Moral Realism Research Articles

Abstract Within the past twenty years, meta-ethicists have started to make their ontological commitments minimal. This has led to the creation of a view called metaethical minimalism . Metaethical minimalism is a meta-ethical theory that states some moral truths are truthmaker gaps, that is, truths without truthmakers. Such a view, though, has not gone without criticism. In this paper, we have two aims. First, we aim to focus on responding to unaddressed criticisms from Donelson (Three problems with metaethical minimalism. 34 , 1.) and by extension deal with worries from Enoch ( Taking morality seriously: A defense of robust realism ), Ingram ( Robust realism in ethics: Normative arbitrariness, interpersonal dialogue, and moral objectivity ), and McPherson (Against quietist normative realism. 154 , 223–240.). Mainly, we aim to diffuse the objections, but in some instances, we adopt parody objections so that if it attacks metaethical minimalism, it equally attacks its rivals. Second, we aim to show how, since the common objections to metaethical minimalism fail, it is an attractive meta-ethical view without any (ontological) costs.

ABSTRACT This study examines the intersection of 20th-century moral philosophies and contemporary K-12 educative leadership theories, focusing on six frameworks: transformational, instructional, distributed, adaptive, ethical, and culturally responsive leadership. Using a multi-method approach, including literature review and thematic analysis, the research identifies key philosophical influences – moral realism, evolutionary ethics, virtue ethics, and postmodernism – and explores their alignment with modern leadership models. Findings show that moral philosophies like virtue ethics and postmodernism support leadership models focused on social justice, collaboration, and ethical decision-making. However, tensions arise between universal ethical principles and context-sensitive leadership, such as moral realism’s fixed principles versus adaptive leadership’s flexibility. The study suggests a nuanced understanding of how these philosophies shape leadership practices and proposes practical strategies for aligning leadership with specific moral principles to create inclusive, ethical environments. It also calls for future research into the impact of moral philosophies on leadership outcomes, particularly in multicultural contexts, and the balance between universal ethics and context-sensitive decisions. In conclusion, the research highlights the importance of integrating moral philosophy into leadership for promoting social justice and improving educative leadership effectiveness.

In this article, we explain how Kant upends the terms of the debate concerning the relationship between God’s existence and an objective morality by looking at his moral-teleological argument for God’s existence in the third Critique. We explain Kant’s rejection of external sources of moral normativity and his method of grounding moral authority in the normativity of practical reason. We then turn to Kant’s argument justifying a practical belief in God as the moral author of nature. Kant’s claims about how we must conceptualize organisms teleologically and, as a result, how reason seeks an unconditioned end of nature, brings together our moral purpose with a conception of nature as an organized whole. Since our teleological concepts of organisms seem to require that human beings serve as the final, unconditioned end of nature, but morality and nature might be incompatible and divergent, we must also believe in a moral author of nature. This belief guards against demoralization and creates a unified view of the human moral agent and the world she inhabits, which Kant thinks of as indispensable for our practical lives. Kant notoriously blurs the lines between theology and ethics in nonstandard ways. Although he rejects many traditional approaches to grounding ethics in a conception of divine commands or eternal law, he still devotes a considerable amount of time to discussing the role of religion as a bulwark of the moral life. The goal of this paper is to defend Kant’s relevance to a discussion of the relationship between an objective ethics and the existence of God; his contribution deserves our notice precisely for the ways in which it promises to shift the terms of the contemporary debate and complicate possible answers to the question of whether there can be an objective morality without God. In contemporary philosophical literature, Kant’s argument contending that we must hope in God from a practical point of view on pain of irrationality of acting from duty has enjoyed substantial discussion. Here, however, we focus on a lesser-known suite of arguments that in order to so much as cognize ourselves and other species as the sorts of natural beings they are, we must believe in a supersensible moral author of these natures. This set of arguments ultimately dovetail with the more well-known argument for theistic hope and operate in much the same way. But they touch on facets of Kant’s whole philosophical system, such as his account of teleological judgment and the unity and final end of all of nature. Our goal is to explicate these arguments and illuminate their relevance of these Kantian arguments to the debate about the relevance of God to objective morality. We will argue that while an objective ethics is possible without God due to the active role of practical reason in rational agents, belief in God’s existence strengthens the claims of morality, both for psychological reasons but also by providing a more unified conception of moral and natural reality.

This paper concerns itself with postulating the necessity of God for Good, in answer to the titular question posed in this edition: “Is an Ethics without God Possible?”. To achieve this end, I consider a specific pantheistic ethic centered on Murdochian love and evaluate a potential contradictory element to this brand of ethic, while also highlighting several important terminological considerations integral to the debate concerning objective moral realism. I tentatively provide a demonstration of moral goodness without a ‘capital G’ God while examining and demystifying the underpinning concepts of goodness and ‘Godness’ (the nature of God).

ABSTRACT This paper argues that moral realism must commit to objectivity as a core feature. According to an influential view, a theory qualifies as moral realism if moral claims are literally construed as straightforwardly true, requiring only cognitivism and success theory without objectivity. However, some forms of relativism accept truth-aptness and success theory while rejecting objective truth values, allowing moral propositions to have different truth values in different contexts of assessment. This creates a dilemma: either the notion of “straightforward truth” implicitly requires objectivity – making moral realism robust rather than minimal – or minimal realism cannot properly classify these relativist views as realist or antirealist. Further emphasizing this issue, research on folk metaethics suggests that people may comprehend moral claims in an assessment-sensitive manner. Future research could contribute significantly by arbitrating between competing interpretations of the current data: indexical moral relativism (moral claims express different propositions in different contexts) versus assessment sensitivity (the same proposition can have different truth values in different contexts of assessment). The paper concludes that moral realism must require objectivity not because relativism must reject it, but because some forms can coherently do so – a conclusion that could be strengthened by empirical studies examining how people judge moral disagreement across contexts.

This study investigates the affective phenomenon of hatred through the lens of philosophical anthropology and existential phenomenology, with particular attention to the work of Vendel Feran. Drawing on Feran’s conceptualisation of affective structures and moral sensitivity, the inquiry explores whether hatred can be understood merely as a chronic, generalised form of anger or whether it constitutes a distinct existential and evaluative stance towards the world. Building on Feran's thesis that moral emotions are not simply reactive but deeply rooted in the structure of human existence, the study juxtaposes hatred and anger in terms of their temporality, intentionality, and moral orientation. As Feran suggests, hatred is more entrenched—it discloses the world through a sustained, morally charged aversion. This investigation further aligns Feran’s insights with Heidegger’s analysis of moods (Stimmungen), proposing that hatred, like anxiety, may serve an existential function by revealing value-laden aspects of the world. However, unlike anxiety, which opens the self to authentic existence, hatred appears to seal the self off from Mitsein (being-with-others), replacing openness with exclusion and moral rigidity. By interpreting hatred as both a moral and existential mood, the study extends Feran’s affective anthropology to account for the ways in which negative emotions structure our relation to others and to moral reality. The findings suggest that hatred is not simply the absence of love, but an active opposition to perceived forms of being deemed unworthy, and that this aversive mood may obscure one’s capacity for authentic moral engagement.

Abstract This article examines China’s environmental diplomacy through the Green Silk Road (GSR), a relatively recent yet strategically significant aspect of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While existing literature has extensively analysed the economic and geopolitical dimensions of the BRI, the environmental narrative remains underexplored, especially concerning China’s international role. Drawing on Role Theory and Moral Realism, this study investigates how China’s efforts to “green” the BRI serve as a mechanism of role adjustment, aligning its self-perception with changing international expectations of responsible power conduct. Using a primarily qualitative methodology that combines content analysis, expert interviews, and a targeted online survey, the article explores the GSR’s impact on China’s global image and its positioning as an emerging environmental leader. Focusing on three regions—Central Asia, Latin America, and Europe—the analysis shows how environmental projects influence perceptions of China’s legitimacy and leadership. Although the GSR seems to enhance China’s international image, scepticism remains about the sincerity of its environmental commitments. The study argues that the GSR marks both a strategic and normative shift in China’s foreign policy, with consequences for global environmental governance and the changing political landscape in the Asia–Pacific and beyond.

Abstract This paper defends the claim that metaethics can be done therapeutically. It does so by first showing how metaethics can fit into recent systemizations of philosophy as therapy. Borrowing from the work of Martha Nussbaum and Eugen Fischer, the paper discusses how metaethics can fulfill the criterion for both a philosophical therapy and a therapeutic philosophy. Then, it argues that there are examples of both robust moral realists and anti-realists doing metaethics as therapy. On the realist side, there is evidence of moral naturalists and non-naturalists doing metaethics for therapeutic ends. Likewise, on the anti-realist side, there are cases of both Pyrrhonian moral skeptics and moral error theorists, in how they answer the “now what?” question, displaying therapeutic motivations for their views. In the process, the concepts of health often implicitly employed by metaethicists are addressed and made explicit. The paper thus suggests that not only has metaethics been done as a kind of therapy, doing metaethics as therapy remains a live option for us today.

How was the term "neoclassical economics" introduced to economics and what thoughts does it imply? Is the current use of this term consistent with the initial efforts of its founders? These questions are among the categories that always occupy the minds of economic scholars. Neoclassical economics was first introduced to economics by Veblen, and it referred to the marginalist thoughts that prevailed in the last decades of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In order to escape from the classical theory of objective value, marginalists resorted to subjective preferences for determining values, hoping that by abandoning objective value, they could establish economics on a more scientific basis. Although these efforts were initially considered good advances, after a while they became so abstract that they seemed to be anything but a theory about human behavior. In this article, we will take a brief look at the scientific life of neoclassical economics to show how this intellectual tradition was formed, what its most important features were, and what it became over time. We will also show that, contrary to existing perceptions, the early thinkers of this intellectual tradition did not have an anti-historical and anti-institutional outlook.

Plato’s Moral Realism by Lloyd Gerson (review)

Abstract Current debate on the validity of an ethical basis for trans+ rights is often expressed as a clash between moral norms based on a biological understanding of sex, and a social and cultural understanding of gender. I will argue a moral realist case for legal and political equality for trans+ people based on objective, universal, and shared values. Such an approach allows us to acknowledge advances in scientific and social theories which question assumed binaries and gendered behaviours, and challenge certain ‘gender ideology’ critiques within the Catholic Church and their use by populist authoritarians of the far‐right.

This article explores the problem of collective memory as a foundation for the construction of Ukrainian collective identity. The authors argue that identity formation in the postmodern era is characterized by personalization, flexibility, and the ambivalent influence of globalization. The study demonstrates that Ukrainian collective memory represents a polyphony of interpretations rather than a homogeneous reflection of the past. Its competitive and composite nature is conceptualized not as a weakness, but as a source of pluralism, adaptability, and potential for critical re-evaluation. Accordingly, memory politics in Ukraine is presented as an active process of shaping a desired society. The article emphasizes that in the context of postmodernity and the Russian-Ukrainian war, collective identity in Ukraine is transforming into a dynamic, flexible, and personalized project. This process strongly correlates with Michel Foucault’s concepts of the "technologies of the self," which in the Ukrainian context evolve into ethical, cultural, and historical practices, shaping collective identity as a reflexive and open construction. Through war, memory, and solidarity, Ukrainian society not only defends its statehood but also creates a new moral and symbolic reality, where the personal and national, ethical and aesthetic, private and political are inextricably intertwined. The construction of a distinct national narrative and Ukraine’s postcolonial awakening are shown to be accompanied by the formation of unique historical conceptions, the affirmation of the Ukrainian language, the emphasis on European values, and the deconstruction of shared Russian-Ukrainian myths.

The paper explores the multifaceted absence of fatherhood in Henrik Ibsen’s Ghosts, offering insight into its personal, social and divine dimensions. Through an interdisciplinary theoretical framework incorporating psychoanalysis (Freud, Jung, Greenson, Modell), sociology (Coltrane), philosophy (Nietzsche, Kierkegaard), and archetypal psychology, the paper underscores the impact of absence on the characters’ emotional, moral and social realities. The first section explores personal fatherhood and the vacant roles of the patriarchs in the lives of the characters. It discusses failures of traditional family structures to provide guidance and protection, emphasizing the consequences of parental vacuity on identity formation and psychological development. The second section focuses on the concept of symbolic fatherhood and the development of father substitutes. It argues that religious institutions, represented by Pastor Manders, fail to embody the parental archetype. The third section examines divine fatherhood, the sense of divine orphanhood and abandonment in the play, caused by the lack of divine justice within it. The paper provides a reading of the play and reflects on the interconnectedness of the threefold fatherhood and emotional and existential crises depicted in the play.

The dominance of Western-centric norms in cybersecurity ethics presents a significant gap in addressing the moral and cultural realities of diverse societies, particularly those in the Muslim world. This paper proposes a decolonial and culturally inclusive framework by integrating Islamic ethical philosophy into the discourse on cybersecurity. Drawing on key Islamic concepts such as amanah (trust), ‘adl (justice), and niyyah (intention), the study explores how these values can inform ethical decision-making in digital environments. Through a philosophical-theological approach, it critiques the assumption of value neutrality in technology and highlights the moral agency and accountability embedded in Islamic metaphysics. The findings underscore the necessity of ethical pluralism and call for a global digital ethics that is both morally substantive and culturally responsive. Ultimately, the study contributes to the development of a more holistic and spiritually informed cybersecurity paradigm that resonates with the ethical traditions of Muslim-majority contexts.

Abstract This paper examines Keith Douglas's “Vergissmeinnicht” through the concept I term “esthetics of ethical realism” to describe Douglas's approach to representing the war dead. The concept refers to a mode of representation that merges stark realism with ethical responsibility, depicting the war dead without glorification or detachment while preserving their individuality through lyrical traces. In this sense, in “Vergissmeinnicht,” Douglas neither sentimentalizes sacrifice nor distances himself from war's brutality. Instead, he cultivates an ethical awareness that restores individuality to the war dead by intertwining graphic depictions of his decay with tender remnants of his past. He approaches the broken body of the German soldier with ethical sensitivity, maintaining realism while revealing his individuality through a photograph. By combining ethical realism and lyricism, Douglas gives voice to the voiceless and compels readers to confront the moral weight of war, foregrounding both its dehumanizing force and the persistence of human identity. In doing so, Douglas offers an ethical mode of representation that goes beyond the combatant‐centered perspective of Combat Gnosticism. Through the esthetics of ethical realism, he transforms poetry into a site of ethical reflection and commemoration, redefining it as a medium that esthetically interrogates the ethical dimensions of war.

Are free will and moral responsibility possible in a world where choices are the inevitable consequences of past causes governed by physical law? Both libertarian and hard incompatibilist theories suggest not. By contrast, this paper develops an account of freedom as self-government, motivated by the need to address key challenges: the need for a broad understanding of free will beyond the limitation of liability, the charge that it proceeds by equivocation, the problem of the lawful causal origins of choice, the recognition of degrees of freedom and moral responsibility, and the risk of conformist functionalism. The framework of freedom as self-government integrates five key ideas. One, it recognizes a wider realm of autonomy for which freedom is relevant, anchored in non-domination. It holds that it is identified by the cognitive and practical role it has in liberation movements against domination, which aims to protect and secure wide capacities for choice. Two, it does not proceed by equivocation, but rather is grounded in a robust compatibilist tradition of thinking about free will from Plato onwards, present in both common and expert circles today. Three, it acknowledges that relative to all causes governed by physical law, no person has free will and moral responsibility. However, drawing from the model of the physical relativity of motion, it argues that the frame of reference of freedom as self-government is also valid, that relative to it people can be free, and that this frame of reference is the more relevant to adopt. Four, the view presented also suggests that in contrast to libertarian and hard incompatibilist doctrines, it can parsimoniously acknowledge degrees of freedom and proportional responsibility. And five, the present view suggests that the functionalist methodological component of freedom as self-government does not have to lead to conformity with de facto evil, if coupled with moral realism.

Power is often understood as the sheer use of force in social relations. While power is frequently expressed and experienced in these terms, it is also necessary for the generation, sustenance, and enhancement of life in all its forms. This means that, in a very basic way, power is constitutive of personhood and society. Understood and exercised in this way, power affirms the dignity of individual persons and promotes bonding between and among persons. Therefore, ethically, social power must be viewed as essentially relational and intended to be reciprocal, community building, and accountable. Contrarily understood and exercised, power gives rise to bondage through denial of the responsibility in its constitutive and relational character. Here, the emphasis on domination and power becomes alienating and irresponsible. The purpose of this article as a whole is to undertake an ethical analysis of social power that furthers exploration of the principles and implications of nonviolent strategies for the exercise of social power.

The article continues the analysis proposed by R. Brague on the “consequences of the experience of war for philosophers” and “the influence of such experience on their way of thinking.” The author suggests distinguishing between different experiences of war based on the nature of conflicts and the ways of participating in them. Furthermore, the article argues that philosophical thought can be influenced not only by firsthand experiences of war — whether as a soldier or a civilian affected by combat — but also by the discovery, through war, of unexpected aspects of human life or history that challenge certain philosophical theories, modes of philosophizing, or philosophy as a whole. The article examines the reactions of 20th century French philosophers to war, particularly those who sought to summarize the experience of specific conflicts and conceptualize war as a reality that challenged them. Special attention is given to the differing perceptions of World War I and World War II by successive generations of philosophers, as illustrated by Alain’s book Mars: Or, The Truth about War (1921) and M. Merleau-Ponty’s article “The War Has Taken Place” (1945). The study also includes a comparative analysis of how World War II shaped the intellectual trajectories of M. Merleau-Ponty and R. Aron. The author argues that J. Baudrillard’s book The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1991) continues the tradition of “postwar” texts by French philosophers, summarizing the consequences of the Cold War and conceptualizing the nature of new forms of warfare. Building on these analyses, the author demonstrates that one of the consequences of the transformation of warfare following the end of the Cold War has been the gradual disappearance of what M. Walzer termed the “moral reality of war,” a characteristic feature of 20th century conflicts. However, with the resurgence of full-scale and prolonged interstate war due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, this moral reality is being revived — posing a challenge, at the very least, those philosophers who have gained lived experience of this war.

Islam organized the lives of societies in such a way as to achieve the mission of succession and servitude to God, and it did not leave any area of life without providing the provisions that man needs to achieve his earthly and hereafter interests. This includes economic matters. The Qur’an has laid the foundations for this economic system, and it is left to individuals to strive, under the umbrella of these principles, to create economic systems in light of these foundations. These principles scattered in the Holy Qur’an cannot be limited, but rather they are basic building blocks that we collected through this research. The research includes an introduction, three sections, a conclusion, and indexes. The first section discusses the concept of Islamic economics including its two requirements: the definition of the Islamic economy and the emergence of the Islamic economy. The second topic discusses the foundations and principles of the Islamic economy as presented in the Qur’an, including its nine requirements: the construction of the land (succession), ownership, work, not restricting wealth to a specific group, prohibiting usury, mutual consent, good choice of the worker, facilitation for the insolvent, and prohibition of acts harmful to the economy, such as bribery, extravagance, and gambling. In the third section, the characteristics of the Islamic economy are explained, including four requirements: that it is a divine economy and moral economy, realism, and comprehensiveness.

In metaethics, there is a close connection between ethical intuitionism and moral realism that is mostly based on the fact that intuitionism is capable of providing a solution to a philosophical problem, the problem of justification. This close connection, however, is more fragile than it may initially seem because the phenomenon of moral fallibility tends to estrange both views from each other: whereas moral realism is largely motivated by fallibilist presuppositions, ethical intuitionism is tacitly under suspicion of having infallibilist consequences. This charge of infallibilism is, to be sure, prima facie not surprising; nevertheless, its peculiar irony is rarely appreciated and shall, therefore, be analysed in the course of the paper.