strong on all these things. He ranges far and wide over world history and philosophy, takingin Herder, Spinoza, StAugustine, St Thomas Aquinasand Suf al-Ghazali, scatteringmany interestingand provocativecomments on the way. His general approachis highly criticalof nationalism.It is 'theproblem, not the solution'(p. 63). Buthe tendsto spoilhiscase by overstatement.Surely therewas room in such a long essayfor qualificationsand reservations.Above all, he repeatedly contradicts the scholarly consensus without giving any detailedjustificationof hispositions.Here aresome examples.I haverestricted my own comments to a minimum. The Greeks 'are actually an Ottoman remnant population rather than anything' (p. 6). This is as if one were to say that the Lithuanians are a remnant Russian population or the Slovenes a remnant of the Habsburg Empire. In fact there was very little Ottoman settlement in Greece. The Middle Ages 'werea period of decline and collapsein WesternEurope'(p. 7). The Polish state became extinct in the eighteenth century 'because Polish provinces did not conform to the diocesan boundariesof the Church' (p. 37). REVIEWS i6i The dialects spoken in Greece were 'self-evidently Turkish in lexicon and phonology' (p. 41). Apostolos Vacapoulos might differ. In the KabardinoBalkariaAutonomous Republic 'two groupswere recognisedtogetherasjoint owners at the expense of other candidates' (p. 104). Slovene 'is not a South Slav but a West Slav language' (p. I I5). After I989 the Czechs 'wanted colour TVs and new cars; Slovakia would be a drag on this consumerism; so they dumped the Slovaks' (p. 48). The Czechs are also apparently responsible for forcing the German minority into Hitler's camp. 'Left out of Czechoslovakia's nationalistic agenda the Germans turned to Hitler' (p. 63). In fact Czechoslovakia treated its minorities better than any other East European country. Nevertheless, I would applaud Christopher Lord's main point, a plea for the toleration by modern Europeans of parallel cultures, on the lines of 'its historical source: the treatment of the Jews in the Middle Ages' (p. 120). But were Jews treated so well in the Middle Ages? If we endeavour to look past the inaccuracies which are possibly inseparable from working on such a gigantic canvas, we see that there is deep thought here, as well as some wit: 'Differences between the Northern and Southern dialect areas of American English would definitely be sufficient grounds' (p. 51) for a Slav nationalist to set up several new states there. The five case studies which follow will have to be treated briefly. The article by Olga Strietska-Ilina on the Russian Federation advances some cogent arguments in favour of...

Globalization: A World Adrift

For some time now we have been inhabiting a world of extreme tentativeness. Major shifts in power and influence are under way, bringing new demands for the redefinition of priorities as well as greater fragmentation and polarization among and between peoples. We are witnesses to major convulsions of thought and identity, and yet at the same time there is a major ideological vacuum. Meanwhile, both traditional diplomacy and conventional ideas of development (including alternative development) seem to be moving in the same old grooves. The most striking feature of the emerging reality is that the structures for managing issues and dealing with problems, whether in terms of world affairs or of encouraging institutions and leadership within individual societies, are becoming more and more incoherent. The old structures and balances are disappearing. New ones that seek to replace them are in a state of flux. We seem to have entered a long period of geopolitical imbalance, ethnic turmoil, and a new upsurge of nationalism that is being expressed in far more traumatic ways than was the case in the past. These are leading to an upsurge of violence and social breakdowns in multiple locations across various regions, North, South, East, and West. The new turbulence is not limited to the peripheries of the industrial capitalist world. The countries and cultures within this core are facing a variety of crises involving new divisions, new reassertions of national identity, and new conflicts over trade and technology. The grand utopias of a unified Europe and an integrated trilateral world system are increasingly coming apart. The crisis of the Japanese state and the Japanese economy and the growing impasse between the United States and Japan (once considered partners in global hegemony, though performing different and often contradictory roles) only underscores this falling apart of the trilateral world. Meanwhile, new powers are joining in or are struggling to enter the

India: Liberalism Vs. Nationalism

India:Liberalism Vs. Nationalism Ashutosh Varshney (bio) Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability by Atul Kohli. Cambridge University Press, 1991. 420 pp. The Politics of India Since Independence by Paul Brass. Cambridge University Press, 1990. 357 pp. With the recent worldwide upsurge in nationalism, students of democracy must pay particular attention to the difficulties posed by religious and ethnic conflict. This is especially true with respect to India, where tensions between Hindus and Muslims caused the most agonizing event in twentieth-century Indian history: the partition of 1947, which displaced millions of people and killed tens of thousands of others, In the past decade, conflicting nationalisms have erupted anew with a fervor unmatched since 1947, challenging the integrity of India as a nation-state. Conflicting nationalisms threaten political liberalism by creating what may be called a liberal paradox: Individuals and groups are free to organize in a liberal democracy, but can they be free to organize for something as radical as secession? If people in a secessionist part of the country are not allowed to secede in spite of their wishes, a fundamental tenet of liberalism is clearly violated—namely, that people have the right to choose their rulers. On the other hand, if secession is allowed, the principle that people are free to choose their government begins to undermine liberal democracy itself. At this point, liberalism and the right to self-determination raise deeply emotional questions: What takes precedence—a nation or a democracy? And what good is a liberal polity if it cannot even protect its own borders? Since human beings are not [End Page 147] only self-interested individuals (as liberal political theory assumes) but also people emotionally anchored in cultural or territorial communities, nationalism defines the limits of liberalism. In circumstances of rising nationalist ferment and conflict, liberalism has a limited capacity for dealing with emotions like loyalty, fear, and anxiety. Liberal democracy has the best prospects when a relatively strong and stable nation-state has already been constructed or is beyond dispute. The stability of American democracy owes much to the Union victory over Southern secession in the Civil War of the 1860s. Sri Lanka, a shining example of Third World democracy through the 1960s, lost its luster when a confrontation between Tamil and Sinhala nationalisms tore the island apart in the 1980s. Democratic theorists have long been aware of the problem but have not discussed it fully. In his 1970 essay on "Transitions to Democracy," Dankwart Rustow described "national unity" as a prerequisite for democracy. "In order that rulers and policies may freely change," he wrote, "the boundaries must endure, the composition of the citizenry be continuous." In his latest work, Democracy and Its Critics, Robert Dahl also recognizes the tension between liberalism and nationalism: Because subcultural conflicts threaten personal and group identities and ways of life, because such threats evoke deep and powerful emotions, and because the sacrifice of identities and ways of life cannot readily be settled by negotiation, disputes involving different subcultures often turn into violent, nonnegotiable conflicts. In a country where conflicts are persistently violent and nonnegotiable, polyarchy is unlikely to exist (p.255). With democracies and nationalism flourishing again, democratic theorists will have to analyze this paradox more fully in the future. The effects of the liberal paradox are clearly demonstrated in India, which is both a democracy and a multiethnic, multireligious state. It now faces a religiously inspired secessionist movement in Punjab, an ethnic and religious insurrection in Jammu and Kashmir, and an ethnic rebellion in Assam, as well as a rising Hindu nationalism in the heartland that represents a backlash against these separatist movements. Compared to the Third World as a whole, the longevity of India's democracy despite all these problems is striking. Yet compared to the period under Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64), the decline of India's democracy is equally remarkable. The first comparison is across countries, and is still a source of pride for Indians; the second comparison is across time, and it is a cause for concern. Both Atul Kohli and Paul Brass address the decline of India's democracy. The "ungovernability" of India's democracy is the central question...

Manuel Gamio and Official Indigenismo in Mexico

In the realm of public ideology, the Mexican Revolution was preceded and accompanied by an upsurge in nationalism. Intellectuals as diverse as Andres Molina Enriquez and Jose Vasconcelos denounced the sterile aping of European doctrines which had characterized the Liberal Reforma of the 1850s, in favour of measures which were based on colonial precedent. In fixing upon mestizaje as the historical mainspring of Mexican nationality, both men echoed Justo Sierra, high priest of Liberal patriotism in the Porfirian era, who had declared that 'the mestizo family ... has constituted the dynamic element in our history'.1 That both Social Darwinism and Romantic Idealism were invoked to justify these claims demonstrates how powerful was the nationalist impulse in Mexico during the first decades of this century. It fell to Manuel Gamio (1883-1960) to apply the principles of Boasian anthropology to further the same cause, albeit, in this case, by insisting on the enduring contribution of Indian civilisation to Mexico's development. As the title of his book, Forjando Patria (1916), clearly attested, Gamio welcomed the Revolution for its destruction of obstacles to the creation of 'the future nationality. ?.. the future Mexican patria'. Although he did not participate in the revolutionary struggle, he praised Pablo Gonzalez, Venustiano Carranza's lacklustre general, as 'an intuitive national? ist', and later characterised Carranza himself as 'a man of many faults, but withal a true progressive and a man of the people', clear evidence that he favoured the victory of the constitutionalist coalition over the popular forces led by Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa.2 In 1935 he asserted that his public goal had always been to promote 'a true, integral nationalism', thus avoiding the contemporary extremes of fascism and communism.3 To assess the significance of Gamio's contribution to the Mexican political and cultural tradition, it should be recalled that although Fray Servando Teresa de Mier and Carlos Maria de Bustamante, the chief ideologues of the 1810 Insurgency, had invoked the grandeur of Anahuac as the chief glory of their Creole patria and defined the Mexican people as a nation which had struggled for three centuries to regain its freedom, a thesis enshrined in the Act of Independence of 1821, by contrast most early nineteenth-century Mexican Liberals dismissed the Aztecs as mere barbarians and viewed contemporary Indians as a hindrance to their country's modernisation.4 In adopting this approach, they could cite Alexander von Humboldt who, in his study of Indian monuments and codices, expounded the neo-classical

Mr. Jones Goes to Richmond: A Note on the Influence of Alexander Parris' Wickham House

EARLY IN THE summer of 1814 General Calvin Jones took time off from pressures of war against British to visit newly completed Wickham House in Richmond. The mansion, considered the best house in Richmond,2 owed its elegant design to collaboration of New England architect Alexander Parris and his mentor Benjamin Henry Latrobe.3 The observant General Jones strode through spacious chambers, sizing up stylish decorations, admiring soaring skylit stair, and exploring novel floor plan. Within a few days, he had convinced leaders in his adopted hometown of Raleigh, North Carolina, to model new Governor's Palace after Wickham House plan. The story of Governor's Palace illuminates process by which high-style architecture influences provincial buildings; in particular it highlights role of layman, as contrasted with architect or artisan, as a carrier of stylistic ideas.4 The relationship between Wickham House (1811-1812) and Governor's Palace (1814-1816) is best understood in context of times. Early 19th-century North Carolina suffered from such poverty and insularity that it was scornfully nicknamed the Rip Van Winkle and the Ireland of America. Its economic and cultural life was shackled by conservative leaders unwilling to tax or pay for internal improvements, education, and transportation state so desperately needed. The tight public purse also assured that young state's first public buildings of I790os were unpretentious and old-fashioned structures. In wake of War of i812, however, North Carolina shared in national upsurge of patriotism and confidence, and proponents of change and improvement enjoyed unprecedented success. The legislature authorized new public investment in internal improvements, public buildings, and even arts, commissioning a statue of George Washington by Antonio Canova and portraits of him by Thomas Sully. Embarrassed by old State House and governor's residence, state focused its attention on erecting a new house for governor and revamping State House (1819-1821) in Grecian style to accommodate Washington's statue.5 Construction of Governor's Palace, as it was often called, began in midst of war years. In May 1814 state lands were sold to raise money and commissioners were authorized to contract for a building. The building committee drafted a plan and advertised for contractors, hoping to settle on a contract

Crise économique et société en Indochine française

Was there any direct or indirect relationship between the Great Depression of 1929 and the national upsurge of 1930-1931 in Indochina ? How did things work ? Neither the chronological sequence nor the geographical expansion support the idea of a causal relation between the two events. The consequences of the Depression were twofold. Economically, the crisis strenght- ened the imperial bounds between France and her Far Eastern colonies. Socially and politically, the consequences were far-reaching : the economic depression worsened the material situation of the colonized people and widened the gap between rulers and subjects, as also between the upper and the lower classes of the indigenous society so that it reactivated the social and political agitation in 1936-1938 and prepared the ground for the later libération.

The Chinese Movement in Java: 1900-1918

By 1900 most of Southeast Asia had been divided on the major Western powers and each ruling country was establishing its own colonial system. In carrying out research the upsurge of nationalism in Southeast Asia, one cannot overlook the movements of the Chinese residing each country the area during the early decades of the twentieth century. The, fall of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911 and the emergence of the Republic of China for the first time in its history had a tremendous impact on the Chinese in Southeast Asia. In the first of this two-series article the author tries to investigate the Chinese movement in Java from 1900 to 1906, because this period reveals the Chinese effort of self-adjustment to the rapidly changing situation of colonial Indonesia.The transition of the Dutch colonial administration from the Liberal to the Ethical Policy at the turn of the century encouraged the improvement of the natives' welfare at the expense of the population of the Chinese descent. Thus, the colonial government decided to abolish totally revenue farming, particulary that of opium sales, hitherto granted to the Chinese, and to tighten their restrictions on residence and travel. In other words, the government tried to divert native frustration and hostility from itself to the Chinese.This policy affected the wealthy Peranakan or local-born Chinese in general, and the officials of their community in major cities in particular. The officials whose autonomous power had been sanctioned by the colonial authority tried to reverse this trend which came to threaten them after generations of their settlement. Under the influence of Chinese intellectuals in Singapore, they finally reached the conclusion that they should undertake to gain a better understanding of their Indonesian environment while at the same time heightening their sense of “Chineseness” by discarding from their daily lives manifestations of the “inferior” native culture. In so doing they even came to despise the Javanese blood which in many cases was circulating in their own veins.The year 1900 was an important one in the history of the Chinese movement in Java, for it was that year that the association Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, commonly abbreviated as THHK, was established in Batavia. The primary purposes of the THHK-Batavia were to revive and spread Confucianism in Chinese communities throughout Java and to purge themselves of Javanese manners and customs. The leaders of the THHK, however, were not China-oriented nationalists. Lie Kim Hok, the ideological leader of the Confucianist revival, was sympathetic to Western ideas. Phoa Keng Hek, the president of THHK-Batavia, directed his efforts toward the advancement of education and the improvement of the status of the Chinese in Java. The leaders of the THHK belonged to the dominant Peranakan Chinese class rather than the poorer Sin-keh or the newcomers. Therefore, the THHK activity can be interpreted as an attempt by the Peranakan Chinese to maintain its predominance in face of the drastic changes then taking place in the Chinese community.As the THHK increased in its influence, the Ch'ing dynasty became gradually aware of its significance and began giving moral support to the association. The dynasty, on the verge of decline, expected to receive financial support from the Chinese in Java in return. Thus, the interests of both sides coincided, and contacts between them became ever closer. This cooperation accelerated the integration of the Chinese movements hitherto somewhat isolated from each other, and the year 1906 saw the establishment of the Tiong Hoa Tjong Hwee or the all-Java Chinese organization, unifying the THHK-Batavia and those of other major cities of Java.In the following issue the author intends to discuss the period from 1906 to 1918.

The Emotionally and Socially Handicapped

Two major movements have occurred since the treatment of this topic in the February 1963 REVIEW. One is essentially political; the other, professional. The political activity is related to the national upsurge of interest in problems of the poor and the handicapped, resulting in large federal appropriations. Many behavioral scientists have turned attention to the area, and numerous publications have resulted prescribing social action for the disadvantaged, the delinquent, and the disturbed. However, the proportion of research investigations is small. The major professional development in the past three years has been the dramatic return to learning theory, specifically behaviorism, for the treatment of disturbing behavior. Literally hundreds of papers have appeared on the theory and application of concepts of conditioning to influence complex behavior, particularly through social reinforcement. Again, however, the majority of publications have been prescriptions, subjective descriptions, and clinical case studies.

Sinhalese Nationalism and Social Conflict in Ceylon

C EYLON, WHICH IN i948 COMPLETED a strikingly tranquil passage from colonial status to independence, has recently undergone severe turbulence and sharp internal conflict. The intense class, communal, and religious strife which has plagued the island followed a rapid upsurge of nationalism among the members of the island's majority ethnic community, the Sinhalese, in the first decade after independence. As militant popular nationalism did not develop in Ceylon until after independence, nationalist claims were not directed against a foreign ruler but against elements of Ceylonese society which were believed to occupy privileged positions as a result of colonial rule. Some of the critical problems of unity faced on the Indian sub-continent and in Burma at independence confronted Ceylon a decade later. Popular Sinhalese nationalism was largely generated by two explosive political issues: the official language issue and Buddhist discontents. The demands that the Sinhalese-speaking, Buddhist masses be accorded their rightful place as the majority of the island's population, which they felt was denied them under colonial rule, sharpened popular awareness of past discrimination and intensified popular frustration over educational and economic inequalities. Both the language and religious issues initially represented revolt against the political and social domination of a Westernized elite. Both, however, produced strongly divisive forces which have inflamed the delicate relations among the island's ethnic and religious groups. As was common in colonial Asia, the Ceylonese national independence movement was directed by a small Westernized elite educated in English and established in the colonial bureaucracy, the urban professions, and the planting and commerce which developed during the colonial period. The Ceylon National Congress was formed in i919 on the pattern of the Indian National Congress to work for self-rule. However, in contrast to neighboring India, where the independence movement was turned into a popular mass movement by Gandhi, the Ceylonese independence move-

Development of Agricultural Land Taxation in Modern Iraq

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the general upsurge of nationalism in Europe exerted an influence on the Jewish population as well. This influence was particularly strong in Eastern Europe, where there occurred a formidable Jewish nationalistic renaissance, some features of which were: the revival of Hebrew as a spoken language; the widespread use of Jewish folk-lore in the works of Jewish writers, painters, and musicians; and the rebuilding and resettling of Palestine by small groups of Jewish pioneers. The new settlers in Palestine soon adapted Hebrew (which had indeed remained very much alive through the centuries as a literary tongue) to the requirements of daily existence, and it became the language of instruction in most of their schools. At present, practically the entire Israeli population (about two million) speaks Hebrew.

The Influence of the Hebrew Language on Contemporary Israeli Art Music

IN the second half of the nineteenth century, the general upsurge of nationalism in Europe exerted an influence on the Jewish population as well. This influence was particularly strong in Eastern Europe, where there occurred a formidable Jewish nationalistic renaissance, some features of which were: the revival of Hebrew as a spoken language; the widespread use of Jewish folk-lore in the works of Jewish writers, painters, and musicians; and the rebuilding and resettling of Palestine by small groups of Jewish pioneers. The new settlers in Palestine soon adapted Hebrew (which had indeed remained very much alive through the centuries as a literary tongue) to the requirements of daily existence, and it became the language of instruction in most of their schools. At present, practically the entire Israeli population (about two million) speaks Hebrew.

Vīs-u Rāmīn (IV)

IN the second half of the nineteenth century, the general upsurge of nationalism in Europe exerted an influence on the Jewish population as well. This influence was particularly strong in Eastern Europe, where there occurred a formidable Jewish nationalistic renaissance, some features of which were: the revival of Hebrew as a spoken language; the widespread use of Jewish folk-lore in the works of Jewish writers, painters, and musicians; and the rebuilding and resettling of Palestine by small groups of Jewish pioneers. The new settlers in Palestine soon adapted Hebrew (which had indeed remained very much alive through the centuries as a literary tongue) to the requirements of daily existence, and it became the language of instruction in most of their schools. At present, practically the entire Israeli population (about two million) speaks Hebrew.