Modern Liberal State Research Articles

Westphalia, Migration, and Feudal Privilege

Most people acquire citizenship at birth; and modern liberal states regulate the migration of non-citizens as a matter of their sovereignty. Do contemporary border and migration controls based on citizenship therefore enforce the continuation of feudal birth privilege? In this paper I interrogate this question by examining the role of migration controls in the Westphalian Treaties, which define a milestone in the development of territorial state sovereign. I find that the Treaties assumed that a sovereign’s subjects are not free to cross territorial borders, and that migration controls continue to enforce birth privilege. However, while feudal sovereigns ruled by bondage, modern liberal states rule by exclusion.

MULTICULTURALISM AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN MODERN NATION STATES

This article is an analysis of the complex relations between concept of multiculturalism and modern liberal nation states, which are based on a principle of common citizenship. Consequently, in this article we question the impact of multiculturalism on the process of integration in these societies, which inevitably brings us to a contemplation of the complex relations of modern liberal democracy and nationalism. The author presents the most influential ideas of the political philosopher Brian Barry who, as a liberal egalitarian, criticized multiculturalism from the theoretical position of liberalism that seeks to provide social justice. The structure of this paper reflects his prominent ideas on this matter. In three separate chapters, the author discusses the impact of public policies with a multicultural agenda on the equal treatment of citizens, the relationship between liberalism and assimilation and liberalism, and national identity perceived as a necessary precondition for achieving integration. The last chapter of article considers the positions of other theorists on the subject of relations between a liberal state and national identity, which leads to concluding reflections of the conception of politics as a space for self-expression.

The rise of the robots and the crisis of moral patiency

This paper adds another argument to the rising tide of panic about robots and AI. The argument is intended to have broad civilization-level significance, but to involve less fanciful speculation about the likely future intelligence of machines than is common among many AI-doomsayers. The argument claims that the rise of the robots will create a crisis of moral patiency. That is to say, it will reduce the ability and willingness of humans to act in the world as responsible moral agents, and thereby reduce them to moral patients. Since that ability and willingness is central to the value system in modern liberal democratic states, the crisis of moral patiency has a broad civilization-level significance: it threatens something that is foundational to and presupposed in much contemporary moral and political discourse. I defend this argument in three parts. I start with a brief analysis of an analogous argument made (or implied) in pop culture. Though those arguments turn out to be hyperbolic and satirical, they do prove instructive as they illustrates a way in which the rise of robots could impact upon civilization, even when the robots themselves are neither malicious nor powerful enough to bring about our doom. I then introduce the argument from the crisis of moral patiency, defend its main premises and address objections.

Migration, Flucht und der liberale Staat

Abstract This paper asks how a modern liberal state that wishes to remain true to its own values should respond to mass inward migration. Three of those values – freedom, equality of opportunity, and human rights – appear to support fully open borders. But a democratic welfare state needs citizens who trust one another, and this in turn raises questions of cultural identity. The cultural integration of immigrant groups requires limits to the numbers being admitted, and the selection of those who will become citizens in future. A closer inspection of the three open borders arguments reveals that none of them is decisive. In particular, immigration is not a human right. Nevertheless refugees, whose human rights are imperilled, may have strong claims to be admitted by liberal states. Ideally these claims should be met by setting up an international burden-sharing scheme. Where refugee numbers are so high as to impose severe costs on the receiving state, the decision to admit needs to be democratically authorised.

Ritual, dependency care and Confucian political authority

In this paper I intend to argue that the liberal democratic model of individual rights and limited government that has carried us this far is no longer conceptually adequate to carry us forward into this interdependent and globalized world where emerging environmental/economic/social/political problems oftentimes crisscross multiple personal, social, legal, cultural, geographical, and national boundaries. We need a different kind of political paradigm that addresses, first and foremost, the inevitability of dependency by grounding the state authority in its capacity to care for the most socially vulnerable instead of relegating the responsibility of caring for the dependent to the private/personal realm (and conventionally women’s realm); secondly, we need a political theory that doesn’t narrowly focus on defending the negative liberty of the selfreliant individual instead of providing an enduring social mechanism to render the self ever more porous to others so that complex and globalized problems can get addressed and solved. In sum, a modern democratic liberal state infused with Confucian emphasis on ritual to ensure social/political cohesion and its political imperative to care for the socially vulnerable is the proper way for us to move forward into the ever more caring, progressive, and inclusive future for humanity.

Politinio pokyčio konceptualizacijos Alaino Badiou ir Jacques’o Rancière’o teorijose

This article discusses the conceptualizations of political transformation, proposed in the political theories of Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière. These authors criticize the disappearance of ideological differences in modern liberal democratic states. As their subject, they choose the marginal parts of society, which can make a rupture in an existing status quo by acting collectively and rebelliously. Both authors propose theories of praxis, in which thoughts have an influence on the material world and, on the opposite, the material world having influence on theory. This article examines the transformational logic of these political concepts and tries to reveal their main limitations.

The Value of Difference: Kantian Hospitality and Flikschuh’s Rethinking of Nomadic Encounters

In this essay I discuss the issue of Kantian hospitality and how Katrin Flikschuh’s arguments in “Kant’s Nomads: Encountering Strangers” offer us a framework for dealing with certain problems that seem to arise out of the Kantian account, namely, problems of dealing with cultures unlike modern liberal states, such as nomadic and indigenous communities. I look at some criticisms of Kant’s position on hospitality and cosmopolitan right and on how Flikschuh’s discussion helps to resolve these criticisms. I focus especially on her discussion of respectful interaction and openness in the course of encountering cultural others, encounters that inherently and positively contain a large element of unexpectedness.

Let the Lord the Judge be Judge: Hobbes and Locke on Jephthah, Liberalism and Martyrdom

This article offers the first comparative study of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke’s readings of the Biblical figure of Jephthah the Gileadite and, in particular, the latter’s notorious appeal to God that leads to the killing of his own daughter. To outline its argument, I focus on a critical moment in Hobbes and Locke’s corpuses where they both appeal to Jephthah’s vow to support their theories of sovereign right: Hobbes’ account of the right to punish in Leviathan and Locke’s account of the right to go to war in the “Second Treatise of Government.” If Hobbes and Locke’s readings of Jephthah differ considerably – the one focusing on Jephthah’s daughter, the other on Jephthah himself; the one exploring domestic political theory, the other international relations theory; the one seeking to legitimize the right to punish, the other the right to go to war – I contend that both see Jephthah’s story as an allegory for the origins of sovereign violence in self-sacrifice or even martyrdom. For Hobbes and Locke, Jephthah’s fate becomes a kind of arcane theological paradigm for sovereign killing: what begins as the religious power to die ends up as the political power to kill. In the obscure story of Jephthah the Gileadite, then, I conclude that Hobbes and Locke set in motion what we might call a martyrological machine at the core of the modern liberal state. What if liberalism is constituted less by its professed love of “life” – private interest, private property, self-preservation, self-determination – than a willingness to sacrifice everything and die?

The Patriotism of Gentlemen with Red Hair: European Jews and the Liberal State, 1789\u20131939

European Jewish history from 1789–1939 supports the view that construction of national identities even in secular liberal states was determined not only by modern considerations alone but also by ancient patterns of thought, behaviour and prejudice. Emancipation stimulated unprecedented patriotism, especially in wartime, as Jews strove to prove loyalty to their countries of citizenship. During World War I, even Zionists split along national lines, as did families and friends. Jewish patriotism was interchangeable with nationalism inasmuch as Jews identified themselves with national cultures. Although emancipation implied acceptance and an end to anti-Jewish prejudice in the modern liberal state, the kaleidoscopic variety of Jewish patriotism throughout Europe inadvertently undermined the idea of national identity and often provoked anti-Semitism. Even as loyal citizens of separate states, the Jews, however scattered, disunited and diverse, were made to feel, often unwillingly, that they were one people in exile.

Mental capacity and states of exception: revisiting disability law with Giorgio Agamben

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) claims a new era of disability rights – a stance that was affirmed when CRPD General Comment 1 provided its authoritative interpretation of CRPD article 12 (Equal recognition before the law). Since the publication of General Comment 1, disagreement about the meaning and significance of article 12 has heightened, particularly in response to its claim for universal legal capacity. The notion of universal legal capacity challenges a fundamental division in the law of modern liberal states – the different treatment of individuals who are unable to participate in the law as rational independent actors. This article draws on the work of Giorgio Agamben to argue that people with disabilities are placed in a ‘state of exception’ where they are subject to exceptional legal regimes. In modern law entry into the state of exception, where people with mental disabilities are exposed to violence and abuse, is triggered by the determination that a person lacks ‘mental capacity.’ This paper argues that the CRPD offers a new approach predicated on equality and inclusion.

Stateness as Landgrab: A Political History of Maya Dispossession in Guatemala

Stateness as Landgrab: A Political History of Maya Dispossession in Guatemala Juan Castro (bio) and Manuela Lavinas Picq (bio) The history of state formation in the Americas is largely a history of indigenous dispossession. But not all dispossessions function the same. In Guatemala the forms of stealing of indigenous territory varied over time. Spanish colonizers made Maya communities buy their own lands. After independence, the modern liberal state defined indigenous territories as “waste land.” Indigenous municipalities were forcefully assimilated into the nation during the 1944 revolution, while neoliberal governments expropriate Maya communities in the name of development. The landgrab of Maya territories initiated by Spanish colonizers never ceased; it evolved over time, perpetuated in times of war and peace by governments across the political spectrum. This essay traces the changing forms of indigenous dispossession in Guatemala from colonial times to the present. We show that the stealing of Maya lands is not a historical episode linked to the Spanish invasion but a defining structure of Guatemala’s modern state. Our argument is twofold. First, various logics of colonization are at play. A historical approach illuminates a combination of settler colonial logics that erase indigenous presence and the colonial logic of racialization to control indigenous peoples. Second, the stealing of Maya territories is intrinsic to modern states. We connect colonial archives with contemporary neoliberal policies of extraction to reveal the continuation of colonial logics in Guatemala. First, we analyze legal records dating back to 1621 in which the Spanish Real Audiencia (colonial court) recognized indigenous municipalities and their communal lands. Second, we explain the creation of land titles in bureaucratic strategies to erase indigenous authority after independence. In the late nineteenth century, state decrees declared Maya communities as nonindigenous ladinos to transform communal land into private property.1 Third, we show how the Revolution of 1944, one of Guatemala’s most progressive and democratic governments, adopted a Marxist narrative that dismantled indigenous municipalities in the name of national unity. Lastly, we trace the landgrab related to resource extraction. In the 1970s, a long civil war brutally displaced and [End Page 791] killed entire communities, in some cases erasing indigenous presence. Today, neoliberal governments license indigenous lands to extractive industries in the name of development. Comunes de Indios: Litigating for Territory with Spain The Mayas defended their territorialities through active litigation in colonial times. Amaqs, a sort of Maya federation, engaged in diplomacy with the Spaniards. Spain appropriated territory mostly in the lowlands (renting or selling land to the communities that most resisted invasion). In the highlands, strong Amaqs successfully preserved their territories, at times having to buy land recognition. The Real Audiencia recognized Maya territories as comunes de indios, a title for communal property encompassing autonomous political authorities. Maya authorities even used the Spanish Crown as a third party to address territorial conflicts among neighbors. In 1641, for instance, the comun de indios of Ch’orti’ de Jocotan took a land dispute with Camotan neighbors to the Real Audiencia and in 1743 bought 635 caballerias of their own land to receive titles from the Spanish Crown.2 The Spanish authorities recognized many comunes de indios, like the K’iches of Chiwila, who also bought their title to territory and have preserved it until today. Some Ancestral Authorities still invoke comunes de indios. The community of Santiago Atitlán has preserved its communal title; it is carefully kept with a piece of cotton depicting the territory by the maximum authorities of the Tz’utuhil people. These titles to territory mean that Maya peoples and Spanish colonizers observed each other’s territories. This territoriality encompassed legal and political authority. Since the sixteenth century, the Crown also recognized the authority of indigenous municipalities. The combination of territorial, legal, and political authority constitutes the foundation of sovereignty, indicating that Maya–Spanish interactions were conceptualized as nation-to-nation relations. One of the oldest Maya indigenous municipalities to have kept uninterrupted authority over its territory is the Forty-Eight Cantones, or parishes, in Totonicapán. It was already a powerful Amaq when the Spaniards arrived and was among the first to have its authority recognized in colonial law. The territory of the Forty-Eight Cantones has...

Against the Political Exclusion of the Incapable

AbstractPolitical exclusion on grounds of incapacity is the primary remaining source of exclusion from the franchise. It is appealed to by states and theorists alike to justify excluding young people (under 18) and many people with cognitive disability from the franchise. Defenders of this exclusion claim that no wrong is done by this exclusion and that states gain some significant benefits from this restricting of the franchise. I have argued elsewhere that political exclusion as currently practiced in modern liberal democratic states in fact causes significant harms, as it excludes some people who have the relevant capacity for political participation. Here, I argue that the exclusion of incapable actors prevents no significant harms to democratic outcomes, and that it confers no significant democratic benefits on the states practising this exclusion. As such, I argue that we ought to heavily modify and perhaps even abandon the capacity standard for political inclusion.

The ‘Unique Role’ of Government Lawyers in Canada

Discussions and depictions of lawyers in Canada largely ignore a significant segment of the legal population: government lawyers. Canada is a modern liberal democratic state with a significant public sector employing a large number of lawyers in many public sector settings. Lawyers who work directly for the executive branch – government lawyers – are a special subset of public lawyers. These government lawyers are ‘unique’ in many respects. They do not have paying clients as do private sector lawyers. Their client is ‘the Crown’ – an abstract emanation of the state. This article explains the unique role of government lawyers in Canada as derived from the historic and legislative responsibilities of the Attorney General. It then addresses questions that arise for government lawyers in Canada in public law litigation.

Monseigneur Darboy (1813–1871): Archevêque de Paris entre Pie IX et Napoléon III by Jacques-Olivier Boudon (review)

Reviewed by: Monseigneur Darboy (1813–1871): Archevêque de Paris entre Pie IX et Napoléon III by Jacques-Olivier Boudon Thomas Kselman Monseigneur Darboy (1813–1871): Archevêque de Paris entre Pie IX et Napoléon III. By Jacques-Olivier Boudon. (Paris: Cerf. 2011. Pp. 192. €19,00 paperback. ISBN 978-2-204-09200-5.) Being the archbishop of Paris was a dangerous job in the nineteenth century. Monseigneur Georges Darboy, the subject of Jacques-Olivier Boudon’s excellent brief biography, was executed as a hostage by forces representing the Paris Commune in May 1871; two of his predecessors, Monseigneurs Affre and Sibour, also died violently—Affre on the barricades of June 1848, Sibour at the hands of a crazed priest in 1857. Boudon’s biography clarifies the details leading up to Darboy’s tragic death, but it also provides an overview of his entire career and thereby brings into focus some of the most important developments in the history of the Church in modern France. Darboy’s career followed a typical pattern for the nineteenth-century French episcopacy. He was born into a modest family in the Haute-Marne, east of Paris. His intelligence and ambition opened doors to high positions in the Church that would have been a rarity for a nonaristocrat, if not unthinkable, in the eighteenth century. Influenced in his seminary years by Lamennais’s project of marrying “God and Liberty,” Darboy was devoted to the work of reconciling the Church and the modern liberal state, a task that proved difficult during the papacy of Pius IX, with whom he clashed on a number of occasions. Boudon shows, however, the extent to which a liberal Gallican bishop could become an influential figure despite the ultramontane policies of Pius IX. Here Boudon’s biography serves as a case study that exemplifies his earlier and magisterial works, L’Épiscopat français à l’époque concordataire (1802–1905): origines, formation, nomination (Paris, 1996) and Paris, capital religieuse sous le Second Empire (Paris, 2001). Like many of his episcopal colleagues, Darboy served an apprenticeship as a vicar-general before he became archbishop in 1863. His familiarity with the administrative and pastoral problems of Paris made him an excellent administrator, visiting parishes, expanding the numbers of clergy, and working cooperatively with the French state. But as Boudon points out, Darboy’s own investigations reveal the challenges he faced, with only 15 percent of the population making its Easter duty in the late 1860s. Darboy’s tenure was also troubled by a long-running conflict with the papacy. His defense of Napoleon III’s Roman policy, and his attempt to interpret Pius IX’s “Syllabus of Errors” in a liberal mode, earned him the enmity of Pius IX, who personally intervened to ensure that the archbishop of Paris would not be named a cardinal. Given his past record, it is no surprise that Darboy was among the leaders of the opposition to the declaration of papal infallibility at the First Vatican Council. Boudon’s treatment of Darboy’s activity at Rome reminds us that despite the lopsided result in favor of the declaration, it was preceded by a bitter dispute in which as many as thirty-four (out of eighty-eight) French bishops agreed with Darboy that it was “inopportune.” Darboy nonetheless accepted the decree, [End Page 945] adhering “purely and simply” to the decision of the Council (p. 142)—a conciliatory move that adds to the complexity of his historical legacy. Darboy left Rome before the final vote and arrived at Paris just as the Franco-Prussian war began. Following the French defeat, he was arrested by the rebellious Paris Commune and held in prison for more than a month. Boudon is characteristically judicious in his analysis of the responsibility for Darboy’s execution, confirming the central role of the virulently anticlerical prosecutor Théophile Ferré, but noting as well the refusal of the government at Versailles to negotiate for the release of the hostages. Boudon sees Darboy’s execution as more of a political than a religious act, a distinction that might not have been perfectly clear to the participants on both sides of the Parisian civil war. In a...

Liberty and Insecurity in the Criminal Law: Lessons from Thomas Hobbes

In this paper, I provide an extensive examination of the political theory of Thomas Hobbes in order to discuss its relevance to an understanding of contemporary issues and challenges faced by criminal law and criminal justice theory. I start by proposing that a critical analysis of Hobbes’s account of punishment reveals a paradox that not only is fundamental to understanding his model of political society, but also can offer important insights into the preventive turn experienced by advanced liberal legal systems. I then suggest that the main importance of an analysis of Hobbes’s theoretical framework lies in how it reveals an inextricable and problematic link between individual autonomy and political authority in the normative conception of the modern liberal state, grounded on the notion of insecurity. By exploring how legal scholars have recently engaged with aspects of this problematic in criminal law and punishment posed by Hobbes’s work, I argue that the paradox found in punishment is such that it both legitimates the criminal law and undermines its normative aspirations, particularly the possibility of securing individual liberty against the power of the liberal state.

“We Are Now the True Spaniards”: Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808–1824

“We Are Now the True Spaniards”: Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808–1824

Sivil kontrol kavramının 17’nci yüzyıldan günümüze gelişimi

This article aims to introduce a conceptual framework concerning the development of civilian control. Civilian control, a concept of modern liberal state, denotes a particular circumstance under which military's authority is constrained in favor of civilians, both holding military accountable to the civilian authorities and enhancing civilians' decisive role in public decision making bodies. The origin of civilian control can be traced back to the 17th century's Social Contract theorists. The concept of civilian control, which began to be used in the 19th century, developed as a concept with its political, economical and social aspects. Civilian control began to be handled within the framework of a descriptive and normative method in the second half of 20th century. In this period, the professionalisation approach, which aimed to transform military into an apolitical apparatus, dominated civilian control literature. Since the late 20th century, an approach has emerged that has intended to provide civilian control by non-state actors beside public bodies and by management techniques. In this context, this article endeavors to demonstrate that the concept of civilian control has developed as a multidimensional concept and that the practice of civilian control has been moved beyond the boundaries of state apparatus since the late 20th century.

Common Spatialities: The Production of the Multitude

The Gezi Park barricades in Istanbul, the OWS occupation of Zucotti Park in New York City, the tents of the Indignados movement in Spain, the London Blackberry riots and the seizure of Tahrir Square in Cairo to demand the overthrow of a dictator. As new forms of social coexistence and relationships are being configured, and new spaces for encounter and conflict are produced, architecture feels that essential questions regarding its activity are being addressed in each and every one of these situations. And yet we seem unable to relate to them and grasp their significance as we repeatedly turn to old metaphors and tools. If modern architecture pursues the modern liberal state techniques of management and administration of life, then recent forms of political action, which claim a new relation to the sensible, demand – and might help develop – a new understanding of architecture. We are moving from technical and disciplinary knowledge towards a critical practice that integrates with the action of the multitude. Starting from a definition of commons as the production of the multitude, we seek not only to understand the spatial dimension of this production, but also to acknowledge space as common.

Common Spatialities: The Production of the Multitude

The Gezi Park barricades in Istanbul, the OWS occupation of Zucotti Park in New York City, the tents of the Indignados movement in Spain, the London Blackberry riots and the seizure of Tahrir Square in Cairo to demand the overthrow of a dictator. As new forms of social coexistence and relationships are being configured, and new spaces for encounter and conflict are produced, architecture feels that essential questions regarding its activity are being addressed in each and every one of these situations. And yet we seem unable to relate to them and grasp their significance as we repeatedly turn to old metaphors and tools. If modern architecture pursues the modern liberal state techniques of management and administration of life, then recent forms of political action, which claim a new relation to the sensible, demand – and might help develop – a new understanding of architecture. We are moving from technical and disciplinary knowledge towards a critical practice that integrates with the action of the multitude. Starting from a definition of commons as the production of the multitude, we seek not only to understand the spatial dimension of this production, but also to acknowledge space as common.

Emancipation and the Creation of Modern Liberal States in America and France

Emancipation and the Creation of Modern Liberal States in America and France Stephen Sawyer (bio) and William J. Novak (bio) He is a man, the equal of all his fellow-men. He is one of the children of the State. —Charles Sumner The Emancipation Proclamation, the Lincoln presidency, and the American Civil War, of course, are topics on which an enormous amount has been written from what seems every conceivable viewpoint. Perhaps only the French Revolution competes as historical subject matter prompting an equal amount of diverse (often fractious) scholarly commentary. It is thus something of a challenge to make room for a fresh perspective. Nevertheless, this article attempts to shed some new light on the historical significance of emancipation by self-consciously widening the interpretive lens. First, it examines the Emancipation Proclamation from the perspective of a burgeoning new literature (both historical and sociotheoretical) on state-building—particularly work focused on the distinctive emergence of modern liberal nation-states in the late nineteenth century. Second, it attempts to simultaneously look at Emancipation from home and abroad—in this case, with special attention to the view from France. Like the Civil War, of course, Emancipation was a momentous international event; so was the development of newly powerful and rapidly modernizing nation-states. Exploring the important links between these two globally significant historical phenomena is the purpose of this inquiry. Lincoln’s use of executive power in issuing the Emancipation Proclamation was emblematic of a newly emerging form of state power in the nineteenth century. As argued in several companion articles in this special issue of the Journal of the Civil War Era, the act of emancipation as a concrete historical event involved thousands of important and complicated changes in and of itself. But as the visual and representational material included in this special issue also make clear, the Emancipation Proclamation was something more than the sum of its discrete parts (interesting though it is to historically and legally parse those parts). That “something more” is reflected in how Emancipation and the proclamation captured and represented a series of dramatic changes underway in the nature of nineteenth-century governance. In the United States, as a consequence [End Page 467] of Civil War and Emancipation, traditional American conceptions of such fundamentals as rule and right, sovereignty and property, state and citizenship, and the relationship of public power and private liberty were all in flux and up for grabs. And the realignment of public powers and individual rights that resulted from the crucial legal and political choices made during these crises generated a new constitutional regime. We refer to this basic reconfiguration of legal and political power in terms of the invention of modern liberal states. While an elaborate and concrete specification of the theoretical and historical underpinnings of modern liberal statecraft is beyond the bounds of this short article, Emancipation is particularly illuminative of three chief characteristics: the extension and consolidation of state power and sovereignty; the individualization and internationalization of notions of right; and the constitutionalization of systems of law and government. The late nineteenth century was awash in new theories and practices of sovereignty and nation-state power. From Francis Lieber’s Introductory to a Course of Lectures on the State to Édouard Laboulaye’s L’État et ses Limites, to Johann Kaspar Bluntschli’s Theory of the Modern State and beyond, late-nineteenth-century commentators were aware that they were witnessing the development of new forms of state power and unprecedented elaborations of sovereignty.1 Central nation-states consolidated around new positive conceptions of sovereignty and administration that radically extended their reach into economy and society. And though notions of individual right are mistakenly contraposed to extensions of state power, in late-nineteenth-century liberal states this unambiguous centralization of authority was only complemented by the increased individualization of right (frequently by drawing on international law and an emerging language of human rights). This new equilibrium of central state powers and individual right was ultimately mediated and legitimated by an equally unmistakable turn to law in the late nineteenth century—particularly public law and constitutional law. What Leon Duguit dubbed the “Transformation of Public Law” underwrote a resurgence in...