Model Of Financial Intermediation Research Articles

Opacity: Insurance and Fragility

What are the effects of banks holding opaque, complex assets? Should regulators require bank assets to be more transparent? I study these questions in a model of financial intermediation where opacity determines how long the realized value of an asset remains unknown. By allowing a bank to sell assets before the realization is known, opacity provides insurance to the bank's depositors. However, higher opacity also increases depositors' incentives to join a bank run. In choosing the level of opacity, therefore, a bank faces a trade-off between providing insurance and increasing fragility. If depositors can accurately observe the level of opacity, banks will choose the socially efficient level. If depositors are unable to observe this choice, however, banks will have an incentive to become overly opaque and regulation to limit opacity can improve welfare.

On reaching for yield and the coexistence of bubbles and negative bubbles

We develop a model of financial intermediation wherein bank managers “reach for yield” – by overinvesting in risky assets and underinvesting in safer assets – provided they do not face much cost from liquidity shortfalls. The managers follow a pecking order in which their first preference is to invest in risky assets; their second preference is to hoard liquid assets; and their last preference is to invest in safer assets. This behavior is conducive to the formation of bubbles and “negative” bubbles in the market for risky and safer assets, respectively. Monetary loosening, by reducing the cost of liquidity shortfalls, induces further reach for yield and amplifies the bubbles.

Business Cycles and the Balance Sheets of the Financial and Non-Financial Sectors

I propose and estimate a dynamic model of financial intermediation to study the different roles of the condition of banks’ and firms’ balance sheets in real activity. The net worth of firms determines their borrowing capacity both from households and banks. Banks provide risky loans to multiple firms and use their diversified portfolio as collateral to borrow from households. This intermediation process allows additional funds to flow from households to firms. Banks require net worth for intermediation as they are exposed to aggregate risk. The net worth of banks and firms are both state variables. In normal recessions, firm and bank net worth play the same role, so their sum determines the allocation of capital. During financial crises, shocks to bank net worth have an additional effect beyond that in standard financial frictions’ models. This mechanism works through intermediation and affects activity, even if shocks redistribute net worth from banks to firms. I estimate my model and find that the new mechanism accounts for 40% of the fall in output and 80% of the fall in bank net worth during the Great Recession. Finally, the model is consistent with the different dynamics of the share of bank loans in total firm debt and credit spreads during the recessions of 1990, 2001, and 2008. JEL Classification: E44, E32, G01

Business Cycles and the Balance Sheets of the Financial and Non-Financial Sectors

I propose and estimate a dynamic model of financial intermediation to study the different roles of the condition of banks’ and firms’ balance sheets in real activity. The net worth of firms determines their borrowing capacity both from households and banks. Banks provide risky loans to multiple firms and use their diversified portfolio as collateral to borrow from households. This intermediation process allows additional funds to flow from households to firms. Banks require net worth for intermediation as they are exposed to aggregate risk. The net worth of banks and firms are both state variables. In normal recessions, firm and bank net worth play the same role and their sum determines the allocation of capital. During financial crises, shocks to bank net worth have an additional effect beyond that in standard financial frictions’ models. This mechanism works through intermediation and affects activity, even if shocks redistribute net worth from banks to firms. I estimate my model and find that the new mechanism accounts for 40% of the fall in output and 80% of the fall in bank net worth during the Great Recession. Finally, the model is consistent with the different dynamics of the share of bank loans in total firm debt and credit spreads during the recessions of 1990, 2001, and 2008.

The cost of capital in a model of financial intermediation with coordination frictions

This paper studies the impact of coordination frictions in financial markets on the cost of capital of real sector projects. In the model, a financial intermediary seeks to raise funds from many small investors, to finance a capital-intensive project. Investors face a coordination problem, as more capital invested in the project increases its chances of success. We employ a global games refinement to characterize the unique equilibrium of the game. The model features a non-monotonic relationship between the cost of capital and project profitability. There exists a ‘socially optimal’ price of capital that maximizes the probability of project success. However, fee-maximizing intermediaries set a return that is higher than the optimal rate. This higher cost of capital is the result of coordination frictions and suggests an inefficiency of the intermediation process. The model best characterizes project finance investments funded through bond markets and yields implications for their cost of capital.

Bankruptcy and cross-country differences in productivity

For a sample of OECD countries, I document a systematic positive relationship between (i) aggregate productivity, (ii) the employment share by large firms and (iii) the proportion of large firms in the economy. I propose that differences in bankruptcy procedures can explain this relationship. In a model of financial intermediation and informational frictions, I show that as bankruptcy procedures worsen—measured by the amount a lender can recover from bankrupt borrowers—lenders respond by (i) shifting their portfolio of loans to smaller (less productive) firms and (ii) lending less. This finding is supported by empirical evidence: across countries, efficient bankruptcy procedures are associated with a higher proportion of new bank loans allocated to large firms. In the model, moving the level of recovery rate from the U.S. level to that of the lowest recovery rate country in the OECD sample reduces TFP by around 30 percent.

Optimal monetary and macroprudential policies: Gains and pitfalls in a model of financial intermediation

We estimate a quantitative general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and financial intermediation to examine the interaction of monetary and macroprudential stabilization policies. The estimation procedure uses credit spreads to help identify the role of financial shocks amenable to stabilization via monetary or macroprudential instruments. The estimated model implies that monetary policy should not respond strongly to the credit cycle and can only partially insulate the economy from the distortionary effects of financial frictions/shocks. A counter-cyclical macroprudential instrument can enhance welfare, but faces important implementation challenges. In particular, a Ramsey planner who adjusts a leverage tax in an optimal way can largely insulate the economy from shocks to intermediation, but a simple-rule approach must be cautious not to limit credit expansions associated with efficient investment opportunities. These results demonstrate the importance of considering both optimal Ramsey policies and simpler, but more practical, approaches in an empirically grounded model.

Market participation in a two-sector Diamond-Dybvig economy

Purpose This paper aims to reconsider the role of asset-market participation in Diamond-Dybvig economies, to reconcile the existence of asset markets as a channel for financial integration with the distortions that they might impose on the banking system. Design/methodology/approach The paper is a two-sector Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation, with comparative advantages in the investment technologies, and introduces the possibility for the depositors to participate in an economy-wide asset market, when they can trade a bond without being observed by their banks. Findings The two-sector competitive banking equilibrium with hidden trades is not equivalent to autarky, is the unique Nash equilibrium of a “participation game” and is a constrained efficient. Originality/value This paper is the first to characterize the equilibrium of a two-sector Diamond-Dybvig economy with hidden trading in the asset market, and produces novel results, in contrast to the existing literature, with respect to the rationale for the existence of a financial system, its coexistence with asset markets and its efficiency. These conclusions also have important implications in terms of policy, in particular, regarding the case for the introduction of financial regulation.

Does One Bank Size Fit All? The Role of Diversification and Monitoring

Using a sample of US bank holding companies from 2001 to 2012, we provide evidence that the relationship between size and bank charter value is an inverse U-shape, which implies the existence of an optimal size. More importantly, motivated by Diamond’s (1984) theoretical model of financial intermediation as delegated monitors, we provide evidence that the inverse U-shape relationship, and consequently the optimal size, is determined by the tradeoff between the diversification benefits and monitoring costs, that is, the direct monitoring cost of bank assets and the delegation costs for debtholders and shareholders.

Financial Intermediaries, Markets, and Growth

In many models of financial intermediation, markets reduce welfare because they limit the amount of risk-sharing intermediaries can offer. In this paper we study a model in which markets also promote investment in a productive technology. A trade-off between risk sharing and growth arises endogenously. In the model, financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against a liquidity shock. Households can also invest directly on a financial market if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market. This can be beneficial because intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they provide more risk-sharing. We show the mix of intermediaries and market that maximizes welfare depends on parameter values. We also show the optimal mix of two very similar economies can be very different.

Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Banks' Home Bias for Sovereign Debt

We show that an increase in banks' holdings of domestic Sovereign debt decreases the ability of domestic Sovereigns to successfully enact bailouts. When Sovereigns finance bailouts with newly issued debt and the price of Sovereign debt is sensitive to unanticipated debt issues, then bailouts dilute the value of banks' Sovereign debt holdings rendering bailouts less effective. We explore this feedback mechanism in a model of financial intermediation in which banks are subject to managerial moral hazard and ex ante optimality requires lenders to commit to ex post inefficient bank liquidations. A benevolent Sovereign may desire to enact bailouts to prevent such liquidations thereby neutralizing lenders' commitment. In this context, home bias for Sovereign debt may arise as a mechanism to deter bailouts and restore lenders' commitment.

An R&D-based real business cycle model

The New Keynesian Real Business Cycle model with staggered price adjustment is augmented with an R&D producing sector. Two sources of economic shocks are considered, namely random participation (perturbances to the value of alternative investment opportunities in another sector) and financial intermediation (shocks to the cost of raising capital in the financial intermediation market). We find that, when compared to the baseline model, both models can explain procyclical R&D spending. Additionally, the investment oversensitivity problem is corrected. However, only the financial intermediation model is consistent with the observed finding that the volatility of R&D is larger than those of investment and output.

Bailouts, moral hazard and banks׳ home bias for Sovereign debt

We show that an increase in banks׳ holdings of domestic Sovereign debt decreases the ability of domestic Sovereigns to successfully enact bailouts. When Sovereigns finance bailouts with newly issued debt and the price of Sovereign debt is sensitive to unanticipated debt issues, then bailouts dilute the value of banks׳ Sovereign debt holdings rendering bailouts less effective. We explore this feedback mechanism in a model of financial intermediation in which banks are subject to managerial moral hazard and ex ante optimality requires lenders to commit to ex post inefficient bank liquidations. A benevolent Sovereign may desire to enact bailouts to prevent such liquidations thereby neutralizing lenders׳ commitment. In this context, home bias for Sovereign debt may arise as a mechanism to deter bailouts and restore lenders׳ commitment.

Rizični kapital i prepreke za njegovo ulaganje

The subject of this article is the concept of venture capital, one of the most attractive model of financial intermediation in the modern business environment. The paper will first present the concept of venture capital, its presence on a global level, the form in which it occurs and stages of this type of investment. Then it will be analyzed the challenges related to the implementation of this financial arrangement, especially in the transition countries. The aim of the research is to look at the key features of venture capital and the possibility of its implementation in different social and economic conditions, given the obstacles faced by the venture capital investors.

Diversification by U.S. Banks: True Safety or a False Sense of Security?

Modern U.S. banks engage into activities traditionally considered as non-core for the banking sector. Consistent with extant models of financial intermediation, which suggest banks diversify to lower risk and improve profitability, we document that banks with higher probability of financial distress and deadweight financial costs diversify more aggressively. Diversified banks appear to benefit from coinsurance, are more profitable, less financially constrained, and supply more credit. However, diversification does not lead to real reductions in risk as its benefits are limited to good times. Diversified banks are more exposed to systematic risk and their lending is more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. They are also more prone to correlation risk, the risk that diversification benefits provided by non-core activities may unexpectedly change especially when they are most needed. Our study contributes to the current debate on the optimal scope of bank activities, and highlights novel channels through which diversification impacts banks' credit supply and therefore the real economy.

Bailouts and Financial Fragility

How does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the efficient policy response is to use public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses. The anticipation of such a “bailout” distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, however: it induces intermediaries to become too liquid from a social point of view and may, in addition, leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis. A policy of taxing short-term liabilities, in contrast, can correct the incentive problem while improving financial stability.

Emergent models of financial intermediation for innovative companies: from venture capital to crowdinvesting platforms in Switzerland

The recent financial crisis has accelerated the changes with regard to the spatial organization of financial channels. In direct investments, the venture capital industry in Switzerland used to be connected to national and international financial markets. Today, these traditional direct investment players are in decline because their traditional business model is no longer suited to the current economic environment. Instead, a new business model for direct investment has recently emerged at the same time revitalizing this financial sector: crowdinvesting platforms exploit more intensively the possibilities opened by Information and Communication technologies and of specialized, but dispersed, expertise. This article highlights the strengths and weaknesses of both business models as well as their contrasted time and space ways to deal with uncertainty.

Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policies: Gains and Pitfalls in a Model of Financial Intermediation

We estimate a quantitative general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and financial intermediation to examine the interaction of monetary and macroprudential stabilization policies. The estimation procedure uses credit spreads to help identify the role of financial shocks amenable to stabilization via monetary or macroprudential instruments. The estimated model implies that monetary policy should not respond strongly to the credit cycle and can only partially insulate the economy from the distortionary effects of financial frictions/shocks. A counter-cyclical macroprudential instrument can enhance welfare, but faces important implementation challenges. In particular, a Ramsey planner who adjusts a leverage tax in an optimal way can largely insulate the economy from shocks to intermediation, but a simple-rule approach must be cautious not to limit credit expansions associated with efficient investment opportunities. These results demonstrate the importance of considering both optimal Ramsey policies and simpler, but more practical, approaches in an empirically grounded model.

Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policies: Gains and Pitfalls in a Model of Financial Intermediation

We estimate a quantitative general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and financial intermediation to examine the interaction of monetary and macroprudential stabilization policies. The estimation procedure uses credit spreads to help identify the role of financial shocks amenable to stabilization via monetary or macroprudential instruments. The estimated model implies that monetary policy should not respond strongly to the credit cycle and can only partially insulate the economy from the distortionary effects of financial frictions/shocks. A counter-cyclical macroprudential instrument can enhance welfare, but faces important implementation challenges. In particular, a Ramsey planner who adjusts a leverage tax in an optimal way can largely insulate the economy from shocks to intermediation, but a simple-rule approach must be cautious not to limit credit expansions associated with effcient investment opportunities. These results demonstrate the importance of considering both optimal Ramsey policies and simpler, but more practical, approaches in an empirically grounded model.

Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility

We study a finite-depositor version of the Diamond–Dybvig model of financial intermediation in which the bank and all depositors observe withdrawals as they occur. We derive the constrained efficient allocation of resources in closed form and show that this allocation provides liquidity insurance to depositors. The contractual arrangement that decentralizes this allocation resembles a standard bank deposit with a demandable debt-like structure. When withdrawals are unusually high, however, depositors who withdraw relatively late experience significant losses. This contractual arrangement can be fragile, admitting another equilibrium in which depositors run on the bank by withdrawing funds regardless of their liquidity needs.