Moral Luck Research Articles (Page 1)

Contemporary theories of luck face problems when it comes to moral luck, that is, luck that nevertheless partially determines moral responsibility. Either they conceive of luck as chancy or modally fragile, which is too narrow and excludes cases such as choosing to do something that is unlikely for you to do or that you do not do in many nearby possible worlds. Others see luck as primarily a matter of lack of control, which is too broad and includes things like the sun’s rising, which is outside of our control, but certainly not a matter of luck. Some try to rescue the moral luck phenomenon by positing hybrid accounts or denying that moral luck is a species of luck. Very little has been written about how Aristotle’s conceptions of luck fit into modern conceptions. Yet, Aristotle has sophisticated accounts of luck and good fortune that shed light on certain problems. I will show how Aristotle fares compared to contemporary theories and what we can learn from his approach to luck and fortune when it comes to how lack of control, modal robustness, and probability factor into luck, the difference between luck and good fortune, and whether moral luck is a species of luck.

Discussions of moral luck, exceptionalism, and ethical watersheds raise the question of what it would mean for our ethical commitments to exhibit, in an axiologically non-trivial way, a diachronic character. This would render a particular evaluation applicable, by virtue of its content, only at certain times and not others. It would also make whether or not there happen to be cases we can point to at a given time and for a given domain contingent on facts about what antecedently occurred in the world. I explore this first by considering how the issue relates to the metaethical division between factualists and non-factualists, and then by examining Wittgenstein’s distinctive line of thinking, in On Certainty, about how framing commitments and empirico-factual beliefs combine in ways that change over time. I conclude that theorising about ethical diachronicity in such terms leads to a problem of self-referentiality, but argue that while such an approach entails a certain “throwing away of the ladder” of philosophical analysis, this need not leave us with nothing to say. There can be a meaningful consideration of putative cases of ethical diachronicity in other ways, via personal histories and fictional narratives.

ABSTRACT In this paper, we give a new argument for the existence of moral luck. The argument is based on a manipulation case in which two agents both lack second-order control over their actions, but one of them has first-order control. Our argument is, we argue, in several respects stronger than standard arguments for moral luck. Five possible objections to the argument are considered, and its general significance for the debate on moral luck is briefly discussed.

According to Rescher, luck is chancy, but constitution is not, and so constitutive luck is a contradiction in terms.In this paper, I look at two recent attempts to controvert this argument. According to the first, constitution is notchancy, but neither is moral luck, because moral luck is not a species of luck. According to the second, moral luckis chancy, but constitution is too, because the comparative class is not the agent herself but rather the populationat large. I argue that neither of these attempts is successful. I begin by explaining the importance of constitutiveluck.

Abstract According to some, luck forms an inevitable part of admirable moral agency. According to others, it is incompatible with a basic principle of moral worth. What's the issue? Is there a ‘problem’ of moral luck; or are there many, or none? With reference to the practice of moral praise, I suggest that there is no single problem of moral luck as traditionally understood. Instead, there is a family of issues regarding the interpretation and assessment of moral performance. In the background is a mixture of descriptive and normative issues, including how to understand the legitimacy of social expectations, the value of effort, and the duties of communities to enable their members to live good and virtuous lives.

Theological ethics has inadvertently contributed to the diminished autonomy many feel amid the anxieties of daily life. The shift from act-based ethics to totalizing ethics, and Vatican II’s universal call to social justice, urged Christians to work for earthly justice without offering tools for assessing one’s moral goodness when these projects fail. Virtue ethics that is attentive to moral luck can help combat moral helplessness by observing moral agency in action patterns that shape the self’s dispositions.

Abstract The most popular position in the moral luck debate is to reject resultant moral luck while accepting the possibility of other types of moral luck. But it is unclear whether this position is stable. Some argue that luck is luck and if it is relevant for moral responsibility anywhere, it is relevant everywhere, and vice versa. Some argue that given the similarities between circumstantial moral luck and resultant moral luck, there is good evidence that if the former exists, so does the latter. The challenge is especially pressing for the large group that exclusively deny resultant moral luck. I argue that rejecting resultant moral luck alone is a stable and plausible position. This is because, in a nutshell, the other types of luck can but the results of an action cannot affect what makes one morally responsible.

In this paper, I argue that there are several different circumstances in which it is rational for human agents not to trust artificial agents (such as ChatGPT). I claim that artificial agents cannot, in principle, be programmed with their own self (nor a simulation of their own self) and, consequently, cannot properly understand the indexicals ‘I’ and ‘me’. It also follows that they cannot take up a first-person point-of-view and that they cannot be conscious. They can understand that agent so-and-so (described in objective indexical-free terms) trusts or is entrusted but cannot know that they are that agent (if they are) and so cannot know that they are trusted or entrusted. Artificial agents cannot know what it means for it to have a normative expectation, nor what it means for it to be responsible for performing certain actions. Artificial agents lack all of the first-person properties that human agents possess, and which are epistemically important to human agents. Because of these limitations, and because artificial agents figure centrally in the trust relation defined in the Buechner–Tavani model of digital trust, there will be several different kinds of circumstances in which it would be rational for human agents not to trust artificial agents. I also examine the problem of moral luck, define a converse problem of moral luck, and argue that although each kind of problem of moral luck does not arise for artificial agents (since they cannot take up a first-person point-of-view), human agents should not trust artificial agents interacting with those human agents in moral luck and converse moral luck circumstances.

In “Moral Luck” (ML), Thomas Nagel characterizes moral luck as “a fundamental problem of moral responsibility to which we possess no satisfactory solution” (1979a, p. 25). Nagel explicitly connects his notion of moral luck to Peter Strawson’s discussion of moral responsibility in “Freedom and Resentment” (FR), and Strawson seems later to endorse the connection in Skepticism and Naturalism. Yet, the connection between these two highly influential works is underexplored in the secondary literature. In this paper, I question the purported connection and suggest that the threat of moral luck to Strawsonian approaches to moral responsibility is unclear. I first show that Nagel’s internal–external distinction does not parallel Strawson’s distinction between participant and objective stances. I then use Strawson’s characteristic methodology to show that three of Nagel’s four types of moral luck—constitutive, circumstantial, and antecedent moral luck—do not threaten Strawsonian approaches to moral responsibility.

ABSTRACT This article sought to provide a new interpretation of Adam Smith’s view about moral luck. In his work Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith diagnosed the influence of luck on our moral sentiments, he named this phenomenon by “irregularity of sentiments”. Given the proximity between Smith’s analysis of this irregularity of sentiments and the debate on moral luck, some philosophers have attempted to shed more light on his position on moral luck. I defend that these previous interpretations fail to notice the real connection between the virtue of justice and the irregularity of moral sentiments. As I intend to argue, this connection gives us the proper tools to better understand Smith’s position in the debate.

Comments on Nicholas Sars, “Moral Luck and the Participant Stance”

Abstract The received view is that Kant denies all moral luck. But I show how Kant affirms constitutive moral luck in passages concerning radical evil from Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. First, I explicate Kant’s claims about radical evil. It is a morally evil disposition that all human beings have necessarily, at least for the first part of their lives, and for which they are blameworthy. Second, since these properties about radical evil appear to contradict Kant’s even more famous claims about imputation, ‘ought implies can’, and free will, I unpack Henry Allison’s proof of radical evil and show how it is consistent with interpretations of Kant’s broader views about morality. Third, I define and illustrate the category of constitutive moral luck and argue that Kant embraces the existence of constitutive moral luck given Allison-style interpretations of radical evil. This provides a reason for philosophers to reject the received view, and it creates an occasion for Kantians and Kant scholars to check their reasons if they deny moral luck.

Abstract It is conventional wisdom that appreciating the role of luck in our moral lives should make us more sparing with blame. But views of moral responsibility that allow luck to augment a person’s blameworthiness are in tension with this wisdom. I resolve this tension: our common moral luck partially generates a duty to forgo retributively blaming the blameworthy person at least sometimes. So, although luck can amplify the blame that a person deserves, luck also partially generates a duty not to give the blameworthy person the retributive blame that he deserves at least sometimes.

The concept of moral luck challenges our traditional understanding of morality, responsibility, and accountability in healthcare. It forces us to confront the reality that many factors that influence health outcomes and medical decisions are beyond our control. By recognizing the role of luck in health outcomes, we can promote a more compassionate, equitable approach to healthcare — one that acknowledges the complex interplay of factors that shape our lives and our decisions.

This article is divided into three sections. In the first and second, I examine Sartorio’s account of the causal structure of the famous Thirsty Traveler thought experiment. I argue that this account does not withstand critical scrutiny. In the third, I turn to a novel kind of moral luck that Sartorio uses the Thirsty Traveler to expose. I expand the scope of my argument to look also at other recently proposed categories of moral luck. I argue that these proposals are overhasty

The Duty Speech Loophole in Whistleblower Protection: Why We Need Retroactive Causality to Avoid Moral Luck

ABSTRACT In this paper, I raise a challenge to Gideon Rosen’s defence of moral contingentism against Jamie Dreier’s moral luck argument. Dreier argues that if moral contingentism is true, acting in a morally permissible way always depends on a form of moral luck, because we could be in a descriptively identical possible world where the moral laws are different. Rosen’s response is that such a world is too remote from ours for us to count it as lucky that we are not in it. I argue that, given Rosen’s method of assessing the remoteness of possible worlds, worlds like the one Dreier describes are close enough to ours to justify his worry, and consequently that Rosen’s counterargument fails. I take this strongly counterintuitive conclusion as a reason to be optimistic that Rosen’s argument for moral contingentism can be resisted.

This paper investigates an ingenious argument by Andrew Khoury which, if valid, could shed new light on some of the most relevant discussions within the field of moral philosophy. The argument is based on the idea that if we deny the phenomenon of resultant moral luck, then the proper objects of moral responsibility must be internal willings. I analyse the argument and find it unsound. The argument does not adequately account for the positions of all relevant moral actors when it comes to the moral evaluation of agents and their actions.

Here is a crucial principle for debates about moral luck, responsibility, and free will: a subject is blameworthy for an act only if, in acting, she did what she ought not to have done. That is, ‘blameworthiness’ implies ‘ought not’ (BION). There are some good reasons to accept BION, but whether we accept it mainly depends on complex questions about the objectivity of ought and the subjectivity of blameworthiness. This paper offers an exploratory defence of BION: it gives three prima facie reasons to accept it, provides a plausible interpretation of it, and shows how holding out against objections can yield fruitful lessons. Five objections to BION are considered: the objection from conscience, from reasons, from suberogation, from objectivity, and from excuses. Their main problem is to either over-subjectify blameworthiness or to over-objectify obligations. To accept BION, we must occupy a desirable middle ground.

On a common characterization, moral luck occurs when factors beyond agents’ control affect their moral responsibility. The existence of moral luck is widely contested, however. In this paper, I present a new challenge for deniers of moral luck. It seems that some factors beyond agents’ control—such as moral principles about blame- and praiseworthiness—clearly affect moral responsibility. Thus, moral luck deniers face a dialectical burden that has so far gone unnoticed. They must either point to a relevant difference between factors like moral principles and the kind of factors that according to them do not affect moral responsibility or show how they can avoid having to point to such a difference. I argue that no obvious way to meet the challenge presents itself and that it thus amounts to a serious worry for deniers of moral luck.