Low-tax Countries Research Articles

Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules and Cross-Border M&A Activity

We investigate the influence of one main anti tax avoidance measure, controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules, on cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity on a global scale. Using three different statistical methods and a large M&A data set, we find that CFC rules distort ownership patterns due to a competitive advantage of multinational entities whose parents reside in non-CFC rule countries. First, we show that the probability of being the acquirer of a low-tax target decreases if CFC rules may be applicable to this target’s income. Second, we show that CFC rules distort the acquirer’s location choice of targets. Third, we show that CFC rules negatively affect the probability of being the acquirer in a cross-border M&A. Altogether, this study shows that for affected acquirer countries, CFC rules lead to less M&A activity in low-tax countries because profit shifting seems to be less feasible. This behavior change could result in an increase in global corporate tax revenue.

Offshoring and outsourcing in a global supply chain: Impact of the arm’s length regulation on transfer pricing

We consider the structure of a global supply chain for operational decisions in a multinational firm (MNF) with tax considerations. The MNF consists of two divisions: one for production and the other for retailing. While the retail division of the MNF and the market for its product is located in a domestic country, the production division may be located in either the domestic (high-tax) country or a foreign (low-tax) country. When the two divisions of a MNF are co-located in the domestic country, the firm enjoys the benefit of a centralized operational decision on the order quantity to maximize its total profit although there is no tax saving opportunity. On the other hand, a MNF can enjoy a tax saving benefit when offshoring its production division to a low-tax country although its operational decision on the order quantity is decentralized, which is harmful to the supply chain profit due to double marginalization. The MNF may further pursue the low procurement cost of its retail division by allowing the retail division to search for an outsourcing opportunity from an outside supplier. However, outsourcing can hurt the profit of the MNF from the loss of the production division due to competition with outside suppliers. We analyze the trade-offs in the MNF’s optimal choice of supply chain structure. In addition, we incorporate a regulation on the MNF’s internal transaction by tax authorities, which is commonly called the arm’s length regulation. We study how the MNF’s choice of the operational structure of its supply chain changes in consideration of this regulation. Our results suggest that tax considerations deserve attention from managers when designing the supply chain structure.

Is China Internationally Tax Competitive?

Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) minimize their tax burden through transfer pricing or the use of lower-tax jurisdictions. Tax incentives are generally not sufficient to attract major flows of investment. China is not a low-tax country, but rather a recipient of substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. The author examines whether this affects China’s international tax competitiveness.

Taxing Intellectual Property in the Global Economy: A Plea for Regulated and Internationally Coordinated Profit Splitting

Inter-country equity in the taxation of IP is a contentious issue. With its BEPS initiative, the OECD aims at taxing in accordance with value creation even though there are admitted difficulties in determining the actual place of value creation. The European Commission promotes the introduction of unitary taxation. The proposal’s drawback is that it lacks incentive compatibility in information exchange. Furthermore, it stipulates a cost-dependent apportionment of the common consolidated corporate tax base that incentivizes locating R&D in low-tax countries. Against this background, this paper makes a case for an internationally regulated split of the profit earned with imported IP.

Trading Offshore: Evidence on Banks' Tax Avoidance

Little is known about how banks shift profits to low-tax countries. Because of their specific business model, banks use other profit shifting channels than non-financial firms. We propose a novel and bank-specific method of profit shifting: the strategic relocation of proprietary trading to low-tax jurisdictions. Using regulatory data from the German central bank, we show that a one percentage point lower corporate tax rate increases banks' fixed-income trading assets by 4\% and trading derivatives by 9\%. Suggestively, this increase does not arise from a relocation of real activities (i.e. traders); instead, it stems from the relocation of book profits.

Trading Offshore: Evidence on Banks' Tax Avoidance

Little is known about how banks shift profits to low-tax countries. Because of their specific business model, banks use profit shifting channels different from those of other firms. We propose a novel and bank-specific method of profit shifting: the strategic relocation of proprietary trading to low-tax jurisdictions. Using regulatory data from the German central bank, we show that a one percentage point lower corporate tax rate increases banks’ fixed-income trading assets by 4.0% and trading derivatives by 9.0%. This increase does not arise from a relocation of real activities (i.e. traders); instead, it stems from the relocation of book profits.

The International Company and Tax Avoidance

In combination with sluggish economic development, the financial crisis and the debt crisis that it triggered have contributed to the fact that tax evasion, tax fraud and tax avoidance are recognized as a serious problem. Tax evasion and tax fraud by well-known personalities from politics, sport, the arts and commerce also attract intensive coverage in the media. In the companies sector, internationalization makes it easier for global corporations to shift their profits to low-tax countries and thus to minimize their tax bill. This paper shall discuss also, the measures to combat international tax evasion to be worked out by the OECD and the G20. The fact that multinational corporations are able to reduce their tax burden on profits through tax-saving plans has been known for decades. There are several reasons for the massive increase in this phenomenon in recent years. On the one hand there has been increasing globalisation, on the other corporate structures have also changed massively in recent decades. Tax havens play an important role in this context and there is practically no global player without branches in tax havens

The International Company and Tax Avoidance

In combination with sluggish economic development, the financial crisis and the debt crisis that it triggered have contributed to the fact that tax evasion, tax fraud and tax avoidance are recognized as a serious problem. Tax evasion and tax fraud by well-known personalities from politics, sport, the arts and commerce also attract intensive coverage in the media. In the companies sector, internationalization makes it easier for global corporations to shift their profits to low-tax countries and thus to minimize their tax bill. This paper shall discuss also, the measures to combat international tax evasion to be worked out by the OECD and the G20. The fact that multinational corporations are able to reduce their tax burden on profits through tax-saving plans has been known for decades. There are several reasons for the massive increase in this phenomenon in recent years. On the one hand there has been increasing globalisation, on the other corporate structures have also changed massively in recent decades. Tax havens play an important role in this context and there is practically no global player without branches in tax havens

Do Tax Information Exchange Agreements Curb Transfer Pricing-Induced Tax Avoidance?

We propose a game theoretical model where a multinational company and two governments interact with each other. Prior to an audit the true arm's length price of the multinational's product is unknown to the tax authorities. In equilibrium, tax evasion emerges in both countries, with both tax authorities conducting audits with a probability that depends on the multinational's transfer price reports. We find that introducing a Tax Information Exchange Agreement between the two tax authorities precludes tax evasion in the low-tax (“foreign”) country, while the degree of tax evasion in the high-tax (“domestic”) country remains unchanged. The volume of production increases, while the foreign tax authority discontinues its audit activities, and the domestic tax authority audits less often at least for sufficiently low arm's length prices. While the expected net tax revenues increase in the foreign country, they may decrease in the domestic country.

Taxing Royalty Payments

The digital economy is characterized by the use of intellectual property such as software, patents and trademarks. The pricing of such intangibles is widely used to shift profits to low-tax countries. We analyze the role of a source tax on royalty payments for abusive transfer pricing, and optimal tax policy. First, we show that mispricing of royalty payments does not affect investment behavior by multinationals. Second, it is in the vast majority of cases not optimal for a government to set the source tax equal to the corporate tax rate. The reason is that shutting down abusive transfer pricing activities needs to be traded off against mitigating the corporate tax distortion in capital investment. The latter can be achieved by some tax deductibility of royalty payments. If the true arm's length transfer price equals zero or for special corporate tax systems that treat debt and equity alike (i.e., for ACE and CBIT), it will be optimal to equate both tax rates.

Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms: New Evidence from Foreign Firm Ownerships

Using a firm-level dataset of Danish exports between 1999–2006, we find robust evidence for profit shifting by multinational corporations. Our triple difference estimations exploit the response of export unit values to acquisitions of foreign affiliates and to changes in statutory corporate tax rates. This identification strategy corrects for a downward bias resulting from firms adjusting arm's length prices to obscure transfer price manipulations. We find that Danish multinationals reduce the unit values of their exports to low tax countries between 5.7 to 9.1 percent. This difference corresponds to a tax revenue loss of 3.24 percent of Danish multinationals' tax returns. (JEL D21, D22, F14, F23, H25, H32)

Repatriation taxes and outbound M&As

Repatriation taxes reduce the competitiveness of multinational firms from tax credit countries when bidding for targets in low tax countries. This comparative disadvantage with respect to bidders from exemption countries violates ownership neutrality, which results in production inefficiencies due to second-best ownership structures. This paper empirically estimates the magnitude of these effects. The abolishment of repatriation taxes in Japan and in the U.K. in 2009 has increased the number of acquisitions abroad by Japanese and British firms by 16.1% and 1.6%, respectively. A similar policy switch in the U.S. is simulated to increase the number of U.S. cross-border acquisition by 11.0%. The yearly gain in efficiency is estimated to be 108.9 million dollar due to the Japanese reform and 3.9 million dollar due to the U.K. reform. Simulating such a reform for the U.S. results in a yearly efficiency gain of 537.0 million dollar.

Formula Apportionment or Separate Accounting? Tax-Induced Distortions of Multinationals' Locational Investment Decisions

We examine which tax allocation system leads to more severe distortions with respect to locational investment decisions. We consider separate accounting (SA) and formula apportionment (FA). The effects of both systems have been hotly debated in Europe in the past years. The reason is that the EU Member States are striving to implement a common European tax system that would lead to a switch from SA to FA. While existing studies focus primarily on the impact of taxes on locational decisions under either SA or FA, the main innovation of this paper is that it compares both systems with regard to the level of distortions they induce. We compare the optimal pre-tax investment decision with the optimal after-tax investment decision and infer from the difference in the allocation of investment funds which tax allocation system causes more severe distortions. We assume that the multinational group (MNG) has comprehensive book income shifting opportunities under SA. We find that the investment incentives under SA are opposed to those under FA for a profitable investment project. Whereas under SA as much as possible should be invested in a high-tax country, under FA as much as possible should be invested in a low-tax country. The distortions of locational investment decisions tend to be more severe under SA than under FA if a greater share of investment funds is to be invested in a low-tax country from a pre-tax perspective and the investment is profitable. Vice versa, locational decisions may be more distorted under FA if the optimal pre-tax investment decision requires investing a major share of funds in the high-tax country. In contrast to the often stated insensitivity of FA towards income shifting, we find the introduction of a tax allocation system based on FA in Europe could lead to a severe shift of economic substance to low-tax countries. The results of this paper are of particular interest for European policy makers and MNGs as our findings may induce European MNGs to reassess their recent locational investment decisions in the face of a potential future change in the applied tax allocation system. (authors' abstract)

Does Foreign Tax Arbitrage Promote Innovation? Evidence from Subsidiary-Level Data

In this paper, I examine innovation in the context of an unexpected policy shock that facilitated tax arbitrage by U.S. multinational firms. I find that after the shock, U.S. multinationals shifted more of their intellectual property to low tax countries. The firms' taxable income moved in parallel, increasing the after-tax return to innovative activity. In response, U.S. multinationals increased their innovative activity in the U.S., whether measured using R&D expenditures, R&D employment, patent applications, or patent citations. The findings contrast with U.S. policy makers' concerns that innovation-focused investment and employment are leaving the U.S. due to disparities between the U.S. and foreign tax codes.

The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in the United States and Beyond

This paper estimates the effect of profit shifting on corporate tax base erosion for the United States. Using Bureau of Economic Analysis survey data on U.S. multinational corporations over the period 1983 to 2012, the analysis estimates the sensitivity of foreign incomes to tax burdens for major foreign direct investment destinations. Controlling for a host of other variables as well as country fixed effects, I find that taxable income is very sensitive to corporate tax rates. Estimates of tax sensitivity are used together with data on reported foreign income to calculate how much “extra” income is booked in low-tax countries due to profit shifting; I then estimate what the tax base would be in the United States without profit shifting. I find that profit shifting is likely costing the U.S. government between $77 and $111 billion in corporate tax revenue by 2012, and these revenue losses have increased substantially in recent years. These findings are consistent with the stylized facts about large quantities of income booked in tax havens. I also undertake a speculative extension of this analysis to other countries, finding that corporate tax base erosion is likely a large problem in countries that do not have low tax rates. The paper concludes with a discussion of suggested reforms.

Decline of CFC Rules and Rise of IP Boxes: How the ECJ Affects Tax Competition and Economic Distortions in Europe

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has become an influential player in the field of direct taxation in the European Union in the past twenty years. However, it is unclear whether the ECJ’s decisions actually increase tax neutrality and therefore contribute to the achievement of an internal market as stipulated by the European treaties or not. In 2006, the ECJ limited the applicability of specific tax rules in Europe that are intended to prohibit the excessive use of low-tax countries. Our counterfactual scenarios show that this restriction of so-called controlled foreign company (CFC) rules and the related emergence of IP boxes cast doubt on the positive effects the ECJ is assumed to have. Additionally, we show that the abolishment of IP boxes would strengthen tax neutrality in Europe. Overall, further research is needed to relate and harmonise economic and legal concepts of tax neutrality.

Informality, Trade Policies and Smuggling in West Africa

In West Africa, recorded intra-regional trade is small but informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is pervasive, despite regional integration schemes intended to promote official trade. We argue that ICBT must be understood in light of two features of West African national boundaries: divergent economic policies between neighboring countries and the ease with which informal operators can ship goods across borders. We focus on two ICBT clusters: Senegal–The Gambia and Nigeria–Benin–Togo. Nigeria and Senegal have protected their domestic industries with high import barriers, whereas Benin, Togo and The Gambia have maintained lower import taxation. These differential trade policies, together with high mobility of goods and people across borders, lead to widespread smuggling, with goods imported legally in low-tax countries and re-exported unofficially to countries with higher import duties.

Cross-jurisdictional income shifting and tax enforcement: evidence from public versus private multinationals

This paper examines the impact of tax enforcement and public listing status on income shifting by multinational corporations (MNCs). For a sample of over 8,000 subsidiaries that are majority-owned by 959 European MNCs over the period 1998–2009, we find strong evidence of income shifting from high to low tax countries and that income is shifted more out of high-tax countries when local tax enforcement is weak. In addition, we show that private MNCs exploit weak tax enforcement more to shift income out of the parent country compared to public MNCs. Combined, our results suggest that tax enforcement plays a crucial role in MNC income shifting decisions and that shifting is more aggressive when MNCs are less affected by nontax shifting costs as is the case in private MNCs.

Do Corporate Tax Cuts Reduce International Profit Shifting?

This paper analyzes whether a corporate tax cut reduces profit shifting to low-tax countries. I use firm-level data of 2,812 German corporations around the Business Tax Reform in 2008.Applying a difference-in-differences framework with a one-on-one matching strategy, which compares earnings of multinational and domestic corporations, I do not find empirical evidence that even a 10 percentage points cut in the business tax rate leads to a reduction of profit shifting activities.

Submission to Senate Committee on Finance International Corporate Tax Reform Why a Worldwide Full-Inclusion System is Far Better for Our Country and Society than a Territorial System or a Hybrid System that Provides a Continuing Preference to Foreign Income

I am commenting on the form that International Tax Reform should take. In brief, the territorial system strongly lobbied for by the U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNCs) standing to benefit from such a system is not what is best for our country or our society. It is bad tax policy in today’s environment where it is so easy for MNCs with their extensive resources and advisors to shift profits from the U.S. and into low-tax countries. The Senate Committee on Finance international tax reform staff discussion draft (the Proposal), especially Option Y, is a major improvement over a territorial system and I definitely support it. Despite this, I am asking in this letter that the Committee review a number of policy issues that would be much better served by a new taxation system that would truly put the taxation of foreign income on par with the taxation of domestic income. In addition to achieving a number of important tax policy objectives, this system would eliminate the competitive disadvantages that pure domestic taxpayers now face in competing with MNCs. This is Submission 1 of 7 Comment Letters Provided to the Committee.