REVIEWS 355 others for its allegiance. Its relative weakness plainly helped spur Czechsponsored Czechoslovak propaganda, but Czechs failed to understand that phenomena like the speakingof Magyar could denote Slovakidentityvis-a-vis themselvesratherthan treasonto the new state. Czech insensitivityat a crucial moment in Slovak national evolution was thus to have significant consequences . Nurmi inclines to a sharp view of 'Czechoslovak' motives, operating not so much to bolster a Slovak identity seen as weak but as exploiting this purported weakness in the interests of the new state's internationalposition, which requiredthe incorporationof Slovakia. The judgement on the Czechs may be a little harsh, given the logic of the international situation. The theme of Slovak national consciousness and the Slovak-Magyar relationship might benefit from a fuller picture of the demographic and sociological inheritance from Dualist Hungary, given the large literature on magyarization in that state. A more rounded study might add a section on attitudesof the smalleducated classof I9 I8, including its Protestant and Catholic wings. Ismo Nurmi concerns himself explicitly, however, with the theme of popular consciousness and on this topic he has provided an interestingand helpfulmonograph. History Department ROBIN OKEY University of Wanwick Liulevicius,VejasGabriel. WarLandontheEastern Front.Culture, National Identity andGerman Occupation in World WarOne.Studiesin the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare,9. CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge, 2000. viii + 309 pp. Notes. Bibliography.Index. $59.95: ?37.50. DR LIULEVICIUS's readable volume evaluates the experience of ordinary German soldiersfightingon the EasternFrontduringthe FirstWorldWar.He is correct to underline that the frenzy of researchunleashedby FritzFischer's seminal Griff nachderWeltmacht (Dtisseldorf, I96I) barely touched on the dayto -day life and work of troops in the East, although the intractable constitutional challenges thrown up for the Imperial German government in planning to annex the Baltic provinces have in fact been studied at some length in otherworks. The present book offersa valuable and carefullyresearcheddescriptionof what was going on in the military administration known as OberOst, encompassing Courland, Lithuania and Bialystok-Grodno.The area was, as the author affirms, 'essentially the feudal fief' (p. 2 I) of the Supreme Commander in the East, General von Hindenburg, aided and abetted by his chief of staffErichLudendorff.The sheerdetailof how the Germanauthorities went about establishingwhat Liuleviciusdescribes as 'the militaryutopia' the attemptsto control the flow of population movements, the development of Germanization policies to inculcate in the native populations the proper respect for the Reich's cultural weight is both impressive and useful for reference purposes. So too is the chapter entitled 'Crisis' which analyses how the German High Command triedto get round the politicalpressuresfor greaterself-determinationfor the majorityof Balticpeoples in the wake of the 356 SEER, 8o, 2, 2002 Russian revolution. At the same time the author would have benefited here from studying earlier works analysing constitutional issues raised by BrestLitovsk ,notably by H-E. Volkmann (Diedeutsche Baltikumpolitik zwischen BrestLitovsk undCompiegne, Cologne-Vienna, I970) or BernhardMann (DieBaltischen Ldnder in derdeutschen Kriegszielpublizistik I9I4-I9I8, Ttibingen, I965). These and other key texts in German do not appearin the bibliography. In general,however, thisentertainingbook isveryfarfroma drydescription of events and aspiresto convey the moods, impressionsand atmospherewhich assailedthe occupying forces. It does this well, if there is too much repetition. As far as the author is concerned, the overridingexperience for troops in the East was one of alienation induced by sensations of being in a remote, strange and hostile environment. 'There, with widened eyes, the German soldier faced vistas of strange lands, unknown peoples and new horizons' (p. 2). Fairenough, but it is sometimes difficultto realize that the author is in fact also consideringa partof Europewhich generationsof travellershad long recognized as 'European' in every sense of the word. How profound and widespreadcould the 'alienation'of the soldiersenmasse have been? The book raisessome interestingideas about what the Ober Ostexperience meant for subsequent generations of Germans, but it is difficultto resist the feeling that Liuleviciuspushes a ratherinterestingcase fractionallytoo farfor comfort, as when he concludes that the 'lessons' of the Eastern Front 'were eventuallytaken up by the Nazi movement and fusedwith the vile energies of their anti-Semitism,to produce a terriblenew plan for the East' (p. 279). Like many historians of such 'continuity' in German foreign policy, he gives insufficient attention to the not insignificant...
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