The​‍​‌‍​‍‌​‍​‌‍​‍‌ sophistication and diversity of missile threats have led to the search for non-kinetic defense technologies that can be used as a supplement to conventional interceptor-based systems. One such technology that has become a candidate solution is the use of electromagnetic shielding systems that manipulate electromagnetic fields to disrupt or neutralize missiles. These systems, in particular, have been conceived as a viable option for quick-response and multi-threat defense scenarios. The objective of this study was to evaluate the potential, challenges, and restrictions of electromagnetic shielding systems in missile defense, mainly concerning their technical performance, feasibility of large-scale deployment, and economic viability when integrated into local defense architectures. The study employed a multidisciplinary approach that combines theoretical electromagnetic modeling with an exhaustive critical analysis of cutting-edge technology such as plasma-based shielding, protection against an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and high-energy electromagnetic disruption mechanisms. Technical issues regarding the power supply, field stability, and area coverage were accompanied by a preliminary cost analysis of installation and operations. The study reveals that an electromagnetic shielding system would be able to provide the rapid response needed, be easily adaptable to the different kinds of threats, and have a very low impact on the environment. The main effects induced by weapons in plasmas and by high-intensity EMPs to cause the destruction of the missile guidance and electronic subsystems have been demonstrated. However, many weaknesses are pointed out, such as the fact that the high energy demand is among the main problems, the difficulty in stabilizing the electromagnetic fields, the limited range of the effect, and the reduced efficiency against some types of missiles. Besides, the cost of the first deployment is estimated to be from half a billion to two billion dollars per installation. Also, the operational expenses are mainly attributable to energy consumption and maintenance complexity. At present, electromagnetic shielding systems are not capable of being stand-alone missile defense systems, but they can be considered as complementary tools in layered defense systems. To be able to practically deploy them on a large scale, the issues relating to power generation, materials, and field-control technologies have to be sorted out. Research and development efforts need to be sustained to work through these technological and economic constraints and to harness the full extent of the defensive potentials of electromagnetic ​‍​‌‍​‍‌​‍​‌‍​‍‌shielding.

The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) seeks to accelerate Europe’s layered air and missile defense through coordinated procurement and integration across NATO-interoperable systems. Launched in October 2022 and counting more than twenty members by mid‑2025, ESSI responds to lessons from the Russia–Ukraine war, namely the need for resilient, multi‑layered defences, munition depth, and robust command‑and‑control (C2). This study synthesizes country‑level capability baselines and acquisition trajectories across Europe and assesses integration challenges—technical, organizational, and political, strategical, economic. It then analyses including Türkiye’s indigenous programmes (e.g., the HİSAR family and SİPER) as well as naval integration initiatives involving the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), a ship-launched medium-range interceptor used for fleet self-defence against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles. and strategic geography at NATO’s south eastern flank, identifying concrete areas where Türkiye can augment ESSI: sensor coverage, layered interceptor effects, and system‑of‑systems integration. Beyond platform portfolios, Türkiye’s defence-industrial base and test infrastructure offer surge capacity and co-production potential under consortium arrangements, diversifying supply chains and reducing single-source risk for ESSI participants; its geostrategic position—spanning the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Levant—extends early-warning depth and provides forward C2 relay nodes for NATINAMDS, particularly for the protection of energy corridors and critical infrastructure. The study combines for a way for supply chain decision makers structured desk research with comparative analysis to propose a pragmatic roadmap for ESSI implementation emphasizing standardization, modular C2, and joint stockpiles. As a conclusion for global markets defence supply chain, writers recommend a road map for decision makers for near‑term capability bridging, mid‑term industrial cooperation, and long‑term architecture evolution toward hypersonic‑capable defence and space‑based early warning.

ABSTRACT Using Russian military documents from the 1950s to present, this study tracks deterrence evolution through seven periods, from nuclear proliferation to hybrid strategic deterrence. Through qualitative analysis of military doctrines and publications including Military Thought and Independent Military Review, the research examines how Russian military thinking articulated deterrence concepts, diverged from Western counterparts, and conceptualized effectiveness within Russia’s strategic-cultural framework.The analysis reveals Russia’s persistent attachment to nuclear status compensating for conventional weaknesses, while evolving toward comprehensive approaches integrating nuclear, conventional, and informational capabilities. Russian documents portray US nuclear reductions as encouraging aggression and view American missile defense as offensive encirclement, creating significant misperception risks. The findings emphasize nuclear weapons’ continued centrality despite recognized limitations, highlighting the imperative for Western policymakers to understand that deterrence conceptualization varies across strategic communities based on cultural context.

“The Golden Dome”, D. Trump’s new missile defense program for the United States, raises concerns about strategic stability enhancement. The project means complete and ultimate rejection to recognize the existence of inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive arms reduction and the level of quality of strategic defensive arms. Within “the Golden Dome” concept, it is planned to revive R. Reagan’s fantastic ideas known as Strategic Defense Initiative. Nuclear-weapon States are in fact offered escalation of the arms race, but with an access to outer space. Meanwhile, a high price of the program is ignored by Washington. The entire “Golden Dome” program is hardly feasible. However, even partial implementation of it can undermine the concept of nuclear deterrence and disrupt the international balance of power. International peace strengthening requires extra diplomatic efforts as well as repudiation of building up a large-scale program designed to establish unconstrained, global, deeply layers and multi-domain missile defense system to protect against any missile threats, including all types of missiles from “peer and near-peer adversaries”. It is necessary to apply diplomatic efforts to coordinate the principle of world practice by joint efforts – it is impossible to strengthen national defense at the expense of the security of other states.

The subject of the research is an important and relevant issue of strategic stability between the United States of America and the Russian Federation in the context of the 21st century. The object is the military-political relations between these two states, particularly the context of the crisis associated with arms reduction, which is observed against the backdrop of a multipolar world. The author conducts a detailed analysis of the evolution of negotiations and military doctrines of both Russia and the USA, including an analysis of the existing strategic balance of power. An important aspect of the research is the regulatory legal framework governing cooperation between the countries, including significant documents such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), missile defense, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), and the Open Skies Treaty. Special emphasis is placed on identifying problems and barriers that hinder a consistent disarmament process. Such barriers include geopolitical interests, mutual rejection of opponents' political systems, stagnation of diplomatic relations, which create additional difficulties in establishing constructive dialogue. Potential directions for cooperation between the USA and Russia that can be implemented in the military-industrial complex and strategic planning are considered. The methodology used in this research is based on the principles of historical objectivity and a systematic approach. It includes general scientific methods such as systemic, dialectical, and comparative analysis, as well as specialized methods related to legal, political science, and historical aspects. The novelty of the research lies in identifying key issues that hinder the development of strategic stability, as well as proposing specific ways to address them, taking into account recent geopolitical trends. The author concludes that, despite the existing barriers present in the negotiation process between the USA and Russia, there remains potential for renewal, especially in the area of disarmament and arms control. The potential of new types of weapons is also assessed, particularly in the context of the stagnation of the negotiation process in this area. In conclusion, the research underscores the importance of creating conditions for constructive dialogue and cooperation, which is a necessary step towards achieving strategic stability and preventing further escalation of tensions between the two states.

Adaptive Structures and Additive Technologies for Defensive Missiles

This article examines the critical imbalance between missile attrition rates and replenishment capacity within the United States and allied defense resupply system under conditions of sustained, high-intensity warfare against peer adversaries. The issue is whether the United States possesses sufficient surge capacity to produce specific missiles in the time of war or during a military conflict in which it or one or more allies is engaged, where the United States supplies these allies with active missiles. For example, in Ukraine, Russian forces launched over 5,000 long-range munitions in July 2025 alone, including 728 drones in a single day, while Ukraine’s air defenses intercepted hundreds every night. Despite Western resupply efforts, Ukrainian forces continued to face persistent shortages of interceptors, cruise missiles, and guided munitions, underscoring the fragility of surge logistics and the time lag between battlefield consumption and industrial replenishment. Based on this information, two inferences are apparent. First, the United States lacks sufficient surge capacity. Additionally, Russia has substantial surge capacity. Furthermore, during the recent war between Israel and Iran, Iran fired 550 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones, with 31 impacts in populated areas, resulting in 28 Israeli fatalities and over 3,000 injuries. Israel’s retaliatory campaign destroyed over 1,000 Iranian missiles and 250 launchers, yet the operation consumed thousands of precision-guided munitions and required over 600 aerial refueling sorties. The conflict exposed the vulnerability of even advanced missile defense systems under saturation conditions and highlighted the strategic cost of maintaining deterrence at scale. This example demonstrates that Iran indeed also has substantial surge capacity. These two examples reveal that attrition rates in modern missile warfare can exceed replenishment timelines by orders of magnitude. Contributing factors include legacy production constraints, component obsolescence, workforce reactivation delays, and mineral dependencies concentrated in geopolitically sensitive regions. Without immediate and future investment in surge capacity, the United States risks entering future conflicts with insufficient missile inventories and degraded strategic credibility.

Purpose. To examine NATO’s evolving strategic posture in future, focusing on how the Alliance balances deterrence, defense, and diplomatic restraint in a rapidly changing security environment. Method: Comparative analysis, and synthesis. Findings. Finland’s accession in 2023 and Sweden’s in 2024 significantly strengthened NATO’s defensive posture in Northern Europe and the Baltic region by expanding the Alliance’s traditional and asymmetric capability potential. The enlargement followed a thorough assessment of political and security risks, underscoring the Alliance’s prioritisation of stability and cohesion. The aspirant countries—Georgia, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Moldova—remain outside the enlargement process due to high escalation sensitivity and the risk of direct confrontation with Russia. NATO applies a calibrated approach to provocations, prioritising consultations, diplomacy, and surveillance. Incidents such as the 2025 Estonian airspace violation or the interception of drones by Poland illustrate this differentiation: low-level threats are neutralised, while actions with a high risk of escalation are avoided. Despite growing defence expenditures, the Alliance faces persistent personnel shortages, complicating the implementation of regional defence plans. Operational capabilities remain unevenly distributed among member states, and European rapid-deployment forces continue to depend on U.S. strategic assets. The strategic focus increasingly encompasses cyber defence, hybrid threats, artificial intelligence, and modern missile defence systems, reflecting NATO’s shift toward flexible deterrence and technological superiority. Theoretical implications. The study demonstrates that NATO’s strategic restraint, selective enlargement, and reliance on technological superiority offer a nuanced theoretical framework for understanding alliance cohesion, modern deterrence, and the role of third-party mediation in protracted conflicts. Practical implications. The study suggests that NATO can enhance alliance cohesion, crisis responsiveness, and conflict management by combining strategic restraint, selective enlargement, technological investment, and robust third-party mediation mechanisms. Value. The study provides critical insights into NATO’s strategic restraint, selective enlargement, and adaptive responses to modern threats, offering both theoretical contributions to alliance behavior and practical guidance for policymakers navigating contemporary security challenges.

This article examines the critical imbalance between missile attrition rates and replenishment capacity within the United States and allied defense resupply system under conditions of sustained, high-intensity warfare against peer adversaries. The issue is whether the United States possesses sufficient surge capacity to produce specific missiles in the time of war or during a military conflict in which it or one or more allies is engaged, where the United States supplies these allies with active missiles. For example, in Ukraine, Russian forces launched over 5,000 long-range munitions in July 2025 alone, including 728 drones in a single day, while Ukraine’s air defenses intercepted hundreds every night. Despite Western resupply efforts, Ukrainian forces continued to face persistent shortages of interceptors, cruise missiles, and guided munitions, underscoring the fragility of surge logistics and the time lag between battlefield consumption and industrial replenishment. Based on this information, two inferences are apparent. First, the United States lacks sufficient surge capacity. Additionally, Russia has substantial surge capacity. Furthermore, during the recent war between Israel and Iran, Iran fired 550 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones, with 31 impacts in populated areas, resulting in 28 Israeli fatalities and over 3,000 injuries. Israel’s retaliatory campaign destroyed over 1,000 Iranian missiles and 250 launchers, yet the operation consumed thousands of precision-guided munitions and required over 600 aerial refueling sorties. The conflict exposed the vulnerability of even advanced missile defense systems under saturation conditions and highlighted the strategic cost of maintaining deterrence at scale. This example demonstrates that Iran indeed also has substantial surge capacity. These two examples reveal that attrition rates in modern missile warfare can exceed replenishment timelines by orders of magnitude. Contributing factors include legacy production constraints, component obsolescence, workforce reactivation delays, and mineral dependencies concentrated in geopolitically sensitive regions. Without immediate and future investment in surge capacity, the United States risks entering future conflicts with insufficient missile inventories and degraded strategic credibility.

Exact and Heuristic Approaches for Anti-aircraft Mission Planning for Defensive Missile Battalions

Today, Trump’s Greenland policy has brought the (potential) strategic importance of the Arctic in the East-West confrontation to the fore. However, this is not unprecedented, as there were already a number of strategic visions for the region during the Cold War. This paper examines the role of the Arctic in Cold War missile defence and nuclear plans and theories. The paper discusses how strategic changes have affected military presence in the Arctic during the Cold War, primarily from the US perspective, and what lessons can be identified from this today. It concludes that the US and NATO Arctic presence during the Cold War was strongly influenced by (nuclear) theoretical innovations, strategic changes, and military technological developments. As for NATO, the study also draws attention to how, at the conceptual level, the importance of the Arctic region has changed and evolved, as well as how it has become an operational arena in its own right.

The ongoing war against Ukraine and the transformation of the global security architecture necessitate a revision of traditional approaches to national security and the development of new governance mechanisms. Similar modernization processes are observed worldwide. The Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) are advancing integrated cyber defense systems, establishing cyber reserves, and enhancing territorial defense with active volunteer involvement. Israel employs high-tech innovations to counter terrorist threats, including the Iron Dome, artificial intelligence for risk monitoring, and unmanned intelligence platforms. Poland demonstrates large-scale defense modernization, increasing its defense budget to over 4% of GDP and purchasing advanced Abrams tanks, Korean K9 howitzers, and FA-50 aircraft, aligning its Armed Forces with NATO standards. Germany has created a €100 billion security fund to modernize the Bundeswehr, while the United Kingdom invests heavily in cyber command and artificial intelligence for threat prediction. The United States develops innovative defense clusters in space security and missile defense, whereas Japan and South Korea reinforce military-technological cooperation with the U.S. to enhance early warning and missile defense systems against DPRK threats. The growing complexity of military, political, and informational challenges underscores the significance of this study for Ukraine and global security studies. Based on an expert survey (2022–2024), the findings reveal advances in innovation and resilience through digitalization, risk management, and international support, while resource provision remains limited. The results inform strategies for strengthening coordination, legal harmonization, digital integration, and financial sustainability in Ukraine’s evolving security system.

Abstract The European Union is trying to play a significant role in space exploration. However, it must contend with powerful competitors, such as the USA, Russia, and China. EU-led space programmes such as the ‚Galileo’ satellite navigation system and the ‚Ariane’ launch vehicles are proof of the high aspirations of Europeans. However, the costs generated by these programmes and the modest achievements they bring indicate that the EU does not have a dominant position in this area. In recent years, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a significant impact on the EU’s space policy, with space exploration linked to security and defence policy. It has become an important part of the strategic autonomy built by the EU. European countries have also decided to build their own missile defence system — ESSI.

Abstract There are 47 unrecognized Bedouin villages located in the ‘open areas’ of the Negev in southern Israel that lack protection from the Iron Dome missile defense system. Having no safe shelters or permanent houses, these communities are more prone to direct injury from rocket fire, resulting in a more significant number of casualties. During the war, 19 civilians from the Negev Bedouin Arab population were killed, including six children (Arava Institute, 2023). The purpose of this study is to explore in-depth the bereavement experience of Bedouin grandparents following the death of a grandchild during the war. We examined this phenomenon from an intersectionality perspective, emphasizing the overlap between minority status, advanced age, and the experience of bereavement. This study employed a qualitative narrative approach. Data collection consisted of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 10 Bedouin grandparents who had lost grandchildren during the war. Interviews were conducted in Arabic to ensure a culturally sensitive exploration of the grandparents’ experiences. Data were analyzed using thematic analysis. Two themes will be presented: (1) “When it’s war and sudden, it’s harsh:” The experience of traumatic loss and accompanying emotions following bereavement; (2) “God gives you the strength to endure the suffering:” Faith in God as a source of meaning and comfort. These themes illustrate the dual reality of grief and resilience in a community shaped by conflict. This study provides a deeper understanding of bereavement processes among minority groups in conflict settings, offering insights into culturally sensitive coping mechanisms.

Expanding the ROK-US alliance to the Indo-Pacific region should be actively pursued. South Korea should take note of the aspect of strengthening the ROK-US alliance and increasing its capabilities for the benefit of South Korea. The development of military technology can be aided by research and development while engaging in military exchanges and cooperation with the United States. The following should be considered as South Korea actively expands the ROK-US alliance to the Indo-Pacific. First, it should be made clear that South Korea is concerned about the excessive number of US troops stationed in South Korea, and that its focus on the Indo-Pacific region does not affect the defense of North Korea. Second, joint research and development of weapons systems with the United States should be carried out while expanding the ROK-US alliance to the Indo-Pacific region. Third, South Korea needs to lay the groundwork for South Korea to secure stable maritime transport routes and receive stable energy in its trade while expanding the ROK-US alliance to the Indo-Pacific region. It is also important for Korea to upgrade its naval base on Jeju Island as a missile defense system amid the expansion of the Korea-U.S. alliance. Jeju Island can significantly reduce accidental clashes and checks, as its naval base has already been built and is geographically far from China. It is safe to choose an area as far as possible away from China if Korea needs to build and upgrade its missile defense bases. This is both a way to save the lives of the soldiers involved and to save the lives of local residents. Jeju is in a good position to receive stable and timely supplies of weapons related to the defense industry because it is close to Changwon. And Jeju Island is well positioned to receive stable rice from grain regions such as Jeolla-do and Chungcheong-do. Jeju Island can contribute to the development of a win-win industry if it receives supply from nearby regions because it produces less rice and produces less rice on its own. When Korea builds a missile defense base while upgrading its military base in Jeju, it is important to lay the foundation for win-win development in connection with local industries and develop the local economy.

Progress in understanding animal function has been tremendously facilitated by research conducted at field stations that provide access to locations, organisms and equipment not otherwise available in more traditional urban universities or research institutions. In this Perspective, we focus on the history and contributions of one such facility, the Concord Field Station (CFS), established under the auspices of the Museum of Comparative Zoology of Harvard University. Originally constructed as a US Army Nike missile defense site in the late 1950s, the site was acquired by Harvard University in 1963. Professor C. Richard Taylor was appointed as the first Faculty Director in 1969 and subsequently Andrew Biewener was recruited as the CFS Faculty Director in 1998. Research generated by CFS faculty, students and collaborators over the years has proven fundamental in a number of key areas of organismal biology, including the study of allometric scaling, locomotor mechanics and the design of vertebrate respiratory, cardiovascular and muscular systems. Research at the CFS has used a diversity of animals to investigate key physiological and mechanical questions. Field stations can have an outsized impact on research in broad areas of biological inquiry, and the CFS at Harvard has played a foundational role in studies of the functional biology of animals and is uniquely placed to make substantial future contributions to the field.

Problem Statement. The state border with Russia spans 2,295 km out of Ukraine’s total border length of nearly 6,993 km, which includes 1,355 km of maritime boundaries. The development of the State Border Guard and Protection System as a Component of National Security is driven by diverse threats emerging in the border area. The main challenges were caused by Russia’s war against Ukraine, which has led to the temporary occupation of parts of Ukraine’s territory, active hostilities, terrorist attacks, and an increase in the smuggling of weapons, ammunition, and other means of warfare. Today, ensuring an adequate level of border security and protection requires the enhancement of engineering and technical infrastructure along Ukraine’s state border and the demarcation lines resulting from occupying parts of the country. The purpose of the article is to analyze the historical experience of organizing the protection of Ukraine’s state borders, modern domestic and international practices of border engineering and technical arrangements, and to develop a concept for the future post-war design of Ukraine’s border and demarcation line. Conclusion. Russia’s war against Ukraine, launched in 2014 with the occupation of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions, has necessitated a fundamental rethinking of Ukraine’s engineering and technical border arrangements. Given that Ukraine borders an aggressive neighbor, Russia, and its satellite state, Belarus, the military threat of invasion will remain into the post-war period. Drawing on lessons from full-scale warfare, Ukraine now requires a comprehensive, multi-layered defense system for its borders and demarcation lines, integrating: physical barriers (fortifications, minefields), digital technologies (radars, thermal cameras, smart sensors, drones, cyber defenses), and active deterrence (missile defense systems, “drone walls”). This concept should be used to develop the engineering and technical arrangement of the border and demarcation line between Ukraine and Russia.

Background: Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear arms control has undergone profound challenges due to weakening treaties and rapid military innovations. The expiration of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 and the near-lapse of the New START Treaty in 2021 created a dangerous vacuum in global security frameworks. Rising geopolitical tensions, particularly between Russia and the West, have escalated fears of renewed arms races that jeopardize decades of achievements in disarmament and nonproliferation. Objective: The study aimed to evaluate the consequences of weakened arms control mechanisms in the post–Cold War era and to assess the potential pathways for strengthening strategic stability through renewed dialogue and treaty frameworks. Methods: A qualitative research design was employed using thematic analysis to examine a wide range of secondary sources, including international treaties, governmental reports, non-governmental policy papers, and academic literature. Inclusion criteria required documents to directly address nuclear arms control, disarmament, and strategic stability. Data were coded iteratively, with triangulation from multiple sources to ensure credibility and minimize bias. Ethical standards of scholarship were upheld, and no human participants were involved. Results: Findings revealed that global stockpiles reduced dramatically from nearly 63,000 nuclear warheads in 1986 to approximately 8,300 today. However, Russia and the United States remain responsible for more than 90% of these weapons and continue expansive modernization programs, including new missile systems, submarines, and strategic bombers. The study identified that the absence of effective verification protocols was a major factor in the collapse of the INF Treaty, and without the renewal of New START to at least 2026, a further erosion of transparency and trust is imminent. Additionally, the integration of emerging technologies—hypersonic weapons, ballistic missile defense, and cyber systems—was found to destabilize the traditional notion of mutual vulnerability. Conclusion: The study concludes that arms control remains indispensable for global security and stability. Renewing the New START Treaty and integrating broader issues such as third-party arsenals, advanced delivery systems, and space- or cyber-based military capabilities are critical. Strengthened verification measures and revitalized multilateral dialogue are essential for reactivating NATO–Russia cooperation and advancing a verifiable, sustainable path toward disarmament.

ABSTRACT The development of new conventional counterforce systems and improved missile defence systems enables non-nuclear states to directly influence the strategic nuclear balance. These dynamics increase the possibility of strategic arms racing spillovers, where arms racing in one dyad yields capabilities that threaten third parties’ arsenals and thus creates a type of security dilemma. It also increases the risk of non-nuclear allies entrapping their nuclear patrons in strategic arms racing. We illustrate this argument via the case of North and South Korea’s arms racing.

Every new U.S. administration adopts and publishes a series of key documents outlining the official stance on the most pressing domestic and foreign policy issues. Among the latter issues of war and peace, the assessment of threats and challenges to international security and the role of military force and nuclear weapons in ensuring it occupy not the last place. At the same time, each succeeding administration inevitably adjusts its predecessors’ views on these matters, especially if they belong to a rival political party. In this context, the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2025 creates a special intrigue. To under- stand both the contours of the updated U.S. strategy in the field of international security and its correlation with the approaches of previous administrations, the authors examine the key American political and military planning documents across the following issue areas: 1) overall assessments of the international situation; 2) perceived major security threats and challenges; 3) likely adversaries of the United States; 4) the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. security policy; 5) views on strategic stability and strategic deterrence; 6) requirements for the U.S. nuclear forces; 7) priorities within nuclear forces modernization programs; and 8) positions on nuclear arms control. The authors conclude that the new Trump administration will undoubtedly introduce certain modifications to the strategic planning documents adopted under Joe Biden, particularly in terms of strengthening the role of nuclear weapons in security policy and advancing missile defense systems. The strategy’s primary focus will likely shift toward China, while Russia-related issues may be deemed less pressing and more manageable in terms of U.S. interests. Meanwhile, nuclear arms control will recede, although efforts to engage China in these activities may continue. Mapped out modernization programs for U.S. strategic nuclear forces will remain intact but could be supplemented by expanded missile defense initiatives. In general, the U.S. security policy is expected to take a more assertive stance, demanding swift and effective resolution of all existing and potential challenges in this domain.