REVIEWS155 In sum, this book strikes one as a possible response to the editors' realization that their series lacked a medieval volume. Its texts ultimately isolated from currents they might have created or in which they may have shared, To the Glory ofHer Sexwill be useful primarily as a reference of first instance. JOHN CARMI PARSONS University ofToronto j.F. verbruggen, The Art ofWarfare in Western Europe During the Middle Agesfrom the Eighth Century to 1340. 2nd ed., revised and enlarged. Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1997. Pp. x, 388. 6 leaves of plates, isbn: 0-85115-630. $71. In 1954, the eminent Belgian histotian J.F. Vetbruggen published De Krijgskunst in West-Europa in deMiddeleeuwen I)C tot begin XlV'eeuw. This work was subsequently ttanslated into English by Sumner Willard and Mrs. R.W. Southern, published in a somewhat abridged form twenty years ago by North Holland, and immediately recognized as the best survey ofmedieval warfare then available in English, although priced too high for much ofits potential audience. Now we have what is described as a revised and enlarged edition, published in Britain as part of the series Warfare in History under the general editorship ofMatthew Bennett. Actually, this edition appeats to be the same translation of the original work, with the inclusion of footnotes and restotation ofthose sections omitted from the eatlier English edition. What made Verbruggen's work so important was his insistence that eatlier military historians, including those best known to readers of English, had failed to give the narrative sources a sufficiently careful and critical reading. As a consequence, they tended to exaggerate the size of medieval armies and to treat medieval battles as disorganized brawls consisting mainly ofindividual combats and lacking any tactical coherence. Verbruggen's reading of the sources led him to conclude that military forces were much smaller than fotmerly claimed, that mounted warriors regulatly fought in groups as small tactical units, and that commanders showed considerable tactical skill in the maneuvering and ordering ofthese units. In the decades since his book originally appeared, Verbruggen's arguments have generally prevailed, and his influence can be seen in many more recent wotks on medieval military history. Aside from its important central thesis, the great sttength ofthe book isVerbruggen's careful reconstruction of vatious famous battles, occupying large parts of the third and fourth chapters (on 'Footsoldiers' and 'General Tactics,' respectively). These chapters are preceded by a short but important one on 'Historiographical Problems' and a long one on 'The Knights.' Despite his attention to othet kinds of fighting men, Verbruggen has limited his study to the centuries in which European warfare was dominated by heavy cavalry, and these knights necessarily dominate the entire work. Geographical coverage ofmedieval warfare is very uneven. Most ofthe evidence is drawn from the Middle East during the century of the first three crusades or from campaigns fought in or near the Low Countries. Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Slavic Europe are not neglected, but Spain and Scandinavia are virtually ignoted, as 156arthuriana is Byzantium except in connection with the crusades. Battles receive vastly more treatment than sieges despite the importance ofthe latter in medieval warfare. Castles are mentioned almost in passing and in connection with defensive warfare, with no attention to their role in an offensive strategy or in the evolution ofmilitary society. These aspects of uneven coverage are the most notable teminder that we are reading a fortyyear-old book. The editor dealswith the problem ofout-datedness by furnishing a full and up-to-date bibliography and supplying, in brackets, occasional addenda to footnotes, indicating when a more recent work has provided an important new perspective. Surprisingly, however, there are no maps, not even the very helpful battle plans that appeared in the previous English edition. Verbruggen's topical arrangement, while effective in making his basic point, does not leave the teader with any consciousness of chronological development. We get little sense ofthe evolution ofarmor, weapons, fortifications, and tactics over a period of several centuries, or whether, and to what extent, medieval commanders learned from the successes and failutes oftheir predecessors. Verbruggen's decision not to go beyond the early fourteenth century may have been...
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Jan 1, 2007
David S Bachrach 
Open Access