ABSTRACT In recent years, a wide gender gap has emerged both in voting and in political ideology among young voters in a number of countries, with young women more likely to vote for left-wing and socially liberal parties than young men. The width of the gap, disproportionate in comparison with older generations, challenges explanations that propose (gradual) structural change. Using British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 27–29 around the UK's 2024 election, I estimate Generalized Additive Models (GAM) on Mokken-derived economic and cultural ideology scales. I find that the gender gap among the young is limited to issues of culture and identity, not economics. These results are consistent with conjunctural, gendered dynamics in the salience and framing of these issues and not fully consistent with a purely gradual, structural account.

One China Policy stifles Taiwan's efforts to achieve independence. Before 2016, Taiwan did not show hostility towards China. For instance, the Kuomintang Party and the Chinese Communist Party signed the 1992 Consensus in an effort to reunify Taiwan and China. However, when the Democratic Progressive Party won power, Taiwan adopted a policy direction that firmly rejected any form of Taiwan-China reunification. As a result, relations between the two countries deteriorated further, notably due to increased military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Against this backdrop, this study analyzes Taiwan's response to China's military security threats from 2016 to 2020. Specifically, it uses secondary data from the Taiwanese and Chinese Ministries of Defense, as well as previous similar studies. The balance of threat theory is applied to examine the rationalization of Taiwan's policy on increasing military capabilities from 2016 to 2020. The research method used is the process tracing technique in deductive qualitative case studies. The results of this study indicate that Taiwan does not trust China and therefore rejects all attempts at Taiwan-China reunification. The election of Tsai Ing-wen from the Progressive Democratic Party, the Taiwanese people's perception of their identity as citizens of Taiwan, and international support for Taiwan as a counterbalance to Chinese communism are some of the factors behind Taiwan's rejection of reunification with China. Furthermore, Taiwan has chosen to balance its position by increasing its military capabilities and diversifying its economy to reduce China's dominance

For many years, the so-called "Taiwan problem" has seriously complicated the development of relations between the PRC and the Republic of China (Taiwan). At the same time, the two main political parties of Taiwan (the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party – DPP) see its solution differently: the Kuomintang seeks to revive the Republic of China, while the DPP – to create an independent Republic of Taiwan. To succeed in this rivalry, they seek to change the macropolitical identity of the island’s inhabitants in accordance with their party preferences. In this work the authors studied the transcripts of speeches given by Kuomintang representative Ma Ying-jeou during his presidency (2008–2016) in order to assess the nature and effectiveness of the discursive policy pursued by him for this purpose. Based on the results of the research, it is concluded that during this period the attempts made by the leadership of the Kuomintang party to change the macropolitical identity of the inhabitants of Taiwan in the direction of "Sinicization" were not very effective.

The paper analyzes the composition of the most recent Lithuanian Parliament, elected in 2024, according to criteria such as social class, age, gender, and education. It also compares the current parliament with the previous one, which was formed following the 2020 legislative elections. Both legislatures have completely different parliamentary majorities. In 2020, the center-right Conservatives won the elections and formed a coalition with two minor liberal parties. Meanwhile, in 2024, the pendulum swung to the left, with the center-left Social Democrats achieving a major victory. Thus, the paper aims to investigate whether notable differences exist in the composition of these parliaments regarding the aforementioned criteria. The social-class identity of the members of parliament (MPs) is established by applying Daniel Oesch's conceptual model. We conclude that the consecutive Lithuanian parliaments, as well as the representatives of major political parties despite their rival ideologies, do not differ significantly in terms of social class, gender, age, and other socio-demographic parameters. This may signify similar mechanisms of elite recruitment across the political spectrum. Finally, we examine whether this pattern is observed in other contemporary European democracies.

This study analyzes the political speeches of Brazilian federal representatives from the Liberal Party (PL), the primary platform for Bolsonarism, to identify patterns and features of conspiracy theories. Two core concepts are used: conspiracy theories as a worldview that addresses unpredictability and complexity of life in contemporary society, and Bolsonarism as a fundamentally conspiracist worldview grounded in reactionary authoritarianism and populism. Analyzing speeches delivered between 2019 and 2024, our inductive methodology identified both epistemological (logic) and narrative (rhetoric) elements. These individual elements organically integrated to form a pervasive, overarching conspiracy theory that we term “The Grand Collusion”. This theory was strategically deployed to support electoral campaigns and structure political opposition to the Lula government. “The Grand Collusion” alleges a vast alliance between the top echelons of the Judiciary (led by STF Minister Alexandre de Moraes) and the Brazilian Left (led by Lula), with assistance from major media and multilateral organizations. Its alleged objectives include rigging the 2022 elections and orchestrating the systematic persecution and censorship of Right-wing politicians and conservative citizens.

Background: This article explores the dominant narratives shared on Facebook by key actors of the Truckers’ Convoy from January 22 to February 23, 2022. Analysis: Using a qualitative content analysis on a novel dataset of the top-performing communications by the eight most followed public Convoy pages and groups on Facebook, we first identified 27 categories of shared information and then manually coded them. Conclusions and implications: Content that gained the most traction tapped broader themes of solidarity with the movement as well as discontent toward the Canadian government, the Liberal Party, and the mainstream media. Our findings provide a systematic look at the Convoy’s common values, beliefs, and self-perceptions, deepening an understanding of the movement’s political implications for the Canadian environment.

Pierre Trudeau’s victory in the 1980 election saw him returned to power and ready to undertake an ambitious agenda, including the establishment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which continues to shape Canada. Yet Trudeau had been defeated a year prior and was on his way out of politics, seemingly for good. This article explores that rapid turnaround through the work of Keith Davey, a Liberal Party strategist who helped convince Trudeau to return to the Liberal leadership following the defeat of the Clark government and then executed a unique strategy that saw Trudeau win re-election by minimizing his public profile. Based on extensive research in Davey’s archival records, this article argues that the 1980 election provides a glimpse into key trends in recent Canadian political history, such as the rising centralization of power around the party leader, unhappiness with that centralization in the broader party, a resurgence of Canadian economic nationalism shortly before it would be overtaken by neoliberalism, and an increasingly tense relationship between the Liberal Party and Western Canada.

The article analyzes the attitude towards the idea of constitutional reform, which was implied by the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, in relation to the period from October to December of the same year, on the part of Nicholas II, his closest associates, Prime Minister Count S.J. Witte, his cabinet and the leaders of the liberal and conservative parties. The author concludes that if the tsar and representatives of the bureaucratic elite, as well as the Octobrists, were supporters of the monarch’s constitution, then the Cadets, who dominated the last All-Russian Congress of Zemstvo and City Leaders, and the Black Hundreds, for opposite reasons opposed this.

Tensions between China and Taiwan have escalated, particularly during President Tsai’s tenure. Following World War II, China endured the Chinese Civil War between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The KMT’s defeat in 1949 marked the end of the conflict, after which it retreated to Taiwan and became an opponent force to Beijing. Since then, Cross-Strait relations have remained tense. Under President Tsai, the issue has become more apparent as she consistently rejects China’s reunification agenda while strengthening Taiwan’s ties with Southeast Asian countries and the United States (U.S.) in particular. This paper also adopts a qualitative desktop research, relying on secondary data collection method which includes treaties, white papers, policy documents, defense reports, and news articles. This paper is also significance because Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) prioritizes safeguarding Taiwan’s autonomy and democratic values and the Kuomintang (KMT) advocates for closer ties with China. Concurrently, scholarly attention to the contemporary dynamics of Cross-Strait relations remains insufficient. Existing studies often focus on outdated analyses, such as the deficiencies in Taiwan’s 2012 elections, rather than the policies and developments under Tsai Ing-wen’s administration (2016–2024). Therefore, this paper examines China-Taiwan relationship during Tsai’s presidency demonstrates the significance of defending Taiwan’s democracy and maintaining its status quo as an autonomous territory within China.

This article explores the parliamentary debates held during the First Session of the Thirteenth Ordinary National Assembly (November 2, 1903 – January 25, 1904), which focused on the policy of the People's Liberal Party government during the Ilinden– Preobrazhenie Uprising of 1903. The central debate on the national question concerned whether Bulgaria should adopt a more independent foreign policy in seeking a resolution, or continue to rely on the goodwill of the Great Powers.

This study investigates the delegitimization strategies employed by Civic‎ Platform, Poland’s largest liberal party, in its portrayal of political opponents ‎during the 2023 parliamentary campaign. By analyzing nine election ads, the‎ paper explores how the formation constructs its political opponents, employing ‎specific semiotic and multimodal strategies to delegitimize the then ruling ‎Law and Justice. The study integrates Bar-Tal’s model of delegitimization to‎ assess the party’s strategic messaging and examines the role of disparaging humor ‎in shaping political legitimacy. The findings reveal that Civic Platform’s‎ campaign frames Law and Justice politicians as incompetent caricatures or‎ lawbreakers harmful to Polish citizens. In particular, Jarosław Kaczyński, the ‎party’s leader, is depicted as inherently malevolent and driven by personal‎ vendettas. The analysis highlights a diverse range of semiotic choices used to ‎construct political adversaries and uncovers striking parallels between Polish ‎liberal discourse and far-right rhetoric, particularly in the use of racial stereotypes ‎against immigrants and in reliance on emotional arguments. These‎ insights emphasize the need for a broader approach to politically-oriented discourse‎ analysis that accounts for ideological overlaps and the strategic use of‎ humor in political communication.‎‎

ABSTRACT Since late 2015, the successive Justin Trudeau Liberal governments have enacted significant social policy expansion, including the adoption of new programs or the expansion of existing social policies in areas such as childcare, dental care, family benefits, old‐age security, and income support for the working poor. This expansion came as a surprise to many political observers and contrasts with the era of “permanent austerity” (Paul Pierson) that has characterized social policies in advanced democracies since the early 1980s. Why did the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) under Justin Trudeau proceed to such significant social policy expansion? In this paper, we argue that this social policy expansion can be explained by an alignment of electoral interests, institutions, and ideas. Most importantly, we show that the LPC's program drifted towards the left to resemble the NDP's platforms in 2015 and to attract voters that demanded more spending after a decade of conservative governments. We contend that this expansionary dynamic was also facilitated by the presence of vertical fiscal imbalance, which exacerbated public demand for social policy expansion as a response to provincial inaction and helped the federal government to fund its social policy expansion by deficits rather than higher taxes. Finally, from an ideational standpoint, we argue that the policy consensus shifted from neoliberal budget restraint to an emphasis on fighting inequality and stimulating demand.

Abstract Historians disagree about how best to conceptualize nineteenth‐century British Liberalism in relation to its international contexts. This article argues that we can better understand the patterns involved by interrogating individuals who bridged the worlds of partisan politics and elaborated thought. The article centres around Mountstuart Elphinstone Grant Duff (1829–1906), whom it identifies as the Liberal parliamentary party's most ambitious interpreter of global and imperial order in the 1860s and 1870s. It suggests that Grant Duff's highly intellectualized and internationally minded ‘philosophic Liberalism’ was aimed at energizing the fractious Gladstonian coalition, and at helping Liberals see themselves as part of a global progressive tide, running against the false and losing cause of Conservatism. The article contends that Grant Duff's case opens up new questions about how British Liberals situated themselves in relation to counterpart foreign liberalisms, as well as having wider methodological implications for the study of nineteenth‐century international thought.

Abstract At the June 2024 European election, the soft Eurosceptic party that comes closest to the definition of right‐wing populist in Luxembourg, the Alternative Democratic Reform Party, won one of the six seats for the first time in its history and joined the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European Parliament. Despite suffering limited losses in its vote share, the Liberal party (Democratic Party/ Demokratesch Partei) only came out third in the election, behind the Christian Socials (Christian‐Social People's Party/ Chrëschtlech‐Sozial Vollekspartei ) and the Socialists (Luxembourg Socialist People's Party/ Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Aarbechterpartei ), and lost its second seat in the European Parliament. The DP had received the largest electoral support in the 2019 European election and remained a coalition partner in government after the 2023 national election.

Abstract The stalemate over the Cyprus question persisted in 2024. Apart from a single informal dinner between the two Cypriot leaders and the UN Secretary‐General in New York, there was no meaningful dialogue—let alone any formal negotiations—despite the efforts of UN Envoy María Holguín, whose tenure ended in the summer of 2024. On the domestic front, within the Greek‐Cypriot‐dominated Republic of Cyprus, the year was marked by the European Parliament election where a YouTuber—Fidias Panayiotou—became third behind the conservative Democratic Rally (25 per cent), which maintained its two Members of the European Parliament (MEPS), and the communist party the Progressive Party of Working People (22 per cent), which lost one of its two MEPs. In the northern part of the island, the de‐facto state Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 2024 witnessed a fake diploma and fraud scandal at a Turkish Cypriot university that reignited the debate on the problems in the Turkish Cypriot higher education sector. Internationally, Cyprus strengthened ties with the US via President Christodoulides’ White House visit.

Abstract Following several years of opinion polling decline, Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) sought to draw a line under successive scandals with the election of a new leader, Shigeru Ishiba. However, the LDP‐led coalition went on to lose its majority in the lower house for the first time since 2012 in the snap election that Ishiba immediately called, leaving him at the head of a minority government. The ruling party also faced internal divisions over his decision to exclude members implicated in scandals from candidate lists in the election. The Democratic Party for the People, formerly a rump party left over following mergers among mainstream opposition groupings, surged in this election, gaining significant attention for party leader Yuichiro Tamaki, while new far‐right parties also made minor gains in the lower house for the first time.

Abstract In this article, I center substantial improvement in subnational democracy in the U.S. states as an object of inquiry and seek to explain it. I theorize that strong unions, high Democratic Party control of state government, an especially liberal Democratic Party, a large population of people of color, and a particularly liberal public mood may each contribute to substantial improvement in democratic quality. Using Coincidence Analysis (CNA), a configurational causal method, I assess the evidence for my hypotheses. The CNA identifies three alternative paths to substantial improvement in electoral democracy in the states. The results of my analysis highlight that substantial improvement in electoral democracy is the product of political struggle centrally involving unions and the Democratic Party.

Abstract This study examines the role of fear in the narratives developed by the European People's Party, the Party of European Socialists and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe during the 2009, 2014, 2019 and 2024 European Parliament elections. The research investigates whether the politics of fear is an exclusive prerogative of Eurosceptic‐illiberal parties or whether fear is equally deployed by Europarties that endorse pro‐European stances and hold positions of power within EU institutions. Drawing on emotion discourse analysis, the findings demonstrate that emotional politics and the politics of fear, whilst often associated with Euroscepticism and populism, can also be mobilised to promote European integration and legitimise EU politics. Highlighting the need for further research, the study underscores the centrality of fear in EU party politics and emphasises the role of mainstream Europarties as agents within the EU's emotional community.

This article analyzes President Biden’s 2024 executive order banning asylum for undocumented immigrants, along with other similar examples of U.S. Democratic Party rhetoric, as emblematic of a latent fascist stance within the ostensibly liberal Democratic Party. Employing Alberto Toscano’s conception of late fascism, I contend that the border rhetoric of U.S. Democrats has long evinced a fascist discourse that uses the supposed threat of the immigrant body to retrench the conditions of capitalism. As I argue, this political disposition, rather than representing an overt challenge to Donald Trump and the increasingly xenophobic GOP (U.S. Republicans), has brought the parties into alignment and helped inaugurate a new era of ascendant nativism and racist violence.

Throughout the 2025 Australian election campaign, the Liberal Party and its then leader Peter Dutton flirted with Trump-style rhetoric and Trumpian alignment became a perceived narrative in some Australian media. The current research uses framing analysis to examine how imported echoes and parallels of Trumpian populist aesthetic are identified and portrayed – amplified, challenged or neutralized – in Australian political and media discourse. This study first conducts a thematic analysis of Trump’s Truth Social posts to identify archetypal populist rhetoric. It then analyses how three Australian media outlets with varying ideological alignments and some of the highest online audience reach in Australia – the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), the Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian – framed the employment of Trumpian populist features by Australian politicians, particularly Dutton. This article demonstrates that Dutton’s rhetorical echoes and parallels of Trumpian populist style were represented as a miscalculation and opportunism or as a threat or as a tool to stoke division or as the product of incompetence.