Abstract Animal agriculture faces increasing moral and societal scrutiny. The GEroNIMO project aims to address challenges such as sustainability, welfare, and genetic diversity through genomic innovations. The ongoing debate about genome editing is mostly driven by experts from few disciplines with an emphasis on technical and science-based arguments resembling consequentialist reasoning without making systematic comparisons. To increase the range of arguments and stakeholders, we conducted eight focus groups ( n = 70) in Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Slovenia, representing rural and urban groups. Furthermore, we discussed alternative or complementary technologies to genome editing such as cultivated meat to both allow for systematic comparisons and to scrutinise the extent to which attitudes towards specific food technologies rely on general attitudes towards food technology. Guided by Critical Applied Ethics and Moral Foundation Theory, we identified underlying moral intuitions of the participants without uncritically adopting their arguments. Across all groups, benefits for animal welfare, fairness and transparency in economic motives, and trust in institutions emerged as key conditions for responsible use of genome editing in animal agriculture. While these concerns were broadly shared, participants from the Netherlands and Germany expressed relatively more openness towards technological food innovation, compared to those from France and Slovenia, within the scope of this qualitative study. Our findings highlight the need to understand the cultural and intuitive dimensions of moral reasoning for effective public engagement and responsible development of emerging food and breeding technologies. In particular, concerns rooted in feelings of disgust deserve deeper scrutiny rather than being addressed with harm-based arguments, which fail to address the moral roots of disgust.

ABSTRACT This essay asks a new question: When someone with a firm understanding of basic operations nevertheless remains ignorant of a complex logical or mathematical truth, precisely what kind of information are they missing? I introduce “catenary truths,” a significant component of this non‐omniscient shortfall. Traditional epistemologies of the a priori don't extend to catenary knowledge, so I offer a novel proposal for how we acquire catenary information. The proposal answers Benacerraf‐inspired worries about access to abstracta by showing how processes of reasoning instantiate catenary truths. The proposal also sheds new light on whether logic is ampliative, how a calculation is like an experiment, higher‐order doubts about deductive reasoning, the inconceivability of logically impossible worlds, and commonalities between mathematical and moral intuition.

Abstract We examine people’s attitudes toward AI-based algorithms as a means to allocate scarce resources. Through a vignette experiment, we confront respondents with five scenarios in which an AI-based algorithm allocates various goods and ask them if they find this morally desirable. We compare people’s moral attitudes toward AI with their attitudes toward a friend, a waiting list, a lottery, and the market. Our results show that people rank allocations through AI as morally clearly less desirable than most alternatives. This is especially true for goods that are nonessential to a person’s survival. One potential explanation for the identified algorithm aversion is that AI is considered more opaque than its alternatives, and that an allocation mechanism’s moral rejection increases if its working is less well understood. Together, our results suggest that using AI to allocate resources, especially nonessential ones, is likely to meet substantial social resistances. To understand the reasons, researchers should systematically study laypeople’s moral intuitions about algorithms, a field we call folk algorithmics.

This study presents a comparative analysis of three advanced artificial intelligence systems (ChatGPT, Gemini, and Claude) in resolving complex ethical dilemmas within human resources management in industrial settings. The systems were evaluated through structured ethical scenarios simulating real-world HR decision-making situations, including conflicts of interest, workplace equity dilemmas, and hiring/termination decisions with moral implications. All three systems demonstrated significant analytical capabilities in identifying relevant ethical factors and structuring arguments. However, notable differences emerged in their approaches to contextual sensitivity and consideration of human nuances. ChatGPT excelled in systematic analysis, Gemini in integrating multiple perspectives, and Claude in considering emotional implications. The findings underscore that while AI systems offer valuable capabilities in information analysis and structuring, they cannot and should not replace human judgment in sensitive ethical decisions. Empathy, moral intuition, and deep contextual understanding remain exclusively human competencies. AI should function as a support tool that enriches human decision-making processes by providing comprehensive analysis and alternative considerations, while preserving moral authority and final responsibility in human hands. This study contributes to developing ethical frameworks for responsible AI implementation in human resources, emphasizing the importance of designing systems that enhance rather than substitute human ethical judgment capabilities. The research supports a human-centered approach to AI integration, where technology serves to amplify human wisdom rather than replace human conscience in morally sensitive organizational decisions. These findings have direct applications for HR practitioners and organizational leaders seeking to leverage AI benefits whionnel decisions.

This review explores James Boyle’s The Line: AI and the Future of Personhood (2024), a work that confronts the profound challenges AI poses to the long-standing foundations of Western legal philosophy. Rather than a simple summary, this analysis engages deeply with Boyle’s propositions through the frameworks of moral sentiment and the classical reciprocity of rights and duties. The review highlights a pivotal concern: while Boyle identifies human empathy as a catalyst for expanding legal personhood, such sentiments are increasingly vulnerable to “technical engineering,” which may distort our moral intuition. Moreover, the inherent complexity of AI—the “inscrutability paradox”—threatens to create a “responsibility gap.” This raises the essential question of whether AI personhood could inadvertently serve as a “legal shield” for capital, distancing power from accountability. Ultimately, this review argues that the discourse on AI personhood must move beyond the ethics of inclusivity. It calls for a transition toward a rigorous defense of democratic accountability. Our humanity, the review concludes, is not defined by how machines mimic us, but by our wisdom in maintaining a social contract where rights are never detached from duties.

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the moral intuitions of mothers and children aged 3–6 (n = 75). Methods: Five dilemmas were applied. The agreement between mother and child responses was evaluated, as were trends in agreement between girls and boys. Kappa statistics and Spearman’s correlation analyses were conducted. McNemar’s test was administered to assess the Double Effect Doctrine and the Contact Principle. Outcome: In general, children responded to moral dilemmas similarly to their mothers. However, no significant agreement was found between mothers and children when evaluating each dilemma. Although the children’s answer patterns were similar to those of their mothers, the presence of neither the Double Effect Doctrine nor the Contact Principle could be identified in children. Conclusions: While there are some similarities between preschoolers and their mothers when responding to moral dilemmas, the integration of deontological principles in the resolution of ethical dilemmas in the children studied has not been achieved. Mothers in the study use these principles, which support the previous related evidence.

Five dilemmas were applied. The agreement between mother and child responses was evaluated, as were trends in agreement between girls and boys. Kappa statistics and Spearman's correlation analyses were conducted. McNemar's test was administered to assess the Double Effect Doctrine and the Contact Principle. In general, children responded to moral dilemmas similarly to their mothers. However, no significant agreement was found between mothers and children when evaluating each dilemma. Although the children's answer patterns were similar to those of their mothers, the presence of neither the Double Effect Doctrine nor the Contact Principle could be identified in children. While there are some similarities between preschoolers and their mothers when responding to moral dilemmas, the integration of deontological principles in the resolution of ethical dilemmas in the children studied has not been achieved. Mothers in the study use these principles, which support the previous related evidence.

This paper defends an expertise-centric account of moral intuition and Confucian sagehood in the Mencius . I argue that we should conceive of sages as moral experts and moral intuitions as intellectual seemings, some of which are expert-like in content and therefore afford prima facie epistemic justification to the moral beliefs that are based on them. Such a proposal rejects an intuition-based moral epistemology in favour of a broadly process reliabilist one. I motivate the proposal by arguing that it allows us to avoid three problems, two of which arise for moral intuitionist readings of Mencius: the problem that such readings posit a mysterious faculty of intuition and that we have difficulty explaining why some but not all relevant moral intuitions epistemically justify beliefs. The third problem arises for both moral intuitionist and connoisseurship readings: the problem that the moral intuitions of Confucian sages are epistemically inaccessible to ordinary people.

In today’s era of rapid globalization and change, humanity enjoys unprecedented convenience and connectivity, yet faces value conflicts, social injustice, and cultural homogenization that threaten global peace and coexistence. Confronted with this global moral crisis, Conscience Culture is emerging as a vital pathway for building consensus and restoring a shared ethical and value-based foundation. As a universal value that transcends religions, cultures, and ideologies, conscience serves not only as an inner moral compass for individuals but also as a crucial driver of practical action, international cooperation, and mutual trust. This paper draws on the Ti-Yong (Essence- Function) concept of Tai Ji Yin-Yang Philosophy, positioning conscience as the core essence (體, ti) of culture and morality, while its external expression (用, yong) is realized through moral intuition (良知, liangzhi) and moral capability (良能, liangneng). Together, these guide individual action and institutional design, achieving an organic integration of inner awareness and the practice of justice. Using Tai Ji Men’s global conscience and peace initiatives as examples, this paper demonstrates how the cultural resilience of Conscience Culture—flexible yet firmly rooted—can help resolve the tensions and challenges posed by contemporary globalization. It further shows how Conscience Culture can guide humanity toward peace, fairness, and the moral renewal of humankind, opening new horizons for “global civilization.”

ABSTRACT This essay critically examines whether ethical naturalization – understood as the grounding of moral inquiry in empirical sciences – can resolve enduring normative disputes. Focusing specifically on the conflict between retributivist and consequentialist justifications of punishment, we investigate whether naturalistic approaches (drawing on evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral economics), in addition to explaining the origins and persistence of moral intuitions and practices, can also justify their normative authority. Scientific naturalists seek to reduce or replace normative ethics with descriptive accounts, often deploying evolutionary debunking arguments to challenge moral realism. Liberal naturalists, by contrast, integrate empirical insights without eliminating irreducible normativity. Through analysis of punishment theories, this article argues that, while naturalization sheds light on the evolutionary roots of retributive intuitions (e.g. adaptive cooperation mechanisms) and highlights neuroscientific challenges to free will, thus reinforcing consequentialist explanations, it nevertheless fails to adjudicate which theory is morally superior, since empirical explanations do not bridge the is-ought gap (Hume’s problem). The resulting stalemate highlights naturalization’s explanatory adequacy but normative insufficiency. The essay concludes by advocating a pluralistic integration in line with liberal naturalism, where science informs, but does not replace, philosophical reflection on ethical justification.

Establishing a shared sense of right and wrong is an essential milestone for human cooperation, raising the question of whether a universal set of moral intuitions exists. However, tests of universality in the domain of human morality are hindered by the overrepresentation of participants from Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies and issues of validity that arise from the use of WEIRD measures (i.e., measures originating in WEIRD societies and primarily normed on WEIRD samples) to make cross-cultural comparisons. Here we address the tension between cross-cultural generalizability and validity by deploying a two-stage approach to investigate the moral beliefs of 5- to 10-year-olds from four diverse societies (N = 331). Specifically, we test a classic case study in which strong universality claims have previously been made: the "moral/conventional" distinction. In Study 1, we test for the distinction cross-culturally using standardized measures widely used in moral cognition research and find robust evidence of the distinction in Canadian children, but a more variable pattern among Korean, Indian, and Iranian children, with Iranian children showing the weakest evidence for a distinction. In Study 2, we focus specifically on Iran and tailor experimental stimuli to reflect culture-specific norms in that country. We find that Iranian children residing under a theocracy also exhibit the moral/conventional distinction-so long as moral and conventional codes do not intersect with religious or legal concerns. These findings support the use of a two-stage model in which cultural comparisons are made using both shared and culturally specific measures. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Two studies examined whether children in four diverse societies make the distinction between violations of moral codes and social conventions. When standardized methods were used, evidence for the moral/conventional distinction was robust in Western children, variable in non-Western children, and weakest in Iranian children. Strong evidence for the moral/conventional distinction was found in Iranian children when culturally tailored measures were used. Our findings support the use of a two-stage model that combines the strengths of standardized and tailored measures for conducting cross-cultural research.

While extensive research has examined the antecedents of utilitarian moral judgment, its subsequent social consequences remain less explored. Drawing on the moral reciprocal partner selection model and the moral intuition modular myopia hypothesis, this study investigates the impact of utilitarian moral judgment on bystander cooperation behavior and the moderating role of personal force. This research aims to determine whether utilitarian moral judgments, compared to non-utilitarian ones, decrease bystander cooperation (Hypothesis 1), and whether this effect is more pronounced when the utilitarian judgment involves personal force (Hypothesis 2). Two progressive between-subjects experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 (N = 159) employed a single-factor design (utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian judgment) using a footbridge dilemma scenario and a trust task to measure cooperation. Experiment 2 (N = 346) utilized a 2 (judgment: utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian) × 2 (personal force: personal force vs. no personal force) factorial design, employing the same trust task. In Experiment 1, bystanders invested significantly fewer tokens in the trust task after observing a utilitarian judgment compared to a non-utilitarian one. Experiment 2 revealed a significant main effect of moral judgment and a significant interaction between moral judgment and personal force. Simple effects analysis confirmed that the negative effect of utilitarian judgments on cooperation was stronger when personal force was involved. Utilitarian moral judgments reduce bystander cooperation compared to non-utilitarian judgments, and this reduction is more substantial when the judgment involves personal force. These findings highlight the interpersonal costs of utilitarian decision-making and underscore the importance of contextual features like personal force in understanding its social reception.

The moral gap of the LGBTQIA+ community can be possibly resolved by redefining moral intuitions as a priori, a formal device devoid of content. This redefinition criticizes the classical thesis of objectivity that moral facts and moral knowledge are eternally valid for all humanity. This line of reasoning is absurd; hence, facts and information are revealed gradually and vary from period to period according to some emergency. Moreover, the claim to objectivity is problematic with the recent moral issues, like the LGBTQIA+ community. The principle is incompatible because of its established truth, where the LGBTQIA+ community is excluded. In addressing the gap, this paper proposed that: Firstly, moral intuitions such as good, right, better, ought, and their opposites should be taken as formal device, hence a priori. From these moral intuitions a moral principle can be generated where objectivity is a product of careful reflection and deliberation of rational person. This contrast with the classical thesis of objectivity that moral principles has eternal validity for all humanity. Secondly, in application, the paper argues that the LGBTQIA+ community can be a content of moral intuitions, hence of moral principle supported by the availability of facts and information of the period.

Abstract This paper critically examines the principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) in the discourse of animal ethics. I claim that within a consequentialist moral order, an entity's moral status comes from working backward from consequences, not solely on intrinsic capacities. Hence, I propose that to judge moral status, one must take into account not only (a) an entity's intrinsic capacity for sentience but also (b) how reliably that entity will reduce suffering overall. Given these two criteria, I explore whether human beings deserve a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. While there is evidence that homo sapiens have evolved a unique instinctual urge to reduce suffering called ‘compassion,’ humans are not always compassionate. For this reason, I conclude that as a species, human beings do deserve a much higher moral status than other animals; however, the moral status of any individual human being falls upon a much wider spectrum above and below other animals. This framework has the advantage of justifying common moral intuitions about human moral superiority while still obligating humans to exercise compassion. I conclude by discussing the implications of this on the moral status of non-paradigm humans, and its possible import for AI ethics and alignment.

ABSTRACT The rise of beauty apps with artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities has transformed how users perceive, evaluate, and engage with their and others’ appearance. While such apps offer entertainment, concerns persist about their ethical implications and psychological effects. In this study, we focus on the concept of algorithmic invasiveness – defined as the tendency of AI algorithms to increasingly influence and integrate into our daily lives. Using a conjoint survey experiment, we empirically assess public attitudes and social acceptability of beauty app functionalities with varying degrees of invasiveness, from removing blemishes to collecting medical data. Results show that functionalities with high degree of algorithmic invasiveness, such as AI-generated attractiveness rankings, are viewed as significantly less socially acceptable than less invasive functionalities. However, acceptability depends on context: functionalities tied to commercial applications, like personalised product recommendations, are often deemed less problematic despite similar data-use practices. User demographics and attitudes further shape perceptions. Older adults display greater acceptance of highly invasive functionalities compared to younger users. Participants with higher self-objectification or positive views of AI show increased tolerance of invasive functionalities. These findings highlight how both technological design and user predisposition influence both ethical attitudes and preferences in beauty-related technologies. This study showcases how we can elicit moral intuitions about new technologies by exploring how the public form preferences around specific functionalities. Moreover, it provides novel insight about how individuals make normative distinction between degrees of invasiveness, contributing to broader discourse about responsible AI design and digital well-being.

Ethics education has emphasized abstract principles and the centrality of prospective reasoning without adequately addressing the embodied, emotional dimensions of moral decision-making or moral psychology's changing understanding of how moral decisions are made. These limitations may leave nurses less prepared for the ethical complexity and moral pain involved in clinical practice. This article describes a "Moral Phenomenology" assignment meant to address these inadequacies by integrating insights from Merleau-Pontian phenomenology in ethics education. The assignment guides students through offering a deep description of an ethical dilemma they have faced, applying phenomenological concepts to deepen their understanding of moral perception, and finally, analyzing the dilemma using classical ethical tools and Lisa Tessman's concept of moral failure. By engaging in sustained phenomenological and ethical reflection on personal dilemmas, students undergo ethical formation rather than mere information acquisition, developing into practitioners whose moral intuitions, perceptual sensitivities, and reflective capacities enable them to navigate moral distress with courage and perceive ethical dimensions of care that might otherwise remain invisible.

The growing complexity of corporate misconduct has placed forensic accountants in high-risk ethical environments, where professional objectivity is often tested by legal ambiguity, organizational pressure, and institutional interests. This study aims to explore how professional moral agency is exercised by forensic accountants in high-stakes investigations, particularly when ethical decision-making extends beyond formal codes toward personal integrity and moral reasoning. Using a qualitative interpretative phenomenological approach, data were gathered from in-depth interviews with twelve certified forensic accountants involved in cases of financial fraud, asset misappropriation, and governance failures. The findings reveal that professional moral agency is exercised through an ongoing negotiation between professional standards, internalized ethical values, and situational pragmatism. Key mechanisms that influence ethical conduct include the presence (or absence) of organizational ethical infrastructure, the strength of moral identity, and the perceived legitimacy of institutional authority. In cases of acute ethical conflict, participants often rely on moral intuition, boundary-setting behavior, or even voluntary disengagement from assignments that compromise their professional integrity. This study contributes to forensic accounting by highlighting the importance of moral agency and ethical resilience as foundational elements in sustaining professional integrity beyond regulatory compliance and technical expertise.

ABSTRACT When creative pranks are featured in entertainment media, they might evoke divergent audience responses and humor appreciation, which in turn could generate double-edged-sword effects. The current study proposes a parallel-process model, in which creativity exhibited in prank TV shows triggers contrasting—positive and negative—effects on humor appreciation. In a positive effect process, centered on the audience, creativity engages viewers, who adopt a humorous, playful mind-set that provides joy, resulting in positive affect and humor appreciation. However, viewers’ moral judgments also may shape their reactions to pranks that seem mean-spirited. In a negative-effect process, centered on victims, the viewers observe that the creative pranks induce intense surprise and fear in victims, then evaluate if and how the pranks align with their moral intuitions. If they arrive at negative moral judgments, it undermines their humor appreciation. Two experiments, one that measures creativity and another that manipulates the perceived creativity of pranks, confirm that the two counteracting processes influence the degree to which viewers appreciate the humor in prank TV shows. Furthermore, the positive-effect path dominates. The proposed model has pertinent implications for understanding the ambivalent nature of pranks and the role of creativity in this process.

Abstract This article discusses the necessity of a performative shift in philosophical practice. The author argues, first, that postcolonial theory cannot be regarded as a homogeneous entity, but rather must be viewed as a diverse field of approaches that address the challenges of colonialism and its aftermath and produce a variety of responses to these challenges. Secondly, she calls for critical reflection on one’s own thematic focus, moral intuitions and reception practices, for an openness to cross-border dialogue and cooperation, as well as a diversification of the philosophical institutional landscape. Only through such a performative turn can philosophy fulfil its role as critical social theory.

Abstract In Morality: From Error to Fiction , Richard Joyce builds a case against the existence of moral facts that consists of three independent arguments. In my assessment, these arguments are unpersuasive. The argument from naturalism presupposes that the world contains only physical facts. I present several reasons to reject such a restriction. The argument from unreliability rests on the claim that moral intuitions are untrustworthy and thus cannot justify moral beliefs. Joyce’s reasons to that effect do not hold up to critical scrutiny. The argument from responsibility states that moral facts do not exist because they necessitate moral responsibility, which is nowhere to be found. I question both premises, arguing that some moral facts do not necessitate moral responsibility and that some form of moral responsibility exists. Overall, while Joyce’s arguments are not entirely bad, I think they are not good enough to make a powerful case for error theory.