Conflicts among nations are most often resolved by means of punishments or deprivations. Given the anarchic character of the international arena, countries have little incentive to abjure the potential gains from pursuing a conflictful course of action until the costs of continuing the conflict become inordinate. Nor do governments have a clear incentive to submit their disputes with one another to outside arbitration, since any negotiated settlement can only be enforced by the self-interested policies of the disputants themselves. Consequently, once armed conflict has broken out among countries, students of international relations generally expect it to persist until the costs of continued warfare become too high for one or both of the parties involved. In the words of Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, 'most crises pass through two distinct phases: first, a confrontation phase in which both parties are following coercive strategies, attempting to win either offensively or defensively; then a resolution phase in which either one party, clearly overpowered, perforce adopts a clearly accommodative strategy, while the stronger party continues on a clearly coercive track, or both parties, finding themselves roughly equal in bargaining power, converge toward a compromise settlement.'1 Conflict management under these circumstances entails raising the level of damage to the warring states to the point at which the material,
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