Local People's Congresses Research Articles

The sword of damocles: Understanding the carbon abatement effects of top-down environmental management practices -- insights from China's campaign-style governance

Inspection, standing for top-down environmental management practices, also known as campaign-style governance, is used by central governments to lessen local environmental pollution. However, there is no causal evidence for carbon abatement. Employing staggered difference-in-differences (DiD), I find that inspected cities mitigate carbon intensity and carbon emissions by 3.72% and 2.34%, respectively, with economic significance. Conducting a triple difference strategy, I suggest the channels are the local people's congresses and political consultative conferences' proposals, government attention, environmental regulation, industrial structure, and green innovation. Also, the heterogeneous effects suggest that municipal party secretaries assigned to their birthplace, the older the party standing and age, and those with natural sciences majors, are more conducive to the inspection achieving carbon mitigation. An alternative DiD specification shows that the “look-back” inspection achieves sustained carbon reduction. I support the argument that top-down inspection helps achieve resilience to climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Path optimization of local people's congress budget supervision in China

Path optimization of local people's congress budget supervision in China

Can local People's Congress supervision improve the expenditure behavior of local governments? Evidence from provincial budget review

The Local People's Congress budget review and supervision is an important measure to “effectively safeguard and improve people's livelihood” under the changes of the current major contradictions. Using the multi period DID method, we found that after the revision of the regulations, the local people's livelihood public service expenditure bias and expenditure efficiency were significantly improved. This conclusion is still valid after considering a series of robustness tests and possible explanations. The specific ways for it mainly include the constraint on the opportunistic behavior of local governments and the signal transmission function of the LPC's supervision. Further research shows that more effective media attention, more open and transparent rule of law environment, greater financial pressure and regional differences can all affect the effect of LPC's supervision of spending behavior. The research conclusion shows that the role of LPC supervision should be further played to ensure the development of local people's livelihood and promote the construction of government revenue and expenditure management system.

Governance edging out representation? Explaining the imbalanced functions of China’s people’s congress system

In theory, representation is the primary function of the people’s congresses. In practice, under China’s party-state system, the ruling party imposes specific governance tasks on the congresses with the effect that the representative function of the People’s Congress System has largely given way to its governance functions. The uneven practice of these functions has left the System facing a serious representation deficit. Based on a careful analysis of historical archives and findings from interviews and observations, this paper examines the causes and repercussions of the imbalanced functions of the People’s Congress System. By proposing a Monitoring and Adaptation Model, we adopt a historical perspective to reexamine the interplay between the people’s congresses and the ruling party, arguing that the imbalanced functions of the People’s Congress System result from the interplay between Party monitoring and the corresponding adaptations of the people’s congresses. The Party, to bolster its governing performance, has introduced an array of institutional arrangements to have the people’s congresses fulfill specific governance tasks. However, the people’s congresses have gained a measure of autonomy thanks to their organizational growth and institutionalization, changes to the makeup of deputies, and significant efforts by certain leaders since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Although they are expected to take on the governance functions assigned by the ruling party, the people’s congresses thus enjoy greater leeway to carry out their functions selectively with an eye to improving their standing and relevance in China’s political system. Ironically, the fact that the people’s congresses prioritize their governance functions and that the overall performance of the party-state system gains consistent improvement may have warded off a potential representation crisis as the weak representativeness of the People’s Congress System would otherwise predict. Abbreviations: PCS: The People's Congress System; CPC: The Communist Party of China; The “M&A model”: The Monitoring and Adaptation Model; NPC: National People's Congress; LPCs: Local People's Congresses; CPPCC: The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

Perspective of the Legal Basis of NPC’s Discussion and Decision-making Power on Major Issues

The decision of local people's congresses to discuss major issues is a basic right granted to local people's congresses by the Chinese Constitution and laws. However, in practice, the implementation of the power of deliberation of major issues by local people's congresses is worrying. By applying the theory of Chinese traditionalism and unity in the theory of law, the theory of “sovereignty in the people” in the social contract theory of Western natural law school, Austin's “legal command theory” in Western positivist law and Hart's “recognition” “Rules theory” to argue that the integrity of rights necessarily involves the dual factors of decision-making and execution. At the same time, the existence and operation of the law always reflects the development of the political system. The realistic political situation requires us to make more precise and meticulous refinement of the external form and specific technical links of the legal system, and to coordinate the rules to make up the legal theory and Conflicts and conflicts in legal practice help to reform social institutions.

Do inferences of competence from faces predict political selection in authoritarian regimes? Evidence from China

Candidate appearance is a significant predictor of election outcomes in democracies because voters often make inference of competence based on facial appearance. Do inferences of competence from faces matter in autocracies? In this article, we study the effects of candidate appearance on the selection of three types of Chinese officials: (1) rural deputies elected to a local people's congress (LPC), (2) urban deputies elected to the LPC, and (3) unelected mayors and bureaucrats. We find that facial competence cues are relevant only to the votes received by rural LPC candidates. Our findings suggest the importance of information accessibility in political selection. In particular, the “selectorate” of mayors and bureaucrats do not need facial appearance cues because they have access to substantive information about the quality of political candidates. Our findings provide a possible explanation for the resilience of some autocracies: they are able to identify talent through an informative, albeit non-electoral, selection mechanism.

How Does Local People's Congress Lead the Lawmaking? The Case of Legislative Evaluation

The recent emergence of legislative evaluation in China brings a new opportunity to understand the role of people's congresses in lawmaking. This paper selects the legislative evaluation in Guangzhou as a revealing case to unravel the dynamics of how people’s congress carry out legislative evaluation and their implications for understanding the role of people’s congress in China’s lawmaking. Based upon document analysis and empirical observations, three dynamics of legislative evaluation, i.e. the formal evaluation procedure, the pragmatic strategies and the third party and public participation, are under scrutiny. A close examination of the formal evaluation procedure covers the agenda setting mechanism, the division of evaluation power and the role of administrative organs in evaluation. Empirical findings reveal that the people’s congress develops pragmatic strategies to deal with the legislature-executive relation in evaluation process. Participation of third parties and the general public help to enhance the capacity and build the brand of the people's congress. These mechanisms indicate that the role of people’s congress in lawmaking has evolved towards a role of agenda setter. Under the recent renewed discourse of rule of law, legislative evaluation in Guangzhou illuminates in what ways people's congresses may possibly attain the leading role in China's ongoing legislative reform.

“The Power of the Purse” of Local People's Congresses in China: Controllable Contestation under Bureaucratic Negotiation

AbstractSince the 1999 budget reform, and for the first time in China, local people's congresses (LPCs) have begun to exert “the power of the purse.” Based on our fieldwork and survey, we argue that while LPCs have strengthened their budgetary oversight since the reform, they continue to employ a strategy of “embeddedness.” Although certain LPCs have become more contentious, they tend to veil contestations in bureaucratic negotiation in order to avoid uncontrollable budgetary conflicts. The strategy adopted by LPCs in budgetary oversight provides a case for examining the recent debate over the behaviour patterns of LPCs in legislative oversight.

Creating “Masters of the Country” in Shanghai and Beijing: Discourse and the 1953–54 Local People's Congress Elections

AbstractThe first round of elections for local people's congresses was an important moment in the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to create an image of the common people as the “masters of the country.” Lower-class people were portrayed in official propaganda as “masters” who were also supporters of the Party. Yet, those “masters” nevertheless displayed diverse political attitudes that were influenced by different local political cultures, particularly in Beijing and Shanghai. The official propaganda promoting the “masters” was a Communist strategy to gain political legitimacy that ironically created the foundation for heterodox mass movements.

Organizational Clientelism: An Analysis of Private Entrepreneurs in Chinese Local Legislatures

Extant literature on authoritarian legislatures argues that dictators set up quasi-democratic institutions to co-opt opposition and attract investors. We argue that dictators also nurture clientelistic ties with social groups useful to their rule, a previously overlooked function of authoritarian legislatures. Drawing on the case of Chinese local legislatures—namely, the local People's Congress and the local People's Political Consultative Conference—we find that Chinese local governments use these institutions to channel patronage to and gain political support from the private sector. Field interviews and an analysis of a nationwide firm-level survey show that private firms owned by local legislative members, while obtaining more bank loans, provide more support to the local government in various forms than those owned by nonmembers. This finding suggests that authoritarian legislatures, even those with weak policymaking efficacy, can help authoritarian states build stable alliances with social groups, thereby contributing to regime resilience.

Who Wants to Be a Communist? Career Incentives and Mobilized Loyalty in China

AbstractThis article analyses trends in the Chinese Communist Party's recruitment strategy and the composition of Party members. Based on original survey data, it analyses the motives for joining the CCP, the consequences on career mobility, and the effects of Party membership on political beliefs and behaviour in contemporary China. These data reveal three key findings. First, for those who aspire to positions in the Party/government bureaucracy or SOEs, Party membership is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition; for those in the non-state sector, it is youth and college education that are the keys to top jobs, and not Party membership. Second, CCP members are more likely to donate time, money, and even blood, for various causes, and to vote in local people's congress elections. This behaviour demonstrates mobilized loyalty: the CCP mobilizes its members to participate in these activities to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime and to serve as examples to the rest of the population. Third, Party members are not more likely to support and trust their state institutions: while they do have higher levels of support for the centre than the rest of population generally, Party membership does not produce increased support for the local state. Nor does economic development: all else being equal, support for central and local party-state institutions is lower in the most developed cities. These findings call into question the Party's recruitment and development policies, as well as the conventional wisdom on the link between economic development and popular support for the status quo.

The constitution of China: a contextual analysis

1 A Century of Turmoil: An Overview of China's Constitutional Reform and Revolutions I. Introduction: The Dawn of a Constitutional Moment II. Constitutional Elements in the Ancient Regime and Their Limitations III. The First Republic: The Nationalist Revolution of 1911 IV. Why Revolutions Fail to Bring about Constitutionalism Further Reading 2 The New Constitutional Order of the People's Republic I. The Second Republic: The Communist Revolution of 1949 II. The 1982 Constitution III. Constitutional Amendments IV. Constitutional Transformations Further Reading 3 Governing the Goliath: China's Central and Local Relations I. Introduction: The Sun Zhigang Tragedy II. The Constitutional Landscape III. Keeping Laws in Order IV. Bottom-Up or Top-Down? Rule of the Party Reinforced V. Pluralism within a Unitary System Further Reading 4 Democracy with Chinese Characteristics? The Role of the People's Congresses I. Introduction: Supremacy by Rubber Stamp? II. The National People's Congress (NPC) III. The NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC) IV. Local People's Congresses (LPCs) V. How to Make Democracy Work Further Reading 5 Administration of the State According to Law I. The Central Government II. Local Government III. Toward Administrative Rule of Law? Further Reading 6 De-politicising the Judiciary I. Introduction: Establishing Judicial Review? II. Judicial Structure and Functions III. Judicial Reform: Necessities, Possibilities, Limits Further Reading 7 The Contemporary Rights Revolution: Life, Liberty, Property and Equality I. Introduction: Back to the Sun Zhigang Model II. Equality III Liberty IV. Property Further Reading 8 Still Dormant: Political and Religious Rights I. Introduction: What the Sun Zhigang Model Cannot Do II. Freedom of Speech III. Freedom of Religion IV The Right to Election Further Reading 9 Conclusion: The Future of China's Constitutionalism I. Back to 1911? The On-going Saga of China's Constitutional Journey II. Toward the Third Republic? The Future of China's Constitutionalism Further Reading

Only the Party Manages Cadres: limits of Local People's Congress supervision and reform in China

This article joins the debate on the increasingly consultative nature of Chinese politics by adding the role of the Local People's Congress (LPC). In contrast to previous research on LPCs that emphasizes their increasing importance and improved capacity, this article shows that the central Party leadership, in order to uphold its monopoly of the cadre management system, has reduced LPC standing committees' (LPCSC) influence over cadres. The article analyses the consequences of the People's Congress Standing Committee Supervision Law passed in 2006 and the policy of appointing the first Party secretary as LPCSC chairperson. A case study of the changes over a ten-year period (1998–2009) in a county People's Congress (PC) in Zhejiang illustrates how the change in leadership and the implementation of the Supervision Law effectively stopped previously initiated reforms to strengthen the LPC and crippled the LPCSCs' capacity to supervise government cadres. The article concludes that the policies adopted in order to strengthen Party control over LPCSCs have resulted in a decrease of horizontal accountability and confirm the image of an emerging consultative authoritarian political system.

Popular Sovereignty and Democratic Centralism in the People's Republic of China

This essay argues that the democratic centralism of the revolutionary People's Republic of China did produce a form of popular sovereignty. As the process that created the people as a political subject, democratic centralism produced popular sovereignty as an effect of the revolutionary praxis of the mass line perfected by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1940s. In the post-Mao period, the CCP sponsored political reforms that pursued an alternative strategy of democratic centralism — direct elections at the village level for villagers' committees and for deputies to local people's congresses. Together, these strategies demonstrate that democratic centralism articulates a form of popular sovereignty quite different from that of liberal democracy, one much more interested in a type of self-government based on managed participation.

Civic engagement through participatory budgeting in China: Three different logics at work

AbstractThis article seeks to develop an understanding of participatory budgeting (PB) in China by examining its three distinctive logics—administrative, political reform and citizen empowerment—and how they operate and intertwine. The background to recent PB is outlined, followed by an overview of the three logics, the mapping of PB developments and activities across China, a discussion of various patterns and related characteristics of PB, an evaluation of PB against a number of criteria within the three logics and a consideration of the prospects for PB. The analysis draws on several sources, including newspaper and journal articles, personal involvement in five PB experiments over the last 6 years, and numerous field trips and interviews with national and local officials. The overall conclusion is that, while the administrative logic will remain dominant in PB experiments, the empowering of local People's Congresses will continue to be constrained by the caution of the central leaders and resistance from local governments. Likewise, the empowering of citizens through PB will be limited by government control. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Independent Candidates in China's Local People's Congresses: a typology

Previous studies of China's local people's congress (LPC) elections have been preoccupied with the description of the new election law, the operation of that law, the control mechanism of local Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committees in the electoral process, electorates and selectorates, and the voting behavior in China's limited-choice election. Less scholarly attention has been paid to the emergence and implications of independent candidates in this electoral setting. Based on interviews, document analysis and observation, this paper defines the independent candidate, classifies them into four types, and describes the campaign process and specific outcomes in China's LPC elections. It is demonstrated that the development of independent candidates forms a realistic power locus in China's LPC elections, and to a large extent provides a functional substitution of opposition parties for exploring the change of authoritarian regime without opposition parties.

Deliberative Democracy in China: Connecting a Deliberative Poll with the Local People's Congress

The issue of how best to consult the public vexes policymakers and the public around the world. There are limitations to elections, self selected town public meetings, public opinion polls and every known method. Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in microcosms of the population, selected by random sampling, who also are given a chance to seriously deliberate about policy alternatives. How might such efforts connect with government institutions, including elected representatives? In China a series of Deliberative Polls have had a direct impact on policy at the local level. This paper reports on one of these projects which also attempted to explicitly connect with the official decision making by the Local Peoples Congress. In February 2008, the local government of Zeguo Township in Wenling City, China conducted its third Deliberative Poll. Zeguo Township began conducting Deliberative Polls in 2005, when the local government sought to consult the public about 30 infrastructure, sewage and environmental projects. The most recent DP was the most ambitious and transparent project this Township has conducted. The local officials randomly selected 197 citizens of Zeguo to deliberate on the Township’s 2008 financial budget allocation. The participants of this DP received balanced briefing materials and a detailed report of the Township’s 2008 budget. This was the first time the local government had released its budget report to the public. As a direct result of this DP project, the Local People’s Congress (LPC) revised items of its 2008 budget to reflect the voice of the people. The participants experienced significant knowledge gains and policy preference changes, but, most significantly is the impact of this project on local governance. Over 60 deputies from the Local People’s Congress observed the DP event and subsequently, the LPC approved the results generated from this DP event. The local government needed a method of public consultation for citizens to engage in deliberation, interact with policymakers and experts, and at the same time, increase transparency. Through Deliberative Polling, the local officials gathered a microcosm of their Township and most importantly, discovered and revised their Township’s budgetary preferences based on voices from informed citizens. This paper analyzes the public opinion data in the DP and assesses it against criticisms about representativeness and the quality of the process.

Local people's congresses in China: development and transition

1. Introduction: local legislatures in Chinese politics 2. The politics of lawmaking with Chinese characteristics 3. Supervising governments and development strategies 4. Supervising courts and the development of new state organs 5. Role fulfillment of deputies to local legislatures 6. Symbiosis between local legislatures and social organizations 7. The development of local legislatures and political leadership 8. Conclusion: the development of local legislatures and political development in China.

Local People's Congresses and Governing ChinaLocal People's Congresses in China: Development and Transition. Young Nam ChoThe People's Congresses and Governance in China: Toward a Network Mode of Governance. Ming Xia

Young Nam Cho, Local People 's Congresses in China: Development and Transition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 192pp. US$80.00 (hardcover). Ming Xia, The People 's Congresses and Governance in China: Toward a Network Mode of Governance. London: Routledge, 2007. 300pp. US$130.00 (hardcover). Taken together, these two books depict the role that local People's Congresses (FPCs) play in Chinese politics. The image that emerges is somewhat unexpected. One might have thought that the crucial question about FPCs centers on how representative they are. What stands out in these accounts, however, is how little attention is devoted to elections, deputy-constituent ties and speaking out at plenary sessions. For Young Nam Cho and Ming Xia, the big story is occurring inside the state, and concerns institutionalization, multi-step deliberation and enhanced oversight. Administrative reforms have transformed the policy process, and new arenas have been created to manage conflict. FPCs have benefited greatly from this re-division of labor and are not a rival show or a rubber stamp (Xia, p. 228) but partners in governance providing a venue for interested parties (mostly within the bureaucracy) to work out disagreements. Energetic FPCs are first and foremost a sign that where Chinese takes place has changed. Fegislative development, in this way of thinking, has less to do with responsiveness and changing state-society relations and more to do with statebuilding, restructuring bureaucratic ties and making Party rule predictable and effective. If FPCs have become a strong political force in local politics (Cho, p. 163) but have been empowered only selectively (with much more attention to lawmaking and oversight than to representation), what does this imply about the shape of the Chinese polity?1 More simply, what do local People's Congresses do, what do they not do, and what does their mixture of activism and quiescence say about how governance is changing? Evidence and Variation Students of LPCs sometimes fall prey to cherry-picking instances of assertiveness, and downplay the fact that most congresses remain pliant and passive. Cho and Xia do not avoid this trap entirely. Many passages, especially in Xia's book, detail the most exciting (but perhaps least representative) episodes of contestation, muscularity in lawmaking and vigorous oversight. The significance of events such as vetoing a court work report (the Shenyang Incident) or interpellating and then refusing to ratify several bureau directors (the Guangdong Phenomena) (Cho, pp. 1-2) can at times be difficult to evaluate, and a feeling lingers that atypical occurrences (and unusually hardworking congresses) have been blown up beyond their import.2 That said, both authors have assembled convincing evidence that LPCs are more active than previously thought and that many are closer to the local center of power than the National People's Congress (NPC) is in Beijing (Cho, p. 163; Xia, p. 25O).3 At a time when the NPC often appears sleepy and handcuffed, the most enterprising local congresses introduce innovations that begin in the provinces and spread outwards. Formerly quiet LPCs emulate dynamic neighbors, and policy diffusion occurs on issues including nationalities' autonomy, consumer rights and the protection of children (Xia, pp. 163-64; Cho, pp. 15, 165). 4 Provincial congresses, especially, have filled a void created by too few national laws promoting economic liberalization (Xia, p. 5), such that, by the late 1990s, legislators in Shanghai and Shenzhen were heard bragging about how advanced their congresses were compared to the NPC, in terms both of top-notch staff and an ability to enact controversial laws.5 Still, legislative activism remains uneven, among and within provinces (Cho, p. 5).6 In the absence of a nationwide sample (or armies of scholars studying People's Congresses), Cho offers a number of useful hypotheses about variation and how to understand it. …

Local People's Congresses and Governing China

The role that local people's congresses (LPCs) play in Chinese politics is somewhat unexpected. One might have thought that the crucial question about LPCs centers on how representative they are. What stands out in recent research, however, is how little attention is devoted to elections, deputy-constituent ties, and speaking out at plenary sessions. The big story, instead, is occurring inside the state and concerns institutionalization, multi-step deliberation, lawmaking, and enhanced oversight. Administrative reforms have transformed the policy process and new arenas have been created to manage conflict. LPCs have benefited greatly from this re-division of labor and are not a rival show or a rubber stamp but partners in governance that provide a venue for interested parties (mostly within the bureaucracy) to work out disagreements. Energetic LPCs are first and foremost a sign that where Chinese politics takes place has changed. Legislative development, in this way of thinking, has less to do with responsiveness and altered state-society relations and more to do with state-building, restructuring bureaucratic ties, and making Party rule predictable and effective.