ABSTRACT People tend to perceive moral transgressions as more wrong and punishable than conventional and prudential transgressions, and they judge older children’s transgressions more harshly than younger children’s. Yet to be explored is the relation between those perceptions and the perceiver’s parental status and knowledge of child development. This online study (N = 214) observed parents’ and non-parents’ judgments about hypothetical transgressions by children. We found that parents perceived prudential and conventional transgressions as more wrong than non-parents, though adults with greater knowledge of child development perceived children’s conventional transgressions as less wrong than those with less knowledge. Non-parents with more knowledge of child development perceived prudential transgressions as less wrong, less punishable, less innate, but better understood. Findings highlight the need for future research into the factors shaping adults’ perceptions of child transgressions, given the influence these perceptions may have on disciplinary policies and social norms affecting children.

ABSTRACT Background: Research suggests that trauma characteristics influence posttraumatic outcomes. Dangerous life-threatening events are associated with fear and anxiety; moral transgressions with guilt, shame and anger; perpetrating moral transgressions with self-conscious moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame); and witnessing transgressions with other-condemning moral emotions (e.g., contempt, disgust). However, research linking situational features to posttraumatic outcomes is limited. This study investigated the influence of trauma-related situational variables on cognitive-emotional appraisals of stressful events. Method: Undergraduate and Community participants imagined themselves as the protagonist in auditory vignettes depicting moral transgressions or life-threatening situations. They were randomly assigned to a self-condition (e.g., protagonist-enacted events; n = 114), or other-condition (e.g., protagonist-witnessed events; n = 131). After each vignette, participants provided ratings of self-conscious and other-condemning emotions and cognitions, and fear on a 7-point scale. Results: Moral vignettes evoked stronger moral emotions and cognitions than life-threat vignettes, with Bayesian t-tests yielding extreme evidence for these differences (all BF 10 > 100). Compared to the other-condition, moral vignettes in the self-condition evoked greater self-conscious emotions and cognitions (BF 10 > 100), lower other-condemning emotions (BF 10 > 100), and no difference in other-condemning cognitions (BF 10 = .085). Conclusion: Findings strengthen the theoretical rationale for integrating situational factors into conceptualizations of posttraumatic outcomes.

Fairness is typically assumed to be in the moral domain, yet recent work shows that young children may not view unfairness as a moral transgression. We investigated whether this may be because the harm caused by unfairness is less salient than the harm caused by more prototypical moral transgressions. We found that both 4-year-olds and adults rated unfairness more seriously when the harm caused by the unfairness was emphasized rather than not emphasized. When asked to categorize unfairness as either moral or conventional, 4-year-olds did not systematically choose either category. Most adults, on the other hand, categorized unfairness with conventional transgressions. These findings suggest that perceptions of unfairness exist along a continuum and are influenced by the salience of the harm caused by unfairness. Highlighting the harm inflicted by unfairness may be an important way to move people, from an early age, to notice and correct it.

Good person, but bad friend: Children's developing evaluations of tattling.

Moving the field forward on moral injury: Possibilities and pitfalls of experimental research.

ABSTRACT Moral outrage is a powerful motivational force that drives social change and collective action. Social media has become a primary arena for the expression and amplification of moral outrage, where users’ emotional reactions often translate into rapid information sharing. Yet this process also amplifies the spread of moralised misinformation, posing substantial social challenges. While moral outrage plays a central role in such dynamics, the distinct roles of its core components, moral anger and disgust, remain unclear. Grounded in the Elaboration Likelihood Model and moral emotion theories, our study aimed to investigate how moral anger and moral disgust interact with source credibility to influence online information sharing. Across three experiments, we systematically manipulated message features (source credibility, moral transgression severity) and participants’ cognitive–affective states (attention to morality versus accuracy, moral emotional states). Results indicated greater transgression severity increased willingness to share (WTS), particularly when morality was emphasised (Study 1). While higher source credibility generally increases WTS (all studies), moral anger (not disgust) overrode credibility cues (Study 2). Drift-diffusion model revealed that anger induction accelerated decision-making and lowered decision thresholds (Study 3). These findings identify moral anger as a peripheral cue that facilitates impulsive sharing and offers insights for emotion-based misinformation interventions.

When people perceive themselves as having violated religious/spiritual principles, they may experience distress that prompts efforts to restore alignment with what they hold as sacred. While divine forgiveness is increasingly recognized as an important part of this process, much of the empirical literature tends to overlook tradition-specific considerations that may be essential to conceptualising and measuring divine forgiveness. Building on an interdisciplinary Christian-sensitive dual-process model for conceptualising and measuring incident-specific psychological experiences of reconciliation with God for personal wrongdoing, we use cross-sectional and longitudinal data to examine the psychometric properties of the Reconciliation with God Scale in seven independent adult Christian samples representing a diverse range of countries, linguistic backgrounds, and denominational affiliations (N=1391). We present evidence for the two proposed factors-engaging in repentance with God and experiencing absolution from God-based on analyses of internal structure and internal consistency. Evidence of convergent validity was observed from associations with theoretically relevant proximal (e.g.,trait divine forgiveness) and distal (e.g.,personal flourishing) variables. Group comparisons based on theory-driven classifications provided support for discriminative validity, with somewhat consistent evidence that those who scored higher on both proposed factors tended to score more favourably on a number of the auxiliary variables. These findings provide initial psychometric evidence supporting the utility of the incident-anchored Reconciliation with God Scale among Christians, making processes of engaging in repentance with God and experiencing absolution from God empirically tractable as stress-regulatory mechanisms following spiritually salient moral transgressions.

ABSTRACT “Dirty hands” is a problem in political ethics that emerges when political actors, faced with urgent circumstances, engage in moral wrongdoing to better serve the public interest. Does containing autocrats justify morally troubling actions akin to dirty hands, and if so, under what conditions? One example is militant democracy, where restrictions on individual rights are considered justified to block antidemocratic actors, but are morally harmful nonetheless. This article identifies structural similarities between dirty hands and democratic self-defence and analyses how normative theorizing about the former can guide approaches to the latter. It discusses the limits of consequentialist and deontological responses in both cases, and why acting in the public interest helps understand and address the problem. The article argues that democracy defenders should consider whether threats to democracy are a result of coercion and carry the prospect of substantial or acute public harm. They should also consider whether the threat of harm is factually certain and sufficiently severe to merit action that causes “collateral moral damage”. It concludes by suggesting how to assess whether moral transgressions are truly necessary and excusable in protecting democracy and argues for rethinking the moral costs of democratic self-defence.

This article examines the meanings of the number seven as it repeatedly appears in The Secret History of The Mongols(hereafter SHM) and explores how this numerical symbolism affected both historical narration and genealogical representation within the text. In Mongolian symbolic traditions, the number seven is commonly associated with negative connotations such as death and punishment, and this symbolic understanding is reflected in the narrative structure of the SHM. For example, this study argues that Yesügei’s pursuit of Yeke Čiledü “across seven hills” is not a literal description of distance but an implicit metaphor for Čiledü’s death. In this context, the narrative treatment can also be understood as an attempt by the author of the SHM to mitigate the moral gravity of Yesügei’s abduction of Hö’elün. Numerical symbolism likewise influences genealogical accounts. The “seven sons” of Menen Tudun and Qabul Qa’an are recorded inconsistently across different sources with regard to both number and names. In particular, the sons of Menen Tudun are listed with alliterative Qa- names, suggesting a formulaic or symbolic construction rather than a faithful record of historical individuals. The number seven here carries layered meanings. On the one hand, since menen denotes “many,” the expression “seven sons” may simply signify “numerous sons.” On the other hand, comparative evidence from Turkic inscriptions and shamanistic traditions indicates that the number seven frequently appears in contexts marking turning points or transitional moments. The generations of Menen Tudun and Qabul Qa’an likewise represent critical junctures in Mongolian history. Accordingly, this article proposes that fluctuations in genealogical numbers within the SHM may reflect the multivalent symbolism of the number seven, encompassing both abundance and historical transition. By employing numerical symbolism, the author of the SHM shaped narrative evaluations of moral transgression, character assessment, and major historical transformations.

The emergence of cancel culture has transformed digital spaces into arenas of moral judgment, where public outrage frequently functions as a mechanism of social control. In the Indonesian context, this phenomenon unveils pronounced gender asymmetries, particularly in the form of symbolic punishment endured by women, which is disproportionate and enduring. This study aims to examine how cancel culture functions as a gendered practice that undermines women's dignity and reframes solidarity through conditional moral standards. Employing a virtual ethnography approach, this study analyzes digital interactions, public narratives, and mediated responses surrounding selected cases of online cancellation involving women. The findings suggest that cancel culture functions not merely as an expression of collective accountability; rather, it constitutes a structured process shaped by patriarchal moral hierarchies, algorithmic amplification, and selective public empathy. Women's purported moral transgressions are characterized as character flaws, whereas analogous actions by men are frequently contextualized and pardoned. In addition, the discourse of Woman Supporting Woman frequently functions as a normative instrument that disciplines women rather than cultivating authentic solidarity. This study makes a significant contribution to contemporary feminist and communication scholarship by conceptualizing cancel culture as a form of gendered power practice and emphasizing the need to reposition digital solidarity as a structural, ethical, and political commitment to achieving gender justice.

ABSTRACT Cervical erosion has historically been perceived as a severe gynecological condition in China, with its evocative nomenclature conjuring images of decay and moral transgression. Despite recent terminological revisions, the condition remains deeply stigmatized and is frequently exploited within a profit-driven healthcare market. This study employed a critical approach to analyze illness narratives related to cervical erosion as expressed on Sina Weibo, China’s preeminent microblogging platform. Our findings extended Frank’s illness narrative typology by uncovering a spectrum of narratives, including compliance, shame, resentment, and awakening. While compliance and shame narratives tended to reinforce biomedical authority and perpetuate structural inequities, the emergence of resentment and awakening narratives exposed instances of structural gaslighting and nascent embodied resistance among women. Ultimately, this study illuminates how traditional Chinese cultural values and neoliberal medicalization jointly shape women’s health experiences, offering critical insights for fostering more transparent and culturally responsive healthcare practices.

Generative AI tools are increasingly being used for creative and academic work. How do people morally evaluate plagiarism involving AI-generated content, and do they judge it differently than when the source is a human? Investigating these questions can provide insight into why people condemn plagiarism; for instance, whether this is due to harm to the original creator or the false benefit gained by the plagiarizer. We examined people’s moral evaluations of plagiarism involving AI-generated content in five experiments (N = 1705). In each experiment, participants read scenarios about a poet submitting someone else’s poem to a contest without credit. We compared three source types: a friend, ChatGPT, and a little-known poetry blog. In Experiments 1–3, participants judged plagiarism from the blog as more immoral than plagiarism from a friend or ChatGPT, with little difference between the latter two. Moral condemnation increased with the amount of content copied and remained stable when compared to other moral transgressions. In Experiments 4 and 5, moral judgments became harsher when human sources (friend or blog) denied permission, but not when ChatGPT did, suggesting that its refusal was not treated as morally meaningful. When all sources granted permission, differences between conditions disappeared. Overall, these findings support both the harm and false benefit accounts of why people condemn plagiarism. The findings also advance knowledge about how, and when, permission from the source affects condemnation of plagiarism.

Developmental science has accumulated considerable evidence that by 2 to 3 years of age, children begin to appreciate the obligatory nature of different social norms and distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions. However, little is known about the early ontogenetic trajectories of normative stances in the moral and conventional domains. Theoretical considerations point to three open questions: (1) Do young children's reactions toward transgressions of moral and conventional norms show increasing differentiation over this age period? (2) To which extent are young children's moral and conventional stances longitudinally stable? (3) Do early moral and conventional stances relate to each other in development? This longitudinal study presented 2.5-year-olds and 3.5-year-olds (N = 93, 45 females, predominantly White, mostly middle to high socioeconomic status) with the same established moral (i.e., harming others, destroying others' property) and conventional (i.e., sorting objects incorrectly) transgressions enacted by puppet characters. Children's spontaneous protest behavior and acceptability judgments were recorded. The relation between 2.5-year-olds' moral and conventional judgment (r = .78) decreased in 3.5-year-olds (r = .30). Moral protest (β = 0.403), but not conventional protest (β = 0.130), showed longitudinal stability. Conventional judgment of 2.5-year-olds related to 3.5-year-olds' moral judgment (β = 0.480). These findings demonstrate that young children's reactions toward moral and conventional transgressions show signs of differentiation regarding acceptability judgments and signs of stability regarding moral, but not conventional, protest behavior. This supports theoretical notions suggesting increasing differentiation and stability as central developmental processes in young children's emerging appreciation for social norms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).

ABSTRACT Over the past decade, cancel culture and celebrity bashing have become prominent markers in public and academic discourse. They can lead to denoting public shaming or exclusion of individuals, brands, or organisations for perceived moral transgressions. Yet, these phenomena are far from stable or self-evident; they operate as contested moral and semiotic fields in which notions of guilt, accountability, and justice are constantly (re-)negotiated. This special issue approaches cancel culture as a 'theatre of morality', with contributions highlighting how cancel culture is a media-driven moral economy, emphasising the central role of media, audiences, and fandoms in shaping public understandings of wrongdoing, culpability, and redemption. Drawing on a broad variety of cases from across the world, and from corporate controversies to more private ones, the articles examine how cancellation circulates through affective, discursive, and symbolic practices. This helps reveal the potential to challenge hierarchies, power structures, and inequalities. By situating cancel culture and celebrity bashing within broader cultural, digital, and commercial contexts, this issue highlights their significance beyond popular culture, offering a critical framework for understanding the semiotic, moral, and structural dynamics of contemporary public accountability and mediated justice.

Mediating pathways from potentially morally injurious events to PTSD: A longitudinal cohort study of U.S. post-9/11 veterans.

How do people respond when a close other, as opposed to a distant other, commits a moral transgression against a third person? Across five preregistered experiments (total N = 2,170), supplemented by pilot studies, we find that people navigate punishment differently depending on relational closeness: they seek less punishment by authorities (institutional punishment) for close others but impose more punishment by themselves (relational punishment) and are more likely to confront the perpetrator directly (Experiments 1–5). Moreover, transgressions of close others elicit both other-blaming and self-blaming emotions, and they prompt individuals to adopt both victim and perpetrator roles (Experiments 2–5). These effects intensify with increasing relational closeness (Experiment 3) and persist across transgressions of varying moral and criminal severity (Experiment 4).

Moral disengagement (MD), or the cognitive strategies used to avoid feelings of guilt in contexts of moral transgression, has been an established cognitive risk factor for engagement in antisocial and criminal behaviors. In justice-involved samples, MD is most frequently measured using the 32-item Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement Scale (MMD). The current study aims to develop a short-form version of the MMD with strong psychometric properties and predictive utility. Using data from a longitudinal study of justice-involved youth, we generated theoretically and data-driven short-form versions of the MMD. We then validated and compared the short-form versions to the full MMD in a different sample of justice-involved youth. Results indicate that a data-driven 11-item short form consistently performed well across both samples. Recommendations are made for future researchers interested in exploring MD, and implications in risk assessment are discussed.

Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have made it easier to create highly realistic deepfake videos, which can appear to show someone doing or saying something they did not do or say. Deepfakes may present a threat to individuals and society: for example, deepfakes can be used to influence elections by discrediting political opponents. Psychological research shows that people's ability to detect deepfake videos varies considerably, making us potentially vulnerable to the influence of a video we have failed to identify as fake. However, little is yet known about the potential impact of a deepfake video that has been explicitly identified and flagged as fake. Examining this issue is important because current legislative initiatives to regulate AI emphasize transparency. We report three preregistered experiments (N = 175, 275, 223), in which participants were shown a deepfake video of someone appearing to confess committing a crime or a moral transgression, preceded in some conditions by a warning stating that the video was a deepfake. Participants were then asked questions about the person's guilt, to examine the influence of the video's content. We found that most participants relied on the content of a deepfake video, even when they had been explicitly warned beforehand that it was fake, although alternative explanations for the video's influence, related to task framing, cannot be ruled out. This result was observed even with participants who indicated that they believed the warning and knew the video to be fake. Our findings suggest that transparency is insufficient to entirely negate the influence of deepfake videos, which has implications for legislators, policymakers, and regulators of online content.

People who can increase their payoff by violating a moral norm may delegate decisions to dilute their perception of responsibility, which can lead to a higher overall frequency of moral transgressions. To structure the different effects at work, we first develop a model with multiple delegation stages where decision makers have private information on their lying costs and dilution of responsibility. Our model shows that the impact of delegation is generally ambiguous, but also identifies intuitive sufficient conditions for more moral transgressions with delegation. We then perform a large-scale online experiment where subjects in groups of three can increase their payoff by lying about the outcome of a lottery. We find no evidence that delegation increases the overall lying frequency. Estimating the subjects’ preferences from the data, we find a normal distribution for lying costs and a strongly negatively skewed distribution for a rather low dilution effect.

People differ in their tendency to be grateful, and this affects interpersonal dynamics. Previous research found that individuals with high (versus low) levels of dispositional gratitude exhibited more prosocial behaviors. In this study we demonstrate that dispositional gratitude may also be associated with negative responses toward others. Specifically, we examined the link between dispositional gratitude and condemnations of various moral transgressions. Given that moral norms might be culture-specific, we recruited participants from the U.S., the UK, and China ( N = 593 in total) to test potential cultural moderators. Results showed that the higher people scored on dispositional gratitude, the more morally wrong they evaluated transgressions to be, and the more punishment they thought that transgressors deserved. The associations were robust across moral domains, countries, and perceived levels of societal tightness. These findings underscore the pervasive and differentiated impact of dispositional gratitude in interpersonal relations, as it may not only increase prosocial behavior but also intensify negative responses to others who violate moral norms. • Dispositional gratitude was associated with harsher moral condemnation. • The association was robust across the UK, the U.S., and China. • Findings were consistent across individualizing and binding moral domains. • Perceived societal tightness did not moderate between gratitude and condemnation.