National Intelligence Council Research Articles

US Hegemony in a Unipolar World: Here to Stay or Sic Transit Gloria?

World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. By Stephen G. Brooks, William C. Wohlforth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 226 pp., $65.00 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-691-12699-9). Unipolarity has preoccupied American international relations (IR) scholars, policymakers, and foreign policy analysts since the Cold War ended and the “unipolar moment” was proclaimed (Krauthammer 1990/1991). Since the Cold War's end IR scholars of various stripes—especially balance-of-power realists—have warned that unipolarity would boomerang against the United States (Layne 1993, 2006a,b; Waltz 1993). The United States’ post-9/11 policies—especially the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003—fanned these worries as scholars and policy analysts argued that “unilateralist” US policies were fueling a backlash against American hegemony (Ikenberry 2002; Nye 2002; Walt 2002, 2005; Pape 2005; Paul 2005). More recently, the financial and economic crisis that hit the US economy beginning in Fall 2007—coupled with the rise of new great powers like China and India, and the resurgence of Russia—have raised questions about the decline of America's relative power. These doubts found official expression in the National Intelligence Council's (2008) Global Trends 2025 report. World Out of Balance is a forcefully argued rebuttal to arguments that American hegemony is waning and that unipolarity provokes other states to check US power. This is an important—must read—book for scholars of IR theory, security studies, and US foreign policy. Displaying a firm mastery of the various IR theory literatures, Dartmouth professors Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth seek to refute the arguments of Waltzian realists, liberal IR theorists, neoliberal institutionalists, and constructivists that “the current unipolarity is not an unalloyed benefit for the Untied States because it comes with the prospect of counterbalancing, increased dependence on the international economy, a greater need to maintain a favorable reputation to sustain cooperation within international institutions, and greater challenges to American legitimacy” (p. 4). Brooks and Wohlforth conclude the “unprecedented …

Avoiding trivia: the role of strategic planning in American foreign policy

After World War II, George Kennan became the State Department's first director of policy planning. Secretary of State George Marshall's initial advice to Kennan: above all, avoid trivia. Concentrate on the forest, not the trees, and don't lost sight of the big picture. Easier said than done. Avoiding Trivia critically assesses the past, future, and future role and impact of long-term strategic planning in foreign policy. Strategic planning needs to be a more integral part of America's foreign policymaking. Thousands of troops are engaged in combat while homeland security concerns remain. In such an environment, long-term coordination of goals and resources would seem to be of paramount importance. But history tells us that such cohesiveness and coherence are tremendously difficult to establish, much less maintain. Can policy planners --in the Pentagon, the State Department, Treasury, NSC, and National Intelligence Council --rise to the challenge? Indeed, is strategic planning a viable concept in 21st century foreign policy? These crucial questions guide this eye-opening book. The contributors include key figures from the past few decades of foreign policy and planning --individuals responsible for imposing some sort of order and strategic priority on foreign policy in a world that changes by the minute. They provide authoritative insight on the difficulties and importance of thinking and acting in a coherent way, for the long term. Contributors: Andrew P. N. Erdmann, Peter Feaver, Aaron L. Friedberg, David F. Gordon, Richard N. Haass, William Inboden, Bruce W. Jentleson, Steven D. Krasner, Jeffrey W. Legro, Daniel Twining, Thomas Wright, Amy B. Zegart.

The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay

Over the next two decades, international politics will be shaped by whether the international system remains unipolar or is transformed into a multipolar system. Can the United States sustain its primacy? Or will the emergence of new great powers reorder the distribution of power in the international system? If U.S. power is waning, will power transition dynamics result in security competitions and an increased possibility of war? In particular, what are the implications of China's rapid ascent to great power status? If the United States is unable to preserve its hegemonic role, what will happen to the security and economic frameworks that it took the lead in creating after the end of World War II and that have provided the foundation for the international order ever since? In a world no longer defined by U.S. hegemony, what would become of globalization and the open international economic system that the United established after World War II and expanded after the Cold War ended? This essay reviews five publications that grapple with these questions: Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy; Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order; Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East; National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World; and Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World.

The Intelligence Time Event Horizon

In November 2008, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) published its third Global Trends report, Global Trends 2025. 1 These reports seek “to stimulate strategic thinking about the future by ide...

Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis

Every four years, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) publishes an unclassified report projecting global trends over the next fifteen years. The intent is to help incoming decisionmakers lift t...

The US National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2025

Population and Development ReviewVolume 35, Issue 1 p. 209-214 The US National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2025 First published: 19 March 2009 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2009.00270.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume35, Issue1March 2009Pages 209-214 RelatedInformation

Iran's Power in Context

Iran–US relations – strained at the best of times since the 1979 Iranian revolution – have never been worse than during the past six years, due to the much more intense interaction between the two ...

The ‘Mega-Eights’: Urban Leviathans and International Instability

By 2015, there will be 58 cities on the planet with a population of 5 million or more and, by 2025, according to National Intelligence Council, 27 cities with a population exceeding 10 million. The U.N. Population Division classifies populations in excess of 10 million as megacities and many of these urban behemoths will be located in the so-called 10/40 window—the area in Africa and Asia between north latitude 10 and 40 degrees. This emerging growth will have serious consequences for international stability, human security and environmental degradation. Without a doubt, unchecked growth in the 10/40 window will change the face of the global map in the twenty-first century. The questions are: how and what should be done about it? In this article, we primarily address the how question—leaving a detailed examination of policy options to others, as we contend that the most important step at this point in time is to first understand the nature of the problem. [Display omitted]

The Latest Intelligence Crisis

In the autumn of last year the National Intelligence Council issued a National Intelligence Estimate that states (in a portion of the NIE that has been published) with ‘high confidence’ that Iran years ago suspended its development of nuclear weapons. This paper questions the wisdom of a consensus intelligence document bound to be published in one form or another, and the soundness of the analysis in it, which pivots on speculation about Iranian decision making and on an ambiguity in the very meaning of ‘suspending’ a nuclear-weapons program while continuing to produce highly enriched uranium. These questions lead in turn to questions concerning the ambitious reorganization three years ago of the US intelligence system.

The Terrorist Threat: Existential or Exaggerated? A “Red Cell” Perspective

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsGeorge C. FidasGeorge C. Fidas is an Adjunct Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. and veteran of more than thirty years in the Intelligence Community. Mr. Fidas held several analytical and managerial positions at the Central Intelligence Agency, serving also as Deputy and later Acting National Intelligence Officer for Economics and Global Issues on the National Intelligence Council. He served also in the State Department's Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, and as the Director of Central Intelligence's faculty representative to the National Defense University's Industrial College of the Armed Forces. As his final tour of duty, Mr. Fidas was Director for Outreach in the Office of the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, where his responsibilities included increasing the nexus between the Intelligence Community and knowledge communities outside the government. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, in February 2007. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Terrorism in the year 2020: Examining the ideational, functional and geopolitical trends that will shape terrorism in the twenty-first century

The intelligence failures associated with the 9/11 attacks in the United States have emphasized the challenges government leaders face when trying to predict specific terrorist attacks. A complementary approach focuses on strategic forecasting, which prioritizes assessment of and response to longer-term trends that may shape the evolution of terrorism. Viewed from a historical perspective, terrorism has been influenced by three key drivers: ideational and ideological trends, functional developments, and geopolitical tensions and transitions. In this paper I follow these three drivers into the future as predicted by the National Intelligence Council (NIC)'s 2004 report, Mapping the Global Future, which identifies key trends that will shape the security environment to the year 2020. I highlight the trends that correspond to historical drivers of terrorism, and conclude that the enabling environment for terrorism will probably be robust and enduring well into the twenty-first century.

Prospects for Middle East Security-Sector Reform

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1See Ellen Laipson (ed.), Security Sector Reform in the Gulf (Washington DC: Henry Stimson Center, May 2006), http://www.stimson.org/swa/pdf/StimsonSSRGulf.pdf, and diverse publications from the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces at http://www.dcaf.ch. 2For a useful discussion of the challenges to Palestinian security-sector governance, see The Role of the Palestinian Security Forces – Political and Legal Challenges, workshop report, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Palestinian Institute for International Humanitarian Law at Al-Quds University, Abu Dis/East-Jerusalem, February 2007, http://www.ssronline.org/edocs/palestiniansecurity.pdf. 3Statement by US Security Coordinator Lt–Gen. Keith W. Dayton before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15 March 2006. 4Testimony before the US House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs, 21 March 2007. 5Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress in accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, 2 March 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/9010_March_2007_Final_Signed.pdf. See also Robert Perito, ‘Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Policy and Facilities Protection Services’, United States Institute of Peace Briefing, February 2007, http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0207_iraqi_interior_ministry.html. 6See, for example, La Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, Political Change in the Gulf States: Beyond Cosmetic Reform? Democracy Backgrounder 5 (Madrid: FRIDE, November 2006), http://www.fride.org/File/ViewLinkFile.aspx?FileId=1211. 7See http:// www.nato.int/ici/home.htm. 8See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2006,available at http://www.freedomhouse.org. 9See Amr Hamzawy, ‘Amending Democracy Out of Egypt’s Constitution’, Washington Post, 2 April 2007. 10For excellent coverage of prospects for reform in Egypt and democracy promotion efforts of the United States, see Michele Dunne, Time to Pursue Democracy in Egypt,Policy Outlook No. 30 (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2007), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Dunne_Egypt_FINAL2.pdf. 11The cases of Korea and Taiwan are often cited; in the 1980s, military-led governments initiated a process of political change, which led to significant overall and security-sector reform. See also Steven A. Cook, The Unspoken Power: Civil-Military Relations and the Prospects for Reform,Analysis Paper No. 7 (Washington DC: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, September 2004), http://www.brookings.org/dybdocroot/fp/saban/cook20040901.pdf. 12See Emile El-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, Henry L. Stimson Center Working Paper, 26 May 2006, pp. 6–8, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=298. Additional informationNotes on contributorsEllen LaipsonEllen Laipson is the President and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington DC. She served in the US government for 25 years; her last position was Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

The Hizballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni Resistance

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsGraham E. FullerGraham E. Fuller is a former vice chair of the National Intelligence Council at the Central Intelligence Agency. He is coauthor of The Arab Shi'a: The Forgotten Muslims (2000) with Rend Rahim Francke and author of The Future of Political Islam (2004).

A Fresh Look at Innovation and Security

Innovation is the lifeblood of U.S. competitiveness and security. U.S. businesses and universities must be able to tap the world's best scientific minds to fuel innovation, while preventing sensitive knowledge from falling into the hands of those who would do us harm. The Bush Administration has begun taking a fresh look at U.S. policies affecting the transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to foreign nationals, also known as “deemed exports,” to ensure that these policies advance U.S. security and prosperity. The same expanding flow of people, products, capital, and information across national borders that has catapulted productivity and innovation has also created new threats. Thus, it is important to pursue the complementary objectives of ensuring access for and implementing effective restrictions on foreign nationals working in U.S. companies and research universities. Almost 20% of tenured science and technology faculty are foreign-born, and nearly 60% of postdoctoral scholars in science and engineering are working here on a temporary basis ([1][1]). This dependence is likely to increase. At the same time, the openness of the U.S. research community also brings with it risks that sensitive technology will be obtained by nations or individuals who threaten our security. As reported by the 2005 National Counterintelligence strategy, “More than 90 countries target sensitive U.S. technologies” [([2][2]), p. 5]. Some believe that foreign access to U.S. technological breakthroughs must be sharply restricted, while others maintain that U.S. technological leadership requires minimizing controls on the transfer of sensitive knowledge to foreign researchers. The Administration, led by Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez, has demonstrated a firm commitment to achieving the difficult but essential equilibrium that this issue requires. Several key principles guide our efforts: Secretary Gutierrez has taken on the challenge of reforming deemed export policy by establishing a Deemed Export Advisory Committee ([3][3]), co-chaired by former Lockheed Martin Chairman and CEO Norman Augustine and former CIA Director and President of Texas A&M University Robert Gates. The Committee will undertake a comprehensive policy review and make recommendations on the appropriate scope and direction of deemed export controls. This very distinguished independent group will have the cooperation of key departments throughout the government, access to related intelligence reporting, and a dedicated staff to support its efforts. Within 12 months, it will provide recommendations to Secretary Gutierrez regarding the future of this important policy. 1. 1.[↵][4]2005 National Intelligence Council Report (National Intelligence Council, Washington, DC, 2005). 2. 2.[↵][5]2005 National Counterintelligence Strategy (Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Washington, DC, 2005). 3. 3.[↵][6]Committee members: Albert Carnesale, former Chancellor of the University of California at Los Angeles; Ruth David, President and CEO, Analytic Services, Inc.; John Engler, President, National Association of Manufacturers; Anthony Frank, Provost and Senior Vice President, Colorado State University; General John A. Gordon, former Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Sean O'Keefe, Chancellor, Louisiana State University; Eva Pell, Senior Vice President and Dean of the Graduate School, Penn State University; Michael Splinter, CEO, Applied Materials; James Siedow, Vice Provost for Research and Professor of Biology, Duke University; William A. Wulf, President, National Academy of Engineering, and Professor of Computer Science, University of Virginia. [1]: #ref-1 [2]: #ref-2 [3]: #ref-3 [4]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1. in text [5]: #xref-ref-2-1 View reference 2. in text [6]: #xref-ref-3-1 View reference 3. in text

The Shia vs. Sunni Split? Not on the Arab Street

New Perspectives QuarterlyVolume 23, Issue 4 p. 34-36 The Shia vs. Sunni Split? Not on the Arab Street GRAHAM E. FULLER, GRAHAM E. FULLER Former vice chair of the CIA's National Intelligence Council. His most recent book is The Future of Political Islam(Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).Search for more papers by this author GRAHAM E. FULLER, GRAHAM E. FULLER Former vice chair of the CIA's National Intelligence Council. His most recent book is The Future of Political Islam(Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).Search for more papers by this author First published: 19 January 2007 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2006.00845.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume23, Issue4Fall 2006Pages 34-36 RelatedInformation

Australia and Asia's rise

The National Intelligence Council, a think tank of the United States of America's intelligence community, recently published a report titled ‘Mapping the global future’, the product of a study of h...

National Intelligence Council

National Intelligence Council

FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA: A RE‐APPRAISAL

Nigeria is a Federal Republic made up of thirty‐six states. The history of Nigerian federalism dates back to the pre‐independence Constitution of 1954 called the Lyttleton Constitution. However, with the advent of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions, there has been a profound change in the practice of Federalism in the Country which has called into question whether Nigeria is indeed a federation. This question has been further accentuated by the recent damning report of the National Intelligence Council of the United States Government which forecasted that by the year 2020, Nigeria might cease to exist as a nation state! The level of government that should take responsibility for such issues as power sharing arrangement, revenue allocation, maintenance of public order, fiscal federalism, judiciary are the major centripetal and centrifugal forces that have threatened the stability of the Federation. The current situation where the federal government is a towering overlord over the component states on the issues enumerated above, and much to the disenchantment of the states, requires a thorough re‐examination and possible redress.

Sub-Saharan Africa's Future: A US National Intelligence Council Conference Report

Sub-Saharan Africa's Future: A US National Intelligence Council Conference Report

Comment on Gray

34 Historically Speaking January/February 2006 flux. Violence, to offer one example, he described as a "pulsation" (Pulsieren) rather than a constant.6 In any case, ifwar's common elements were constants, the zealots would be justified in canceling them out oftheir formulae for success, as indeed they try to do now. I suspect Gray would agree with this portrayal ofthe nature of war. My concern, however , is not with his interpretation, but how it might be received by those who lack his breadth and depth of knowledge. His argument can be taken as claiming that all one needs to know about the nature of the weather , for instance, is that it consists of a few common and inescapable elements, such as barometric pressure, heat index, dew point, wind velocity, and so on. This line of reasoning does not allow us to appreciate that there is indeed a qualitative difference between a rain shower and a hurricane—so much so in fact that we might do well to consider them two entirely different types of weather and prepare ourselves accordingly. We ought, therefore, to recognize not only the elements common to all forms ofweather, but also how those elements relate to each other, and how changes in one or more of them will affect how we should prepare ourselves before stepping outdoors. After all this, I think Gray and I are largely in agreement, except ofcourse on those niggling details. Antulio J. Echevarría II is the Director of Research andDirector ofNational Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U. S . Army War College. He is the author o/After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War (University Press ofKansas, 2001), and is currently working on two books, one that examines Clausewitz 's On War as an "unfinished symphony " and one that compares amateur andprofessional military views offuture war in the West before 1914. 1 See, for example, the U.S. National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future (National Intelligence Council, December 2004). 2 Antulio J. Echevarría II, "The Trouble with History in Military Education," Historically Speaking: The Bulletin ofthe Historical Society (September/October 2005): 11-15. 3 Vom Kriege, Book I, Ch. 2, 214.·* Vom Kriege, Book I, Ch. 1, 212-13. 5 Vom Kriege, Book VIII, Ch. 3B, 970-74. 6 Vom Kriege, Book I, Ch. 2, 210. Comment on Gray Andrew J. Bacevich I concur with Colin Gray. Indeed, I am almost tempted to say that I agree with every jot and tittle of his essay and to leave it at that. Almost, but not quite. Gray expects others to find his essay "shocking" and "unfashionable" and "controversial ." He should prepare to be disappointed . Serious students of war will judge his views to be commonsensical and even conventional . There is not a lot new here. Simplifying only slightly, Gray's argument reduces to a single sentence: "Clausewitz got it about right." Indeed, he did, especially in fixing the relationship of war to politics. The ugly truth is that as long as politics persists so too will large-scale, politically motivated violence. That the innocent, the naive, and the idealistic will bridle at that prospect is to be expected. As with those who rail against the market or deny the existence of Original Sin, theirs is an exercise in futility. To be sure, those opposing all war as a matter of principle serve a useful purpose: they make it harder for ambitious or bloodthirsty politicians to portray the conflict lurking over the horizon as high-minded, moral, and unavoidable. So two cheers for those who protest and demonstrate and proclaim "hell no, we won't go." Yet no amount of emoting for peace, however well intentioned, will succeed in making an end to war. Gray puzzles over the fact that some of those actually in the war business fall prey to their own peculiar version of romanticism. The counterparts to the pacifists denying the utility of war are the visionaries—soldiers as well as strategists—who entertain dreams of perfecting war, liberating it from Clausewitzian risk and uncertainty. Since the end ofthe Cold War, Americans have shown a particular susceptibility to such fantasies. Theorists have developed...