This essay examines the intersection of science education and Victorian chil-dren’s literature, arguing that novels such as Charles Kingsley’s The Wa-ter-Babies (1863), Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Won-derland (1865), and Anna Sewell’s Black Beauty (1877) functioned as sophisticated pedagogical instruments. Through narrative embedding, these works integrated scientific concepts, including natural history, evolutionary biology, logical reasoning, and veterinary anatomy, into imaginative frameworks designed to engage juvenile readers. The analysis identifies three core pedagogical methods: taxonomic ob-servation, logical empiricism, and applied ethical science, each tailored to democratize scientific knowledge across class and gender. Further-more, the essay explores the socio-cultural implications of these texts, highlighting their role in extending scientific literacy beyond elite institutions, moralizing empirical inquiry, and influencing educational reforms. By bridging entertainment with in-struction, Victorian chil-dren’s novels not only cultivated a scientific habitus among young readers but also established a trans-historical model for nar-ra-tive-driven STEM pedagogy, offering enduring insights for contemporary educational practice.

The debate on the neutrality of scientific knowledge whether science is value-free or value-laden has been a central discussion in the philosophy of science from the era of logical positivism to the present. The positivist tradition of Carnap and Reichenbach, along with Popper’s falsificationism, argues that the process of scientific justification must be separated from non-epistemic values in order to secure objectivity. However, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in contemporary scientific research presents empirical evidence that challenges this ideal of value-free science. This study critically examines how the use of AI in science supports the value-laden position advocated by Thomas Kuhn, Helen Longino, and feminist epistemology. Employing a qualitative method with a content analysis approach, the study is analyzed through a philosophical analytical framework. The findings identify three major positions: neopositivism, which defends the value-free ideal; the Kuhnian position, which acknowledges the role of epistemic values; and the radical value-laden position. The discussion demonstrates that artificial intelligence substantiates the value-laden view through four dimensions: algorithmic bias as a manifestation of social values, value-laden design choices in artificial intelligence systems, the incommensurability of artificial intelligence paradigms, and situated objectivity, which requires explicit recognition of embedded values. The study concludes that artificial intelligence not only confirms but reinforces the argument that the value-free ideal is a philosophical illusion, and that responsible science requires critical reflexivity toward the values embedded within scientific practice.

The European Renaissance marked the rise of scientific materialistic philosophies that focused on understanding the universe through the experimental scientific method. This approach aligned with the rapid advancements in science and technology. Logical positivism, which sought to challenge metaphysics, emphasized the importance of induction as the primary method for scientific inquiry. This shift made induction central to the philosophy of science.However, there are fields, especially those related to human phenomena, where this scientific approach cannot be applied easily due to inherent epistemological challenges. Despite these difficulties, there is still a strong push to adopt scientific methods in these areas. Scholars argue that humanities should follow the example set by the natural sciences and work to establish their relevance in the broader scientific scope. It is important to note that some phenomena relate to sensory reality, such as those studied in natural sciences, which are open to empirical investigation. On the other hand, non-material phenomena, such as historical, social, and psychological events, are linked to human reality. These phenomena were also separated from philosophy, which created further complexity. Human sciences, particularly those studying human behavior, deal with moral and psychological issues involving free will, making them more difficult to study compared to inanimate matter.

This paper offers a critical analysis of modern materialist philosophy from an Islamic perspective. It argues that the spread of materialist thought—emerging prominently in the 19th century with ideologies like positivism, evolutionism, Marxism, pragmatism, and logical positivism—has fundamentally reshaped global intellectual discourse, often at the expense of metaphysical and spiritual values. The authors contend that these philosophies, while presenting themselves as “scientific” and “rational,” are unified in their denial of divine revelation, their reduction of reality to material phenomena, and their promotion of atheism. Drawing from the works of influential Western thinkers such as Karl Marx, Ernst Haeckel, and others, the paper highlights how materialism became the philosophical backbone of modern secular ideologies, particularly in education, politics, and economics. In contrast, the Islamic worldview maintains that reality encompasses both the seen and unseen, and that true knowledge must integrate reason, revelation, and empirical observation. The authors also reference contemporary Muslim scholars who have critically engaged with these ideologies, proposing methodological reforms in Islamic theology to better respond to the epistemological challenges posed by materialist philosophies. Ultimately, the paper asserts that modern materialism not only contradicts core Islamic tenets about God, man, and the universe but also leads to moral and existential crises by excluding transcendental values. Thus, a comprehensive Islamic critique is essential not only to defend the integrity of Islamic thought but also to contribute constructively to global philosophical debates

Corry, Porter, and McKenna recently argued that logical positivism is a dead 'research paradigm' and should be stricken from the textbooks. Though I wholeheartedly support moving beyond logical positivism, I think its demise has been greatly exaggerated. This essay traces the continued influence of logical positivism on the nursing discipline. It also examines how far-ranging the revisions would have to be if positivism is truly rejected from the nursing science. Section I argues that Corry et al.'s critique of positivism reiterates core positivist presuppositions. Sections II and III argue that positivist presuppositions about theories and operations still govern much nursing research. Section IV briefly discusses the role of values in the nursing science and argues that the positivists had an important point. This essay aims to clarify how deeply embedded positivism is in the nursing discipline, for it is only when we know how deep the infected tissue is that we can hope to excise it.

This article examines the parallels and distinctions between mystical experiences within religious and cultic contexts, using Mormonism and Happy Science as case studies. The study begins with a clarification of the theoretical framework, rejecting logical positivism and acknowledging the truthfulness of beliefs as held by followers. Definitions of religion and cults are explored, highlighting the challenges in distinguishing between them. Religion is defined through the lens of transcendent belief in God, offering solutions beyond the natural world, while cults are characterised by their non-traditional beliefs and the presence of a divine element within an individual leader. The similarities between cults and religion are discussed, emphasising the human need for meaning and orientation beyond empirical evidence. Mysticism is defined as an experiential phenomenon transcending the physical world, often involving telepathy, clairvoyance, and union with the divine. The article then presents the mystical experiences of Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, and Ryuho Okawa, the founder of Happy Science. Smith’s vision is portrayed as a transcendent experience, marked by paradoxical elements and a dissolution of self, aligning with traditional religious mysticism. In contrast, Okawa’s experience is contained within the physical realm and emphasises the divine within the individual, reflecting characteristics of cultic experiences. The article concludes that the interpretation of the divine as either uncontainable or contained serves as a philosophical tool for distinguishing between religious and cultic traditions, respectively. This framework provides a basis for further research across a broader range of religious and cultic contexts.

Logico-empiricism emphasises the importance of empirical verification as a scientific criterion for distinguishing meaningful from meaningless statements. Although logico-empiricism has made significant contributions to the development of the philosophy of science and has been practically beneficial for every legal scholar, criticisms of the a variety of assumptions underlying logico-empiricism have emerged from several perspectives. Therefore, this article is important to write in order to: 1) explain and deepen the criticisms of logico-empiricism assumptions by focusing on the perspective of dogmatic legal science; 2) offer an alternative epistemology to address these criticisms. This study uses a conceptual approach supported by secondary data sources. The results show that there are six criticisms of the logico-empiricism assumptions of the logical positivism paradigm when viewed from the perspective of dogmatic legal science. These criticisms highlight the tendency of logico-empiricism to reduce legal complexity, limit the scope of explanation, generalise inappropriately, raise questions of objectivity, and ignore social, political, and societal dynamics in the formation and application of law. This critique also demonstrates the limitations of the logico-empiricist approach, necessitating a more inclusive and interdisciplinary alternative epistemology. Several alternative epistemologies proposed to address criticisms of logico-empiricism include hermeneutics, pragmatism, phenomenology, and falsificationism. It is also possible to integrate these various approaches to form a complementary methodological framework, which the author calls "critical-pragmatic hermeneutic phenomenology." This approach is advantageous because it is holistic, open to revision, contextual, practically useful, and respectful of human experience.

:<i>On Theories: Logical Empiricism and the Methodology of Modern Physics</i>

Abstract Friedrich Waismann’s views sometimes hide Wittgenstein’s ideas and methods and sometimes they appear mixed with them. In light of the recent literature and guided by a contrasting overview of Waismann’s and Wittgenstein’s published and unpublished works, I argue that underlying Waismann’s variations on themes by Wittgenstein was the logical empiricist aspiration to unify various kinds of knowledge and explain their relative position within the web of science. Waismann’s unique variation of logical empiricism is meant to accommodate Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy in an alternative account of the relative position of logic, mathematics, natural science, ethics, and religion. I intend to delineate some aspects of this ambitious project underlying Waismann’s writings.

ABSTRACT This article compares the transformation of two distinct strands of twentieth century philosophy under two politically repressive regimes. It begins by presenting the suppression of the Lvov-Warsaw School by the Soviet regime. Then, it turns to the persecution of logical empiricists in the US during the McCarthy era. While Stalinist repression forced the philosophers into ideological conformity, McCarthyite pressures contributed to the depoliticisation of philosophy of science. In both cases, political repression distorted scientific priorities. It is argued that cases like these represent extreme forms of the central case of ‘epistemic intimidation’.

The article deals with the shortcomings of a common argumentative strategy in popularizing science – rationalist bias, which relies on the enlightenment ideal of informing and rational persuasion. Some data shows that adherence to pseudoscientific or esoteric concepts is not always a result of low educational or intellectual level – sometimes it is the more educated denialists hold on to their beliefs more firmly and reject scientific explanations. This situation implies the need of searching new argumentative strategies – this is the main goal of this article. The article shows that the trends of the past few decades in the philosophy of science and in the theory of argumentation also push to a rethinking of the rationalist bias. In the philosophy of science, the ideals of logical positivism were revised in the light of constructivism, which showed that science is not a purely rational activity which is doing according to strict methodological rules. In the theory of argumentation, there has also been a revision of the formal-logical approach, and a turn to models of real discussions, which take into account the rhetorical and pragmatic aspects of argumentation. In light of this, a number of tactics have been analyzed – appeal to authority, appeal to tradition, appeal to emotions, appeal to benefit (or appeal to consequences) – which are sometimes attributed to argumentative errors, but a closer examination shows that these techniques can play a constructive role in popularizing science. Appealing to authority is inevitable in today’s world, where experts are indispensable in many matters. At the same time, it is important to avoid abuse of authority (as in the absolutization of the role of science in scientism). The appeal to tradition is connected with the conventionalist theory of truth, and it can also be a powerful safeguard against amateurs or charlatans who propose some “revolutionary” theories or discoveries. Appealing to emotions allows evoking interest from an audience and motivating to take action on practical issues. Despite stereotype that rationality opposes emotions, the emotional aspect can actually be combined with the rational, and then the argument can have a stronger communicative impact. Another tactic – an appeal to benefit – encourages us to consider the motives of our interlocutors. The classical approach to argumentation emphasizes the value of impartiality and considers appeals to interests to be a mistake. But in real communication, where the search for truth is not the main goal for everyone, taking into account the interests that underlie a certain belief helps to find the most acceptable way of presenting information for the audience. And finally, the criticism of rationalist bias has to do with the very method of justification. Popularizers should better rely not on the classical ideal of a completely convincing proof, but rather on the principle of abduction, which involves choosing the best of available explanations, even if that explanation is not perfect.This analysis of argumentative tactics can be useful in developing effective argumentative strategies in the popularization of science.

Abstract Although prominent figures in Soviet philosophy, such as Valentin Asmus, criticized Kant for limiting his project to epistemology and treating contradiction solely as formal-logical, the primary critique within the Soviet tradition stemmed from a substance-materialist perspective, focusing on his oscillation between idealism and materialism and the resulting agnosticism. Evald Ilyenkov, however, bases his criticism of Kant on the latter’s rejection of the identity of thinking and being, which amounts to a severance of thought and world, and of subject and object. Ilyenkov’s approach implies that Kant’s dismissal of ontology in favour of epistemology is not a consequence of his metaphysical commitments concerning the existence of matter and the claim regarding the unknowability of the thing-in-itself, but that this dismissal and the alleged unknowability of things-in-themselves are the necessary result of his rejection of the unity/identity of thinking and being. Furthermore, Kant’s consequent ideal of the non-contradictoriness of the language of knowledge, which has informed several generations of philosophers from Neo-Kantians to logical positivists, is another manifestation of his dualism and renders thinking impossible.

To confront complex, ‘wicked’ problems such as climate change and migration, science is essential. But what type of knowledge can science provide and what do we actually need? What is the role of the philosophy of science in clarifying what knowledge is required and how to bring it together? To address these pivotal questions, this article reviews three scientific approaches: the empirical cycle (the logical empiricist model reigning in the natural sciences), the hermeneutic cycle (the interpretive model mainly used in the social sciences and humanities), and the model cycle (a more recently emerging approach). Each has its strengths and limitations in dealing with complex problems. We discuss opportunities to combine the various approaches to gain the most from them and provide illustrative examples of how students can be encouraged to understand and integrate the different perspectives they contain. To enhance this, we propose a ‘wicked’ philosophy of science that takes complexity thinking as an overarching framework; as it enables us to combine realist and constructionist perspectives, it offers a more nuanced approach to knowledge acquisition. Given the post-truth society we live in, the proposed ‘wicked’ philosophy also advocates a broader rationality concept that includes emotive and value-laden aspects, and a reflexive science that continually assesses its impacts. The ultimate aim is to equip students with critical, reflexive, and integrative thinking skills that help prepare them for interdisciplinary research on complex problems, thus cultivating a scientific approach that contributes to finding solutions to the pressing challenges we are currently facing.

Poor clinical clerkships, an exclusive focus on scientific medicine, and a lack of scientific attitudes have been identified as key limitations of Korean medical education. This study aims to critically examine the historical and cultural contexts, as well as the evolving trends in medical education in the United Kingdom and the United States, from a comparative education perspective, in order to address these limitations within the Korean context. The United Kingdom values diversity, democracy, knowledge, and the National Health Service, which have shaped UK medical education to emphasize: (1) graduate outcomes encompassing knowledge, skills, and attitudes; (2) community-based clerkships; (3) a “third discipline” divided among population health, ethics and jurisprudence, psychology, and social sciences; (4) research skills; (5) student-selected components; and (6) cultural diversity. The United States values cultural competence, democracy with a preference for small government, progressivism, and specialty-based patient care. These values have led US medical education to prioritize: (1) competency-based graduate outcomes; (2) longitudinal clinical programs; (3) health systems science; (4) dual degree tracks; (5) transition programs; and (6) critical culturalism that moves beyond traditional notions of cultural competence. Korea, in contrast, values national development, respect, personal growth, democracy, and future-oriented competencies. Currently, there is a lack of critical and emergent care in non-capital regions, and the Korean government oppressively intervenes on both medical education and healthcare delivery. Given these circumstances, the following are needed: (1) contextually relevant graduate outcomes; (2) diverse forms of clerkships to supplement tertiary hospital-based block rotations; (3) expanded education in the social sciences and humanities that goes beyond the narrow paradigm of scientific medicine; (4) research competence that moves beyond logical positivism and academic imperialism; (5) career choice programs; and (6) contextualized anti-bias education.

Abstract I argue that the epistemic aim of scientific theorizing (EAST) is producing theories with the highest possible number and degree of theoretical virtues (call this “TV-EAST”). I trace TV-EAST’s logical empiricist origins and discuss its close connections to Kuhn’s and Laudan’s problem-solving accounts of the aim of science. Despite TV-EAST’s antirealist roots, I argue that if one adopts the realist view that EAST is finding true theories, one should also endorse TV-EAST. I then defend TV-EAST by showing that it addresses the challenges raised against using “the aim of science” metaphor and offers significant advantages over the realist account.

W. Dilthey argued that the main categories of humanities ("Geisteswissenschaften") are not cause and effect, but purpose, value and meaning. Indeed, we usually give teleological, rather than causal, explanations for human actions. Actions are from the beginning perceived as intentional. Intentions cannot be considered as the causes of human actions and historical events in the natural sciences’ sense. In intentional actions, we react not to objects and situations as such, but to their meaning. Meaning is a new side of phenomena that appears in the world of purposefully acting beings. Objects and phenomena acquire meaning in relation to our goals. Supporters of the naturalistic approach in social sciences and humanities strive to get rid of meanings, to reduce the material of humanitarian knowledge to what is accessible to external observation. Philosophical grounds for such an approach were given by logical positivism. And in sociology – by E. Durkheim and behaviorism. However, it is not possible to perform such an approach consistently. Each culture is a world of meanings. The ways of understanding meanings accepted in a given culture are assimilated by us in the process of socialization. Meanings are fixed and realized in language. But the world of meanings is internalized practically – in the course of the development of a child's activity and his mastery of the forms of activity characteristic of a given culture. The central character of the concept of meaning in humanitarian knowledge prevents the transfer of natural scientific methods into it. The scientistic interpretation of psychoanalysis is criticized, because it works entirely in the field of meanings. It is proved that it is impossible to analyze social and human life, ignoring the world of meanings.

ABSTRACT This article offers a resuscitative reading of Iris Murdoch’s Under the Net as a critically underestimated work that interrogates the philosophical problem of defining personal responsibility in a contingent world. It argues that the novel employs the framework of philosophical comedy to explore how the individual can live meaningfully in the midst of uncertainty. The text explores the tension between autonomy and external challenge, using Jake’s creative process as a writer which the novel captures to present a possible moral framework for authorship in a postwar world. Positioning the text within the intellectual currents of postwar Britain, the article contends that the work critiques the reductionism of logical positivism while promoting a new metaphysical seriousness. It highlights Murdoch’s nuanced response to the Kantian categorical imperative and concludes that Under the Net reconfigures the experiments of modernity to articulate a vision of ethical and artistic responsibility that is deeply relational. By modeling a way of living thoughtfully within uncertainty, Murdoch’s debut establishes itself as a cornerstone of her philosophical trajectory and a vital response to the existential challenges of its time.

Abstract In the 1950s, after a year in Vienna, Arthur Pap published a monograph on the most recent developments in analytic philosophy (Analytische Erkenntnistheorie, 1955), a book which can be read as a strong criticism of logical empiricism. I reconstruct the historical context in which the book was written and analyze Pap’s criticism of a core thesis of the logical empiricists: the linguistic theory of logical necessity. Against Rudolf Carnap and Friedrich Waismann, Pap argues for an absolute notion of necessity as a property of propositions conceived as abstract entities independent of language and linguistic conventions. I analyze Pap’s arguments against the logical empiricists as well as Rudolf Haller’s reaction to Pap’s criticism. Pap’s arguments can be seen as an attempt to give to analytic philosophy a re-orientation quite at odds with logical empiricism.

Empiricism has a long and venerable history. Aristotle, the Epicureans, Sextus Empiricus, Bacon, Locke, Hume, Mill, Mach and the Logical Empiricists, among others, represent a long line of historically influential empiricists who, one way or another, placed an emphasis on knowledge gained through the senses. In recent times the most highly articulated and influential edition of empiricism is undoubtedly Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. Science, according to this view, aims at empirically adequate theories, i.e. theories that save all and only the observable phenomena. Roughly put, something is observable in van Fraassen’s view if members of the human epistemic community can detect it with their unaided senses. Critics have contested this notion, citing, among other reasons, that much of what counts as knowledge for scientists, especially in the natural sciences, concerns things that are detectable only with instruments, i.e. things that are unobservable and hence unknowable by van Fraassen’s lights. The current paper seeks to overcome this objection by putting forth and defending a liberalised conception of observability and an associated, and accordingly liberalised, conception of empiricism. ‘Grounded observability’ and ‘grounded empiricism’, as we call them, unchain themselves from the burdens of traditional conceptions of experience, while at the same time tethering themselves to the source of epistemic credibility in the senses, and, hence to the true spirit of empiricism.

Logical empiricist anti-exceptionalism in its Austro-German context.