Multiparty Competition Research Articles

Friendly fire? Negative campaigning among coalition partners

In democracies with multi-party competition, government parties face a dual challenge in election campaigns: on the one hand, they have to compete against and criticize their coalition partners. On the other hand, they should avoid virulent attacks on their partners to preserve their chances of future collaboration in government. Going beyond a dichotomous operationalization of negative campaigning, this manuscript analyses the tonality and volume of negative campaigning. Studying 3030 party press releases in four national Austrian election campaigns, different patterns for the tonality and frequency of negative campaigning reflect the electoral dilemma of government parties. Coalition parties criticize each other abundantly but refrain from ‘burning bridges’ with their partners through virulent attacks. These findings have implications for studying negative campaigning and coalition politics.

Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in mixed-member proportional systems

How does competition for first (candidate) and second ballot (party-list) votes affect the strategic positioning of parties in mixed-member proportional systems? We study this question in a simulation study of multiparty competition in the two tiers. In the first step, we use data from elections for the German Bundestag to estimate individual vote function for each tier based on ideology, policy, and valence incentives. We then use these parameter estimates to calibrate a model in which parties compete for either first- or second-tier votes. Results suggest that parties may face a dilemma when adopting a positional strategy. When national parties and their candidates hold significantly different valences, large valence advantages generate centripetal incentives whereas smaller valences exert a centrifugal pull. Overall, centrifugal incentives dominate the German mixed-member system.

Measuring Electoral Competitiveness: With Application to the Indian States

We consider alternative methods of measuring the competitiveness of a majoritarian electoral system in the context of an analysis of Indian State elections. Our analysis highlights a number of weaknesses in the construction and interpretation of commonly used measures such as the effective number of parties, the first versus second place vote margin and safe seats, while presenting these and their proposed alternatives for 14 major Indian states from 1952 to 2009. The alternative indexes we present are based in part on ideas that are longstanding in the literature but have not been fully adopted within the Indian context. These indexes incorporate vote volatility, allow for multi-party competition at the constituency level, and adjust for asymmetry among parties of safe seats in the legislature. We argue that these newly computed indexes capture distinct but related dimensions of electoral competition better than do the extant commonly used measures. The analysis of these indexes is then extended to consider the role of caste, class, regionalism and level of development to reveal interesting patterns of commonality and difference in electoral competition across the states.

Issue Yield and Party Strategy in Multiparty Competition

The issue yield model introduced a theory of the herestethic use of policy issues as strategic resources in multidimensional party competition. We extend the model by systematically addressing the specificities of issue yield dynamics in multiparty systems, with special regard to parties’ issue yield rankings (relative position) and issue yield heterogeneity (differentiation) on each issue. Second, we introduce a novel research design for original data collection that allows for a more systematic testing of the model, by featuring (a) a large number of policy issues, (b) the use of Twitter content for coding parties’ issue emphasis, and (c) an appropriate time sequence for measuring issue yield configurations and issue emphasis. We finally present findings from a pilot implementation of such design, performed on the occasion of the 2014 European Parliament election in Italy. Findings confirm the soundness of the design and provide support for the newly introduced hypotheses about multiparty competition.

The 2016 Electoral Reform in Mongolia: From Mixed System and Multiparty Competition to FPTP and One-Party Dominance

This article tests the effects of a new electoral system that was introduced in Mongolia for the June 2016 elections. The decision to implement a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system instead of a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, which was first and last used in the previous elections of 2012, was due to the April 2016 ruling of the Mongolian Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality of the list tier as one of the mechanisms for distributing seats within MMM. Through an analysis of national- and district-level results, this article addresses the question whether electoral competition at the district level was consistent with Duverger’s law and resulted in the restoration of bipartism, which had been disrupted in 2012 due to the use of MMM.

Number of Parties, Endogenous Partisan Preferences and Electoral Turnout Rates: A Stochastic Equilibrium Analysis

This paper analyzes the impact of the number of parties on turnover rates within an endogenous partisan preference framework. Our results show that the turnover increases in the number of parties under various levels of individual propensity to abstain. We find strong interactions effects between both motives for abstention, alienation and indifference, and the abstention propensity. The results are based on an agent-based computer simulation of multi-party electoral competition in a two-dimensional policy space.

Epistemic Political Egalitarianism, Political Parties, and Conciliatory Democracy

This article presents two interlocking arguments for epistemic political egalitarianism. I argue, first, that coping with multidimensional social complexity requires the integration of expertise. This is the task of political parties as collective epistemic agents who transform abstract value judgments into sufficiently coherent and specific conceptions of justice for their society. Because parties thus severely lower the relevant threshold of comparison of political competence, citizens have reason to regard each other as epistemic equals. Drawing on the virulent “peer disagreement debate,” I then analyze the epistemic significance of political disagreement. I contend that citizens ought to pursue epistemic conciliation, an idea I contrast to the ideals of compromise and of consensus. Subsequently, I introduce insights from public choice theory and empirical findings which show that and why multi-party electoral competition coupled with equal rights to participation tends to produce conciliatory outcomes. We thus have reason to endorse political egalitarianism on epistemic grounds.

Does multiparty competition increase ethnic security fears? Evidence from North India

This article explores the political foundations of ethnic security fears and examines the relationship between the structure of party competition at the constituency level and security fears at the individual level in Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest state. The analysis shows that security fears are higher in constituencies characterised by multiparty competition. The central implication of this finding is that rather than leading to ethnic moderation, multiparty competition in ethnic party systems tends to be more ethnically divisive than in two party systems, increasing collective fears of the future.

Moderate as Necessary: The Role of Electoral Competitiveness and Party Size in Explaining Parties’ Policy Shifts

This article investigates how the degree of electoral competition affects parties’ policy positions. It follows a growing body of research on party positioning in multiparty competition that regards elections as signals for parties that have to choose their positions and issue strategies. In this article we argue that previous elections provide information about the competitiveness of the upcoming election. The expected degree of electoral competition affects parties’ future policy positions since with increasing competitiveness of an election, parties have higher incentives to move toward a vote-maximizing position. However, what constitutes a vote-maximizing strategy varies between parties. While large mainstream parties have an incentive to moderate their positions, small and niche parties choose more extreme positions to distinguish themselves from their mainstream competitors. Applying a novel measure of electoral competitiveness, we find that the degree of electoral competition indeed determines par...

Strategic Ambiguity of Party Positions in Multi-Party Competition

Party competition is largely about making policy promises to voters. We argue that the clarity of the expressed policy position may be equally important. If blurred messages toward different audiences and therefore ambiguous positions can attract votes from different groups, parties have incentives to present ambiguous rather than clear-cut policy platforms. We present a formal model of multi-party competition with stochastic voting where party leaders make strategic choices on both the position and the level of ambiguity of their platforms. Leaders respond to the demands of two principals, the general public and party core constituencies. We derive two hypothesis on the location and ambiguity of party platforms and provide initial tests of these hypotheses in a comparative setting in 14 Western European democracies gathering data on voter and party left-right positions from Eurobarometer surveys and electoral manifestos. Ambiguity of party profiles is estimated using a variant of Wordscores on a newly established data set of electoral manifestos. We find that platforms become more ambiguous as the preferences of the two principals diverge. Our findings imply that ambiguity can be a winning strategy for parties, especially in settings with strong partisan lines.

District level competition in Mexico’s chamber of deputies: an embedded analysis

ABSTRACTWhy does Mexico’s mixed legislative system diverge from Duverger’s Law? Rather than rehash cultural and historical explanations, we suggest two institutional factors – a fused ballot and compulsory voting laws – may explain this divergence. Cross-national evidence controlling for these factors suggests Mexico is not an outlier and that the fused ballot encourages multiparty district competition. The results also suggest ways reforms could bring competition closer toward Duvergerian expectations.

Negative Campaigning and the Logic of Retaliation in Multiparty Competition.

The extant literature has demonstrated that the logic of retaliation is a core feature of negative campaigning. Attacks by one side induce counterattacks by the other. Yet most research on the interactive nature of negative campaigning is limited to two-party competition and provides little theoretical justification for why political actors should respond to attacks with counterattacks. The present paper addresses these research gaps. We argue that the negativity bias in human information processing and the zero-sum nature of elections make retaliation a rational strategy. Importantly, these arguments also imply that retaliation may not be the only plausible response to attacks in multiparty systems. Rather, parties may prefer to react to attacks from one competitor by attacking another. To grasp empirically how being attacked and attacking are related, we conduct a highly disaggregated time series analysis of such instances while controlling for other factors that may influence actor behavior. Our analyses draw on several thousand party press releases issued during three national election campaigns in Austria, a typical European multiparty system. They show that retaliation is an important strategy also in multiparty politics. Yet in such context, parties do not exclusively follow a tit-for-tat approach but rather display more complex patterns of attack behavior.

Co-optation & Clientelism: Nested Distributive Politics in China’s Single-Party Dictatorship

What explains the persistent growth of public employment in reform-era China despite repeated and forceful downsizing campaigns? Why do some provinces retain more public employees and experience higher rates of bureaucratic expansion than others? Among electoral regimes, the creation and distribution of public jobs is typically attributed to the politics of vote buying and multi-party competition. Electoral factors, however, cannot explain the patterns observed in China’s single-party dictatorship. This study highlights two nested factors that influence public employment in China: party co-optation and personal clientelism. As a collective body, the ruling party seeks to co-opt restive ethnic minorities by expanding cadre recruitment in hinterland provinces. Within the party, individual elites seek to expand their own networks of power by appointing clients to office. The central government’s professed objective of streamlining bureaucracy is in conflict with the party’s co-optation goal and individual elites’ clientelist interest. As a result, the size of public employment has inflated during the reform period despite top-down mandates to downsize bureaucracy.

Demography and Democracy: A Global, District-level Analysis of Electoral Contestation

According to the classical perspective, polity size and democracy are inversely related. In this article, we argue that there is an important exception that manifests itself at the district level in settings where multiparty competition is allowed. Specifically, we find that larger districts encourage greater contestation. This results from a little-noticed mechanical effect as well as from several features of constituencies that are affected by size and have direct repercussions for contestation. To demonstrate this thesis we assembled a unique dataset, the Multi-level Election Archive (MLEA), which unites electoral contests across a variety of districts (national, regional, and local) and elective offices from the eighteenth century to the present, including a total of 88 countries, 2,344 elections, 79,658 districts, and more than 400,000 contests. With this evidence we were able to conduct a broad array of statistical tests, some global and others focused on particular countries or election types, all of which support our general argument.

Elections and civil violence in new multiparty regimes

The introduction of multiparty competition around the world following the Cold War raises the specter of rising civil violence during election periods in emerging democracies and hybrid regimes. Yet there are also plausible theoretical reasons to expect dropping civil violence around elections in these states or, alternatively, no significant change in the level of such conflict. This article tests these hypotheses in Africa with the aid of event data on the daily rate of civil violence incidents (1997–2013). It asks if civil violence in that region is more frequent, less frequent or constant during election cycles compared to other times. To guard against definitional and data selection problems encountered in some prior cross-national studies of elections and use of force, the research design emphasizes the relative risk of social conflict at the national level. The analysis suggests three distinct patterns in Africa. Given countrywide norms, election periods in most countries run the same relative risk of a day with violent events as do non-election periods. A subset of African countries exists, however, with more civil violence during elections when judged against the national reference line for conflict. There is a smaller group of countries where the risk of electoral civil violence is comparatively low. While caution should be exercised in interpreting the findings, the policy implication is that no general reason exists to preclude or defer elections in Africa as a way to minimize social conflict associated with political campaigns, although there may be specific reasons to do so in particular countries.

Conforming to the Dominant Discourse: Framing Distance and Multiparty Competition

This study introduces a measure of framing distance, capturing the degree of frame overlap among parties. Additionally, it provides a causal mechanism explaining differences between parties in framing distance. Parties within PR systems have to take coalition considerations in their stride, and therefore mainstream opposition parties, which have previously governed, are unlikely to adopt large framing distances. Alternatively, challenger parties, those that have never governed, are likely to frame important issues differently. Nonetheless, challengers are expected to reduce their framing distance when performing well in election polls. Electoral success acts as a trigger for these parties to reconsider their goals (policy, office, or votes) and to become more office-seeking. These theoretical propositions are confirmed on the basis of the European integration issue, using a mixed methods approach. Pooled time-series regressions on party manifestos issued by 21 parties between 1987 and 2006 in three political systems (Germany, Netherlands, and UK) are complemented with case study analysis.

Issue Entrepreneurship and Multiparty Competition

How do issues enter the political arena and come to affect party competition? This study extends the literature on issue evolution from the U.S. context to multiparty systems. While traditional models assume opposition parties to be the agents of issue evolution, this study argues that within multiparty competition not all parties in opposition have an incentive to change the issue basis of political competition. The central propositions of our issue entrepreneurship model are twofold: First, political parties are more likely to become issue entrepreneurs when they are losers on the dominant dimension of contestation. We focus on three components of political loss in multiparty systems relating to the office-seeking, voting-seeking, and policy-seeking objectives of parties. Second, parties will choose which issue to promote on the basis of their internal cohesion and proximity to the mean voter on that same issue. We test these propositions by examining the evolution of the issue of European integration in 14 European party systems from 1984 to 2006. The time-series cross-sectional analyses lend strong support to our model.

Political Clientelism in Mexico: Bridging the Gap between Citizens and the State

AbstractThis article explores practices of political clientelism in a native village in Mexico City during recent elections (2006, 2012), aiming to create more conceptual clarity and to demonstrate the usefulness of ethnographic approaches. Seen from the clients' and the brokers' perspective, political clientelism and vote buying are two different practices, carried out in different ways, with different degrees of legitimacy. The problem-solving network studied here bridges the gap between the citizen and the state, while the political operators hope to be rewarded with public employment. In this case, one candidate-patron changed parties a few months before the 2012 elections, and the electoral statistics provide indications of the numerical effectiveness of his clientelist network. Multiparty competition, instead of undermining clientelist practices, appears to “democratize” them.

Women's Participation in Politics: Ukrainian Case

AbstractThe international practices takes into account the question of women's participation in the political life of modern Ukraine. The selection of the state was due to the dynamic process of democratic transformation - the separation of powers, the formation of multi-party competition among political actors in the electoral process, the activity women in the various institutions of civil society. The position was claimed on the basis of empirical data range of academic institutions and reputable sociological centers, and also interviews with experts who said that the creation of real conditions for self-realization by women's interest in politics is only possible for long term. The process is controversial and caused by political culture, traditions and interests of the ruling class represented mainly by men.

Grand Coalition and Multi-Party Competition: Explaining Slowing Reforms in Gender Policy in Germany (2009–13)

Since 2005, the Christian Democrats (CDU) modernised family and labour market policy by supporting gender equality. Recent explanations trace this back to their competition with the Social Democrats (SPD) for female voters. What is missing from these accounts is a discussion of coalition dynamics. We argue that the drive for modernisation faltered under Angela Merkel's second term for three reasons: (1) coalitional dynamics in the new Conservative–Liberal coalition; (2) the traditionalist CSU wanted to distinguish itself from the moderate impulses of the CDU; and (3) the CDU reacted by moving away from its former ‘social democratisation’. As a result, gender equality policies in the family and labour market slowed and developed increasing inconsistency by indicating not only openness for modern but also emphasising conservative ideas. Despite the inherent contradictions this appealed to many different voters and contributed to a substantial victory for the CDU in the federal election of 2013.