Within the framework of this study, the authors have constructed a forecast of electricity consumption in China, disaggregated by economic sector, for the period up to 2040. The initial data were the input-output tables for 2022, compiled by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The exogenous conditions for the forecast are based on macroeconomic projections for China produced by the Australian Lowy Institute. It is assumed that, as per capita income in China rises, the sectoral structure of energy consumption will increasingly resemble that of higher-per-capita-income countries, particularly Japan. Forecasting electricity demand in China is carried out by solving an optimisation problem. The objective function in the optimisation model is the projected gross domestic product (GDP) index of the Chinese economy for 2040 relative to 2022. The main constraint is the minimisation of the total discrepancy between the sectoral structure of energy consumption in China and the corresponding structure of Japan in past years. The model also takes into account anticipated technological changes that affect the volume of energy consumption in economic sectors. Electricity demand in each industry is determined by the product of the final demand for goods or services in that industry and the total input coefficient for that industry. The main structural changes in China’s energy consumption by 2040 are driven by changes in the sectoral structure of final demand for goods and services. A decline in electricity demand from the construction sector and an increase in demand from households are expected. The electricity consumption growth index is projected to be no lower than the GDP growth index.

Foreign media coverage of the Aceh flood crisis in November 2025 generated critical narratives regarding the Indonesian government’s disaster policy response. These narratives shaped not only international perceptions but also domestic public opinion through the mediation of opinion leaders. The objective of this article is to examine foreign media framing of the government’s response and to analyze the role of opinion leaders in interpreting and disseminating these frames within national public discourse. A qualitative approach was employed using Robert N. Entman’s framing analysis and the two-step flow of communication framework. Data were collected from foreign media reports published by Asia News Network, Lowy Institute, and The Straits Times, supported by official government documents as comparative data. The analysis focused on problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and policy implications. The findings indicate that foreign media frame the Aceh flood as a humanitarian and structural crisis, while portraying government responses as slow and poorly coordinated. Opinion leaders play a significant role in reinforcing these frames in domestic discourse. These results highlight the importance of transparent, responsive, and structurally oriented disaster governance..

Usando os dados do Global Diplomacy Index, publicado pelo Lowy Institute (https://www.lowyinstitute.org ) o artigo começa com uma comparação das principais redes, a partir de gráficos e mapas que complementam os do Lowy Institute, continua com uma análise dos tipos e evolução das redes, e termina focando sobre as redes diplomáticas estrangeiras no Brasil e do Brasil no exterior: que países tem embaixadas no Brasil e em que países o Brasil tem as suas embaixadas?

Background Development aid to Pacific Islands states tends to take the form of grants to provide services in health, education and transport, however Melanesian states are largely rural, and it may be time to consider stronger support for the agricultural sector as a mode of development to provide for future food security, decreased reliance on imports, and improved nutrition in an era of climate change adaptation. Methods To understand the place of family farming in the donor development strategies of four Melanesian states we first assess the place of foreign aid in total development finance to Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji between 2008–2021. Using data from the Lowy Institute a detailed study of aid flows highlights the respective place of official development assistance (ODA), other financial flows, private flows and remittances in the financial flows for each recipient state. We then focus on donor aid flows and their sectoral breakdown concentrating on the ‘Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ (AFF) sector, and within AFF on the sub-sectors of donor intervention. Results We demonstrate the main areas of interest for each donor, paying particular attention to aid to agriculture, specifically who gives it, and why. Conclusions We conclude by noting that the orientation of agricultural aid to Melanesian states is outward and directed toward producing niche products for the global economy, and not inward or directed towards supporting the development of a stronger agricultural sector, nor the resilience of local population through food security. We thus argue that donor development aid to the agricultural sectors of these four Melanesian states is more reflective of ‘retroliberalism’ than of genuine concern for Pacific Islands food security.

The COVID-19 crisis has prompted the implementation of new measures aimed at containing the virus, given its potential health threats to humanity. Studies indicate that the stringency of these policies is associated with a country’s performance in managing the pandemic. However, the literature still needs more coherent evidence on the relationship between policy stringency, COVID-19 management, and corruption perception, and thus, warrants further investigation. This study used data mining on publicly available datasets from 96 countries worldwide, which include Transparency International’s corruption perception index, COVID-19 stringency measures from the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, and COVID-19 management performance scores from the Lowy Institute. The researchers applied clustering techniques to group nations with similar characteristics and mediation analysis to explore the relationship between a country’s corruption perception and its COVID-19 stringency concerning its management performance. Findings revealed four clustered countries. Fourteen countries with less stringent policies and highly transparent tend to manage COVID-19-related indicators better. Thirty-six countries were imposing stricter policies with low scores in the corruption perception level inclined to have lower COVID-19 management performance. Forty-five countries with average stringency and corruption perception levels have average COVID-19 management performance. Meanwhile, the mediation results proposed no mediation effects of the corruption perception on the association of the policy severity and the COVID-19 management performance level of the 96 countries and all clustered countries. With these findings, this study hopes to enlighten policymakers to review the strictness of their policies, as it posits an inverse effect on the COVID-19 management performance of a country.

The battle of Taiwan, or what a Chinese invasion of a „rogue province” could look like This article describes the possible course of the battle of Taiwan. The paper presents the Chinese policy towards Taiwan, conclusions drawn from the war games conducted by the Pentagon, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and civilian think tanks, the military potential of both sides, and the battle scenario. During the actual research, studies and articles published in Forbes, Business Insider, Taiwan News, Lowy Institute, War on the Rocks, NBC News, China Power, Military Times, Reuters, and Daily Guardian, along with reports of think tanks such as the Atlantic Council and RAND, reports of the US Congress, and reports of Military Ballance were used. The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, a book written by Ian Easton, turned out to be a particularly useful source of knowledge. According to the author of this article, a „forceful solution” for the Taiwanese issue by Beijing is possible in the future and the Western world should seriously analyze its possible course. This is evidenced by numerous statements of Chinese politicians, the desire to change the current global balance of power, the continuous growth of China’s economic power, the expansion of the PLA’s power projection capabilities in terms of an invasion of the „rogue province”, and regular war games and violations of the Taiwanese air defense identification zone. If there was a battle of Taiwan, from the point of view of the People’s Republic of China, it would be crucial to isolate the island, to quickly eliminate the enemy’s anti‑aircraft and anti‑missile defenses by means of missile and cyberattacks, to paralyze the command system, to gain air superiority, and then to land on the beaches from which operations would be then carried out inland. From the point of view of the Taiwan Armed Forces, the most important thing would be to survive the first days of massive air and missile attacks, to disperse their forces, and then to attack the enemy by exploring its weaknesses, i.e., shooting down selected planes and helicopters, sinking ships in the Taiwan Strait, interrupting supply lines, and then inflicting as much damage as possible during the ground combat.

The COVID-19 crisis has prompted the implementation of new measures aimed at containing the virus, given its potential health threats to humanity. Studies indicate that the stringency of these policies is associated with a country’s performance in managing the pandemic. However, the literature still needs more coherent evidence on the relationship between policy stringency, COVID-19 management, and corruption perception, and thus, warrants further investigation. This study used data mining on publicly available datasets from 96 countries worldwide, which include Transparency International’s corruption perception index, COVID-19 stringency measures from the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, and COVID-19 management performance scores from the Lowy Institute. The researchers applied clustering techniques to group nations with similar characteristics and mediation analysis to explore the relationship between a country’s corruption perception and its COVID-19 stringency concerning its management performance. Findings revealed four clustered countries. Fourteen countries with less stringent policies and highly transparent tend to manage COVID-19-related indicators better. Thirty-six countries were imposing stricter policies with low scores in the corruption perception level inclined to have lower COVID-19 management performance. Forty-five countries with average stringency and corruption perception levels have average COVID-19 management performance. Meanwhile, the mediation results proposed no mediation effects of the corruption perception on the association of the policy severity and the COVID-19 management performance level of the 96 countries and all clustered countries. With these findings, this study hopes to enlighten policymakers to review the strictness of their policies, as it posits an inverse effect on theCOVID-19 management performance of a country.

ABSTRACT Australian foreign policy makers increasingly place an emphasis on the importance of rules and norms. These foreign policy statements reflect concerns about China's growing assertiveness combined with the belief that a ‘thick’ anarchy is safer for middle powers. Yet while Australia has been fixated with how China poses a threat to the international order, at times, Australia has actively challenged that order itself. Such was the case when the Prime Minister gave an address on ‘negative globalism’ at the Lowy Institute in October 2019. This article advances a theoretically grounded framework for understanding how these performative challenges arise and come to cause norm erosion. The framework draws together three elements: the rule or norm in question; representational strategies; and domestic audiences. The article illustrates this framework using the example of the Prime Minister's Lowy Institute address.

Chinese Debt in the Pacific: Information from the Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map

In this article we comprehensively document aid volatility (short‐term changes in aid flows) and aid fragmentation in the Pacific. We study two types of fragmentation: fragmentation across countries and fragmentation across projects. Our research draws on a new dataset compiled by the Lowy Institute. The dataset includes aid flows to the Pacific from non‐traditional donors such as China. This allows us to undertake the first‐ever study of Pacific aid volatility and fragmentation factoring in non‐traditional donors. We contrast the Pacific with other regions, finding that while fragmentation across donors is less in the Pacific, project fragmentation is worse, as is aid volatility. We find fragmentation across donors is increasing in the Pacific. We find a similar trend for fragmentation across projects. We find no evidence that non‐traditional donors such as China are driving these trends. However, we find some evidence that non‐traditional donors give more volatile aid.

Recent surveys have indicated a worryingly low level of support for democracy among Australian youth and around the world. For example, in the 2017 Lowy Institute Poll, 36% of Australians indicated that, in some circumstances, a nondemocratic government is preferable. Such concerns, while hardly new, have triggered calls for more civic education and civic involvement. Linked to these concerns are discussions about the way new media (including mobile accessibility, the internet, and social media) is reshaping our understandings of public participation in democracy, especially the way that we conceive of the public sphere. Schools are often seen as important sites for the development of civic values in democratic countries. Having the skills and knowledge to navigate the public sphere in a critical way as well as contribute to it meaningfully is an important part of any activist approach to citizenship education. This paper presents one such example of radical citizenship education, Justice Citizens, and presents a framework that fellow critical educators might use to encourage young people to contribute to the public sphere not as citizens-in-waiting but as justice-oriented citizens.

The SAIS Review Interviews Fiona Cunningham Fiona Cunningham (bio) November 22, 2019 SAIS Review: Would you be able to provide us a brief summary of your background—as it relates to China and nuclear weapons—and how you got interested in the topic? Dr. Fiona Cunningham: I started researching China and nuclear weapons issues a long time ago when I was a research associate for the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. At the time, President Obama had just given a speech expressing his desire for a nuclear-weapon-free world to occur at some point, which triggered a lot of interest, obviously, in the Australian government, the Japanese government, and the think tank community about how that could be achieved, particularly in Asia. I was involved in a project that was looking at the future of extended nuclear deterrence—or extended deterrence I should say—as one moved towards a world with a lesser role for, and eventually no, nuclear weapons. Over the course of the two years that that project ran, it became quite obvious that the conventional military balance in Asia was changing in ways that was going to make that a very difficult objective. Through the course of this project, I started to look at questions about the China and its nuclear weapons program—what its ambitions were in the region, what its nuclear weapons were good for, how its nuclear strategy worked—and realized that there were some unanswered questions I thought needed more interrogation, specifically about what China wanted, the nature of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons, and what nuclear weapons could provide to different countries. It was this line of inquiry that guided my entrance into [End Page 181] graduate school. Ultimately, I ended up looking at a broader range of issues about China and strategic deterrence than what I started with. SAIS Review: In researching Chinese nuclear weapons, did you have any trouble conducting your research in China? What was it like doing your research in China? Were Chinese officials forthcoming? Dr. Fiona Cunningham: It's obviously a sensitive topic and it isn't an easy one to research. On the one hand, because nuclear weapons are one of those capabilities from which statesmen derive much more utility if they aren't used, China wants its nuclear deterrence policies to be understood. On the other hand, probing at some of the more difficult and sensitive issues can get a little tricky. My sources have consisted of interviews with members of China's expert community who weren't actually serving officials and doing a lot of documentary research with materials that are available in both the United States and in China that I was able to collect to try to understand the decision-making and the mentality behind China's approach to nuclear weapons versus other military tools of strategic leverage, including its space weapons, cyber capabilities, and conventional missile program. I will say that there is an expert community in China that is much better developed on the nuclear side than on the other tools, so it is much easier, in many ways, to research nuclear weapons than the other tools. But there are, of course, sensitive parts, and there are questions that can't be asked in interviews that have to be answered in other ways. But I would say just generally speaking, that China's expert community welcomes the opportunity to exchange and to understand what Western analysts find surprising and concerning about China's nuclear strategy, as well as the opportunity to help China's policies to be a little better understood abroad. SAIS Review: The American nuclear process—how it launches nuclear weapons with the president and the "nuclear football," the American nuclear apparatus—is fairly well known by the public and is relatively easy to research and learn about. What is the process in China, in terms of how they launch nuclear weapons? What is the political and military structure governing a Chinese nuclear weapons launch? How many checks and balances are there? And is there a debate about whether these kinds of processes should be reformed? Dr. Fiona Cunningham: These are really hard topics...

ABSTRACTThe 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper emphasises the importance of ‘maximising’ Australia’s power and influence. However, the White Paper and much of the commentary on Australian foreign policy do not clearly conceptualise ‘power’ or indicate how it ought to be increased. The Lowy Institute’s recent Asia Power Index implies one possible strategy via its resource-based approach to measuring power. We outline a different approach and argue that power should be conceptualised and evaluated as a specific relationship causing behavioural change, rather than as a general attribute of its wielder. To complement the Lowy Institute’s carefully catalogued database, and facilitate a more focused conversation about maximising power and influence in Australian foreign policy, we offer a typology identifying five pathways through which states can translate their material and non-material resources into outcomes that serve the national interest.

ABSTRACTThis article considers the transformations taking place in the consular landscape and the resulting pressures on departments of foreign affairs both in Australia and elsewhere. For Australia, the challenges are particularly compelling. As the Lowy Institute has observed in successive reports, Australia’s anaemic overseas representation renders the growing consular load an even more formidable problem. When crises strike, resources are diverted both within government and within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, skewing other priorities. The second part of the article analyses government responses to these challenges. It examines the new focus on consular diplomacy and the government’s first formal consular strategy. It assesses the recent modest expansion of Australia’s overseas diplomatic network, together with the steps taken to enhance international cooperation on consular issues. The article concludes that while the problems facing Australia’s consular service remain pressing, some progress has been made.

ABSTRACTThe majority of today’s authoritarian regimes have little hope of promoting autocracy beyond their own borders, let alone to consolidated democratic countries. However, China and Singapore are two prominent examples of non-democratic countries whose soft power arsenals have given them some global appeal beyond that enjoyed by most authoritarian regimes. But to what extent has China’s and Singapore’s power of example influenced consolidated democracies in terms that the latter wanting to replicate some political practices or even norms in these non-democratic regimes? In this article, we engage recent works to examine this question in relation to how Australians perceive the political example offered by China and Singapore. Focusing our analysis on several prominent polls conducted recently by the Lowy Institute for International Policy, we suggest that at present there is little evidence of a causal impact of the rise of authoritarian powerhouses such as China and Singapore on how Australians view democracy at home. Through these case studies, this article sheds some light on the theoretical as well as practical questions about the inherent impediments of authoritarian diffusion in consolidated democracies.

Condemned to Crisis? By Ken Ward. Sydney: Penguin Books and Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2015. Hardcover: 152pp. Condemned to Crisis? could not have come at a better time. While Indonesia--Australia bilateral relations have often been subject to ups and downs, roller coaster ride seems to have grown erratic in recent years. Indeed, lunging from crisis to crisis has seemingly become the new normal in how Jakarta and Canberra deal with one another, even as Australian observers maintain that a warm with is invaluable. Ken Ward, however, provides a sobering and lucidly written assessment of why this is mistaken. His message is clear: Australia needs to be more realistic about its bilateral and should not adopt wildly ambitious goals vis-a-vis Indonesia (p. 24). Ward claims that describing Australia's with as most important regional strategic relationship (p. 47) neither enhances Canberra's negotiating strength nor elicits appreciation from Indonesia. Instead, Ward calls on Australian political elite to adopt a measured approach, improve political communication and avoid using as a domestic partisan political football. The book examines how Indonesia's history has shaped its foreign policy, how Indonesia-Australia has been entangled by domestic politics of both countries, and role of political communication and culture. Throughout, Ward provides thought-provoking analyses as he debunks a few prevailing myths in bilateral relationship. He correctly debunks, for example, a long-held myth that bilateral relations are difficult due to cultural differences (pp. 56-61). He claims that such a view conflates a certain variant of Javanese culture with Indonesian culture as a whole, and that cultural accounts fail to offer a reliable guide on how Indonesian leaders may react in crisis situations with Australia. Overall, book is a refreshing and important addition to ongoing debate over management of this bilateral relationship. Written for Australian public in mind, it has rightfully fostered numerous debates in Australian media and elsewhere. However, rather than rehashing these debates, I will closely examine book's analyses of Indonesia, which underpin its policy recommendations. Here, unfortunately, it falls short of providing a thorough, balanced and nuanced understanding of Indonesia. At times, analyses are crowded out by cherry-picked quotes, contradictions and unnecessary innuendos. Ward's thesis--Canberra should avoid big dreams and focus on building a stable of weathering storms --contradicts his own claim that past crises that engulfed only had a limited impact on investment and trade, educational exchanges or tourism (pp. 26-27). If status quo is already capable of weathering bilateral storms, why aim for something better? This confusion may be due to an absence of a clear framework to assess evolution in this bilateral relationship. Ward suggests that we compare Indonesia-Australia relations with Indonesia-Singapore and Indonesia-Malaysia relations (pp. 34-50), but he does not persuasively explain why those comparisons are pertinent. Singling out distance as a variable seems like an odd choice since has eight neighbors--and a cursory citing of Stephen Walt's Origins of Alliances to justify this focus on neighbourly threats is not a substitute for case selection analysis. Furthermore, lack of substantive evidence for some of his claims exacerbates such analytical concerns. He points out, for example, that Sukarno's view of world--that it is dominated by exploitative forces--has endured in one form or another ... [and] underlies continuing suspicion of foreign investment and striving for self-sufficiency (pp. 31-32). But he offers no evidence to show whether and how it endures. …

Over the years, the Lowy Institute's annual poll has uncovered a number of unexpected and concerning trends about Australian attitudes. However, one of the most alarming findings during the last de...

The G20 is an evolving international institution. Aided by both advances in information technology and support from home governments, a number of knowledge actors and networks seek to influence global economic governance with policy analysis and advice. This article assesses the international G20 think tank network called Think20 and the policy advocacy of private research institutes (such the Lowy Institute in Australia and the Centre for International Governance and Innovation in Canada) which are in the orbit of the G20 policy community. Think20 assists the global economic governance processes of the G20 by developing ‘coordinative discourses’ for policy development and implementation. Points for practitioners Ideas matter but ideas that imply major policy reform and innovation need to be made to matter if they are to direct government action. Networks provide one mechanism to broadcast and disseminate ‘communicative discourses’ to many different publics – local as well as global – and the infrastructure to crystalize and amplify ‘coordinative discourses’ underpinning the policy blueprints and reform proposals of governments that must motivate their own bureaucracies as well as collaborate with foreign government. This article discusses some of the network tools and practices for consensus building in ‘transnational policy communities’ that cultivate global policy coordination.

Polynesia in Review:Issues and Events, 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 Christina Newport (bio) Reviews of American Sāmoa, Hawai‘i, Niue, Sāmoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna are not included in this issue. Cook Islands As the 49th year of Cook Islands “self-governing” in free association with New Zealand, the period under review has been characterized by a number of political ups and downs, culminating in a snap election with contested results and court action set to determine the outcome. The results highlight the need for reform to address the disparity of the value of a vote across the country. As 2014 is also the International Year of Small Islands Developing States, international and local attention is focused on the country’s development partnerships as it prepares to celebrate its unique form of sovereignty in 2015. Other issues this year revolved around a rollout of tax reforms, marine resources, and the management of the climate change–related drought in the southern group islands. The Cook Islands continues to place priority on climate change and climate-related disaster risks, with a number of southern group islands “dealing with drought-like conditions after months without decent rainfall” (cin, 16 Dec 2013). On Atiu, groundwater supplies were at critically low levels. These problems were further compounded with increased demands expected over the Christmas period and the drought conditions forecast to extend the dry season (cin, 16 Dec 2013). With two water treatment plants and a desalination machine dispatched from Rarotonga, the New Zealand High Commission added its support by supplying one of the solar-powered water-treatment plants as part of a nz$225,000 grant to support the Cook Islands drought response strategy. The strategy includes equipment, training, awareness raising, and water level monitoring and reporting (cin, 31 Jan 2014). On a much larger scale, the nz$60 million Cook Islands Water Partnership, or Te Mato Vai, linked to climate change, is intended to improve water supply and quality on Rarotonga. The initiative will refurbish water intakes, increase water storage and treatment, and replace ring mains and piping (cin, 19 Oct 2013). Funding for the project has been raised, with nz$22 million from the Cook Islands government, a nz$15 million grant from New Zealand, and a nz$23 million concessional loan from the People’s Republic of China. This jointly funded partnership has drawn international attention and is “believed to be a first for the emerging Asian country which has traditionally been known to deliver aid unilaterally” (cin, 12 Sept 2013). Visiting researcher Philippa Brant of the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia suggested that because the Pacific faced no current military conflict, the Cook Islands was ideal for Beijing [End Page 251] to test out its new aid strategy while avoiding accusations of self-interest by allowing the Cook Islands and New Zealand to drive the project (cin, 12 Sept 2013). Locally the project also drew attention through public meetings and consultations on the Water Master Plan. With construction due to start on 14 April 2014, a petition with over two thousand signatures was delivered to Parliament seeking to put a stop to the project “until misgivings and shortcomings on the project can be identified and investigated and other options explored,” said James Thomson, spokesman for the Te Mato Vai Petition Committee (cin, 5 April 2014). It was agreed that a Parliamentary Select Committee would be established; however, the project still proceeded. Since the 2011 establishment of the Climate Change Division in the Office of the Prime Minister, a number of initiatives have commenced. A us$5 million Adaptation Fund project facilitated the development of a national climate-change policy. In November 2013, the Kaveinga Tapapa: Climate and Disaster Compatible Development Policy 2013–2016 was launched. In taking an integrated approach, the policy is focused on low-carbon, climate-change–and disaster-resilient development. Prime Minister Henry Puna’s introductory statement notes that the policy, by integrating with existing policy instruments and planning tools, “builds on our existing structures and draws on our capability to lift our game” and its “fundamental message is to prepare today for tomorrow...

In May 2014, Griffith University and the Lowy Institute for International Policy jointly organized the conference ‘G20 and Development’. This conference brought together academics, policymakers, representatives of the civil society and other development stakeholders to discuss the role of the G20 as a development actor. Four key themes were addressed: ( i) the G20 as a global steering committee: performance and challenges, ( ii) the G20 as a development actor: governance, agenda and accountability, ( iii) mainstreaming development in the G20 agenda and ( iv) G20’s contribution in other development policy areas. This article provides an overview of the discussion around these four themes. JEL Classification: F53, F55, O10