Market Attention Research Articles

Construction Strategies for Residential High Rise Buildings Decoration during Structure Work

The market's attention to the quality and efficiency of engineering construction is continuously increasing. Quality inspection departments, market departments, and others have begun strict supervision and review of projects, aiming to ensure that they are completed in accordance with the correct ideas and standards. Process interleaving is achieved through design optimization and process optimization, reducing processes and measures, and fully utilizing spatial and process parameters to achieve the goals of shortening time parameters, improving quality, and reducing costs. The design of process interleaving schemes lies in the effective utilization of the plane site and spatial resources on the construction site, maintaining the improvement of utilization efficiency, installing as many construction mechanization equipment as possible, and adopting an automated construction mode to improve not only construction efficiency but also reduce the impact of external temperature, humidity, and climate, thereby achieving better improvement in engineering construction quality.

Managerial incentives for attracting attention

AbstractThis paper studies the mechanisms which motivate managers to engage in cheap talk and attract the market's attention in a credible way. We consider stock split announcements, voluntary earnings forecasts, and press releases issued by firms to the media as proxies for managerial cheap talk. We show that: (a) managerial performance‐related pay contracts incentivize executives to attract attention; (b) analysts increase their coverage of firms following cheap talk; and (c) chief executive officers are punished for attracting attention when market prices do not increase following cheap talk. The results are stronger for firms which are most in need of attention.

Reinventing the Securities Disclosure Regime: Online Questionnaires as Substitutes for Form-Based Filings

We briefly describe a proposed reform of the SEC's disclosure process that would replace the great majority of disclosure forms with an on-line questionnaire driven disclosure regime subject to mandatory updating according to a schedule defined by the Commission. This approach allows the Commission to elicit all the information currently generated by its forms-based filing system at, we believe, a dramatically lower cost to filers. It would also facilitate rapid, low-cost construction of databases that promote ready comparison of disclosures across registrants and over time. The system promises to eliminate the filing of duplicative information and can automatically focus attention on changes from prior disclosures. It thereby facilitates Commission review while simultaneously calling the market's attention to matters most likely to influence price formation. This new regime would also allow the Commission to achieve the significant potential benefits of a company-based disclosure system without seeking legislative authority, and without running the risk of changes to the liability structure provided under the current offerings-based disclosure regime.

Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring

ABSTRACTWe provide a theory of informal communication—cheap talk—between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value. The theory also relates the credibility of managerial announcements to the use of stock‐based compensation, the presence of informed trading, and the liquidity of the stock. Our results are consistent with the existence of positive announcement effects produced by apparently innocuous corporate events (e.g., stock dividends, name changes).