For the past two decades, the standard perception of the Mexican political system was more or less as follows. Following the Revolution and, even more so, the Cardenas presidency the Mexican political elite won the support of most of the country's peasantry and proletariat. Rather than continuing with its revolutionary policies, however, the post-1940 elite (particularly during the presidency of Aleman) used its 'popular' organizations to control rather than represent the masses while initiating a process of capitalist industrializa? tion. Subsequently, the PRI and its ancillary organizations were used to maintain social peace by the notorious process of 'co-optation and control' while income inequality grew alongside the power of the bourgeoisie. All of this was due to the logic of capitalist development to which the course of Mexican politics was increasingly subordinated. However, while earlier writers (Scott, Brandenburg) saw these developments as relatively benign and the more arbitrary and authoritarian elements of the system as on the whole transitional, later writers (Hansen, Johnson, Hellman and, in his later work, Cockroft) concentrated more on the system's repressiveness and remoteness from most of civil society. The watershed of this perceptual change was the Tlatelolco massacre of October 1968. Despite this shift, however, all of these writers implicitly or explicitly accepted the premises of desarrollo estabilisador. Work which was sufficiently recent to take account of Echeverria's presidency tended to dismiss it as an aberration, or as a heroic but doomed attempt to raise the ghost of Cardenas in a radically changed society. Indeed this perspective was shared by most non-academic observers of Mexico until about mid-1982. Faced with developments in and after 1982, it now seems clear that this textbook account of Mexican politics is either incomplete or outdated, and that a change of paradigm is necessary if one is to keep up effectively with the rapidly changing situation in that country. To put it briefly, it is no longer possible to regard Mexican capitalism as a success or to see the Mexican state as uncomplicatedly pro-middle class or pro-bourgeois (still less to see these sectors as uncomplicatedly pro-system). An early example of what will assuredly become a flood of revisionist writing is provided by Olsen (1985). Although the author (or was it the editors?) is excessively fond of post-dependencia jargon, the article does make some important points. It seeks to fit the Mexican economic crisis into the familiar pattern of late ISI crises (cf. pre-1964 Brazil) with the original policy leading to 'demand bottlenecks' and a halt to further expansion. In the Mexican context Olsen sees this crisis developing from the mid-1960s with
Read full abstract