Prior work has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs) are prone to an auditory metacognitive illusion such that loud words are given higher predictions than quiet words despite no differences in recall as a function of auditory intensity. The current study investigated whether judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs)—judgments that focus participants on whether or not recollective details will be remembered—are less susceptible to such an illusion. In Experiment 1, participants studied single words, making item-by-item JOLs or JORKs immediately after study. Indeed, although increased volume elevated judgement magnitude for both JOLs and JORKs, the effect was significantly attenuated when JORKs were elicited. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and additionally demonstrated that participants making JORKs were less likely than participants making JOLs to choose to restudy quiet words relative to loud words. Taken together, these results suggest that JORKs are impacted less—in terms of both metacognitive monitoring and control—by irrelevant perceptual information than JOLs. More generally, these data support the contention that metacognitive illusions can be attenuated by simply changing the way metacognitive judgments are solicited, an important finding given that subjective experiences guide self-regulated learning.

In this study the authors investigated whether children demonstrated the underconfidence-with-practice (UWP) effect. This effect is a highly robust metacognitive illusion in which adults become underconfident in their memory performance when asked to predict their memory for the same items across multiple study-test trials. One explanation for such underconfidence is the result of adults basing their predictions of future performance on how well they performed on the immediately previous trial and not adjusting their predictions upward for new learning. By contrast, previous research has demonstrated that young children's predictions are influenced minimally by their past performance. Thus, if using this memory-for-past-test heuristic is a major contributor to the UWP effect, young children may not demonstrate it. In two experiments, children were asked to predict their recall of the same pictures across multiple trials. In Experiments 1A and 1B, kindergarteners did not become underconfident with practice, whereas third graders did. In Experiment 2, first-graders did not exhibit the UWP effect even with an additional two trials. Correlational analyses suggested that memory for past test influences 3rd graders' predictions but did not consistently influence younger children's predictions. These findings implicate the role of the memory-for-past-test heuristic in the UWP effect and suggest that this metamemory illusion arises with maturation or schooling experiences.

In four experiments, we examined the effects of repetitions and variability on the learning of bird families and metacognitive awareness of such effects. Of particular interest was the accuracy of, and bases for, predictions regarding classification of novel bird species, referred to as category learning judgments (CLJs). Participants studied birds in high repetitions and high variability conditions. These conditions differed in the number of presentations of each bird (repetitions) and the number of unique species from each family (variability). After study, participants made CLJs for each family and were then tested. Results from a classification test revealed repetition benefits for studied species and variability benefits for novel species. In contrast with performance, CLJs did not reflect the benefits of variability. Results showed that CLJs were susceptible to accessibility-based metacognitive illusions produced by additional repetitions of studied items.

Prior work has demonstrated that the perceptual features of visually presented stimuli can have a strong influence on predictions of memory performance, even when those features are unrelated to recall (Rhodes & Castel, 2008). The present study examined whether this finding would hold in an auditory domain and influence study-choice allocation. Participants listened to words that varied in volume, made judgments of learning (JOLs) for each item, and were then administered a test of free recall. In Experiment 1, we showed that JOLs were influenced by volume, with loud words given higher JOLs than quiet words, and that volume had no influence on recall, illustrating a metacognitive illusion based on auditory information. In Experiment 2, we extended these findings to control processes and showed that participants were more likely to choose to restudy quiet words than loud words. These findings indicate that highly accessible auditory information is integrated into JOLs and restudy choices, even when this information does not influence actual memory performance.

Retrieval practice is a potent technique for enhancing learning, but how often do students practice retrieval when they regulate their own learning? In 4 experiments the subjects learned foreign-language items across multiple study and test periods. When items were assigned to be repeatedly tested, repeatedly studied, or removed after they were recalled, repeated retrieval produced powerful effects on learning and retention. However, when subjects were given control over their own learning and could choose to test, study, or remove items, many subjects chose to remove items rather than practice retrieval, leading to poor retention. In addition, when tests were inserted in the learning phase, attempting retrieval improved learning by enhancing subsequent encoding during study. But when students were given control over their learning they did not attempt retrieval as early or as often as they should to promote the best learning. The experiments identify a compelling metacognitive illusion that occurs during self-regulated learning: Once students can recall an item they tend to believe they have "learned" it. This leads students to terminate practice rather than practice retrieval, a strategy choice that ultimately results in poor retention.

Although perceptual information is utilized to judge size or depth, little work has investigated whether such information is used to make memory predictions. The present study examined how the font size of to-be-remembered words influences predicted memory performance. Participants studied words for a free-recall test that varied in font size and made judgments of learning (JOLs) for each item. JOLs were influenced by font size, as larger font sizes were given higher JOLs, whereas little relationship was evident between font size and recall. The effect was modified when other, more valid, sources of information (e.g., associative strength) were available when JOLs were made and persisted despite experience with multiple study-test sessions, use of a forgetting scale to assess predictions, and explicit warning of participants that font size has little effect on memory performance. When ease of reading was manipulated, such that large font size words were made less fluent, the effect was eliminated. Thus, highly accessible perceptual cues can strongly influence JOLs, likely via encoding fluency, and this effect can lead to metacognitive illusions

In three experiments, learning performance in a 6- or 7-week cognitive-science based computer-study programme was compared to equal time spent self-studying on paper. The first two experiments were conducted with grade 6 and 7 children in a high risk educational setting, the third with Columbia University undergraduates. The principles the programme implemented included (1) deep, meaningful, elaborative, multimodal processing, (2) transfer-appropriate processing, (3) self-generation and multiple testing of responses, and (4) spaced practice. The programme was also designed to thwart metacognitive illusions that would otherwise lead to inappropriate study patterns. All three experiments showed a distinct advantage in final test performance for the cognitive-science based programme, but this advantage was particularly prominent in the children.

Previous research indicated that learners experience an illusion of competence during learning (termed foresight bias) because judgments of learning (JOLs) are made in the presence of information that will be absent at test. The authors examined the following 2 procedures for alleviating foresight bias: enhancing learners' sensitivity to mnemonic cues pertaining to ease of retrieval and inducing learners to resort to theory-based judgments as a basis for JOLs. Both procedures proved effective in mending metacognitive illusions-as reflected in JOLs and self-regulation of study time-but only theory-based debiasing yielded transfer to new items. The results support the notion that improved metacognition is 1 key to optimizing transfer but also that educating subjective experience does not guarantee generalization to new situations.