The period from September 2013 until October 2014 is distinguished by a series of events that drastically changed the trajectory of developments in the post-Soviet area, including those in the South Caucasus.In this case, a crucial role is played by relationship to the West, which is shaping the security environment in Europe and Eurasia. On the one hand, both sides blame each other for violating core principles of international law, including those related to the sovereignty of states and, on the other hand, each side introduces its own decisions and approaches as pragmatic.This article addresses the following question: How pragmatic are these approaches? It focuses on developments in the South Caucasus, viewed through the prism of decision making by the main regional and non-regional actors. Mainly owing to the allegedly pragmatic decisions of the stakeholders involved in processes in this region, the South Caucasus states have become even more divided and insecure. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have found themselves facing more difficulties both in dealing with each other and with all the external actors concerned.Russia's Foreign Policy PragmatismThe key components of foreign policy began to develop in the late 1990s as a response to Western ignorance of Russian national interests. They crystallized over the course of the following years, becoming more offense-oriented and, to some extent, more intolerant toward the West in general. This policy has been shaped in accordance with self-identification as one of the pillars in a multi-polar world, and an equal partner among global leaders in international affairs, capable of defending its strategic and national priorities.* 1 This foreign policy focuses on Russia's increased responsibility for setting the international agenda and shaping the system of international relations.2Russia develops and implements its foreign policy on the basis of two ideas, both of which aim to contribute to the strengthening of power and influence of the Russian state. First, Russia should be a great power and serve as a bulwark for all conservative forces fighting against revolutions, chaos, and liberal ideas being spread by the U.S. and Europe. The second pillar of Russian foreign policy relates to the shaping of the Russian national identity and national idea. It is rooted in a belief in the existence of a great Russian world and a unique Russian civilization, which is in many ways different from Western civilization (which poses a threat to Russian national identity) and extends far beyond geographic borders.3 The modem Russian state is a protector of this civilization and all people who define themselves as bearers of it and, hence, as Russian compatriots. In general, a concept of Eurasiamsm found fertile ground in new and independent Russia, a nation that defines itself as a model nation in opposition to the West. The most important figure among the modem Eurasianists is President Vladimir Putin, who gradually injects his vision of greatness and its unique role in Eurasia into Russian society at large. He demonstrates its strength through the implementation of hard-nosed security measures in immediate neighborhood, thereby challenging the West.The first test was the Five-Day War with Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The West reacted moderately to the violation of Georgia's sovereignty and international law because this South Caucasus state (together with Armenia and Azerbaijan) was viewed a priori as an area of special, privileged, or national/strategic interests and owing supposedly to warnings against the background of developments surrounding Kosovo. However, the speedy annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis in general have become a watershed in relations between Russia and the West and pushed the latter in the direction of developing a unified strategy to counter and/or constrain Russia. …