Minimum Regulatory Capital Requirements Research Articles

The role of the banks' rating system in the allocation of loans

The subject of this paper is the analysis of the application of banking internal credit risk measurement models for the purpose of calculating the minimum regulatory capital. The Basel Committee established proposals for an internal rating-based approach (IRB approach-internal rating-based) to capital requirements for credit risk. Such an approach, which relies on the bank's internal assessment of counterparties and exposures, can ensure two key objectives: the first is additional risk sensitivity, in which capital requirements based on internal ratings can be much more sensitive on the drivers of credit risk of economic losses in the banking portfolio; the second is incentive compatibility, where the appropriate structure of the RBI approach can provide a framework that encourages banks to continue to improve their internal risk management practices. The internal ranking approach aims to improve the safety and soundness of the financial system. The paper defines the terminology and classification of the rating system. The probability of default (PD-probability at default) and the other two risk components LGD (loss given default) and EAD (exposure at default) are key input parameters for the calculation of regulatory capital. The rating system is, therefore, a significant driver of risk management and financial performance measurement. To be in a position to demonstrate to supervisors that an internal rating system should be used for the purposes of determining minimum regulatory capital requirements, banks must first demonstrate that the rating system is an integral part of their ongoing operations and risk management culture.

The Determinants of Credit Risk: An Evidence from ASEAN and GCC Islamic Banks

In less than a decade, the Islamic Banking (IB) industry has become an essential part of the global financial system. During the last ten years, the IB industry has witnessed changes in economic conditions and proved to be resilient during the periods of financial crisis. This paper aims to examine the important issues related to credit risk in selected Islamic banks in nine countries from Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regions. It employs the generalized least squares panel data regression, to estimate the ratio of non-performance financing to total financing as dependent variables and bank specific variables (BSV) to determine the credit risk. It uses 12 years of unbalanced panel data from 40 different Islamic banks. The overall findings show that financing quality has a significant positive effect on credit risk. It is observed that the larger IBs owned more assets with lower credit risk compared to smaller banks. The bank’s age is also an important factor influencing the credit risk level. Moreover, regulatory capital significantly reduces the credit risk exposure adherence to the minimum regulatory capital requirements which help IBs to manage their credit risk exposures. It was also observed that IBs were not affected by the global financial crisis due to less credit risk compared to the conventional banks.

Pricing Contingent Convertibles: A Derivatives Approach

This article provides an in-depth analysis of pricing and structuring of contingent convertibles (CoCos). These debt instruments convert into the equity of the issuing bank or suffer a write-down of the face value upon the appearance of a trigger event. This trigger mechanism provides an automatic strengthening of the capital structure of the bank. Equity is in this case injected on the very moment the bank is failing to meet the minimum regulatory capital requirements or when it is heading towards a state of non-viability. In this paper the pricing of CoCos is handled using two different approaches. The first approach starts from a credit derivatives background. A second approach tackles the pricing and structuring of a CoCo as an equity derivatives problem. Both models are applied on the CoCos issued by Lloyds and Credit Suisse and allow to quantify the risks embedded within each of these structures.

A regulatory stress test to-do list: Transparency and accuracy

Regulatory stress tests use forecasts of bank performance over hypothetical multi-year stress scenarios to set minimum regulatory capital requirements. Notwithstanding their popularity among US and European regulators, little is known about the accuracy of supervisory stress test models. Regulators keep the details of their stress test models confidential, inhibiting an independent verification of regulatory model performance. Using data from the 2008 financial crisis, this paper demonstrates how the lack of transparency and model inaccuracy have the potential to create costly misallocations of banking resources.

Capital Adequacy, Bank Behavior and Crisis: Evidence from Emergent Economies

Using the simultaneous equations model, this paper examines the impact of capital requirements on bank risk-taking during the recent financial crisis. It also explores the relationship between capital and risk decisions and the impact of economic instability on this relationship. By analyzing the data of 46 commercial banks between 2004 and 2014 from four Middle East countries, the study concludes a positive effect of regulatory pressure on bank capital and bank risk taking. The findings reveal also that banks close to the minimum regulatory capital requirements improve their capital adequacy by increasing their capital and decreasing their risk taking. Furthermore, the results show that economic crisis positively affects bank risk changes, suggesting that banks react to the impact of uncertainty by increasing their risk taking. Finally, the estimations show a positive correlation between banks profitability and increase in capital, indicating that profitable banks can more easily improve their capitalization through retained earnings rather than issuing new securities. Keywords: bank regulation, risk taking, bank capital, crisis.

Do We Need a Separate Banking System? An Assessment

Motivated by the current discussion on different separate banking systems, we provide an overview of the different systems, question them and outline their effect on systemic stability and the German banking sector. The results show that the various separate banking systems only play a minor role in reducing and limiting systemic risk. They only marginally contribute to solving conflicts of interest and can even be detrimental to banking business diversification. A separate banking system could, however, facilitate banking supervision by reducing the banking system’s complexity. Furthermore, credible threats to not support investment banks with federal resources in times of crisis could lead to a more adequate incentives structure of suppliers of equity and outside capital. More efficient measures to further reduce systemic risk in the financial sector should, however, use different levers, such as additional minimum regulatory capital requirements.

Equity Incentives and Earnings Management: Evidence from the Banking Industry

We examine the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the banking industry. By focusing on this regulated industry and using industry-specific earnings management proxies, we provide evidence on the impact of regulation on earnings management arising from CEOs' equity incentives. We find that bank managers with high equity incentives are more likely to manage earnings, but only when capital ratios are closer to the minimum regulatory capital requirements. This finding indicates that in the banking industry, potential regulatory intervention induces, rather than mitigates, earnings management arising from equity incentives.

What We Know, Don't Know and Can't Know About Bank Risks: A View from the Trenches

This paper seeks to put forward a framework, from the perspective of practitioners and policymakers, for how the known, unknown, and unknowable vary by risk type within banking. We define total bank risk in terms of earnings volatility, which can be broken down into five major classes of risk: market, credit, asset/liability, operational, and business risks. For our purposes, risk is known (K) if it can be enumerated, in the sense of being identified, and quantified; it is unknown (U1) if the set of risks can be identified and enumerated but not meaningfully quantified; and it is unknowable (U2) if the existence of the risk or set of risks is not predictable ex ante, let alone quantifiable. Based on these definitions, we position the five sources of bank risk within the K, U1, U2 space based on evidence from industry practice and suggest that K decreases, and U1 and U2 increase, along a spectrum from market risk to credit risk, asset/liability risk, operational risk, and business risk. Using bank-level data we attempt to quantify or size both total bank risk and the contribution from each risk type based on a large sample of earnings volatility data for US bank holding companies over the 1986-2005 period. We find that a) total earnings volatility is protected by minimum regulatory capital requirements at implied credit rating levels ranging from about A- to BBB, depending on the sample; b) when allocating among the different risk types, market risk accounts for only about 5%, credit for almost half, structural interest rate risk for about 18%, and non-financial risks, including both operational and business risk, for about 30% of total risk; c) the diversification benefit, i.e., the difference between the whole and the sum of the parts, is about one-third. Not surprisingly, large banks also seem to experience fewer extreme adverse outcomes.

How accounting and auditing systems can counteract risk-shifting of safety-nets in banking: Some international evidence

This paper suggests that accounting and auditing systems can be effective devices to counteract tendencies for firm risk-taking associated with bank safety nets. Results are obtained from an international sample of publicly traded banks after controlling for other regulatory control devices for bank risk such as restrictions on banking activities, minimum regulatory capital requirements and official discipline. The efficacy of accounting and auditing systems in controlling bank risk diminishes with bank charter value and increases with moral hazard stemming from a country's deposit insurance. The results also indicate that accounting and auditing systems are complements for minimum capital requirements, but substitutes for restrictions on bank activities and official discipline.

Myth and reality of discriminatory power for rating systems

Under the Revised International Capital Framework, debtors’ credit ratings and probabilities of default in credit portfolios have a key role in determining minimum regulatory capital requirements. To measure discriminatory power of rating systems, methods such as the area under a ROC curve, the Accuracy Ratio and PowerStat are often used both in academic studies and in practice. This paper shows that these measures need to be interpreted with caution since their values hinge crucially on the characteristics of the portfolio under consideration and not just on the quality of the rating system.

Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks, Securities Firms and Insurance Companies

We examine why these regulatory differences exist and what they imply for differences in minimum capital requirements for position risk. We consider differences in the definition and measurement of regulatory capital and we quantify differences in the capital charges for position risk by reference to a model portfolio that contains a variety of financial instruments including equity, fixed income instruments, swaps, foreign exchange positions, and options - instruments that may appear in the portfolios of securities firms, banks or insurance companies. For most leading firms in the financial services industry, however, market forces, not minimum regulatory capital requirements, appear to play the dominant role in firms' capital decisions. Thus we conclude by considering measures to enhance market discipline.

Investment opportunity sets, accounting‐based regulatory contracts, and accounting discretion

Refers to previous research to suggest that US commercial bank managers use discretion to “manage” regulatory capital and that accounting discretion can influence a bank’s investment opportunity set (IOS) and therefore its share price. Challenges the assumption that using accounting discretion to manipulate contracting variables will only result in a redistribution of wealth. Develops a mathematical model based on Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and uses it to explore the bank manager’s optimal investment in risky assets, the constraint on investment choice produced by minimum regulatory capital requirements and how accounting discretion can reduce this. Shows that regulatory requirements do constrain a bank’s IOS but that discretion (e.g. over loan loss provisions) can only mitigate this if dividend and financing policies depend on the discretionary components.