Maritime Domain Awareness Research Articles

Performance Evaluation of SeaSonde High-Frequency Radar for Vessel Detection

AbstractHigh-frequency (HF) surface wave radar has been identified to be a gap-filling technology for Maritime Domain Awareness. Present SeaSonde HF radars have been designed to map surface currents but are able to track surface vessels in a dual-use mode. Rutgers and CODAR Ocean Sensors, Ltd., have collaborated on the development of vessel detection and tracking capabilities from compact HF radars, demonstrating that ships can be detected and tracked by multistatic HF radar in a multiship environment while simultaneously mapping ocean currents. Furthermore, the same vessel is seen simultaneously by the radar based on different processing parameters, mitigating the need to preselect a fixed set and thereby improving detection performance.

Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) Apropos Global Maritime Security

Globalisation of the world economy and the interdependence of nations thereof, has ensured that the security of global maritime trade remains a priority security issue for the state administrations. Maritime terrorism, illegal arms and drug trafficking, piracy etc., continue to remain the scourge of trading nations. Visibility and identification through maritime domain awareness (MDA) has come to be universally recognised as the basic tenet of the process to ensure maritime security. In 2000, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) decision for mandatory provision of automatic identification system (AIS) onboard merchant ships and International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) compliance by ports served to significantly enhance maritime security. With increased perceptions of threat post 9/11, further measures were discussed to augment maritime security during the 2002 International Convention for the Security of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Conference organised by the IMO. The mandatory security measures, adopted in December 2002, included a number of amendments to the 1974 SOLAS. The Conference also adopted Resolution 3, for “further work by the IMO pertaining to enhancement of maritime security” and Resolution 10 for “early implementation of long range ship's identification and tracking (LRIT).” During the 81st session of the Maritime Safety Committee, held at IMO Headquarters in London on May 10-19, 2006 regulations for LRIT were included in SOLAS Chapter V on Safety of Navigation. LRIT was made a mandatory requirement with effect from December 31, 2008 for merchant ships (over 300 gross registered tonnage — GRT) on international voyages and mobile offshore drilling units. LRIT entitles SOLAS Contracting Governments to receive information about ships navigating within a distance not exceeding 1,000 nautical miles (nm) off their coast. The regulation was scheduled to enter into force on January 01, 2009. Though the deadline of December 31, 2008 has elapsed, the implementation of LRIT could not be executed due to lack of conformity by all contracting nations. This paper deliberates on the concept of LRIT and traces its development while specifically exploring its relevance to India in terms of implementation and operation. At the threshold of entering LRIT enabled maritime awareness domain, it would be prudent for India to put in place procedures and infrastructure that will maximise the system output.

AIS Database Powered by GIS Technology for Maritime Safety and Security

The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an efficient tool to exchange positioning data among participating naval units and land control centres. It was developed primarily as an advanced tool for assistance to sailors during navigation and for the safety of the life at sea. Maritime security has become a major concern for all coastal nations, especially after September 11, 2001. The fundamental requirement is maritime domain awareness via identification, tracking and monitoring of vessels within their waters and this is exactly what an AIS could bring. This paper will be focused on how the AIS-derived information could be used for coastal security, maritime traffic management, vessel tracking and monitoring with the help of GIS technology. The AIS data used in this paper was collected by the Canadian national aerial surveillance program.

Globalization, State Failure and Maritime Insecurity in West Africa

This article explores the impact of globalization on the capacity of states in West Africa to exacerbate and manage escalating insecurity in the domain of West Africa, with particular focus on the Gulf of Guinea. It articulates the elements of security in a globalized world and lays out the nature of maritime domain awareness in the region, and explores the elements of contemporary insecurity in the region, including piracy and militia insurgency, human smuggling/trafficking, small arms and light weapons trafficking and contraband smuggling, plundering and depletion of marine resources, marine pollution and environmental degradation, and the threat of terrorist activities. The paper ends with a discussion of the lessons for West Africa, the United States and the world community.

Globalization, State Failure and Maritime Insecurity in West Africa

This article explores the impact of globalization on the capacity of states in West Africa to exacerbate and manage escalating insecurity in the domain of West Africa, with particular focus on the Gulf of Guinea. It articulates the elements of security in a globalized world and lays out the nature of maritime domain awareness in the region, and explores the elements of contemporary insecurity in the region, including piracy and militia insurgency, human smuggling/trafficking, small arms and light weapons trafficking and contraband smuggling, plundering and depletion of marine resources, marine pollution and environmental degradation, and the threat of terrorist activities. The paper ends with a discussion of the lessons for West Africa, the United States and the world community.

A Network-Centric Approach to Maritime Domain Awareness

The Integrated Deepwater System's C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance) system is a critical element in the U.S. Coast Guard's efforts to modernize its aging force structure and implement its maritime strategy for homeland security. >> Conceived during the 1990s, the fully implemented Deepwater program will consist of three classes of new cutters and their associated small boats, a new and upgraded fixed-wing manned aircraft fleet, a combination of new and upgraded helicopters, both cutter-based and land-based unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and highly improved systems for C4ISR and advanced logistics capabilities. Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS, a joint venture between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman) is Deepwater's partner in industry and systems integrator. >> Deepwater's C4ISR capability improvements will contribute to higher levels of maritime domain awareness (comprehensive information, intelligence, and knowledge of all relevant entities within the U.S. maritime domain, and their respective activities, that could affect U.S. security, safety, economy, or environment). The Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) will play an important role in transforming the Coast Guard to meet the nation's 21st-century maritime-security requirements

Best Practices on Performing a Tactical Port Security Risk Assessment Using Risk-Based Decision-Making1

ABSTRACT In the wake of September 11, 2001, Captains of the Port (COTPs) nationwide set into motion various security measures to protect potential targets (referred to as an “asset” throughout this paper) located in, on or near navigable waterways. However, the way in which these measures were carried out and the degree to which they were enforced were vastly different from port to port and raised much speculation in the U.S. maritime community over what the security landscape of the future would look like. Over one year later, maritime security practices remain a widely debated issue and one that will continue to challenge COTPs to answer the constantly looming questions of, “what is an adequate level of security for my port?,” “what level of security can I maintain at predefined Maritime Security (MARSEC) Conditions?” (USCG, 2002) and “how can I defend my assertions?” It is widely agreed in maritime security circles that concepts such as MARSEC Conditions and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) (USCG, 2002) are essential components of the port security posture of the 21st century, but most of this community will concede that they do not have a clear cut strategy on how to bridge the gap between transforming these lofty concepts into clearly defined, tactically sound and implementable security solutions. The purpose of this paper is to describe such a bridge, or a port security risk assessment methodology if you will, that is based on factual data that is verified by Coast Guard personnel and that synthesizes security concepts and Risk-Based Decision-Making (RBDM) methodologies (USCG, 2001) into systematic assessment phases that have been developed and tested by U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office (MSO) St. Louis, Missouri. Moreover, it describes how the analysis of the data gained from the assessment phases provided the COTP St. Louis with tangible and accurate data results that can now be used by Port Security Committees (PSCs) (USCG, 2002) as a foundation for tactical planning and the development of Port Security Plans (PSPs) (USCG, 2002). These PSPs meet the guidelines established in the U.S. Coast Guard's Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 9–02 entitled, “Guidelines for Port Security Committees, and Port Security Plans Required for U.S. Ports.” Once proven in broad applications, this tool can be consistently implemented by COTPs nationwide providing them with detailed port risk characterizations. Armed with this tactical analysis, COTPs can then accurately prioritize high-risk assets and maximize the use of PSC resources to stem potential terrorist threats or attacks.

Scenario planning after 9/11: managing the impact of a catastrophic event

Managers need a framework for assessing various kinds of risk and uncertainty that will continue to confront corporate decision makers as the 9/11 event plays out over the following months and years. The authors suggest an innovative scenario process, one that provides business continuity planning and medium‐term operational planning with a more rigorous analytical grounding, but without overburdening the process with excessive and ultimately counter‐productive complexity. The authors have introduced alternative scenario‐based tools to respond to this specific need for continuity assurance and near‐term operations planning. Case one: business continuity planning (BCP) for the management of one leading global financial services firm committed to a process of identifying and remedying gaps in the recoverability of its key assets. Workshops developed strategies that would close unacceptable asset recovery gaps in two scenarios. Case two: medium term operational planning for a professional services firm in the weeks that followed 9/11 evaluated the plausible range of impacts on their business and operations as the USA and the world took action and terrorist groups responded further. Case three: three years ago the US Coast Guard developed scenarios for very long range strategic planning for their long view project. The Coast Guard developed ten basic strategies from these scenarios. The fourth strategy was “Acquire full maritime domain awareness”. The goal was to give the Coast Guard the ability to acquire, track, and identify in real time any vessel or aircraft entering America’s maritime domain. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) turned out to be highly relevant for USCG decision making both before and after 9/11. Of all the major US federal services involved in the 9/11 response operation, the Coast Guard was singled out for its agility and preparedness.

AIS The Cornerstone of National Security?

The International Maritime Organization has mandated carriage requirements for VHF Automatic Identification System (AIS) on vessels over 300 tons by 2007 (IMO SOLAS: 1974 and IMO Resolution MSC.99(73)). The AIS will transmit a vessel's position and voyage data to other AIS-equipped vessels and shore-based authorities. It was envisioned that AIS data could enhance the safety of navigation by allowing vessels to quickly identify each other and use Digital Select Calling (DSC) to arrange maneuvers. We will discuss the history and the development of AIS, the technical issues surrounding its use by the mariner as a navigation tool and the pros and cons of the proposal by the US Coast Guard (USCG) to use AIS as a means of surveillance for Maritime Domain Awareness.