Means-end Relationship Research Articles

Dreaming of AI: environmental sustainability and the promise of participation

AbstractThere is widespread consensus among policymakers that climate change and digitalisation constitute the most pressing global transformations shaping human life in the 21st century. Seeking to address the challenges arising at this juncture, governments, technologists and scientists alike increasingly herald artificial intelligence (AI) as a vehicle to propel climate change mitigation and adaptation. In this paper, we explore the intersection of digitalisation and climate change by examining the deployment of AI in government-led climate action. Building on participant observations conducted in the context of the “Civic Tech Lab for Green”—a government-funded public interest AI initiative—and eight expert interviews, we investigate how AI shapes the negotiation of environmental sustainability as an issue of public interest. Challenging the prescribed means–end relationship between AI and environmental protection, we argue that the unquestioned investment in AI curtails political imagination and displaces discussion of climate “problems” and possible “solutions” with “technology education”. This line of argumentation is rooted in empirical findings that illuminate three key tensions in current coproduction efforts: “AI talk vs. AI walk”, “civics washing vs. civics involvement” and “public invitation vs. public participation”. Emphasising the importance of re-exploring the innovative state in climate governance, this paper extends academic literature in science and technology studies that examines public participation in climate change adaptation by shedding light on the emergent phenomenon of public interest AI.

도덕교육과 행복: 교육윤리학의 관점

Ethics, to be genuinely meaningful, must thoroughly elucidate the intricate relationship between knowledge, virtue, and happiness. Educational ethics represents the perspective that this relationship can be justly addressed within a life dedicated to the pursuit of schola, or in simpler terms, a life devoted to education. An ethics that assumes virtue can be determined independently of, or prior to, the practice of moral education, a so-called philosophical ethics, leaves room for an understanding of the relationship between practice and virtue as a means―end relationship, and further imposes on life and education the covert but insistent demand that the realization of ends requires heroic effort. In philosophical ethics, happiness is a question that is always left unanswered. On the other hand, modern virtue ethics rejects the foundation assumed by philosophical ethics, thereby diminishing the significance of happiness to the level of ease and comfort that can be enjoyed in a life without that foundation. If so, the topic of happiness can be a good starting point for exploring the possibility of a genuine ethics that contrasts with philosophical ethics but does not deny the metaphysical foundation. According to Thomas Aquinas, the acquisition of virtue is not something that can be guaranteed by heroic efforts against nature. The highest virtue lies not in the human determination to ‘regulate’ nature, but in the divine determination to ‘let’ nature be the master. The life of teaching and learning knowledge is a journey into a life where nature is master.

Feminist Transformation: Result of the Waves of Feminist Movement

This article is about feminist transformation. The main objective is to draw the connection of feminist transformation to waves and types of feminism. Document analysis has conducted under qualitative research design for drawing conclusion. The main intention of feminist transformation is to eradicate various forms of oppression and injustice that exist on the basis of gender difference. The right to vote and property ownership, legal and social rights and the use of social media for ending oppression were the achievement of the waves and these achievements were for feminist transformation. On the other hand, all feminism types have the same motive to end oppression on the basis of gender which makes feminist transformation easier. It is concluded that there is the means-end relationship between waves and types of feminism to feminist transformation. The saying and doing of people and authority must be same for true feminist transformation.

Cultivation of Compassion and Self-understanding: Liberal Education in J. J. Rousseau’s Emile

이 논문의 목적은, 장 자크 루소의 ｢에밀｣ 후반부에 들어있는 동정심의 함양을 위한 인문교육을 검토함으로써, 정서의 함양에 관한 교육적 시사점을 도출하는 데에 있다. ｢에밀｣의 청년기 교육은 동정심의 함양을 목적으로 역사, 철학(종교), 문학을 중심으로 한 인문교육으로 진행된다. 이 부분은 루소 교육이론을 이해하는 데에도, 그리고 교과교육과 정서 함양의 관련을 이해하는 데에도 매우 중요하다. 유소년기에 진행되는 직접적인 경험 위주의 자연교육과 달리, 청년기 교육은 독서를 통해 역사와 철학(종교)과 문학을 배우는 교육이다. 루소가 보기에, 청년기 이후의 본격적인 교육에서 가장 중요한 과제는, 자기애라는 원초적 정념의 힘을 억누르거나 통제하지 않고 이성의 도움을 받아 가능한 한 확장하도록 하는 데에 있다. 이렇게 확장되어 정의의 원리와 일치된 정념이 동정심이다. 그리고 동정심의 함양은, 특정 프로그램이나 훈련의 성과가 아니라, 자신의 자아를 새로운 시각으로 이해하는 인문 교과를 통해 이루어진다. 역사의 가치는 다른 사람의 경험을 자신의 시각으로 판단하는 데에, 철학의 가치는 사물의 질서 속에서 인간의 위치를 조망하는 데에 있으며, 문학과 예술의 가치는 자신의 취향을 일상의 행위 속에서 표현하는 데에 있다. 이렇게 볼 때, 도덕교육에서 정서의 함양은, 개별정서를 겨냥한 특수한 처치가 아니라, 일체의 교과들을 배우면서 얻게 되는 자아의 확장을 통해 가능하다. 이때 교과와 함양된 정서 사이의 관계는 수단-목적의 관계가 아니다. 그것은, 한 사람의 정서는, 교과를 잘 배운 사람이 응당 가질 수밖에 없는 자기이해의 표현이라는 뜻에서의, 필연적 관계이다.The purpose of this thesis is to derive educational implications for the cultivation of emotion by examining the liberal education for the cultivation of compassion in the latter half of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Emile. Youth education in Emile is conducted as liberal education centered on history, philosophy (religion), and literature for the purpose of cultivating sympathy. This part is very important in understanding Rousseau's educational theory and in understanding the relationship between subject education and emotional cultivation. Unlike nature education which focuses on direct experiences in childhood, youth education is an education that learns history, philosophy (religion), and literature through reading. In Rousseau's view, the most important task in full-fledged education after adolescence is not to suppress or control the power of the primordial passion of self-love(amour de soi), but to expand it as far as possible with the help of reason. The passion thus extended and in accord with the principle of justice is ‘compassion’. And the cultivation of compassion is not the result of a specific program or training, but through humanities subjects that understand one’s self from a new perspective. The value of history lies in judging the experience of others from one's own perspective, the value of philosophy lies in looking at man's place in the order of things, and the value of literature and art lies in expressing one's own tastes in daily activities. It is to express within. From this point of view, the cultivation of emotions in moral education is possible through the expansion of the self obtained while learning all subjects, not through special treatment aimed at individual emotions. At this time, the relationship between subjects and cultivated emotions is not a means-end relationship. It is a necessary relationship in the sense that a person's emotion is an expression of self-understanding that a person who has learned the subject well should have.

Proof theory for the logics of bringing-it-about: Ability, coalitions and means-end relationship

Abstract The logic of bringing-it-about (BIAT) aims to capture a notion of agency in which actions are analysed in terms of their results: ‘An agent does something’ means that the agent brings it about that something takes place. Our starting point is the basic BIAT logic as introduced by Elgesem in the ‘90s: this logic contains only a modal operator to express BIAT statements by single agents. Several extensions have been proposed by Elgesem himself and others, notably with the capability operator, coalitions of agents and means-end BIAT statements (i.e. of the form ‘the agent does B by doing A’). We first propose a variant of the neighbourhood semantics, called bi-neighbourhood semantics, for the basic BIAT logic and the mentioned extensions, in which a world is equipped by a set of pairs or neighbourhoods. Differently from the semantics defined in the literature, this reformulation is well suited for countermodel construction. We then introduce modular hypersequent calculi for all logics considered in this work. Our calculi enjoy the fundamental property of cut admissibility, from which it follows their completeness with respect to the axiomatization. Moreover, our calculi provide at the same time a decision procedure, as well as the first practical countermodel extraction procedure: from a single failed proof it is possible to build directly a finite countermodel of the formula under verification in the bi-neighbourhood semantics. By this last result, we obtain constructive proofs of the semantic completeness of the calculi and consequently of the finite model property for all logics.

The Goodness of Means: Instrumental and Relational Values, Causation, and Environmental Policies

Instrumental values are often considered to be inferior to intrinsic values. One reason for this is that instrumental values are extrinsic and rely on two factors: (a) a means–end relationship that is (b) conducive to something of final or intrinsic value. In this paper, I will investigate the conditions under which bearers of instrumental value are given different value or owed different levels of respect. Such conditions include the number of means that are conducive to something of final or intrinsic value as well as the form of causality that is implied. It will be suggested that different numbers and causal relations will imply different degrees of reverence or respect to the bearers of instrumental value. I will also critically investigate recent proposals such as relational values that allegedly go beyond the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. Drawing from this critical analysis, a nuanced picture of instrumental value will be provided.

A Hermeneutic Reading into "What Strategy is": Ambiguous Means-End Relationship

Given the underutilization of hermeneutic research in organizations and the recognition that we do not know what strategy is, we undertake a hermeneutic reading of authorial texts to develop a robust understanding of strategy. We enter into a self-reflexive dialogue with the text to accomplish a fusion of horizons where we hope to turn our prejudices into productive prejudices. In this dialogue, we utilize competing strategy paradigms within a framework that treats the means-end relationship and its underpinning rationality as central to our understanding. This study portrays strategy as a series of intended actions operating along the instrumental/objective - interpretive/subjective continuum, depending on the nature of the means-end relationship. We further contribute to knowledge by demonstrating how to apply hermeneutics to understand complex organizational concepts, and through the intendedness of strategy we emphasize management agency and dispense with the 'emergent strategy' notion, common in the literature.

The influence of customer loyalty program design on the relationship between customer motives and value perception

Despite the strong use in marketing practice, the effectiveness of loyalty programs is still heavily questioned among researchers. In our study we present an empirically tested framework that views customer loyalty programs (CLPs) with their differing designs as a moderating tool in a means-end relationship between customer motives and value. By disentangling customer value perceptions of loyalty programs we contribute to the remaining question of the efficacy of CLPs and set the road for further research. Our results support the argument that CLPs can be an effective tool and are not only something that adds to the value of a product or service, but rather creates value by itself. However, this is only the case for programs that target prevailing customer motives and hence provide a higher level of perceived value.

The Trouble with City of Boerne, and Why It Matters for the Fifteenth Amendment As Well

The Supreme Court's test for the constitutionality of state action and its test for the constitutionality of congressional legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment are out of synch with one another. When a plaintiff challenges state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, the degree of scrutiny varies with the type of claim. Racial classifications, for example, are examined under strict scrutiny. Most classifications, such as disability, age, or socioeconomic status, are examined on a rational basis. When Congress acts pursuant to its Section 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect rights, however, the Court has no corresponding spectrum of degrees of scrutiny. In this paper I argue that the Court should adopt the mirror image spectrum of scrutiny for congressional enactments pursuant to its Section 5 powers. For example, if Congress seeks to protect people from age discrimination or discrimination based on disability by permitting individuals to sue states without their consent in federal court, the plaintiff should have to show that he or she actually suffered a constitutional violation in the case at bar. If Congress seeks to protect people from race discrimination, the plaintiff should have to show only that there is a rational, means-end relationship between the congressional remedy and the targeted discrimination. Applying this test to the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits race discrimination in voting, the courts should apply rational, means-end scrutiny to statutes such as the Voting Rights Act, including the preclearance condition that is likely to come before the Supreme Court in the near future.

Reconsidering the Marxist-Anarchist Controversy in and Through Radical Praxis: Lessons Taken from the Greek Uprising, December 2008.

This paper reflects on the Greek revolt of December 2008 and reexamines the dispute between Marxism and anarchism in and through the social unrest. It argues that their polemic and intolerance should not be perceived as established and unchanging. Throughout the uprising, both Marxists and anarchists created a space of openness, united action and active solidarity overcoming their sectarianism and closure. The study considers that the two opposing currents could learn valuable lessons and draw significant conclusions from the radical practice of the insurgents concerning the critical organizational issue and the means-end relationship. It argues, also, that the revolted questioned the existing Marxist and anarchist presuppositions as regards the issues of state and time. The paper maintains that the continuation of the Marxist-anarchist conflict perpetuates the crisis of the international radical movement. It concludes that both Marxism and anarchism could play a constructive role in order to form a new radical alternative and return to the practical and theoretical broadmindedness of the First International. [Article copies available for a fee from The Transformative Studies Institute. E-mail address: journal@transformativestudies.org Website: http://www.transformativestudies.org ©2010 by The Transformative Studies Institute. All rights reserved.]

Factors behind Organizational Learning from Benchmarking: Experiences from Norwegian Municipal Benchmarking Networks

Benchmarking rests on the assumption that it supports organizational learning and innovation, but the empirical knowledge that underpins this perceived means-end relationship is limited. This article draws on existing research to develop a framework for analyzing organizational learning outcomes from municipal benchmarking. The framework incorporates explanatory factors at different levels (network and municipality), and with different time perspectives (past and present). Empirical results from a nationwide Norwegian benchmarking project indicate that municipalities do obtain organizational learning from benchmarking but that care must be taken when organizational learning is conceptualized and assessed. Learning should incorporate aiding agenda setting and decision making, as well as changes. Factors such as network and administrative characteristics and management and political participation are found to influence learning outcomes. There are also indications that learning from benchmarking is subject to politics. Notably, nonsocialist political regimes are less receptive to organizational learning than other regimes and political competition enhances organizational learning from benchmarking.

Nancy Davis and the Means-End Relation

In her paper, The Doctrine of Double Effect: Problems of Interpretation, Nancy Davis attempts to find an interpretation of the means-end relationship that would provide a foundation for the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) and its reliance on the distinction between what an agent intends or brings about intentionally and what that agent merely foresees will result from his/her action, but does not intend (or bring about intentionally). Davis's inability to find such an interpretation lessens the plausibility of the view that the DDE is an acceptable moral doctrine. In the present paper, it is suggested that Davis's inability to find an interpretation of the means-end relationship that will support the DDE results from her assumption that an agent must intend to produce whatever he/she produces intentionally. Borrowing an argument from Michael Bratman, this article shows that Davis's assumption is false. That realization paves the way toward a defense of the DDE.

Effect of a means-end contingency on young children's food preferences

This study showed that a means-end relationship between two snacks exerts a negative influence on preference for the means snack in the contingency. Two snacks ranked of approximately equal medium appeal were individually chosen from an array by each of 86 children (ages 4 years, 4 months to 7 years, 2 months). Children were then assigned to a means-end condition (where one snack was eaten as a means of gaining the other), a temporal order control group (where one snack was presented and eaten before the other), or a mere exposure control group (where the children chose the order in which they ate the two snacks). Post-treatment rankings of the snacks showed that children in the means-end group came to devalue the means snack relative to the reward snack, despite the demonstrably equal prior appeal of the two snacks. Children in the temporal order and mere exposure control groups did not come to prefer the two snacks preferentially. Implications of the finding that adults can affect children's preferences by relatively minor variations in the manner of presentation are discussed.

Intrinsic Rewards in School Crime

The systemic structure of a school provides opportunities for both prosocial and antisocial behavior. Actions in a school may be motivated by (1) the extrinsic mechanisms of discipline and grades, (2) the means-end rela tionship of school behavior to students' long-term goals, and (3) the immediate intrinsic satisfactions obtainable in different activities. This paper treats the third type, intrinsic motivation. Using previous research, the authors propose that the state of enjoyment occurs when a person is challenged at a level matched to his level of skills. According to the model, the experience of meetable challenges requires the perception of a constrained set of possible actions, clearly defined goals, and opportunities for unambiguous feedback. The system of rules in a formal game provides these prerequisites. The systemic structure of a school can also provide the conditions of enjoyable involvement. Ideally, learning should involve systemic involvement in sequences of challenges internalized by students. However, evidence indicates that such involvement is rare and is often subverted by the school itself. Without such opportunities, antisocial be havior provides an alternate framework of challenges for bored students. Disruption of classes, vandalism, and violence in schools are, in part, attempts by adolescents to obtain enjoyment in otherwise lifeless schools. Restructuring education in terms of intrinsic motivation would not only reduce school crime but would also accomplish the goal of teaching youths how to enjoy life constructively.

Function Statements

An examination of difficulties in three standard accounts of functions leads to the suggestion that sentences of the form “the function of x is to do y” are used to make a variety of different claims, all of which involve a means-end relationship and the idea of design, or use, or benefit. The analysis proposed enables us to see what is right and also wrong with accounts that analyze the meaning of function statements in terms of good consequences, goals, and etiological explanation. It also enables us to show that function sentences can be used in providing various types of explanations, including, in certain cases, noncausal explanations of the presence of the item with the function.

What is it that I Want?

T HE question phrased in the title is at the root of the controversy between Socrates and the Sophists concerning virtue as reported in the Platonic dialogues. The Sophists take the position that man must fulfil his nature and satisfy his interests; and they argue that virtue is unnatural and evil because it consists in the thwarting of nature and of desire. Temperance means starving your appetites and so destroying yourself; justice is giving up your interests in favor of those of another; the philosophic way of life is one of unworldliness and of inability to defend yourself against shrewd aggressors. The strategy of Socrates in defending virtue from such attacks is to accept the premises of the Sophists but to show that the alleged conclusions do not follow. Thus, Socrates seems to admit that the supreme obligation of man is to his own nature, to obtain what he wants, to fulfil his desires; and then to argue that virtue, far from being a frustration of desires, is a fulfilment of them-that virtue is profitable, that it promotes the health of the soul, if not of the body, that virtue makes us happy. But what is it that enables Socrates to draw such a different conclusion from the same premises? Partly it is that he is able to show that the Sophists were wrong as to the means-end relationship; that they attended to the short-run consequences of virtue and ignored the long-run ones, for instance. But partly also it is that Socrates conceived the end and nature in a new way. We must satisfy our nature, yes; but our nature is not to be merely construed in bodily terms; we must get what we want, but we do not really want what the Sophists think we do. Thus, it turns out that what the Sophists regard as a thwarting of human nature is a fulfilment for Socrates, and conversely. And so, whether the reader thinks that Socrates has made his point or not, depends partly at least on what he conceives to be the object of human desires-on what he thinks it is that man wants. Whether Socrates even meets the point of his adversaries is not always clear. When Thrasymachus urges that the ruler should exploit his subjects, Socrates answers by giving an analysis of techie, of which the art of ruling is a special instance. Tech/e, he says, has no aims of its own of any kind; it is directed wholly to its object; the shepherd is for the good of the sheep, the doctor is for the patients, the teacher is for the students; and so the ruler (qua ruler) rules in the interests of the ruled. Here Socrates seems to be expounding the concept of what today we would call a profession; professional activity is one which is governed by impersonal or at least unselfish norms. But it is hard to see how all this is relevant to the point which Thrasymachus has raised. The latter takes as his premise that the good is what promotes my interests; then, if tee/me be unselfish activity, teck/e is not good. What can be, then, the merit of the appeal to teci/e? Does Socrates perchance mean that human beings care for standards, so that a ruler who exploits the public and does not proceed according to the norms of his techne, so far forth fails to obtain what he wants? Or is it something else that Socrates means-that