Local Government Contracting Research Articles

Representative bureaucracy and local government contracting: Examining supplier diversity programs

Representative bureaucracy and local government contracting: Examining supplier diversity programs

Government contracts and audit fees

Topics concerning government contracts have recently attracted much attention from researchers and the public because of the US government's significant spending on goods and services. In this study, we investigate whether audit fees are associated with audit clients' government contracts. We find that firms with a higher proportion of government sales to total sales pay higher audit fees than other firms. Our further analysis shows the audit premium is driven mainly by the federal government and local government contracts. We also show that local government contracts have a larger effect than federal government contracts on the determination of audit fees. Taken together, our findings enhance our understanding of a potential determinant of audit fees and imply that auditors may view firms with and without government contracts differently.

지방계약의 책임성 제고를 위한 부패 유형과 개선방안 연구

It is necessary to enhance accountability of local government contracts due to the high risk of corruption. In previous studies, local government contracts have been continuously mentioned as one of the major fields of corruption in local governments. However, there are few studies that have specifically reviewed the corruption of local government contracts. Therefore, this study reviewed the corruption types of local government contract and improvement measures through analyzing the audit results of the Board of Audit and Inspection(BAI). As a result of the analysis, corruption in local government contracts occurred most frequently in the preparation stage as a procedure and in the field of construction as the object of the contract. Unfair private contracts were most common corruption types, followed by contract with the unqualified contract partners, improper cost calculation and payment and split contracts of single contracts. Characteristically, local government contract corruption are mainly caused by the actions of local public officials. And favorable treatment due to unfair contracts and contracts according to unfair instructions were also occurring. The lack of expertise of local public officials in charge caused corruption. Poor guidance and supervision of managers was also acting as a cause of corruption. Therefore, in order to prevent corruption in local government contracts, this study suggest necessity strengthening the internal control system, enhancing transparency, clarifying related laws and regulations, educating local public officials in charge and strengthening the roles of internal and external audits.

Do Local Constraints on Corporate Political Activities Really Bite? Evidence from Local Adoptions of the American Anti-Corruption Act

We examine the consequences of local laws modeled on the American Anti-Corruption Act (“AACA”), which aims to constrain corporate political activities. Consistent with these laws significantly increasing the costs of forging local political connections, we find a reduction in the likelihood that: (i) local incumbent politicians are re-elected; and (ii) firms receive local government contracts. We also find a negative capital market reaction to the AACA — indicating that shareholders punish firms for losing valuable connections, and a decline in opportunistic reporting, suboptimal investments and corporate risk-taking. Our evidence feeds into the calls to legislate the AACA at the state (federal) level.

Symbol and Substance in Local Government Workforce Development: First Source Hiring Programs

First Source programs intend to spur interviewing/hiring of hard-to-hire or disadvantaged individuals on local government contracts. Such programs are belief-based, rooted in values that must be translated into outcomes and subjected to diligent evaluation processes. The failure of values-based programs to achieve desired outcomes is an ethical consideration. This article views two First Source programs (in Washington, DC, and Providence, RI) through the lens of semiotics, asking what the program language says about symbol and meaning in public policy, and what these programs have led to in outcomes for workforce development. The programs show potential for community benefit, but ambiguity in detailing expectations and program processes may lead to underwhelming results, even though the passage or existence of the program might satisfy advocacy groups.

The Effect of Formal and Informal Contracting Mechanisms on Implementation Performance in the U.S. Federalist System

The relationship between contract management capacity and implementation success in local government contracting is well established. However, less is known about how specific contract mechanisms are linked to this success. This study uses implementation of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program to examine the use of formal and informal contract management techniques in the implementation of energy projects. The use of formal contract mechanisms, such as full and open competitive bidding, contact rescission and outcome-based performance measures, exhibits a statistically significant effect on implementation performance. The findings advance contracting theory and have practical implications for local government contracting and implementation success in fiscal federalism.

INSTITUTIONAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING: EVIDENCE FROM ENGLAND

Theories of contracting out offer contrasting perspectives on the noneconomic determinants of local government contracting. Some suggest that ideological motives predominate, with contracting decisions reflecting the ideology of ruling parties. Others emphasize political motives, with governments responding to local preferences. In this article, we draw on ideas about isomorphic pressures within organizational fields to examine whether institutional influences might also affect contracting behaviour. Using a spatial auto‐regressive probit model, we evaluate whether mimetic pressures as well as ideological and political motives shape the decision to contract out service provision in English local governments. In addition, we analyse whether those factors also determine whether contracting local governments decide to contract with a commercial firm or a not‐for‐profit provider. The statistical results suggest that the decision to contract out is spatially dependent, and hence reflective of institutional forces. By contrast, political motives and market size considerations shape with whom local governments contract.

Government Contracting - Surety Bonds

Jennifer Schaus in Washington, DC presents this piece with Joshua Etemadi (SBA Bonds) on obtaining a Surety Bond for Federal and State & Local government contracting. The topics include but are not limted to Government Contracting, B2G, Federal Procurement, Surety Bonds, B2G, GovCon and SBA.

Understanding the Differences Between Vendor Types in Local Governance

It is commonly posited that for-profit, nonprofit, and other government vendors have fundamental differences, which make one or the other the superior choice depending on the circumstances of service delivery. Past research, focusing on service and market characteristics, finds support for this proposition. In this article, we investigate not only the typical theoretical expectations regarding vendor traits, service characteristics, and market conditions associated with the sectors, but also the presumed trustworthiness and management practices that are argued to differentiate them in an effort to better understand the roles played by each in local government contracting. Our findings indicate that as expected, nonprofits are most commonly employed when dealing with hard to define, “soft” services with weak markets. However, contrary to expectations, nonprofits are not generally considered more trustworthy than for-profits and are not managed more “loosely” (i.e., more ambiguous contracts, more discretion exercised in sanctioning) than their for-profit peers. Rather, public vendors seem to be the most trusted and are managed less rigidly than contractors from the other sectors.

What Determines the Formal Versus Relational Nature of Local Government Contracting?

In this article, we examine the governance structures used to manage local service delivery contracts with an eye toward two specific concerns. First, we contend that public managers likely use dual regimes in which contract writing is more formal in nature than is the management style adopted during contract implementation. We also explore the determinants of such mechanisms. We find some evidence to support our contention in that managers frequently contact and communicate with their vendors despite the presence of clearly and formally written contracts. We further find that the formal versus relational nature of written contract features is influenced by different factors (service characteristics, market conditions, vendor ownership) than is management style (reputation, management capacity, expectations of continuing relationships).

Exploring Variations in Contracting for Services Among American Local Governments

During the previous two decades, researchers have conducted an array of empirical studies of local government contracting for services. Some of the more recent findings have suggested that this form of privatization has become less politically controversial and more accepted as a service delivery approach. Do politics still matter when it comes to explaining patterns in local government contracting? The findings from this study indicate that the influence of political factors, such as demand for smaller government and public employee opposition to privatization, still help to account for variations in local government contracting, as they did during the 1980s and early 1990s. Contract management capacity is an important determinant of local government contracting.

Collaborative Performance Measurement: Examining and Explaining the Prevalence of Collaboration in State and Local Government Contracts

Viewing collaboration as an imperative for public managers, scholars are calling for a better understanding of its origins, prevalence, and impact on organizational performance. The objective of this study is to explore the prevalence and the determinants of collaboration pursued in the course of monitoring government contracts. The theoretical framework proposed in this study explores the effect of several categories of collaboration determinants pertaining to government agencies, contractors, contractual relationships, services, and markets. Data were collected using semi-structured interviews administered to 69 state and local contract managers as well as nonprofit and for-profit contractors in five jurisdictions. Qualitative analysis identifies a variety of collaborative strategies used by agencies seeking vendors’ input and by vendors proposing and negotiating performance monitoring arrangements. Regressions analysing the determinants of collaboration suggest that the latter is more often pursued by nonprofit contractors and vendors with a unique expertise and higher resource dependency. Governments with advanced in-house professional capacity and willingness to collaborate are also more likely to rely on the contractors’ input. Meanwhile, high service measurability, long-term relationships, and dynamic markets reduce the likelihood of collaboration. This study suggests that collaborative performance evaluation presents both challenges and opportunities for effective contract implementation. The responsibilities of monitoring officers appear to extend beyond specifying and enforcing performance standards—they require the skills and motivation to empower contractors and to learn from their input and the professional capacity to evaluate their

Minority Business Bidding for Local Government Contracts: The Complexity of Availability

SUMMARY While minority-business enterprises (MBEs) have gained some access to local government contracts during the last three decades, these firms continue to receive a small share of local government contract spending relative to the number of available firms. Researchers have suggested two general explanations for the low representation of MBEs in contract awards: (1) lack of qualifications and capacity among MBEs, and (2) public and private discrimination against MBEs in contracting processes. This study on prime contract opportunities in a Northern central city and county with a large minority population finds that low bid rates greatly contribute to the low MBE shares of prime contracts and that bidding is reduced by both local government processes and characteristics of the firms. Some implications of these findings are that local governments need to: (1) monitor MBE shares of prime contract bids by size of contract and use share of bids as one measure of program and organizational effectiveness; (2) identify MBEs that are qualified for prime contracts and encourage and help interested firms to submit competitive bids; and (3) ensure that local government policies and practices do not diminish access to information about prime contract opportunities for qualified and interested minority firms. Another implication is that bidders lists should not be a primary basis for determining MBE availability, since many qualified and interested MBEs do not bid because of perceived barriers in local government.

Racial and Ethnic Disparities in SSRI Availability in Substance Abuse Treatment

Racial and Ethnic Disparities in SSRI Availability in Substance Abuse Treatment

From Bilateral to Trilateral Governance in Local Government Contracting in France

In France, the tradition of contracting out local public services has been predominantly one of partnership and co-operation rather than competition and antagonism. However, in recent years the traditional approach has come under intense criticism, something which has far-reaching implications for public-private governance. Adopting the socio-legal approach to the study of contract governance set out by Peter Vincent-Jones, this paper explores the discrepancy between descriptions of a traditional French approach to local public services governance, in which the bilateral values of trust and co-operation are emphasized, and a new discourse of local public services governance, which argues for detailed contract planning and close contract monitoring. It is argued that this discrepancy reveals the beginning of a shift in the governance of public service exchange relationships from relatively noncontractual and bilateral to relatively contractual and trilateral. The French case highlights the importance of regulatory and accountability frameworks to the manner in which contracting parties perceive exchange governance. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.

Privatization and Its Reverse: Explaining the Dynamics of the Government Contracting Process

Empirical evidence shows local government contracting is a dynamic process that includes movements from public delivery to markets and from market contracts back to in-house delivery.This ‘‘reversecontracting’’reflectsthe complexityofpublicserviceprovisionin aworld where market alternatives are used along with public delivery. We develop a methodology to link responses to national surveys and create a longitudinal data set that captures the dynamics of the contracting process. We present a framework that incorporates principal agent problems, government management, monitoring and citizen concerns, and market structure. Our statistical analysis finds government management, monitoring, and principal agent problems to be most important in explaining both new contracting out and contracting back-in. Professional managers recognize the importance of monitoring and the need for public engagement in the service delivery process. The results support the new public service that argues public managers do more than steer a market process; they balance technical and political concerns to secure public value.

Managing the contract: A transaction cost analysis of externalisation

This paper examines the externalisation of the London Borough of Ealing's Technical Services Group between 1994 and 1999, the first local government Technical Services function to be externalised as a whole. The case is discussed in the light of transaction cost theory from economics. The study illustrates the difficulties that arise under local authority competitive tendering where the parties enter into an incomplete contract and rely on mutual goodwill to adjust the contract terms later. The study confirms that transaction costs can be pervasive in local government contracting.

THE NOTTINGHAM EXPRESS TRANSIT PFI PROJECT.

The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was launched in 1992 with the stated aim of delivering higher quality and more cost-effective public services. Since that time, procedural changes (the 1997 Bates Review and the Local Government (Contracts) Act), together with a realization that other capital funding was unavailable, have resulted in a growing list of local authority projects competing for PFI resources. The proposed Nottingham Express Transit (NET) system has developed through this period of change and the procurement of NET Line 1 is the largest local authority promoted PFI project in the UK. This paper describes the public-private partnership arrangements from concept to contract. The size and complexity of the Nottingham project has made it a significant pathfinder for PFI in the local authority sector, highlighting issues which have been at the forefront of developing practice.

Contract Service Firms in Local Authorities: Evolving Geographies of Activity

REIMER S. (1999) Contract service firms in local authorities: evolving geographies of activity, Reg. Studies 33 , 121-130. The introduction of compulsory competitive tendering has significantly reshaped the nature of manual service provision in local authorities. Since 1989, private firms have won an increasing share of contracts, particularly within the cleaning and catering sectors. The paper evaluates the activities of large national and multinational companies, and both considers the reasons why such firms have taken on local government contracts, and examines decisions to bid for contracts in particular places. It is suggested that cleaning and catering firms have been influenced by perceptions about the political control of local authorities and by the shape of the management structures of firms' existing contracts. The paper indicates that a previous north-south split in tendering patterns has been replaced by more complex geographies of private sector activity. REIMER S. (1999) Les prestataires des services aux administrations locales: des géographies d'activité en pleine évolution, Reg. Studies 33 , 121-130. L'introduction de la mise en adjudication compétitive obligatoire d'un contrat a sensiblement modifié la prestation des services manuels aux administrations locales. Depuis 1989, les entreprises privées remportent une proportion de plus en plus importante des contrats, notamment au sein des secteurs du nettoyage et de la restauration. Cet article cherchè a évaluer les activités des grandes entreprises nationales et multinationales, et considère les raisons pour lesquelles de telles entreprises ont passé contrat avec les administrations locales, et examine pourquoi, dans des endroits particuliers, elles ont décidé de faire une soumission. On laisse supposer que les entreprises de nettoyage et de restauration ont été influencées par l'idée qu'elles se font du pouvoir politique des administrations locales et par la structure de la gestion des contrats actuels des entreprises. Cet article laisse voir le remplacement d'un clivage nord/sud antérieur quant à la répartition des offres par des géographies plus complexes de l'activité du secteur privé. REIMER S. (1999) Vertraglich verpflichtete Dienstleistungsfirmen in der Ortsverwaltung: aufkommende Unternehmensgeographien, Reg. Studies 33 , 121‐130. Die Einführung obligatorischen Einholens miteinander konkurrierender Angebote hat in Ortsverwaltungen eine wesentliche Umstellung in von Hand ausgeführten Dienstleistungen ergeben. Seit 1989 sind zunehmend Verträge mit Privatfirmen abgeschlossen worden, besonders auf dem Gebiet der Reinigungsarbeiten und der Lieferung von Speisen und Getränken. Dieser Aufsatz beurteilt die Tätigkeiten großer überregionaler und internationaler Gesellschaften, und zieht nicht nur in Betracht, warum solche Firmen Verträge mit Ortsverwaltungen abschließen, sondern untersucht auch die Beschlüsse, sich um Verträge an bestimmten Orten zu bemühen. Es wird unterstellt, daß sowohl Reinigungs- als auch Speisen und Getränke liefernde Firmen von Vorstellungen der politischen Gewalt der Ortsverwaltungen und von der Form der Leistungsstrukturen bereits abgeschlossener Verträge der Firma bestimmt werden. Der Aufsatz weist darauf hin, daß die ehemalige Nord/Südteilung der Vertragsmuster einer komplexeren Geographie der Unternehmen des Privatsektors gewichen ist.

Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997

Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997