Liberal Equality Research Articles

Safeguarding Fundamental Rights: Judicial Incursion into Legislative Authority

This article claims that congressional authority over civil rights is linked to an American rights-based tradition. It traces that tradition from the Revolution, through Reconstruction, and onto today. Contrary to scholars like Rogers Smith and Larry Yackle, I claim that a fairly stable national ethos, which can be traced to the founding documents, has played a vital role in centuries of civil rights development. The principle of liberal equality, lying at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment, is essential to developing national civil rights policies. Part II of the article discusses the concepts of liberty and equality during the revolutionary period. Emphasis is given to the early understanding of the national statements of purpose in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution. That part also discusses the constitutional compromises that failed to achieve the stated ends of national government. Part III turns to several abolitionist views on the existence of a national obligation to protect rights. Those constitutional theories became influential during debates on the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, which granted Congress the power to pass laws securing rights intrinsic to national citizenship against arbitrary abuses. Debates on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the subjects of Part IV, made the principle of equal rights enforceable through federal statutes. As Part V recounts, the Court variously restrained the reach of new congressional powers. The article concludes, in part VI, with a critique of recent Supreme Court decisions, such as United States v. Morrison and Board of Trustees v. Garrett, which have further limited congressional civil rights authority.

CARTOGRAPHY OF GENDER EQUALITY PROJECTS IN ICT: Liberal equality from the perspective of situated equality

This paper examines gender equality activities in the context of information and communication technology (ICT), traces the social and cultural relations that intertwine with them and discusses the understandings of gender, equality and ICT maintained in them. The aim of the paper is to analyse how liberal equal treatment actions prevail in ICT, although it is well known that liberal politics alone do not succeed in promoting gender equality, and not even in fulfilling its own goal of raising the proportions of women in technology. The study is based on oral history interviews with 30 women who have committed important parts of their lives to gender equality activities through several decades, as well as follow-up studies of women's ICT groups that aimed to promote equality in ICT expertise, both of these studies being conducted in Finland. The interviewed gender equality workers are competent promoters of gender and equality. However, they need to negotiate their aims, for example, in order to get funding, within national and transnational institutional practices, with actors who have little knowledge regarding the social construction of gender, equality or ICT. The managerial terms ‘efficiency’ and ‘good practice’ then take over the understandings of the gender equality activities in ICT, mainly organized as projects, and further emphasize the measurable goals often linked to liberal gender equality actions. These terms have material consequences and while gender equality projects continue to provide possibilities for unexpected changes, they are locked within liberal politics.

Lesbian and gay fostering and adoption in the United Kingdom

Since the 1980s, the fostering and adoption of children by lesbians and gay men in the United Kingdom has gained considerable acceptance in legislation and policy. This paper traces these changes, particularly those occurring during the New Labour period of 'liberal equality'. Despite this progress, as evidenced by the backlash from some leaders of the religious and political right, it is argued that prejudice continues. Within this context of new opportunities, but continued prejudice, this paper identifies two important areas for adoptive parents, foster carers and social work practitioners: firstly, the challenges that might confront gay and lesbian young people and secondly, the process by which gay and lesbian people are assessed as potential carers by fostering and adoption agencies.

Is Gay Parenting Bad for Kids? Responding to the ‘Very Idea of Difference’ in Research on Lesbian and Gay Parents

This article examines the claim that children of lesbians and gay men are different to those of heterosexuals, particularly in their gender and sexual identity. The author considers two examples, a UK Christian discourse opposed to all forms of lesbian and gay parenting and a US liberal equality approach, represented by the work of Stacey and Biblarz (2001). Both, the author argues, treat difference as a thing acquired by children. This article examines and disputes the ways in which this idea of difference is achieved, and proposes that treating gender and sexuality as measurable outcomes is highly problematic. The author argues for research that asks how contemporary discourses of sexuality actually maintain the very idea that lesbian and gay families are different.

Time, social justice and UK welfare reform

While analyses of time have never strayed too far away from those of social justice, and vice versa, this article's premise is that they have so far failed to converge as directly and coherently as they might. The aim of this article is to facilitate a greater degree of convergence by working within a framework of liberal equality and establishing similarities in the work of the two theorists who have gone furthest in bringing the various debates together. These are Robert Goodin and André Gorz, and the article explores the respective strengths and weaknesses of their ideas. A liberal theory of socio-temporal justice is derived from their work and is then used to critique some recent developments in UK welfare reform.

Thurgood Marshall's pursuit of equality through law

Thurgood Marshall (1908–1993) profoundly shaped the direction and success of the American civil rights struggle. Joining the staff of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1936, he headed its Legal Defense and Educational Fund from 1939 until 1961, subsequently becoming a federal appeals court judge, Solicitor General, and Justice of the US Supreme Court. Marshall was more an egalitarian integrationist than a pluralist and deployed the law in pursuit of this moral objective. Although tolerant of the Communist Party in the 1930s and 1940s, he supported anti‐communism in the 1950s as a means of gaining significant support for black civil rights from the federal government. On the Supreme Court, Marshall sought to extend equality not only to African Americans but also to women, gays and the poor. Flexible and pragmatic, Marshall viewed the law as a means to an end, and the relevant end, or ideal, for him was liberal equality.

THE VALUE OF COMMUNITY, OR HOW BURKE COMPROMISES DWORKIN

The import and intentions of Ronald Dworkin's work are fairly grand. Dworkin does not propose a plain theory of law. Indeed, his theory of law is one part of a grand architectonic that also encompasses a theory of liberal equality and an important discussion of community. Though it is the last component that this essay is most interested in, it is impossible to consider one part in isolation from the others. Dworkin believes that community can serve as a go-between for authority and autonomy; or, to use a different rubric, community can explain and justify obligation. The authority must present a legal system that is true to the value of integrity. If a legal system displays integrity, the political community becomes amenable to personification. Personification of the community allows for the formation of feelings of veneration and attachment towards it. These feelings are critical to the well-being of the individual. Hence if authority abides by the demands of community, it deserves allegiance from the individual. The tension between authority and autonomy is in this manner resolved.

Millian Radical Democracy: Education for Freedom and Dilemmas of Liberal Equality

This paper returns to J. S. Mill to draw out democratic conceptions of education and equality that challenge still-current conceptions of intractable human inequalities. Mill acknowledges that individuals differ in abilities. Nonetheless, he develops a broad conception of ‘education for freedom’ and insists that only ‘wretched social arrangements’ prevent virtually all people from exercising capacities for self-government in citizenship, marriage, and industry. In the same breath, he qualifies his democratic egalitarianism with reference to a sub-class of working people whose ‘low moral qualities’ leave them unfit for such self-government. Modern liberal states largely dismiss Mill's more radical democratic impulse. Meanwhile, they reiterate and refine his exclusionary one through new practices for constructing and managing inequalities – for example, IQ tests, educational ‘tracking’, and social science categories like the ‘underclass’. I reconsider this divided legacy of Mill's egalitarianism as a basis for rethinking the limits of today's ‘meritocratic’ egalitarianism.

Defining Disability in Theory and Practice: A Critique of the British Disability Discrimination Act 1995

This article presents a theoretical critique of the employment provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) (1995), focusing on the definition of disability. It argues that the underpinning medical assumption of the statutory definition of disability is detrimental to the achievement of disability equality in the workplace and is problematic for practitioners and Employment Tribunals. In particular there are four areas of significant confusion arising from the need for medical evidence, the lack of congruence between managerial and legal definitions, the focus on the negative aspects of disability and the fact that disability is often hidden. By exploring these four themes and drawing on comparisons with the other equality laws, the article concludes that the definition of disability contained in the DDA (1995) contradicts many of the principles of the liberal equality framework that underpins it. Finally the article considers the public policy implications and suggests a new statutory approach.

Opportunity, responsibility and the market: interrogating liberal equality

This article scrutinizes the claim that liberal egalitarians are now the last real torchbearers for the principles of egalitarian reform. This claim might appear eccentric on the surface, but is increasingly common in leftist circles following the recent abandonment of such principles by formerly socialist parties. Programmes of 'social inclusion', for instance, are now widely criticized for substituting a desire to tackle economic inequalities with an incitement for us to become obedient, productive citizens. Focusing here on the claim that liberal egalitarians pose a radical alternative to this kind of discourse, I show that the real deficiencies of much liberal egalitarianism not only resemble but in many ways actually provide the sort of discourse within which parties like New Labour operate.

Regarding equality: rethinking contemporary theories of citizenship, freedom, and the limits of moral pluralism

Chapter 1 Strong Equality Chapter 2 Liberal Equality Chapter 3 Democratic Equality Chapter 4 Strong Pluralism and Moral Incommensurability Chapter 5 Agency and Equal Regard Chapter 6 Toward Responsive Regard

Liberal Equality and Ethics

Dworkin’s conception of distributive justice, equality of resources, requires equality in the distribution of impersonal resources and compensation for personal resource deficits, or their consequences, to be determined by a fair hypothetical insurance scheme. Among other things, that conception offers a recognizably liberal account of interpersonal comparison for the purposes of justice. Consider the envy test, for example. Dworkin cites the envy test as a test for equality in the distribution of impersonal resources, such as wealth, land, occupation, and material goods. The test is satisfied if no one prefers anyone else’s bundle of impersonal resources to her own. The attractions of the envy test within a liberal conception of equality are evident. First, it conforms to a widely held egalitarian view that an individual is disadvantaged if she enjoys less wealth than others because of the circumstances in which she lives (e.g., living in an area with less fertile land than others enjoy), rather than because of her ambitions. If Alice and Biff both hold the same goals but Alice faces a more propitious material environment in which to pursue hers, then both would prefer to be in her position. The envy test highlights those kinds of inequality as unjust.

Book Review: Rethinking Liberal Equality: From a "Utopian" Point of View

Book Review: Rethinking Liberal Equality: From a "Utopian" Point of View

Liberalism, Justice, and Markets: A Critique of Liberal Equality

This important new study presents a systematic and definitive critique of Ronald Dworkin's highly influential theory of liberal equality. Focusing on the connection Dworkin attempts to establish between economic markets and liberal egalitarian political morality, the study examines his contention that markets have an indispensable role to play in the articulation of liberal ideals of distributive justice, individual liberty, and state neutrality. Subjecting the central tenents of this theory to sustained critical analysis, the author argues that Dworkin's attempt to establish deep affinities between the market and equality is unsuccessful and his proposed solutions to some central controversies in political theory are seriously flawed. This powerful examination of the work of America's leading public philosopher reveals some timely lessons about the hazards and limitations of the market as a device for the articulation and realization of egalitarian justice.

Liberalism, Justice, and Markets: A Critique of Liberal Equality

1. Introduction 2. Initial Equality 3. Equality through Time 4. Disabilities 5. Unequal Talents 6. The Place of Liberty 7. Neutrality or Tolerance? 8. Conclusion

Rethinking Liberal Equality: From a “Utopian” Point of View. By Andrew Levine. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 140p. $32.50.

Rethinking Liberal Equality: From a “Utopian” Point of View. By Andrew Levine. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 140p. $32.50.

Liberalism, justice, and markets: a critique of liberal equality

This important new study presents a systematic and definitive critique of Ronald Dworkin's highly influential theory of liberal equality. Focusing on the connection Dworkin attempts to establish between economic markets and liberal egalitarian political morality, the study examines his contention that markets have an indispensable role to play in the articulation of liberal ideals of distributive justice, individual liberty, and state neutrality. Subjecting the central tenents of this theory to sustained critical analysis, the author argues that Dworkin's attempt to establish deep affinities between the market and equality is unsuccessful and his proposed solutions to some central controversies in political theory are seriously flawed. This powerful examination of the work of America's leading public philosopher reveals some timely lessons about the hazards and limitations of the market as a device for the articulation and realization of egalitarian justice.

Feminism and Punishment

aria Faye Tucker's L t-menielt, made shortly before she was killed by the state of Texas in 1998, undercuts the liberal feminist argument that one can be opposed to the death penalty and yet continue to hold that so long as the death penalty is imposed, it should be imposed equally on men and women. However, the target of Tucker's statement was not feminism, as we will see, but the one person who held her life in his hands, Governor George W Bush. Tucker is making a case not for liberal equality before the law but against capital punishment, her own in particular. Neither is she calling the state's legitimacy into question; to my knowledge, interviews with Tucker did not disclose any explicitly political claim against the state or any political motivations for her crime. While her comments were not explicitly political, I suggest that they were strategically aimed at Bush in the final contest over Karla Faye Tucker's life. In these brief comments, I consider gender as it bears in the strategic contest over the life of the condemned. It is impossible here to fully defend either treating capital punishment as a strategic contest or treating the significance of gender only within that contest. However, it is enough, I think, to realize that capital punishment is a contest in which the condemned often believe they have a chance to win. Moreover, like both Renee Heberle and Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, I understand capital punishment to be a discretionary system of decisions, conflicts, contests, and trials. That means there is always a chance to intervene in the process leading up to death. The condemned are vying for their lives; that is why law books are worth fighting for on the inside.' From death row, Mumia AbuJamal explains that jailhouse lawyers make up the largest group in disciplinary units because they are capable of using the law to alter prison condi-

Rethinking liberal equality: from a "utopian" point of view

Rethinking liberal equality: from a "utopian" point of view

Islam, immigration and group recognition1

Islam generally, and Muslim immigrant communities in particular, have recently been targeted for criticism by Western academics and in popular Western media. This article explores the substance of these criticisms and weighs them against the beliefs and practices of Muslim immigrants in Western liberal democracies. The article addresses three distinct questions. First, what sorts of cultural adaptations is it reasonable for liberal democratic states and societies to expect immigrants to make, and what kinds of adaptation is it unreasonable to demand? Second, how vulnerable are Islamic beliefs and practices to the criticisms commonly leveled against them in the name of liberal democracy and gender equality? Finally, how strong are the parallels between the claims for political recognition and accommodation that issue from immigrant cultural communities and the claims for recognition and inclusion that issue from groups that have historically been marginalized within liberal democratic societies? Although the authors do not dismiss the notion that there may be tensions between the core commitments of liberal democratic societies and some Islamic practices, they conclude that these tensions are exaggerated by Western writers. Muslim communities generally pose no greater challenge to liberal societies than do other religious and immigrant communities. Western writers should be chary of rejecting their claims to toleration and accommodation too swiftly.