Metacognitive Representations Research Articles

Contributions of tactile information to the sense of agency and its metacognitive representations.

Despite the ubiquitous presence of tactile information in our daily activities, studies of how we experience agency of our actions have rarely relied on manipulated visuo-tactile feedback. Instead, what is often manipulated are the distal (and arbitrarily associated) consequences of our actions. The few studies that did investigate whether tactile information contributes to the experience of agency have been limited to the binary assessment of tactile feedback about the outcome of an action being present or absent. Here, we went beyond the coarse comparison of agency with versus without tactile feedback and introduced instead an experimental manipulation where we could control the amount of mismatch between predictions and observations. Participants (N = 40) reached with their right hand toward a ridged plate with a specific orientation and saw online feedback that could match or differ from their action in one of three ways: the physical plate's orientation, the action's timing, or the hand's position in space. Absolute subjective ratings revealed that an increased mismatch in tactile information led to a diminished sense of agency, similar to what has been reported for spatial and temporal mismatches. Further, estimations of metacognitive efficiency revealed similar Mratios in identifying visuo-tactile violation predictions as compared to visuo-temporal violations (but lower than visuospatial). These findings emphasize the importance of tactile information in shaping our experience of acting voluntarily and show how this important component can be experimentally probed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Supplemental Material for Contributions of Tactile Information to the Sense of Agency and Its Metacognitive Representations

Supplemental Material for Contributions of Tactile Information to the Sense of Agency and Its Metacognitive Representations

Metacognitive judgments during visuomotor learning reflect the integration of error history.

People form metacognitive representations of their own abilities across a range of tasks. How these representations are influenced by errors during learning is poorly understood. Here, we ask how metacognitive confidence judgments of performance during motor learning are shaped by the learner's recent history of errors. Across four motor learning experiments, our computational modeling approach demonstrated that people's confidence judgments are best explained by a recency-weighted averaging of visually observed errors. Moreover, in the formation of these confidence estimates, people appear to reweight observed motor errors according to a subjective cost function. Confidence judgments were adaptive, incorporating recent motor errors in a manner that was sensitive to the volatility of the learning environment, integrating a shallower history when the environment was more volatile. Finally, confidence tracked motor errors in the context of both implicit and explicit motor learning but only showed evidence of influencing behavior in the latter. Our study thus provides a novel descriptive model that successfully approximates the dynamics of metacognitive judgments during motor learning.NEW & NOTEWORTHY This study examined how, during visuomotor learning, people's confidence in their performance is shaped by their recent history of errors. Using computational modeling, we found that confidence incorporated recent error history, tracked subjective error costs, was sensitive to environmental volatility, and in some contexts may influence learning. Together, these results provide a novel model of metacognitive judgments during motor learning that could be applied to future computational and neural studies at the interface of higher-order cognition and motor control.

Motor outcomes congruent with intentions may sharpen metacognitive representations

We can monitor our intentional movements and form explicit representations about our movements, allowing us to describe how we move our bodies. But it is unclear which information this metacognitive monitoring relies on. For example, when throwing a ball to hit a target, we might use the visual information about how the ball flew to metacognitively assess our performance. Alternatively, we might disregard the ball trajectory — given that it is not directly relevant to our goal — and metacognitively assess our performance based solely on whether we reached the goal of hitting the target. In two experiments we aimed to distinguish between these two alternatives and asked whether the distal outcome of a goal-directed action (hitting or missing a target) informs the metacognitive representations of our own movements. Participants performed a semi-virtual task where they moved their arm to throw a virtual ball at a target. After each throw, participants discriminated which of two ball trajectories displayed on the screen corresponded to the flight path of their throw and then rated their confidence in this decision. The task included two conditions that differed on whether the distal outcome of the two trajectories shown matched (congruent) or differed (incongruent). Participants were significantly more accurate in discriminating between the two trajectories, and responded faster in the incongruent condition and, accordingly, were significantly more confident on these trials. Crucially, we found significant differences in metacognitive performance (measured as meta-d’/d’) between the two conditions only on successful trials, where the virtual ball had hit the target. These results indicate that participants successfully incorporated information about the outcome of the movement into both their discrimination and confidence responses. However, information about the outcome selectively sharpened the precision of confidence ratings only when the outcome of their throw matched their intention. We argue that these findings underline the separation between the different levels of information that may contribute to body monitoring, and we provide evidence that intentions might play a central role in metacognitive motor representations.

Impaired metacognition and reduced neural signals of decision confidence in adults with traumatic brain injury.

Metacognition reflects our capacity to monitor or evaluate other cognitive states as they unfold during task performance, for example, our level of confidence in the veracity of a memory. Impaired metacognition is seen in patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI) and substantially impacts their ability to manage functional difficulties during recovery. Recent evidence suggests that metacognitive representations reflect domain-specific processes (e.g., memory vs. perception) acting jointly with generic confidence signals mediated by widespread frontoparietal networks. The impact of neurological insult on metacognitive processes across different cognitive domains following TBI remains unknown. To assess metacognitive accuracy, we measured decision confidence across both a perceptual and memory task in patients with TBI (n = 27) and controls (n = 28). During the metacognitive tasks, continuous electroencephalography was recorded, and event-related potentials (ERP) were analyzed. First, we observed a deficit in metacognitive efficiency across both tasks suggesting that patients show a loss of perceptual and memorial evidence available for confidence judgments despite equivalent accuracy levels to controls. Second, a late positive-going ERP waveform (500-700 ms) was greater in amplitude for high versus low-confidence judgements for controls across both task domains. By contrast, in patients with TBI, the same ERP waveform did not vary by confidence level suggesting a deficient or attenuated neural marker of decision confidence postinjury. These findings suggest that diffuse damage to putative frontoparietal regions in patients disrupts domain-general metacognitive accuracy and electrophysiological signals that accumulate evidence of decision confidence. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Value, Confidence, Deliberation: A Functional Partition of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Demonstrated across Rating and Choice Tasks.

Deciding about courses of action involves minimizing costs and maximizing benefits. Decision neuroscience studies have implicated both the ventral and dorsal medial PFC (vmPFC and dmPFC) in signaling goal value and action cost, but the precise functional role of these regions is still a matter of debate. Here, we suggest a more general functional partition that applies not only to decisions but also to judgments about goal value (expected reward) and action cost (expected effort). In this conceptual framework, cognitive representations related to options (reward value and effort cost) are dissociated from metacognitive representations (confidence and deliberation) related to solving the task (providing a judgment or making a choice). We used an original approach aimed at identifying consistencies across several preference tasks, from likeability ratings to binary decisions involving both attribute integration and option comparison. fMRI results in human male and female participants confirmed the vmPFC as a generic valuation system, its activity increasing with reward value and decreasing with effort cost. In contrast, more dorsal regions were not concerned with the valuation of options but with metacognitive variables, confidence being reflected in mPFC activity and deliberation time in dmPFC activity. Thus, there was a dissociation between the effort attached to choice options (represented in the vmPFC) and the effort invested in deliberation (represented in the dmPFC), the latter being expressed in pupil dilation. More generally, assessing commonalities across preference tasks might help in reaching a unified view of the neural mechanisms underlying the cost/benefit tradeoffs that drive human behavior.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Decision neuroscience studies have implicated the medial PFC in forming the cognitive representations that drive human choice behavior. However, different studies using different tasks have suggested somewhat inconsistent links between precise computational variables and specific brain regions. Here, we use fMRI to demonstrate a robust functional partition of the medial PFC that generalizes across tasks involving an estimation of goal value and/or action cost to provide a judgment or make a choice. This general functional partition makes a critical dissociation between neural representations of decisional factors (the expected costs and benefits attached to a given option) and metacognitive estimates (confidence in the judgment or choice, and effort invested in the deliberation process).

Analysing the Relationship Between Mental Load or Mental Effort and Metacomprehension Under Different Conditions of Multimedia Design

Cognitive load theory assumes effort may only lead to comprehension if the material-induced load leaves enough resources for learning processes. Therefore, multimedia materials should induce as little non-relevant load as possible. Metacognition research assumes that learners tap into their memory processes to generate a mental representation of their comprehension to regulate learning. However, when judging their comprehension, learners need to make inferences about actual understanding using cues such as their experienced mental load and effort during learning. Theoretical assumptions would assume both to affect understanding and its metacognitive representation (metacomprehension). However, the question remains how perceived effort and load are related to metacomprehension judgments while learning with multimedia learning material. Additionally, it remains unclear if this varies under different conditions of multimedia design. To better understand the relationship between perceived mental load and effort and comprehension and metacomprehension under different design conditions of multimedia material, we conducted a randomised between-subjects study (N = 156) varying the design of the learning material (text-picture integrated, split attention, active integration). Mediation analyses testing for both direct and indirect effects of mental load and effort on metacomprehension judgments showed various effects. Beyond indirect effects via comprehension, both mental load and effort were directly related to metacomprehension, however, this seems to vary under different conditions of multimedia design, at least for mental effort. As the direction of effect can only be theoretically assumed, but was not empirically tested, follow-up research needs to identify ways to manipulate effort and load perceptions without tinkering with metacognitive processes directly. Despite the limitations due to the correlative design, this research has implications for our understanding of cognitive and metacognitive processes during learning with multimedia.

Motor Outcomes Congruent with Intentions May Sharpen Metacognitive Representations

Motor Outcomes Congruent with Intentions May Sharpen Metacognitive Representations

Interoceptive Awareness Is Negatively Related to the Exteroceptive Manipulation of Bodily Self-Location.

The perception of being located within one’s body (i.e., bodily self-location) is an essential feature of everyday self-experience. However, by manipulating exteroceptive input, healthy participants can easily be induced to perceive themselves as being spatially dislocated from their physical bodies. It has previously been suggested that interoception, i.e., the processing of inner physiological signals, contributes to the stability of body representations; however, this relationship has not previously been tested for different dimensions of interoception and bodily self-location. In the present study, using an advanced automatized setup, we systematically manipulated participants’ perspective of their own body (first- vs third-person perspective) as well as the synchrony of visuotactile stimulation (synchronous vs asynchronous). The malleability of bodily self-location was assessed using a questionnaire targeting in-body and out-of-body experiences. Participants also performed a heartbeat discrimination task to assess their interoceptive accuracy (behavioral performance), interoceptive sensibility (confidence in their interoceptive abilities), and interoceptive awareness (meta-cognitive representation of interoceptive signals). Bodily self-location was significantly influenced by perspective, with third-person perspective being associated with stronger out-of-body experiences compared to first-person perspective. Furthermore, there was a significant perspective × stimulation interaction, with subsequent analyses showing that participants reported out-of-body experiences particularly under third-person perspective combined with synchronous visuotactile stimulation. Correlation and regression analyses revealed that meta-cognitive interoceptive awareness was specifically and negatively related to the exteroceptively mediated malleability of body experiences. These results indicate that the perception of the self being located within one’s body relies on the interaction of exteroceptive input and higher-order interoceptive abilities. This has implications for theoretical considerations about the bodily self in health as well as for the understanding of disturbed bodily self-processing in clinical contexts.

Enacting Thinking: Supporting Teacher Candidates in Modeling Writing Strategies

ABSTRACT Instructor modeling of metacognitive processes has been shown to support student learning. Teacher educators have leveraged this research to support teacher candidates in framing, decomposing, and explaining disciplinary thinking and decision-making, particularly in reading development. However, little work has focused on supporting teacher candidates’ use of similar pedagogical moves when teaching writing. This project investigated teacher candidates modeling of writing before and after instruction aimed to support their ability to model. What we noticed was a trajectory of learning to frame, decompose, explain, and highlight writing content using visual and metacognitive representations to make the cognitive processes of writing more visible. However, we noted places for growth in teacher candidates’ knowledge of content and students, so that candidates might more aptly decompose and highlight their disciplinary thinking in ways that are appropriate for the teaching context.

Metacognition deficits and impulsivity in Parkinson’s Disease patients with and without gambling behavior: A pilot study

IntroductionImpaired metacognition and impulsivity are critical factors in pathological gambling behavior subsistence. This study aims at jointly exploring metacognitive skills and impulsivity levels in subgroups of Parkinson’s Disease (PD) patients with different gambling status. Method48 PD participants were divided into three subgroups: PD Gamblers (PDG), PD patients with a previous history of gambling and PD controls. Impulsivity was assessed by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. After performing the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), patients filled in a self-report measure to assess their metacognitive strategies. ResultsFindings highlighted that PDG showed higher levels of impulsivity than PD controls as reflected by clinical scales and behavioral measure. Also, PDG displayed a worse performance at IGT although they stated to use an efficacious strategy, suggesting then an erroneous metacognitive representation. ConclusionsOverall findings proposed that high levels of impulsivity combined with an explicit metacognitive bias on self-efficacy could intervene in the persistence of pathological gambling behavior in PD patients.

Knowing Ourselves Together: The Cultural Origins of Metacognition.

Metacognition – the ability to represent, monitor and control ongoing cognitive processes – helps us perform many tasks, both when acting alone and when working with others. While metacognition is adaptive, and found in other animals, we should not assume that all human forms of metacognition are gene-based adaptations. Instead, some forms may have a social origin, including the discrimination, interpretation, and broadcasting of metacognitive representations. There is evidence that each of these abilities depends on cultural learning and therefore that cultural selection might shape human metacognition. The cultural origins hypothesis is a plausible and testable alternative that directs us towards a substantial new programme of research.

The Identification of Mathematics Students’ Characteristic and Metacognitive Level in Mathematical Problem Solving State University of Medan

Metacognition is needed in solving mathematics problem. It is defined as the knowledge, awareness, and control of one’s thinking process. In solving mathematics problem, not all students are able to use their metacognitive thinking processes. The objective of this research was to describe Mathematics Students characteristics and level of metacognition in mathematical problem solving and to know students’ metacognitive scaffolding question in answer the question of problem solving at second semester Universitas Negeri Medan. This research use qualitative data which is described to get the students’ metacognitive representation in mathematical problems. That is why this research is included in descriptive qualitative research. The subject in this research is the whole mathematics students’ who’s taking Geometry analitic at State University of Medan. The students’ given test then grouped into three groups that us high level ability, medium and low ability. Every group is taken two subjects to have interview to get more credible data. Then, the data is analyzed to get conclusion from each group. The result of the research is obtained that the high level ability students has reflective cognitive use. Medium level ability students have strategic metacognitive use. Low level ability students have aware use and tacit use. Scaffolding questions given in the test should be help students in completing the problem. From the result of this research is hoped will be source of information and input material for mathematics lecturer, researchers, and all side which needed especially in Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Science State University of Medan’s environment.

Релевантность понятий «гештальт», «фигура», «фон», «фокус» для анализа концептуальной области «кажимости»

The paper suggests the metacognitive representation of the conceptual framework of кажимость gestalt. The metacognitive representation is based on the inferential conclusions obtained by cognitive-discursive analysis of the functioning contexts of polysemous verbal predicates казаться, показаться. The Gestalt script includes native speakers’ experience conceptualized in the semantics of contexts. This experience can be presented by the following meta-utterances: The speaker knows that it is not possible to see an object being observed properly from afar, i.e. the first impression of it could turn out to be mistaken. The speaker also knows that it is possible to come closer to the object afterwards and observe it, i.e. to re-verify the results of perception empirically. This allows them to form a more complete idea / knowledge about the object. Subsequently, the speaker reflects on his first visual impression based on the received idea / knowledge, evaluates it as “true” or “false”. In addition, the speaker is aware that there are particular circumstances under which effect the visual images of objects in the real world are distorted and the recipient receives visual illusions. In the paper, a cognitive Gestalt script was formed. Based on it, all contexts with the words казаться, показаться are built. Due to the dialectical combination of perceptual and epistemic modes, a single /unified Gestalt script consists of two parts. On the one hand, there is supposed to be a subject-experiencer as well as his perceptual act, the object he observes, the first, potentially erroneous /distorted image of the object. There should also be a potential opportunity to implement an act of reflexive verification of the first impression and establish the truth. On the other hand, there is supposed to be the subject as a bearer of knowledge, his knowledge of the distorted character of the subject-experiencer's perception as well as his knowledge of the inconsistency between the subject-experiencer's first impression and what exists in reality. In addition, there should be implicit / explicit awareness of the reasons that led to the distortion of the perception results. The author demonstrates the integrity of the conceptual semantics of the Gestalt script. The correlation between the conceptual level and the level of language semantics is shown in a sketchy way in terms of figure, background, and focus. The author also describes focus shifts which underlie the construction of different contexts - background and figure.

The Disambiguation Prediction Effect

ABSTRACTChildren tend to select a novel object rather than a familiar object when asked to identify the referent of a novel label. Current accounts of this so-called disambiguation effect do not address whether children have a general metacognitive representation of this way of determining the reference of novel labels. In two experiments (each N = 48), three- and four-year-olds received a prediction task that required such a representation. In the initial phase, children completed four disambiguation test trials that were presented as instances of the same “game.” In the next phase, they received four additional trials. These differed only in that before the label was presented, children were asked to predict which object “was going to be right.” On the first prediction trial, most four-year-olds predicted the novel object, whereas most three-year-olds did not. On subsequent trials, despite having received feedback regarding predictions, three-year-olds showed no tendency to begin to predict the novel object, whereas most four-year-olds continued to make this prediction. These findings add to the evidence that most children develop a general metacognitive representation of their tendency to map novel labels onto novel rather than familiar objects some time around their fourth birthday.

T149. METACOGNITIVE DEFICITS IN INTEROCEPTION ARE ASSOCIATED WITH DISSOCIATIVE EXPERIENCES IN PATIENTS WITH FIRST EPISODE PSYCHOSIS

BackgroundDissociative experiences, including depersonalization and derealisation, represent perturbations of consciousness and selfhood, and are commonly reported by patients during early stages of a psychotic illness. The continuity and integrity of a conscious sense of self is proposed to be grounded upon the control of internal physiological state and its predictive representation through interoception, i.e. the sensing of internal bodily changes. We tested the hypothesized relationship between dissociation and interoceptive deficits in patients with first episode psychosis (FEP), combining behavioural testing with functional neuroimaging.MethodsIndividuals with first episode psychosis (N=41) and matched community control participants (N=21) performed an interoceptive task (heart-tone synchrony judgments) during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Trial-by-trial confidence ratings indexed subjective performance, and measures of metacognitive interoceptive awareness (insight) were derived from confidence-accuracy correspondence. We tested for regional brain activity relating to dissociative symptom scores and objective, subjective and metacognitive aspects of interoception.ResultsIn patients with FEP, metacognitive impairments in interoception predicted magnitude of dissociative symptoms, accompanied by hypoactivation of right insula cortex. Other dimensions of interoception, and accuracy, confidence and metacognitive insight on an exteroceptive task were unrelated to dissociative symptoms and there were no group differences between FEP patient and control groups.DiscussionOur findings suggest that symptoms of disturbed conscious integrity and selfhood in early psychosis arise through selective disruption of higher-order metacognitive representations of interoceptive signals. Brain systems supporting the conscious integration of bodily feelings may represent a target for interventions to enhance functioning and, speculatively, mitigate illness progression in psychosis.

Domain-General and Domain-Specific Patterns of Activity Supporting Metacognition in Human Prefrontal Cortex.

Metacognition is the capacity to evaluate the success of one's own cognitive processes in various domains; for example, memory and perception. It remains controversial whether metacognition relies on a domain-general resource that is applied to different tasks or if self-evaluative processes are domain specific. Here, we investigated this issue directly by examining the neural substrates engaged when metacognitive judgments were made by human participants of both sexes during perceptual and memory tasks matched for stimulus and performance characteristics. By comparing patterns of fMRI activity while subjects evaluated their performance, we revealed both domain-specific and domain-general metacognitive representations. Multivoxel activity patterns in anterior prefrontal cortex predicted levels of confidence in a domain-specific fashion, whereas domain-general signals predicting confidence and accuracy were found in a widespread network in the frontal and posterior midline. The demonstration of domain-specific metacognitive representations suggests the presence of a content-rich mechanism available to introspection and cognitive control.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT We used human neuroimaging to investigate processes supporting memory and perceptual metacognition. It remains controversial whether metacognition relies on a global resource that is applied to different tasks or if self-evaluative processes are specific to particular tasks. Using multivariate decoding methods, we provide evidence that perceptual- and memory-specific metacognitive representations coexist with generic confidence signals. Our findings reconcile previously conflicting results on the domain specificity/generality of metacognition and lay the groundwork for a mechanistic understanding of metacognitive judgments.

The metacognitive disambiguation effect

ABSTRACTFrom an early age, children show a tendency to map novel labels onto unfamiliar rather than familiar kinds of objects. Accounts of this tendency have not addressed whether children develop a metacognitive representation of what they are doing. In 3 experiments (each N = 48), preschoolers received a test of the metacognitive disambiguation effect, which involved deciding whether the referent of a novel label was located in a bucket of things “I know” or bucket of things “I don’t know.” Most 4-year-olds passed this test, whereas most 3-year-olds did not. Children’s performance was predicted by their ability to report whether various words and pseudowords were ones that they knew, even after age and vocabulary size were controlled. As children develop an awareness of their lexical knowledge/ignorance, they also develop a metacognitive representation of their tendency to map novel labels onto unfamiliar rather than familiar kinds.

Differential responses of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and right posterior superior temporal sulcus to spontaneous mentalizing.

Previous research suggests a role of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) in metacognitive representation of social information, while the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) has been linked to social perception. This study targeted these functional roles in the context of spontaneous mentalizing. An animated shapes task was presented to 46 subjects during functional magnetic resonance imaging. Stimuli consisted of video clips depicting animated shapes whose movement patterns prompt spontaneous mentalizing or simple intention attribution. Based on their differential response during spontaneous mentalizing, both regions were characterized with respect to their task-dependent connectivity profiles and their associations with autistic traits. Functional network analyses revealed highly localized coupling of the right pSTS with visual areas in the lateral occipital cortex, while the dmPFC showed extensive coupling with instances of large-scale control networks and temporal areas including the right pSTS. Autistic traits were related to mentalizing-specific activation of the dmPFC and to the strength of connectivity between the dmPFC and posterior temporal regions. These results are in good agreement with the hypothesized roles of the dmPFC and right pSTS for metacognitive representation and perception-based processing of social information, respectively, and further inform their implication in social behavior linked to autism. Hum Brain Mapp 38:3791-3803, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Confidence Leak in Perceptual Decision Making

People live in a continuous environment in which the visual scene changes on a slow timescale. It has been shown that to exploit such environmental stability, the brain creates a continuity field in which objects seen seconds ago influence the perception of current objects. What is unknown is whether a similar mechanism exists at the level of metacognitive representations. In three experiments, we demonstrated a robust intertask confidence leak—that is, confidence in one’s response on a given task or trial influencing confidence on the following task or trial. This confidence leak could not be explained by response priming or attentional fluctuations. Better ability to modulate confidence leak predicted higher capacity for metacognition as well as greater gray matter volume in the prefrontal cortex. A model based on normative principles from Bayesian inference explained the results by postulating that observers subjectively estimate the perceptual signal strength in a stable environment. These results point to the existence of a novel metacognitive mechanism mediated by regions in the prefrontal cortex.