As researchers strive to develop more complete models of human memory, one benchmark used to measure the adequacy of the models has been the degree to which they can account for mirror effects observed in simple verbal learning paradigms. An example of a mirror effect is the word-frequency mirror effect (Glanzer & Adams, 1985, 1990; Glanzer, Adams, Iverson, & Kim, 1993), which refers to the phenomenon that the hit rate (correct recognition judgments for presented items) is higher for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words (e.g., Balota & Neely, 1980; Gorman, 1961; Kinsbourne & George, 1974; McCormack & Swenson, 1972; Schulman, 1967), whereas the false-alarm rate (spurious recognition judgments for items not studied) is higher for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words (e.g., Glanzer & Adams, 1985, 1990; Glanzer et al., 1993). When hits and false alarms are plotted with word frequency on the abscissa, the functions are mirror images—hence the name. One class of models that has strived to account for mirror effects such as the word-frequency mirror effect is referred to as global memory models (e.g., Hilford, Glanzer, & Kim, 1997; Hintzman, 1994; Hirshman, 1995; Kim & Glanzer, 1993; Maddox & Estes, 1997; McClelland & Chappell, 1998). These models involve a single process and, in their basic form, assume that the memory strength or familiarity of an item is the factor that affects recognition memory. For these models to account for the word-frequency mirror effect, they often require the postulation of auxiliary assumptions such as differential stimulus salience and different response criteria for different word classes (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Hintzman, 1988) or differential attention during encoding to words of different frequency classes (e.g., Glanzer & Adams, 1990; Glanzer, Adams, & Iverson, 1991). A competing account for these memory effects comes from dual-process models (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980; Reder et al., 2000; Yonelinas, 1994). Reder et al. (2000) proposed a formal dual-process account for the word-frequency mirror effect. The account is embedded within the SAC (source of activation confusion) theory of memory. The SAC account of the word-frequency mirror effect also makes novel predictions concerning the pattern of “remember” and “know” judgments as a function of word frequency. The computer simulation based on the theory closely fitted individual subject “remember”–“know” data as well as “old”–“new” responses as a function of normative and experimental word frequency. SAC has also been used to account for other phenomena such as feeling of knowing, strategy selection, and the misinformation effect (Ayers & Reder, 1998; Reder & Schunn, 1996; Schunn, Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Richards, & Stroffolino, 1997). It is also being extended to account for other mirror effects such as list length and list strength (Cary & Reder, 2001). One of the goals of our study was to test whether the SAC account of the memory effect would be confirmed using artificial stimuli, that is, pseudowords of different prefamiliarization.