Advanced maritime equipment, notably unmanned marine vehicles (UMVs), is a priority due to the rising global need for marine resource exploitation and maritime security [...]

The regionalization of the October 2023 conflict as a result of the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping at the entrance to the Red Sea created global ramifications, resulting in international intervention. While the crisis was also a reminder of the importance of maritime security to the GCC countries, they have neither adopted a collective response nor joined the international coalition. They have opted for unilateral responses to protect their interests. This was conspicuous, since securing Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the vicinity of the Arabian peninsula remains essential to the security and global economic engagement of the GCC states. This article argues that the lack of a collective response by the GCC states to the maritime security dilemmas in the Red Sea partially indicates divergent views on the crisis, and reflects the current security orientation of each. More to the point, at the root of their ad hoc and unilateral responses lies the long-standing inability to devise a common maritime security strategy. Thus, the paper studies five major factors that present major impediments to the adoption of a common maritime security policy at the GCC level.

ABSTRACT Australia’s oceans face rapid climate and coastal changes, impacting national productivity, prosperity, security, and well-being. Healthy, resilient, and sustainably managed oceans require future-ready, national marine research infrastructure to support maritime industries, biodiversity conservation, climate forecasting and adaptation, and coastal development. Marine research infrastructure provides the foundations for scientific discovery, international collaboration, knowledge exchange across sectors, marine STEM training, and more. Over the past 10 years, national marine research infrastructure has been strengthened through strategic national-scale investments, improved coordination, and deployment of cutting-edge technologies. However, substantial challenges remain that constrain Australia’s sovereign capability, maritime security, economic progress, leadership, and preparedness for emerging challenges. This paper identifies the current state of Australia’s marine research infrastructure, examines key barriers and enablers, and outlines priority actions for the next decade to meet current and growing needs. Key actions to deliver and sustain a future-ready marine research infrastructure include embedding Indigenous priorities and rights in planning and use, scaling-up and securing long-term research vessel capability, modernising research infrastructure, maintaining and expanding observing systems to fill critical gaps, exploring sovereign satellite capacity, advancing sensor technologies, strengthening coordination and governance across research infrastructure capabilities, and building a skilled workforce.

The article examines the conceptual foundations of automatization of situation management within a system for monitoring the underwater and surface situation in the Black Sea area under contemporary military challenges. Existing means of observing the maritime environment are analyzed, and their main limitations in ensuring continuous monitoring and operational concealment are identified. An architectural model of an integrated automated system, which includes a sensor layer, regional data processing centers, and a central situation center is proposed. The possibility of using a network of stationary seabed hydroacoustic stations in combination with unmanned surface platforms for data collection and transmission is considered. Particular attention is paid to the implementation of situation management using artificial intelligence technologies, including neural networks and large language models, for data integration, risk assessment, and automatized scenario modeling of possible developments. There is also proposed a structure of an expert knowledge base supporting managerial decision-making. Therefore, the proposed approach contributes to improving maritime situational awareness and enhancing the effectiveness of decision-making in dynamic operational environments. The proposed architecture enables multi-source data fusion, supports scalable deployment of distributed sensors, and facilitates the rapid detection and reaction to maritime threats. It also provides a technological basis for integrating heterogeneous monitoring assets into a unified information space, thereby increasing the resilience and adaptability of maritime security systems. Such an approach creates conditions for more effective coordination between monitoring components and analytical modules while supporting timely response to emerging operational situations. The obtained results may be used in the development of a system for monitoring the underwater and surface situation for the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The vulnerability of global supply chains now extends far beyond major strategic straits, permeating a complex network of secondary nodes whose importance is often overlooked. Intermediate ports, rail corridors, transhipment hubs, and digital platforms have become critical points whose disruption can trigger cascading consequences worldwide. By foregrounding ‘invisible bottlenecks’, this Essay challenges conventional maritime security perspectives, traditionally focused on iconic chokepoints. Contemporary risks are systemic, hybrid, and interdependent, spanning physical, organisational, and cyber dimensions. India exemplifies a strategy rooted in logistical resilience, regional integration, and critical infrastructure protection, reshaping the levers of power within global trade networks.

ABSTRACT Among various shipping risks, piracy incidents are characterized by selectivity, directness, randomness, and violence, posing a significant threat to the safety of vessels, crews, and cargo. Understanding the spatiotemporal evolution and influencing factors of piracy incidents is essential for maritime security policymaking and resource allocation. This study adopts a multi-scale approach, utilizing spatiotemporal analysis and machine learning methods to identify high-incidence piracy regions and their spatiotemporal evolution patterns. Additionally, the study quantitatively assesses the marginal effects of external environmental factors on the formation and development of piracy incidents. At the global scale, high-incidence piracy regions include Maritime Southeast Asia, Somali waters, and the Gulf of Guinea. The intensity and spatial extent of piracy clustering vary across these regions. At the regional scale, the spatiotemporal evolution of piracy incidents exhibits regional differentiation. At the local scale, the formation and development of piracy incidents are influenced by national political and socio-economic contexts, local land-sea interface environments, and specific triggering factors. Indicators such as the socio-economic impact levels from climate disasters, energy investment scale, and coastline complexity are the most significant drivers. This study provides data-driven support and a theoretical framework for maritime transport policymaking.

ABSTRACT Australia claims the third largest maritime jurisdiction in the world, with a vast marine estate spanning 13.86 million square kilometres. With stakes in the management and security of waters in three of the four major oceans (Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans), and the three seas located to its North (Timor, Arafura and Coral Seas), Australia’s national security depends on maintaining strong maritime borders, and ensuring a stable regional order and global maritime environment. This article discusses Australia’s security environment and examines how science and technology can support efforts to deter, prevent and defeat threats to its sovereignty, security and national interests. This article identifies core security imperatives for Australia, and the associated infrastructure, capabilities, technologies and tools required to defend its interests. It offers recommendations on how Australia could effectively leverage science and technology to enhance maritime security arrangements, and protect Australia’s sovereignty, resources and borders over the next decade.

ABSTRACT This article challenges conventional understandings of maritime power. Using case studies from the Arabian/Persian Gulf region, it argues that maritime power serves not only material and strategic purposes but also ontological ones. Drawing on Ontological Security Theory (OST), this study introduces the concept of Ontological Maritime Security (OMS) to explain how Gulf states, namely Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, use maritime power to perform distinct identity functions. Iraq seeks to reclaim its Gulfness and to become a rightful maritime actor in the Gulf; Kuwait uses maritime engagement to rebuild confidence after the 1990 invasion; Bahrain uses maritime power to project unity at home amid the Iranian threat; Oman uses maritime power to maintain neutrality; and Saudi Arabia constructs maritime self-reliance, signaling a shift to autonomous maritime power. The findings suggest that smaller and medium-sized Gulf states possess significant agency in shaping international security narratives and, thus, offer critical insights into how states use maritime power as a domain of symbolic performance and legitimacy.

Maritime governance should be tailored to effectively confront the complexity of maritime security challenges, namely their cross-boundary nature, the interlink of maritime threats to one another, as well as their inter-weaving with terrestrial challenges. The complexity of the issue often reveals an inherent tension between the trans-sovereign nature of effective governance at sea and the tendency of involved states to insist on their sovereignty and exclusive jurisprudence. In this article we inquire whether state sovereignty and the resulting power dynamics among states is at odds with the ability to achieve an effective security regime at sea. To tackle this question, which bears both theoretical and policy importance, this article investigates circumstances in which dynamics of governance and sovereignty create by themselves a challenge to effective security at sea. The article ventures into in-depth analysis of two maritime security case studies, Singapore in the Malacca Straits and Frontex in the Mediterranean. The analyses reveal the tensions and contradictions that exist between single states’ sovereignty and jurisprudence, and the goal of supra-state maritime security, and identify ways to overcome them. Conclusively, maritime security requires cross-sovereign thinking and regional approach to governance that includes investments in the development of good governance along the coasts, shared jurisdiction at sea, and a unitary command structure and authority over areas of operations.

Integrating Real-Time Wind Speed Data and Wind Rose Analysis for Enhanced Maritime Security: A Case Study of the Bima-Ujung Pandang Shipping Route

ABSTRACT This research article examines Spain’s evolving role in the European Union’s (EU) maritime security operations launched within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework from 2008 to 2025. It posits that the Spanish leadership in EUNAVFOR Atalanta generated an ‘Atalanta Effect’, a paradoxical outcome where operational prominence reinforced rather than changed its traditionally cautious strategic culture. This study traces how Spain’s self-perception as a ‘middle power’, its preference for multilateralism, and its risk aversion have persisted despite unprecedented command responsibilities. Through comparative case studies of Operations Atalanta, Sophia, Irini, and Aspides, it explores how the country’s leadership in counter-piracy strengthened its legitimacy-oriented defence posture but also limited its willingness to support more assertive EU naval actions, such as the response to the Red Sea crisis (2023–2024). The findings suggest that Spain’s operational leadership within the EU’s Operation Atalanta significantly enhanced its institutional visibility but also restricted its strategic flexibility, revealing a deeper tension between ambition and restraint.

MEMS hydrophones, as critical sensors for maritime security and underwater information acquisition, have sensitive membrane structures that exhibit insufficient ability to withstand hydrostatic pressure, necessitating an overload-protection design. Based on buckling stability theory, a collaborative optimization method for overload-protection column design was proposed, integrating theoretical analysis, finite-element simulation, and process feasibility. An optimized design scheme for hydrophone overload-protection columns was established by comprehensively considering geometric buckling-resistant design, micro-gap anti-adhesion requirements, minimal impact on sensitivity, and micro/nano-fabrication constraints. The results indicate that intermediate slenderness columns with radii between 5.5 μm and 7.5 μm sufficiently meet both fabrication and operational requirements, effectively providing overload protection. Furthermore, at water depths not exceeding 382 m, the MEMS hydrophone can maintain the integrity of its membrane structure without column buckling.

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are among the most strategically important maritime chokepoints in the global trading system. Although conventional threats such as piracy have been managed through regional cooperation, the rapid digitalisation of ports, vessel traffic systems, and naval command infrastructures has created new hybrid cyber-physical vulnerabilities. Despite recurring cyber incidents between 2020 and 2025, no institutionalised real-time cross-border Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) mechanism has emerged among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. This study examines the puzzle of institutional inertia under growing threat interdependence and its implications for SDG 9, Target 9.1 on resilient infrastructure, and SDG 17, Targets 17.16 and 17.17 on knowledge-sharing and effective public-private partnerships. Drawing on 18 semi-structured interviews and qualitative analysis of policy documents from 2020 to 2025, the study identifies three governance bottlenecks: legal-institutional ambiguity, sovereignty-related political constraints, and technical-operational interoperability gaps. Building on Regional Security Complex Theory and regime complexity scholarship, the article theorises Cooperative Sovereignty as a middle-ground governance modality between supranational integration and sovereignty-maximising bilateralism. It proposes the Malacca Cyber Intelligence Node (MCIN) as a federated, sovereignty-compatible mechanism for structured cyber threat signalling while preserving national control over data. The study contributes to governance scholarship and offers actionable pathways for strengthening maritime cyber resilience in sovereignty-sensitive regions.

The aim of maritime surveillance is to support maritime security by protecting national and international rights and interests through reliable monitoring systems, thereby increasing situational awareness. As threats continue to grow, ranging from piracy and illegal fishing to environmental hazards like oil spills the critical importance of surveillance to ensure security and support sustainable use of the ocean becomes increasingly evident. However, relying solely on single-sensor data for detection and identification purposes is often inadequate. To increase the likelihood of successful detection and identification of vessels, it is critical that heterogeneous ( i.e ., varying types of) data from several different sensors ( i.e ., radar, optical systems, Automatic Identification System (AIS), and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)) be integrated to eliminate the limitations of individual sensors and create a more comprehensive view of the maritime domain. The focus of this review is to provide a systematic overview of various approaches to multi-sensor fusion with emphasis on artificial intelligence (AI)-based methodologies. The article provides a structured literature review of literature related to the ship detection, recognition, tracking, and anomaly detection using fusion processes and presents and discusses most recent and successful practices, some of the technical challenges that exist today, and potential areas of future research. The evaluation includes both traditional and contemporary AI-based techniques ( i.e ., machine learning and deep learning) as well as the complexities that exist when attempting to handle large volumes of data, process data in real-time, and account for variability in the environment and potential cyber threats. In summary, the ultimate goal of this study is to provide an informative reference, for the purpose of enhancing maritime situational awareness.

Abstract This study investigates how trade structure, external financing capacity, defence expenditure, and artificial intelligence capabilities interact in shaping India’s foreign policy options and security architecture. The central argument is that national power in the contemporary international system cannot be understood through military capacity alone; it is increasingly conditioned by the composition of trade, the resilience of payment balances, the concentration of strategic dependencies, and the institutional ability to deploy data-driven statecraft. The paper therefore develops an integrated geostrategic framework that links geoeconomics, strategic autonomy, and AI-enabled governance to measurable indicators drawn from official and widely cited public datasets. The framework treats trade not simply as an economic variable but as a channel through which vulnerability, leverage, technological upgrading, and coalition-building are transmitted. Empirically, the study draws on Indian government merchandise trade series, Reserve Bank of India balance-of-payments data, World Bank macroeconomic indicators, SIPRI defence and arms-transfer data, and Oxford Insights and industry-based evidence on AI readiness. The results show that India’s trade expansion has significantly increased the scale of national power, but that the widening merchandise deficit and the persistence of concentrated strategic import channels continue to produce vulnerabilities that require active management. At the same time, net invisibles and investment inflows have repeatedly cushioned the merchandise deficit, while defence expenditure has risen alongside a gradual reduction in arms-source concentration from Russia. On this basis, the paper proposes an innovative policy architecture in which trade diplomacy, industrial policy, maritime security, technology coalitions, and AI-assisted strategic decision systems are treated as mutually reinforcing pillars of state capacity. The analytical conclusion is that India’s external strategy will be strongest when commercial diversification, financial resilience, defence indigenisation, and sovereign AI capabilities are pursued as one integrated national power project. Keywords: India; geostrategy; foreign policy; national power; trade security nexus; strategic autonomy; artificial intelligence; defence economics; balance of payments; supply-chain resilience

ABSTRACT Maritime development in South Asia is increasingly articulated within securitised frameworks that integrate strategic infrastructure with national security priorities. This study presents a Critical Maritime Security Studies (CMSS) framework to examine how development discourses generate and legitimate state-centric, exclusionary paradigms that frequently ignore ecological issues, gendered vulnerabilities, and subaltern perspectives. Utilising the Copenhagen School, feminist political ecology, and postcolonial security theory, the study contends that prevailing methodologies obfuscate non-conventional concerns impacting coastal populations and natural ecosystems. The article advocates for a de-securitised marine governance paradigm that prioritises human security, ecological sustainability, and diverse epistemologies. The research redefines the Indian Ocean by transitioning from geopolitical rivalry to inclusive, people-centric maritime frameworks, envisioning it not just as a site for power projection but as a collaborative place for security, social equality, and environmental stewardship.

ABSTRACT The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed the enduring significance of maritime power, even within a predominantly land-centric conflict, while also illustrating how its character is evolving. Despite lacking a conventional surface fleet, Ukraine has constrained Russian freedom of action in the Black Sea through an adaptive sea-denial approach integrating land-based strike systems, naval mines, and uncrewed platforms. This article identifies three principal maritime lessons: maritime power remains a critical instrument of statecraft, but must be conceptualised beyond traditional fleets; qualitative factors such as morale, leadership, and crew proficiency are decisive; and high-intensity conflict intensifies maritime security challenges, including pollution, navigational hazards, and sanctions-evasion activity linked to Russia’s shadow fleet. However, these lessons require careful caveating: the Black Sea’s enclosed geography, restricted access, and compressed operating distances amplify the effectiveness of coastal strike and unmanned systems in ways that are not readily transferable to blue-water theatres in the Atlantic, Pacific, or Indian Oceans.

Indo-Pacific Strategy and India’s Maritime Security

Maritime security technologies and coastal neo-fortification

The development of digital technology and automation in port facilities increases the risk of cyberattacks that can disrupt logistics operations and maritime security. According to a recent report, 72% of port facilities in Indonesia have experienced attempted cyberattacks in the past three years, with potential losses reaching USD 5.2 million per incident. This study aims to analyze cyberthreats in port facilities and evaluate mitigation strategies. The research method used was descriptive quantitative, with data collected through a survey of 120 port security officers, interviews with 15 operational managers, and an analysis of 10 related cybersecurity policy documents. The results showed that 68% of facilities had a moderate to low level of cybersecurity readiness, 74% of respondents emphasized the importance of human resource training, and 63% of facilities had not implemented a real-time intrusion detection system. Recommended mitigation strategies include the implementation of comprehensive network security protocols, multi-layered digital surveillance, and regular training programs for all personnel. These findings emphasize the urgency of integrating cybersecurity policies with daily port operations to reduce the risk of disruption, improve operational reliability, and minimize economic losses.