The first part of the article (sections 2-6) sketches a general, criterial theory of moral progress. Three types of moral progress are distinguished: 1. ethical progress, i.e. the epistemic and moral improvement of moral theory (ethics), 2. practical-moral progress or moral progress in the narrow sense, i.e. the moral improvement of moral systems and moral action, and 3. mundane moral progress, i.e. the mundane improvement of the world according to moral criteria of social well-being. These concepts are defined and the definitions are justified without circularity. Characteristics of this approach are, for one thing, the inclusion of ethical progress, which is what first brings about the central concept of moral desirability and which can then be used in the definition of moral progress in the narrow sense, and for another thing, that ethical progress, and thus also the justification of the definition of the concept of moral desirability is not moral but epistemic and is based on prudential desirability. Furthermore, epistemic problems of these definitions and criteria are discussed, such as their circle-free justification and self-referentiality (sect. 6). The second part (sect. 7-10) lists examples of the three types of progress, but also corresponding regressions. The appendix (sect. 11) discusses some alternative theories of moral progress.

Humanitarianism can be broadly understood as a concern with human suffering and a moral desire to alleviate it. It manifests not only through discrete acts of helping, but also through a set of practices, norms, laws, and forms of government. The urgency of humanitarian causes is regularly invoked to justify the large-scale mobilisation of people and resources. They provide anthropologists with a critical site for studying the structural tension between two competing impulses within humanitarianism: the ethical yearning to alleviate suffering, and the political inclination to control suffering populations. This entry explores four main areas of anthropological scholarship on humanitarianism. First, anthropologists have examined the political implications of the humanitarian management of suffering populations, with its emphasis on fostering physical survival. Second, they have developed critiques of humanitarian ethics, particularly in relation to how lives are valued differently within Western humanitarianism, and the political and moral weight carried by the word ‘humanitarian’. Third, anthropologists have interrogated the concept of crisis, with a focus on how local communities are transformed by the routine presence of humanitarians in protracted conflicts or disasters. Finally, they have explored non-Western humanitarian practices rooted in different traditions of care and different scales of action. As climate change impacts prospects for human life in vulnerable areas of the world, it is likely that climate-induced displacement crises will only grow more common and prolonged. Humanitarianism’s definitions, boundaries, and limits will also shift in response, offering anthropologists an important terrain of inquiry into how societies frame, mitigate, and manage the suffering of others.

Debate on whether ectogenesis is a morally desirable solution to gender inequality often starts by analyzing whether gender inequality has been caused by (i) reproductive differences between the sexes or (ii) social structures. I term these two sides the biological model and the social model. Without taking either side, this article contends that both models provide a fragile foundation for assessing the moral desirability of ectogenesis. I draw on Ronald Dworkin's luck egalitarian theory and Ron Amundson's perspective to demonstrate that both models are inherently interactionist and share the view that society's inadequate response to female reproductive traits is crucial in gender oppression. Actions on either biological or social factors are prima facie valid. Meanwhile, neither model can conclusively determine whether ectogenesis is morally desirable.

In the context of climate change and rural revitalization, numerous solar photovoltaic (PV) panels are being installed on village roofs and lands, impacting the enjoyment of the new rural landscape characterized by PV panels. However, the visual acceptance of PV panels in rural areas of China is not yet fully understood. This study aims to identify and correlate three key influential factors that contribute to the acceptance and appreciation of PV panels in China’s rural settings. A quasi-experiment was conducted, incorporating diverse landscapes into six rural settings, each containing both the original landscape and PV panels. The findings demonstrated that the original rural landscape was significantly more scenic than PV panels, and factors contributing to the appreciation of traditional landscapes, such as nostalgia, played a vital role in rejecting PV panels. Conversely, renewable energy-related factors, such as economic stakes and moral desirability, were found to contribute to the acceptance of PV panels. This study contributes to the strategic planning and design of solar PV panels in rural landscapes, taking into consideration social acceptance and local contexts.

Dietitians are increasingly working in residential aged care facilities (RACF). As such, supportingthe RACF dietetic workforce is imperative. This qualitative study explored dietitians' experiences and preparedness for working in RACFs. A qualitative descriptive approach from a non-singular reality relational position was used. Recruitment occurred through convenience and snowball sampling, including contacting a list of dietitians who had previously consented to be contacted for research. The interviews included a semi-structured approach. Data were analysed using constant comparison and reflexive thematic analysis. Thirty-one dietitians (n = 29 female; median age, 39 years) with a range of career experience participated in an interview. Interviews ranged from 25 to 68 min (mean duration, 41 min). Five themes and 14 subthemes were identified. Themes were: (1) joining the aged care workforce was not initially considered a career option, (2) difficulty sustaining satisfaction working in aged care, (3) navigating practical challenges working with residents while prioritising quality care, (4) poor acknowledgement of the dietitian role by staff and (5) grappling with a moral desire to improve the aged care sector. Dietitians face many challenges in fulfilling their role in RACFs, including RACF staff's poor understanding of dietitians' scope and a lack of procedural support for their daily activities. Dietitians report that genuine improvements in their job satisfaction and experiences of older adultsrequire structural reform within the government, beyond their locus of control.

Bystander intervention is a promising approach for prevention of sexual violence. Assessing factors that may promote or hinder bystander intervention among sexual minority adolescents (i.e., lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer) is essential, given high rates of violence among sexual minority youth. Prior research examining barriers and facilitators of bystander intervention intentions does not consider how factors may vary by sexual identity. As such, the current study aimed to (1) examine how barriers and facilitators of bystander intentions, bystander intentions, and bystander behavior vary between heterosexual and sexual minority high school adolescents and (2) explore mediators of the association between sexual identity and bystander intervention intentions. We proposed that students' level of school connectedness, gender equitable attitudes, and anticipated positive consequences of bystander intervention (e.g., having a moral desire to help) would promote bystander intervention intentions, whereas binge drinking, and students anticipated negative consequences of bystander intervention (e.g., fear for one's own safety) would tend to weaken bystander intervention intentions. Participants included 2,645 10th grade students (Mage = 15.37, SD = 0.61) recruited from high schools in the Northeast United States. Sexual minority youth reported higher bystander intentions, bystander behavior, anticipated positive consequences of bystander intervention, gender equitable attitudes, and binge drinking relative to heterosexual youth. Sexual minority youth had lower school connectedness than heterosexual youth. Anticipated negative consequences of bystander intervention did not vary by group. Parallel linear regression analyses found that only anticipated positive consequences of bystander intervention and gender equitable attitudes fully mediated the relationships between sexual identity and bystander intentions. Bystander intervention programs may benefit from attending to specific facilitators of bystander intervention among sexual minority youth, such as gender equitable attitudes.

A liberal democratic system should ensure intergenerational upwards class mobility. In a rigid class society, the class structure of the society will reproduce itself from generation to generation. Ever since the beginning of the first industrial revolution, questions have arisen about the efficacy, sustainability and moral desirability of such system. One extreme rigid form of such a society is the class and caste system prevalent in India for centuries. However, in the modern times, such systems obstruct rapid development of the society as also of the elites. Rapid economic development requires that opportunities for mobility be available to all segments of the society and education is that one tool through which this can be achieved. The contribution of education in intergenerational class mobility is examined in this paper

Abstract Sharon Lamb, Sam Gable and Doret de Ruyter have recently argued that sex education in schools should promote a more demanding standard for morally permissible sex than consent. On their view, pupils should be taught that morally permissible sex is not only consensual but also mutual, where mutuality requires participants in sex to ‘try to know what is knowable’ about each other. I argue here that, while Lamb et al. are right about the insufficiency of consent, the case for mutuality as a standard of moral permissibility cannot be sustained. Mutuality fares better as a standard of moral desirability, but even in this weaker form, it is too controversial to promote in schools.

Visual evaluations of wind turbines: Judgments of scenic beauty or of moral desirability?

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N=192 children, range=4.00-9.95 years; and N=193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.

ABSTRACT Since 1976, the Sahrawi national liberation movement known as the Polisario Front anticipates state sovereignty in Western Sahara by organizing into the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Southern Algeria. Drawing on excerpts from the life-histories of six Sahrawi women who contributed to build the SADR’s early social and physical infrastructures, this paper presents practices of public remembrance as coextensive to a history-making labour of social regeneration that seeks international recognition for the Sahrawi nation, as well as to pass on nationalist moral values and political desire across time. The life-worlds of the Sahrawi generation these six women belong to have undergone considerable structural changes brought about by Spanish colonialism, the emergence of the Polisario Front in the 1970s, war, forced displacement, and a 1991 UN mediated ceasefire. Highlighting the on-going vitality of anticolonial nationalisms, this paper offers an account of how elderly Sahrawi female militants seek to socially regenerate the project of a Sahrawi revolutionary nationalism through their production of history.

We deploy logical notions in moral thought as we do in non-moral thought. But how can a moral expressivist understand the meaning and role of logical constants in moral thinking? That is the question. Here I supply the framework for an answer. What is called ‘expressivism’ typically comprises a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that moral thought does not represent the existence of moral facts or states of affairs. This implies that moral judgments (which might be occurrent thoughts or settled dispositions) should not be understood as beliefs about moral facts or states of affairs, and true moral judgments are not true in virtue of moral facts or states of affairs. The positive claim is that moral judgments should be explained in terms of ‘sentiments’, such as pleasures, emotions or desires, which are intentional mental states with non-moral contents, and these are ‘expressed’ in moral judgements.1 We may assume a distinction between beliefs that have moral contents, and sentiments, such as pleasures, emotions and desires that have non-moral contents.2 Thus guilt and anger are not the kinds of sentiments on which expressivists should build, for such states have moral content—that I did something wrong or that someone has wronged me. Given this, we can describe what is called ‘the Frege-Geach problem’ like this: if moral judgments are interpreted in terms of beliefs that represent moral facts, then we have a good understanding of the meaning and role of logical constants in moral thinking, since they bind moral propositions that represent moral facts. That means that logically complex moral propositions represent logically complex moral facts in a way that is a function of their logical and non-logical constituents. Furthermore, on this account, moral propositions mean the same when embedded in complex moral propositions, such as disjunctive, conditional or belief contexts, as they do in non-complex or atomic contexts. In both cases they represent moral facts. There need to be such identities of meaning if the usual entailments (modus ponens, disjunctive syllogism, truth elimination etc.) are to be valid. It is this requirement that generates the most serious problems for expressivism. For, on that account, moral judgements are expressive of sentiments of pleasure, emotion or desire that have non-moral content. But, then, what would be the meaning of moral propositions when embedded in logically complex propositions? When the proposition [kicking dogs is wrong] occurs in a disjunction, in a conditional or in a belief context, it does not express a negative sentiment towards kicking dogs. But in the atomic case, it does. At very least we are short of an account of its meaning in the complex cases. Furthermore, the point seems to be stronger than that since it seems that whatever conceivable expressivist account is given of the meaning of moral propositions, it cannot respect the constraint that the meaning is the same in and out of complex contexts. If so, there cannot be the usual entailments involving moral propositions, which are part of ordinary moral thinking. It is difficult to see how there can be unasserted moral propositions that mean the same as when asserted. This is the main thrust of what is known as ‘the Frege-Geach problem’, after Peter Geach who put the point forcefully and who invoked Frege in doing so (Geach 1965). This objection to expressivism has seemed to many philosophers, not just to be damaging, but to be fatal. Expressivists need to answer this challenge. This enterprise of answering this challenge lies broadly within what Simon Blackburn has called ‘quasi-realism’, which is the general project of showing how expressivism can explain and justify the surface conceptual features of our moral thought and talk that might tempt one to realism (Blackburn 1984, 1988, 1998; see also Gibbard 2003, 2012). Since logic is pervasive in moral thinking, an important part of the quasi-realist project is the attempt to give an account of the role of logical constants in moral thinking.3 However, I shall deploy resources other than those that Blackburn offers; and I shall not frame the issue quite as Blackburn frames it. Nevertheless, I think that he would or at least should be sympathetic with the way I describe the issue. The initial goal in this paper is to understand the Frege-Geach problem properly, and to consider exactly what is at issue, rather than to decide the issue one way or the other. We need a neutral view of what would count as success or failure for expressivism in explaining and justifying the role of logic in moral thinking. We need to do this before rushing to try to solve the problem. However, I shall not remain neutral. For once we have a proper conception of what is at stake, it will become clear that quite a few objections to expressivism arise from an improper understanding of the issue. Furthermore, a proper understanding of the issue should lead to a greater sympathy for the expressivist project, or at least an openness to seeing how far it can get with specific logical constants. I shall not pursue this in this paper, since we have enough to do to understand what such proposals would amount to. Any proposals need an interpretation, and it is the job of this paper to provide an acceptable interpretation.4 There is a move that need to be made, a matter of fundamental reorientation, without which the problem is insoluble. On this basis, and only on this basis, we can offer some concrete proposals. Because of the role of this fundamental reorientation, I shall give an expressivist account of embedding, without in the first instance embedding the account much in the literature on the Frege-Geach issue, since that literature does not take off from this reorientation. Later on, once we have something substantive under our belts, we will address some writers who differ in their approach, where we can learn from these differences. An understandable although misguided first thought would be that we should begin with some general principles concerning the nature of logic before turning to consider the expressivist treatment of logical constants in moral thinking. The thought would be that we should proceed this way because we need to know what has to be attained in order to account for the role of logical constants wherever they appear. Thus, we should lay down a general conception of logic and then draw on that conception when we turn to consider the role of logic in moral thought, for then we are dealing with an application of general principles to a particular case. This, as we shall see, is exactly the wrong approach, and this paper proceeds by dropping this priority assumption. Indeed, it deliberately flouts it. Consider the doctrine called ‘inferentialism’ about logic, according to which understanding logical constants is either being bound by certain norms for propositional attitude revision or perhaps being disposed to conform to those norms. Thus, to understand and or or is either to be subject to norms such that we should infer A from [A and B], and [A or B] from A, or perhaps it is to be disposed to infer in accordance with those norms of inference. In particular, each logical constant is supposed to have distinctive ‘introduction’ and ‘elimination’ rules that define what it is to be that logical constant. This is a popular view (Wittgenstein 1932-33, Gentzen 1935, Strawson 1952, Kneale 1956, Hacking 1979, Brandom 1994). However, any such view is subject to fundamental difficulties. One central objection to inferentialism is an objection from explanatory direction: such norms for propositional attitude revision hold in virtue of something; and in particular, they hold in part in virtue of the logical constant contents of the propositional attitudes in question. That is, we should infer in those ways because our propositional attitudes involve those logical constants: the logical constant contents explain the norms, not vice versa. Hence, inferentialism as a general doctrine about logical constants seems implausible (see further Zangwill 2015, 2021). If so, it seems that expressivists should not seek to explain the logical constants that figure in moral propositions in terms of inferential norms. For if there are norms bearing on complex moral thoughts, thoughts with logical contents, they derive from the logical components of complex moral propositions. It is at this point that expressivists need to make a decisive move, one that opens up a distinctive approach to understanding how logical constants figure in expressive moral thought and discourse. Expressivists need to claim that inferentialism is right about moral thinking; there, the usual order of explanation is reversed. There are inferential norms in both non-moral and in moral thought and talk, but in moral thought and talk the direction of explanation that holds between logical constants and inference differs from the usual case of non-moral thinking. It is fundamental to the expressivist project to stand anti-inferentialism on its head. This move is present in an ironic way in Blackburn’s development of expressivism because Blackburn mistakenly embraces a general inferentialism about logic (Blackburn 1998). But by making a mistake about the general case, Blackburn hit on the right strategy in the moral case. Blackburn made a good mistake! Given this, we arrive at the right way to approach the Frege-Geach problem: the aim is to give an account of the norms of sentiment revision that simulate or mimic what they would be if moral judgements were beliefs about moral facts. This is what it is to generate moral logic and to have the basis from which to solve the Frege-Geach problem for expressivism.5 In moral thought, the logical particles are defined or explained by norms of propositional attitude revision unlike in the non-moral case, where it is the other way round. In the non-moral (that is, the non-normative) case, norms of belief revision are explained by the logical constants that figure in the belief contents; the norms hold partly in virtue of those logical constants. By contrast, for an expressivist, to operate with moral contents with logical constant constituents is to be bound by norms of inference—those corresponding to the ‘introduction’ and ‘elimination’ inferential rules for the logical constants in question. Those rules do not hold in virtue of the logical constants, as in non-moral cases. In morality, expressivism should flagrantly flout the direction-of-explanation point. The intuitive direction of explanation and justification is reversed. The idea pursued in this paper is to address the Frege-Geach problem by appealing to norms bearing on the sentiments that expressivists identify as central to making moral judgments, and then to work from those norms to an account of the logical constants that figure in the content of moral thoughts and discourse. Moreover, this is surely an essential part of expressivism. For, if we have not stood anti-inferentialism on its head in this way, then we bound to wonder how expressivism can possibly succeed given the category difference between propositional contents and norms bearing on propositional attitudes to these contents (Harman 1986, chapter 1). How can we work from one to the other? The Frege-Geach problem would be intractable. But the whole point is to give a different understanding of the grasp of logical constants such that the norms for inference mirror those in play in non-moral thought and talk. This simulation is what it is to construct logical constants, and also the moral propositional contents that they bind, for expressivist forms of thought and talk. What will be developed here should be distinguished from two kinds of approaches to the Frege-Geach problem that go under a similar name. First, a number of philosophers have declared themselves to be ‘moral inferentialists’ and claimed that this solves the Frege-Geach problem. (Examples are Chrisman 2015, Warren 2015, 2018, Woods 2017, Frapolli 2019.) This moral ‘inferentialism’ is supposed to contrast both with realism and expressivism. These philosophers often have a general sympathy to general inferentialist accounts of meaning, which typically claim that possessing some concept just is being bound by rules that that define it. Unfortunately, such general inferentialist accounts face serious problems as well as being intuitively implausible. One central objection—to put it briefly—is that the rules that are held to be definitive of entertaining a certain content are norms for inference. But then there is the question: in virtue of what do those norms hold? The answer to that question, which must lie beyond inferentialism, will give substance to the inferentialist claim, which was not there before. Without answering the in-virtue-of-what? question, the theory is not yet properly formed, leaving too much open. But once it is answered, the contrast with realism and expressivism dissolves. For realism and expressivism are naturally construed precisely as giving different accounts of why the rules of inference hold. There are distinctively realist and expressivist explanations. Furthermore, if the norms for inference were held to be irreducible then we would have no theory, since either norms are not grounded in anything, or else they are explained in terms of other norms, and we are back where we started. This general ‘moral inferentialism’ is not a happy option. This is to say nothing of doubts that are bound to surface concerning specific proposals as to what these rules might be. Second, Luca Incurvati and Julian Schloder have pursued a program that they also advertise as a kind of expressivist ‘inferentialism (Incurvati and Schloder forthcoming. But they pursue inferentialist expressivism about the logical constants, quite generally, not just as they figure in normative thinking. So, their project is also quite different from what is envisaged here under a similar label. Thus, the first kind of theory pursues inferentialism about all moral content, not just about logical constants as they figure in moral thinking, while the second pursues expressivism of an inferential sort about all logical constants, again, not just about the logical constants as they figure in moral thinking. The project pursued here is more delimited; it is an inferentialist account of logical constants only as they figure in moral (or other normative) contexts. This paper is a prolegomenon to the theoretical reconstruction of norms for specific logical constants and specific implication relations. Such specific proposals I pursue in another paper in progress. This paper aims to describe what such proposals would be assuming, and what they would be attempting to achieve. In both moral and non-moral thought with logical constant constituents we can ask: in virtue of what do norms of propositional attitude revision hold? In the non-moral case, the norms of belief revision hold in virtue of the logical constant contents of the beliefs in question plus the nature of the propositional attitude of believing; that is, they hold partly in virtue of being thoughts with certain logical constant contents and partly in virtue of being beliefs. But for expressivism, our understanding of logical constants depends on norms of sentiment revision (inckuding stability). Furthermore, expressivists will have views about why norms of sentiment revision hold. They will say that they hold in virtue of the purposes of moral thought—the purposes being such that we need our system of sentiments to be complex and to be structured in certain ways, pre-eminently with certain consistency requirements, if it is to serve its purposes, socially and individually. These purposes, which are extrinsic to the sentiments themselves, explain the norms of revision, adherence to which just is our grasp of logical constants in moral thought. To appreciate the power of the inferentialist move, consider the weakness of certain objections to expressivism. In the 1980s, Bob Hale and Crispin Wright complained that Blackburn’s account captures only the moral necessity of drawing inferences, not the logical necessity of doing so (Hale 1986, Wright 1988). But given the way we have set up the issue, we can see that this objection is completely ineffective, because the whole point of the inferentialist development of expressivism is to simulate the inferential norms arising from logic that hold among non-moral beliefs (Zangwill 1992). When the similarity is close enough, that is, when there is enough of a structural isomorphism of inferential norms to inferential norms, that just is success for the expressivist. Asserting a distinction between moral and logical necessity thus begs the question against appealing to constraints on sentiment combination in order to mimic the norms at work in the non-moral case that derive from the logical constituents of propositions. That is, the expressivist project is to try to explain the existence of norms of sentiment revision, in terms of consistency and inconsistency between sentiments, so that they are similar to, or run parallel to, or simulate, the norms of belief revision binding non-moral beliefs with logical constant contents. Perhaps there are difficulties of detail in the way of the account. But the entire project cannot be ruled out of court by saying that even a perfect simulation would not suffice for real and true and genuine logical necessity. At very least, the onus lies with such opponents of expressivism to show that ordinary moral thought contains more than the simulation. Even to admit that it is hard to tell whether or not ordinary thought contains real and true and genuine logical constants or ‘merely’ simulations constructed from norms binding sentiments is in effect to concede victory to expressivism. A much stronger and more interesting objection is this: does not the account, or its main presuppositions, imply that the meaning of logical constant concepts and words differs between moral and non-moral cases? An initial reply to this objection is to say that the difference in what the logical constants are, or what logical constant concepts or terms mean, need not be available to those who engage in the conceptual practice. It is a standard expressivist move to insist that what they are aiming at is not conceptual analysis but an explanatory enterprise; and that those who engage in moral thinking and apply moral predicates need not know the expressivist explanation of their thinking (for instance, Blackburn 1984: 189 and 1993: 152-53). Expressivism is, as it were, the ‘deep structure’ that explains the superficial conceptual nature of the form of thought that ordinary thinkers are aware of. Those who wield the logical constants in their thought know the rules of inference—the introduction and elimination rules that govern their thought. But they need not be aware of the deep explanation of their acceptance of those rules, and of the deep source of their right to deploy them. Thus, it seems that there can be a topic-neutral conception of logical constants on the expressivist account. What about mixed propositions? Since there is an overlap of meaning between moral and non-moral conceptions of logical concepts, it is difficult to see a problem here. Grasping the rules of inference for the logical constants should enable a thinker to pass freely and seamlessly between moral and non-moral propositions, and hybrid combinations of these, without any sense of changing gear and swapping to logical constants with new meanings. So, it seems that conjunctions or disjunctions of moral and non-moral clauses do not present a difficulty. While it is true that the deep explanation and justification of the norms defining good practice with the logical constant varies between moral and non-moral thought, the superficial meaning, that ordinary thinkers grasp, and that conceptual analysis might aspire to reveal, is blind to this explanatory difference. Ordinary thinkers are blind to the deep differences that do not surface in their superficial conceptual practice: there the norms suffice. However, a follow-up objection, at this point, might be: even if the meaning of logical constants concepts does not differ between moral and non-moral contexts, did we not say that the direction of explanation from logical constants to norms is intuitive in the ordinary non-moral case? Surely, then, it should be intuitive in the moral case too. But we said that in the moral case, the logical constants are just bundles of norms, which means that the intuitive direction of explanation is lacking in the moral case. I think that this objection can only be met by conceding that, in the moral case, the intuitive direction of explanation is illusory. The expressivist should concede that this is a cost, but not a large one. People might be right to deploy logical notions and they might be right about the norms of modification in moral thought that they generate. It is just that on those occasions when people are reflective, they are wrong in their self-understanding of why those norms hold. However, most of the time, in ordinary non-moral cases, it is enough to grasp the concepts and the norms, and more of explanatory are not Such are important to philosophers, but ordinary thinkers just need the concepts and norms in order to get on with moral thinking, not its explanation and then, is the basis from which an expressivist can of logical constants that figure in moral thought. Without inferentialism, they are not By the inferentialist approach does not difficulties with the inferential norms for the disjunction, or whatever other logical constants there see Hale However, it is clear that the of any proposals depends on the inferentialist and they assume some explanatory account of the source of the norms of inference in moral that does not lie in the logical constants This an understanding of what is, or to at when expressivists and the success of specific proposals for for logical constants as they figure in moral thinking. It is not that there are no difficulties to be that the the understanding of particular logical constants in moral thought and depends on the inferentialist and without the proposals are the point. Indeed, those inferential norms are what are in the proposals. those who think of the issue as a problem are A without an proper and explanatory as I once a without a also and Zangwill This simulation goal can be put if we it with the way Gibbard the issue Gibbard in terms of an explanation of moral content in terms of of Gibbard to the expressivist program to all contents. to pursue a he that the expressivist explanation of logical constants is not off than the usual explanation (see Gibbard But this project is since the expressivist of moral content off from certain sentiments with contents and on that basis aims to construct a content. some content cannot be It seems that expressivism cannot be the as Gibbard and it can only succeed as a The is that according to what we might logical constants figure in propositional contents; and that explains implication among those propositional contents (Harman 1986, chapter of that on any kind of propositional attitudes with those contents. The propositional attitudes be beliefs or It no difference given that the contents of such propositional In the non-moral case, the logical contents that generate have nothing to do with propositional attitudes to those contents; they with logical constant constituents. logic is a case, where a system of sentiments the inferential norms for beliefs that derive in part from the propositional contents of and in particular from their logical constant contents with the kind of propositional attitudes that they To put it another there are implication among propositional contents, which hold in virtue of the logical content constituents of those contents; and there are inferential norms for which derive in part from the implication among belief contents, and in part from the nature of By contrast, there are the normative among sentiments, which mimic the inferential norms among beliefs. The basis is by expressivism and cannot be logic must be we move on to address notions of consistency and inconsistency among sentiments, it is here that the simulation approach it that quite a few ways of the issue are In particular, it is to say that the to expressivism, and frame the Frege-Geach issue, is between kinds of propositional beliefs by contrast with desires or of states with different of (Zangwill 1998). But this cannot be For if there are beliefs with moral content, there are very also to be moral desires and emotions with moral propositional content (see Zangwill In the kind of propositional attitude is not the issue, as is when the issue is set up in terms of an between mental issue was set up in of this paper in terms of propositional attitude kinds and we should say that the expressivist is someone who explains moral thought and in terms of propositional attitudes without moral propositional contents. have to The kinds of propositional attitudes that expressivists to, whatever they are, have non-moral propositional contents, and they get in moral judgments or moral Thus, the standard a moral also moral such as desires and emotions with moral propositional contents. What is important is that if some beliefs have moral propositional contents, then what explains the norms of propositional attitude when we is the propositional contents, with their logical plus the nature of By contrast, what explains the norms of propositional attitude for expressivism, are the norms binding sentiments with non-moral contents, with the function of the practice of making moral It true that for one theory, moral judgments are beliefs moral for the they are certain kinds of But all should admit that there is more to moral thought than moral In order to this of thought, and to to put some on the I shall the idea that the and that we seek on of moral expressivism are to be understood as and development will be a point to which I shall norms are being at and also being at are so are being by being at and also being at To explain this, a first for the expressivist is to development of expressivism in which sentiments are not just with but also with and It then that and sentiments to the same are because it is to do both and not do at the same So, it is to to do positive and negative sentiment to are given that it is also to to do and to to do if we have a positive sentiment to at least in those cases where doing is in our Thus, one kind of consistency and inconsistency between sentiments lies in the or of of the contents of and sentiments to the same are sentiments in this given an between sentiments and Such a of sentiments I that have someone then what I think about the view that do not have and I I with that I completely neutral about it. than that,

In a series of recent papers Francesco Orilia has presented an argument for the moral desirability of presentism. It goes, in brief, as follows: since the existence of painful events is morally undesirable, presentism, which denies that past painful events (tenselessly) exist, is morally more desirable than non-presentism, which instead affirms that past painful events (tenselessly) exist. An objection against this argument, which has already been taken into consideration by Orilia, is the ugly history objection or radical objection: what really matters in the moral appraisal of a world is the history of it, and since the presentist and the non-presentist versions of our world share the same ugly history, they are morally on a par. This paper aims at corroborating this objection and defending it from Orilia’s criticisms. This will be done by bringing into play various thought experiments and a distinction between relevance (of an event or a fact about the occurrence of an event) to the moral evaluation of a world and moral (and psychological) involvement (in an event or in a fact about the occurrence of an event).

Why shouldn’t we cut the human-biosphere umbilical cord?

Abstract There are two major possible responses to the question: what (if anything) can justify a basic income experiment? An experiment might be justified either because it gathers positive empirical evidence supporting rolling out a basic income, or because it justifies the moral desirability of such a measure. This paper critically explores both responses, the “empirical” and “ethical claim” in light of the Barcelona B-MINCOME pilot, alongside other similar experiments. We sustained that although the empirical claim is necessary, there seems to be sufficient data to easily predict that all future experiments are to gather positive results too. Consequently, we argue that experiments are particularly well-equipped to foster debates on the work ethics and on the ethical dimension of social policies and welfare regimes in general.

Companies often benefit from others’ attributions of moral conviction for prosocial behavior, for example, attributions that a company has a sincere moral desire to improve the environment when behaving sustainably. Across four studies, we explored how organizations’ changing resource positions influenced people’s attributions for the motivations underlying prosocial organizational behaviors. Observers attributed less moral conviction following prosocial behavior when they believed an organization was losing (vs. gaining) economic resources (Studies 1 and 2). This effect was primarily a “penalty” assessed against organizations that were losing resources, as opposed to a “reward” given to organizations gaining resources (Study 3). Finally, we found that this effect occurred because people perceive organizations that are losing resources as more situationally constrained, leading them to attribute less dispositional moral conviction (Study 4). We discuss theoretical and practical implications stemming from how changes in resource access can lead people to be more skeptical of organizations’ motivations following prosocial behavior.

The paper looks into some of the competing normative claims surrounding the development of Identity Management systems in general and Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) systems in particular. It is argued that SSI developments should be assessed against the backdrop of IMs attempting to implement a global identity layer based on aggregated singular identities and reputation scores. It is also argued that this trend defines key ethical issues pertaining to the development of SSI systems. In order to explicate and evaluate these issues, the paper looks at the desirability of singular aggregated identities through the lens of moral-philosophical theories. It is argued that such an analysis strongly suggests moral desirability of a plural identities approach in SSIs that have built-in advantage for the implementation of practical separation of identities.

The article highlights the need to create a portrait drawing in frontline conditions. One of the important factors is the creation of portrait images, posters, aimed at the propaganda of military activities in the Red Army. In addition, the artists were fully interested in creating sketches for paintings, portraits, diary entries reflecting reality not only for agitation, but also for the creation of creative works that contain their own view of the working days of the frontline soldiers. The analysis of the paintings shows how similar and at the same time different the portraits are. To a large extent, the differences are due to the place of battles, their complexity and the circumstances in which the portrait drawings were created. The images of people were united by moral and volitional desire for victory, the imprint of fatigue on the face, the experience of relatives and friends who became close in battle. One of the important aspects for understanding the portrait image is the conditions for creating a picture - it is a portrait after the battle with combat weapons, wounded in hospital, at a concert, in the working environment of the headquarters, writing a letter in a trench. The models for portraits were as a rule people close to the artists and who belonged to the combat unit where they served.

The article is devoted to the study of the motivation of the civil servants and local government officials’work. The concept of the motivation was revealed. The elements of moral and psychological methods ofthe motivation were analyzed. The importance of material and immaterial stimulation in public service wasexplained. The main motives and peculiarities of stimulation of a public servant in the modern conditionsof public service development in Ukraine were studied on the basis of empirical data. In particular, ithas been found out that the main motive for joining the public service is a stable salary and the desire ofpublic servants to work for the benefit of the state and society. So, mercantile aspirations in financial termsdominate - stable payment for work, as well as patriotic, valuable, moral and ethical desire to work forthe benefit of the state are in the minds of the citizens. The results of the study show that the prestige ofpublic service remains quite low. The main problems which negatively influence the image of the publicservice and make it unattractive to the public are high staff turnover, incomplete implementation of socialguarantees, poor financial support, and partial satisfaction of the basic needs of public servants, whichreduce the effectiveness of public administration in Ukraine.It is determined that the main way to increase the efficiency of public servants and in general publicadministration is to develop effective methods of the motivation and the stimulation, both economic andnon-economic. It was proven, that effective motivation in the public service depends to a large extent notonly on its filling of highly qualified personnel and efficiency, but also on trust and respect of the population.

There are two dominant trends in the humanitarian care of 2019: the ‘technologizing of care’ and the centrality of the humanitarian principles. The concern, however, is that these two trends may conflict with one another. Faced with the growing use of drones in the humanitarian space there is need for ethical reflection to understand if this technology undermines humanitarian care. In the humanitarian space, few agree over the value of drone deployment; one school of thought believes drones can provide a utility serving those in need while another believes the large scale deployment of drones will exacerbate the already prevalent issues facing humanitarian aid providers. We suggest in this paper that the strength of the humanitarian principles approach to answer questions of aid provision can be complimented by a technology-facing approach, namely that of robot ethics. We have shown that for humanitarian actors we ought to be concerned with the risks of a loss of contextualization and de-skilling. For the beneficiary, we raise three concerns associated with the threat to the principle of humanity for this group: a loss of dignity by reducing human-to-human interactions; a threat to dignity through a lack of informational transparency; and, a threat to dignity by failing to account for the physiological and behavioral impacts of the drone on human actors. Although we acknowledge the obstacles (and dangers) associated with understanding the physiological and behavioral impacts we insist that the moral acceptability and desirability of drones in humanitarian contexts is dependent on the findings from such studies and that tailored ethical guidelines for drone deployment in humanitarian action be created to reflect the results of such studies.